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This dissertation examines the role of secret practices of opposition in 
the urban politics of Florence between 1340 and 1382. It is based on a wide 
variety of printed and archival sources, including chronicles, judicial records, 
government enactments, the records of consultative assemblies, statutes, 
chancery letters, tax records, private diaries and account books, and the ad 
hoc opinions (consilia) of jurists. Over the course of four chapters, it presents 
three major arguments: (1) Conspiracy, a central mechanism of political 
change and the predominant expression of political dissent in the city, 
remained primarily a function of the factionalism that had shattered the 
medieval commune, although it was now practiced not as open warfare but 
secret resistance. (2) Conspiracies were especially common when the city was 
ruled by popular governments, which faced almost constant conspiratorial 
resistance from elite factions that been expelled from the city or had had their 
political power restricted, while also inspiring increased worker unrest and 
secret labor organization. (3) Although historians have often located the 
origins of the “state” in the late medieval and early Renaissance cities of 
northern and central Italy, the prevalence of secret political opposition, the 
strength of conspirators and their allies, and the ability of conspiratorial 
networks, large worker congregations, and even powerful families to vie with 
weak regimes for power and legitimacy seriously calls this into question.
iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Robert Fredona graduated from Fenwick, a Dominican Catholic High 
School in Oak Park, Illinois, in 1996. He earned a B.A. with honors in history in 
2000 from the College of the University of Chicago, where he concentrated in 
medieval history and was advised by Julius Kirshner. At Cornell University, he 
studied medieval and Renaissance history and worked with John Najemy 
(major field adviser), as well as Paul Hyams, and Susanne Pohl before her 
departure from the University. Duane Corpis joined his committee after he 
began the dissertation. Before the completion of his thesis, Robert Fredona 
published (or had in press) several articles. He has also received a post-
doctoral fellowship at the Robbins Collection, an institute for legal history, in 
the University of California at Berkeley’s law school.
iv
Dedicated to my parents, Robert and Mary Fredona
vACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In order to undertake research in Italy, I was fortunate to receive 
extraordinarily generous funding from the bequest of Theodor E. Mommsen to 
the history department of Cornell University, as well as additional support in 
the form of a Sage Fellowship awarded by Cornell University in 2005, and a 
one-month research grant from the Renaissance Society of America in 2006. I 
also received a one-month Mellon fellowship to work at the Vatican Microfilm 
Library at St. Louis University in 2007. 
I am indebted to the archivists, staff, and directors of the Biblioteca 
Nazionale Centrale and the Archivio di Stato in Florence, where I undertook 
the vast majority of my research, for providing me daily with invaluable and 
kind assistance.
I also wish to thank the personnel at the following libraries in the United 
States and Italy where I did research: the Regenstein Library at the University 
of Chicago, the Newberry Library in Chicago, the Vatican Microfilm Library of 
St. Louis University, the Biblioteca Berenson at Villa I Tatti in Florence, and, 
especially, the John M. Olin Library at Cornell University and its extraordinary 
and unfailingly helpful staff.
I have also been helped immeasurably by a number of scholars: Paul 
Hyams (Cornell University) taught me a great deal about the law and carefully 
read the entire thesis, providing me with characteristically keen judgments and 
helpful suggestions; Osvaldo Cavallar (Nanzan University) offered me a 
rigorous and necessary critique of a draft of my final chapter; Vincenzo Colli 
(Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte) generously provided 
vi
me with microfilms and shared his vast knowledge of Baldo’s consilia; Anthony 
Molho (European University Institute) invited me into his circle of friends and 
scholars at Fiesole, and shared his deep understanding of Florentine history
and contemporary historiography; since I met him on my very first day in the 
archives, Lawrin Armstrong (Pontifical Institute, Toronto) has provided me with 
friendship and invaluable conceptual and practical advice; and Lauro Martines 
(University of California at Los Angeles, emeritus), for whom my respect is 
immense, has to my delightful surprise continued to supply me with the 
warmest possible encouragement.
Two scholars, in particular, have taught and guided me over the last 
decade: Julius Kirshner (University of Chicago, emeritus) introduced me to 
both the history of law and of Florence when I was an undergraduate and I 
have profited ever since from his incomparable erudition, thoughtfulness, and 
liberal assistance. John Najemy, my mentor and friend, taught me how to be a 
historian; it is to him that I owe my greatest debt as a scholar—one too large to 
ever be repaid. I can only hope to pay back some of that debt by following his 
example of incredible personal generosity, sensitivity, and scholarly rigor in my 
own career.  
Many colleagues and friends in Ithaca and in Italy made my research 
more pleasurable, but space sadly permits me to name only a few. In Ithaca: 
Ionuţ Epurescu-Pascovici and Yael Nadav-Manes. In Italy: Douglas Dow, 
Carol Nisbet, and Francesca Lidia Viano. In Ithaca and Italy: my dear friends 
Niall Atkinson and Alizah Holstein; I hope they all know how much their 
friendship has meant and continues to mean to me. While in Europe, I also 
profited from the kindness and generosity of three couples: Laura Battistoni 
vii
and Gabriele Griffini (in Florence), Carlo Augusto and Giorgia Viano (in Turin 
and Santa Margherita-Ligure), and Erik and Fernanda Reinert (in Venice and 
Norway). I would also like to thank my two brothers, Andrew and Joseph, and 
their families in Chicago, as well as my friends there, Matthew Norris and 
Anthony Vais. Finally, Sophus Reinert has been my best friend since I first met 
him in 2001; he has made this dissertation immeasurably better and made its 
writing immeasurably more fun. 
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Robert and Mary Fredona. 
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch iii
Dedication iv
Acknowledgments v
Table of Contents viii
List of Illustrations xi
List of Tables xii
List of Abbreviations xiii
Explanatory Notes xvi
Introduction 1
Faction, Opposition, and Conspiracy 1
The Vocabulary of Conspiracy 10
Organization and Argument 15
Chapter I: Political Conspiracy in Florence, 1340-1368 22
Elite and Magnate Conspiracies 22
The Bardi-Frescobaldi Plot of 1340 23
The Conspiracies against the Duke of Athens 34
The Corso Donati Plot of 1344 42
The Ricci-Magnate Plot of December 1360 51
Workers’ Conspiracies and Revolts 61
The Rebellion of Andrea Strozzi 63
The Tumultuous 1340s 69
The Grain Riot of 1368 79
ix
Chapter II: Conspiracy and the Tumult of the Ciompi 83
The Plots of June 1378 83
The Plots of July 1378 105
The Knights of the Ciompi 115
The Petitions of July 125
The Plots of August 1378 140
After the Tumult 147
Chapter III: Conspiracies against the Guild Government, 1379 152
The Good Friday Plot 158
The Plot of Giannozzo Sacchetti 165
The Attack at Figline 174
The Great Conspiracy of December 1379 181
The Roster of Guildsmen 214
Chapter IV: Baldo degli Ubaldi on Conspiracy and Treason (Crimen Laesae 
Maiestatis) in Late Trecento Florence 221
The Condemnation of Donato Barbadori 221
The Legal Issues 225
The Consilia 229
The Influence of Baldo’s Opinion 251
The Case of Tommasino da Panzano 259
Appendices 267
Appendix 1 267
xAppendix 2 272
Appendix 2a 274
Appendix 3 276
Appendix 4 279
Bibliography 287
xi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
I. Schematic of the Santa Maria Novella quarter of the Florentine contado circa 
1340, showing important towns and fortresses (page 28)
II. Map of the Arno River Valley east of Empoli circa 1340 (page 47)
xii
LIST OF TABLES
I. Personal provisions in Ciompi petitions, 1378 (pages 133-4)
II. Parte Guelfa leadership, petition and arson victims, and balìa participation, 
1378 (page 136)
III. Office-holding among the leaders of the Parte Guelfa, 1370-89 (in two 
parts, pages 201-02)      
xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Archival source abbreviations
ASF Archivio di Stato, Florence
Capitano Atti del Capitano del Popolo
CP Consulte e pratiche
CR Capitoli, registri
Esecutore Atti dell’Esecutore degli Ordinamenti di Giustizia
Missive Signori, missive (prima cancelleria)
Podestà Atti del Podestà 
PR Provvisioni, registri
Statuti Statuti del commune di Firenze
BCFL Biblioteca Capitolare Feliniana, Lucca
BNCF Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence
BAV Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vatican City
N.B.: The names of most fondi at the ASF are not abbreviated (e.g., Estimo, 
Prestanze, etc.) and full references are given for all manuscript sources not at 
the ASF. 
Printed source abbreviations
ACCIAIUOLI = Cronaca di Alamanno Acciaiuoli, in SCARAMELLA, pp. 13-34.
xiv
AGGIUNTE = Aggiunte anonime alla cronaca precedente (i.e., ACCIAIUOLI), pp. 
35-41, in SCARAMELLA.
ANONIMO = Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dall’ anno 1358 al 1389, ed. 
Alessandro Gherardi, in Cronache dei secoli XIII e XIV, ed. Marco Tabarrini 
(Florence: Cellini, 1876), pp. 207-588.
GIOVANNI VILLANI = Giovanni Villani, Nuova cronica, 3 volumes, ed. Giuseppe 
Porta (Parma: Fondazione Bembo, 1990-1).
MATTEO VILLANI = Matteo Villani, Cronica, ed. Francesco Gherardi Dragomanni
(Florence: Sansoni, 1846).
MONALDI = Diario del Monaldi, printed together with and in Istorie pistolesi 
ovvero delle cose avvenute in Toscana… (Prato: Guasti, 1835), pp. 495-528. 
NADDO = Croniche fiorentine di ser Naddo da Montecatini..., ed. Ildefonso di 
San Luigi, Delizie degli eruditi fiorentini, vol. 18 (Florence: Cambiagi, 1784).
SER NOFRI = Cronaca di ser Nofri di ser Piero delle Riformagioni, in 
SCARAMELLA, pp. 55-66.
PAGOLO = “Transcription de la chronique de Pagolo di Ser Guido, cimatore 
(ASF, Carte Strozziane, 2a serie, 59, ff. 98r-101r),” in Alessandro Stella, La 
révolte des ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail (Paris: EHESS, 1993), pp. 
271-5.
xv
SCARAMELLA = Il tumulto dei Ciompi: Cronache e memorie, ed. Gino 
Scaramella (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1934). 
SQUITTINATORE = Cronaca prima di Anonimo, in SCARAMELLA [known as the 
“Cronaca dello Squittinatore], pp. 73-102.
STEFANI = Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, ed. Niccolò 
Rodolico (Città di Castello: Lapi, 1903). 
Roman and canon law abbreviations
I use Theodor H. Mommsen, ed., Corpus iuris civilis, 3 volumes, 11th edition 
(Berlin, 1963-6) for the text of the Roman law; and I have employed the 
following abbreviations: D. = Digest or Pandects, I. = Institutes, and C. = 
Code; I always supply modern citations in parentheses in addition to the 
medieval citations, in which ff. = Digest. According to the medieval ordering, 
the Digest was divided into three parts: Digestum vetus (D. 1.1.1 to D.24.2), 
Infortiatum (D.24.3 to 38.17), and Digestum novum (D. 39.1 to 50.17). 
Authenticum is the medieval term for the Novellae constitutiones post 
Codicem. For the canon law, I have used Emil Freidberg, ed., Corpus iuris 
canonici, 2 volumes (Leipzig, 1879-81) and employed these abbreviations: D. 
= Gratian’s Decretum, X. = Liber Extra, or the decretals of Gregory IX, VI. = 
Liber Sextus, or the decretals of Boniface IX, and Clem. = Clementinae, or the 
decretals of Clement V.
xvi
EXPLANATORY NOTES
Dates
The Florentine year began on 25 March (Feast of the Annunciation). Modern 
dates will be given in the text, but, when needed for clarity in the notes, dates 
will be given in the Florentine style with the modern year in square brackets;
for example, 20 January 1355 [1356]. 
The staio
Commonly used to measure grain, the staio (pl. staia), in Latin sextarium (pl. 
sextaria) and sometimes starium (pl. staria), is equal to roughly 0.73 bushels 
or 26.5 liters, or about 6 dry gallons. 
The florin and the lira
The Florentines had two parallel monetary systems, the relative value of which 
were in nearly constant flux, namely the florin (fiorino, -i) and the lira (pl. lire), 
in Latin florenum and libra, both of which were divided into twenty soldi and 
subdivided into 240 denari, in Latin solidi and denarii. Florentines referred to 
the soldi and denari of the lira as “di piccioli”. 
1INTRODUCTION
Without a congregation, there is no city. 
There are both congregations of men 
and of affections in the heart. A 
congregation of evil men is called by two 
names in scripture: sedition or 
conspiracy. Sedition is an agreement of 
many men for evil. A city with evil 
affections in its heart has two peoples, 
iniquity and contradiction, as the psalm 
[54:10] says, “I have seen iniquity and 
contradiction in the city.” Conspirators 
and members of factions never have 
peace among themselves, because they 
do not exist without pride, since, as 
Solomon says in Proverbs 11[:2], 
“where pride is, there shall also be 
reproach.”1
—Thomas of Chobham
Faction, Opposition, and Conspiracy
Just as modern states in the West are judged by how efficiently they 
provide services, such as health and education, governments in medieval Italy 
were judged by how well they provided for the public peace. If the emerging 
early modern state, with all its anxieties and terrible contradictions, can be 
1 Sermones, Sermo XVII, ll. 23-32: “Non est autem civitas sine congregatione. 
Est autem congregatio hominum et est congregatio affectionum in corde. Congregatio 
autem malorum hominum in canonica scriptura duplex legitur, scilicet sedicio vel 
conspiratio. Sedicio est plurium consensus in malum. Civitas autem malarum 
affectionum in corde duos habet populos, scilicet iniquitatem et contradictionem, sicut 
legitur in psalmo: vidi iniquitatem et contradictionem in civitate. Conspiratores autem 
et factiosi numquam habent pacem inter se, quia sine superbia non sunt. Nam, sicut 
dicit Salomon in Proverbiis XIo: ubi fuerit superbia ibi erit et contumelia.” All 
translations, unless noted, are my own.
2signaled by invoking the title of a single book, the Leviathan of Hobbes, the 
free stato of late medieval and early renaissance Italy, with all its pretensions 
to symmetry and order, can be signaled by invoking another—the Defensor 
pacis (Defender of Peace) of Marsilius of Padua. Poets and chroniclers alike 
regularly meditated upon the causes of violence and discord, discovering 
always that the lack of peace resulted from a politics of faction or party. The 
chronicler Dino Compagni (d. 1324), who recorded the disastrous conflict of 
the White and Black Guelph factions in Florence, described factionalism as 
resulting from the gara di ufici: “enmity is born among you,” he says, “because 
of the competition for political offices and honors.”2 Looking even deeper, his 
contemporary Dante (d. 1321) seized upon the universal defects in man’s 
fallen nature: “pride, envy, and greed are / the three sparks that have set 
hearts on fire.”3 But the most read and discussed political thinkers of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, usually theologians, failed to say much if 
anything about the nature and practice of the gara di ufici, about factions or 
parties, or about political opposition at all. As such, it is not surprising that the 
image of medieval Italian politics often presented by historians of political 
thought and of the law has tended to be schematic and anachronistic, pre-
occupied with the “important” questions (papal and imperial power, the political 
rights of free cities, the nature and limits of kingship, etc.) and trapped in the 
teleological narrative of the transformation of the late medieval commune into 
the early modern state. Over the last thirty years, political historians have 
2 Dino Compagni e la sua cronica, ed. Isidoro del Lungo (Florence: Le 
Monnier, 1887), II.8, 161: “tra voi è nato alcuno sdegno per gara di ufici.”
3 Inferno, VI, 74-5: “Superbia, invidia, e avarizia sono / le tre faville c’hanno i 
cuori accesi.”  
3challenged former assumptions about pre-modern political communities, 
positing a radical disconnect between these normative discourses of politics 
and the actual practice of politics, revealing inchoate regimes founded upon 
networks of patronage and secured through pervasive practices of factional 
violence and exclusion. Only with the so-called commentators or post-
glossators of the fourteenth century, jurists like Bartolo da Sassoferrato (d. 
1357) and his student Baldo degli Ubaldi of Perugia (d. 1400), did political 
thinkers come to express the nature and practice of politics in the Italian cities 
as it was and not as it was hoped or imagined to be.   
Indeed, the politics of opposition in late medieval Italy are nowhere 
more clearly and brilliantly described than in the treatise On Guelphs and 
Ghibellines by Bartolo, which, together with three other tracts tied together 
metaphorically by the Tiber river, was probably intended as part of the pre-
eminent jurist’s ultimate statement on the practice of politics in central Italy.4
Contrary to the usual fashion of medieval political thinkers, Bartolo in the 
treatise revels in the ambiguity and fluidity of the terms Guelph and Ghibelline, 
describing them as simple placeholders devoid of ideological meaning: 
“today… we see many called Guelphs who are actually rebels against the 
Church, while many others called Ghibellines are rebels against the empire,” 
and explaining that the terms can now even signify the opposite of their 
traditional meaning; but, he continues, “in cities where there are divisions and 
4 De Guelphis et Gebellinis has been edited by Diego Quaglioni in Politica e 
diritto nel Trecento italiano: Il “De tyranno” di Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314–1357);
con l’edizione critica dei trattati “De Guelphis et Gebellinis,” “De regimine civitatis” e 
“De tyranno” (Florence: Olschki, 1983), 131-46 [cited as De Guelphis below]. For the 
structure of the multi-part work, see Osvaldo Cavallar’s important essay, “River of 
Law: Bartolo’s Tiberiadis (De alluvione),” in A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and 
Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain, ed. John A. Marino and Thomas 
Kuehn (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 31–82.
4factions, it is necessary that these parties be given some kind of name, so 
those names are applied because they are familiar.”5 The situation is such, 
Bartolo argues, “that one man can be [esse] a Guelph in one place and a 
Ghibelline in another.”6 A Guelph, then, is simply one “qui adheret et affectat 
statum illius partis que vocatur pars Guelpha,” who is a member and supporter 
of the regime of the party called the Guelf party, an expression that contains 
within it the root of one of Bartolo’s most exquisite terms for faction, affectio.7
In many cities “there are two parties, and one of them is governing the city, 
while the other party is now driven out, but governed at one time.”8 It is in this 
context that one can understand Bartolo’s expression exititii ratione 
partialitatis, exiles resulting from factionalism, that is, the men of the faction 
driven out (deiecta); for the politics of opposition in the Italian cities was often 
a politics of intrinseci et extrinseci, of insiders and outsiders, of the party in 
power (and in the city) and the party out of power (and out of the city). The 
question that lies at the center of the treatise is, of course, whether 
membership in such a faction or party is lawful. If the faction in power pursues 
the public good, Bartolo argues, it is lawful to be a member, “for just as it is licit 
to bring friends together for the defense of one’s goods, all the more to do so 
5 De Guelphis, 134: “Hodie… videmus enim quamplures qui Guelphi vocantur 
esse rebelles Ecclesiae, et alios quamplures qui Gebellini vocantur esse rebelles 
imperii… sicut contingit in… civitatibus in quibus sunt divisiones et partialitates, 
necesse est ut dicte partes aliquo nomine vocentur: ideo dicta nomina imponuntur 
tanquam magis communia.”
6 Ibid., 137: “…potest quis in uno loco esse Guelphus et in alio Gebellinus.”
7 For the quotation, ibid., 134; for the definition of affectio, 131. 
8 Ibid., 140, “sunt due partes, quarum una regit civitatem, altera stat deiecta, 
sed alio tempore rexit.”
5for the public defense.”9 In such a case, membership in the opposing faction is 
“absolutely illicit [simpliciter illicitum],” but if the faction in power is wicked or 
tyrannical, membership in the opposing faction is lawful. Even if riots and 
unrest (rumor vel tumultus) occur in the city as a result of opposing a 
tyrannical faction, legal penalties ought not apply.10 While parties could fight 
wars outside of cities, rumor and tumultus were the results of political 
opposition within a city and, in this sentence, Bartolo has gone farther even 
than the radical political thinker Tolomeo of Lucca (d. 1327) or John of 
Salisbury, the famous defender of tyrannicide (d. 1180). On the one hand, he 
has exposed the emptiness of the vocabulary of party politics and laid bare the 
stark nature of opposition in the Italian cities, in which everything can be 
reduced essentially to the party in power and the expelled party that seeks to 
return to power. But, on the other hand, he has established the crucial, ethical 
core of politics itself: political resistance, even violent resistance that causes 
rumor and tumultus in the city, can be lawful as long as the resisting party 
seeks the public good and the opposed party does not.
Whatever Bartolo may have thought about licit resistance, even in cities 
like Florence where somewhat broad political participation and debate were 
allowed, urban regimes in late medieval Italy viewed all political opposition as 
criminal or, at best, illicit and unacceptable. The idea of a “loyal opposition,” 
most obvious in Britain where the party out of power is actually called “His (or 
Her) Majesty’s Loyal Opposition,” and which developed alongside and is 
associated with the practice of politics in modern democracies, would have 
9 Ibid., 137: “Sicut enim ad tuitionem rerum licet congregare amicos, ita multo 
magis ad tuitionem publicam.”
10 Ibid., 139. 
6been entirely alien to a fourteenth-century Italian. In this context it is not at all 
surprising that, for example, almost everything we know about labor 
organization in Florence at the time comes from the city’s criminal archives. 
And for this reason, most political opposition was, in some way or another, 
practiced in secret. Secret political opposition, or conspiracy, the subject of 
this thesis, was therefore a pervasive phenomenon. The Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences defines political conspiracy as “a secret combination of 
persons for the purpose of changing the form or personnel of government by 
violence or other unconstitutional means.”11 This definition certainly applies to 
the fourteenth century, but, within the medieval Italian cities an even broader 
definition may be used: in this thesis, the expression “conspiracy” or “political 
conspiracy” may thus refer to the entire wide range of practices of political 
opposition, viewed by the regime in power as illegal or illicit, in which a group 
or groups of persons coordinate or attempt to coordinate in secret. As the 
Encyclopedia notes, “[p]opular judgment upon conspiracies is essentially 
indicated by the unpleasant connotation of the term” and, as a result, “the 
plotting which precedes most successful revolutions is rather quickly forgotten; 
at least it is seldom referred to as a conspiracy.” A similar point was made by
Thomas R. Conrad in a 1974 review essay, where he argued that political 
conspiracy is “an utterly subjective concept … that elude[s] operationalization 
11 Article by Joseph J. Senturia (New York: Macmillan, 1937), vol. 3, p. 238. 
He adds that it is the “agency by which most assassinations, coups d’état, and 
revolutions are brought into being” and that it “shades off indistinguishably into 
various related activities: semi-secret revolutionary political action, such as Fascist or 
Communist, where ultimate ends are open but immediate activities more or less 
secret; joint economic action on a large scale, like the general strike; and murder with 
political aspects, like that of Rathenau.”
7as a part of a value-free vocabulary for political science.”12 Because we rightly 
value the public as opposed to the private practice of politics, the rule of law, 
openness, and non-violence, it is nearly impossible to always describe 
“conspiracy” in value free terms. Nonetheless, in this thesis, in deciding what 
counts as conspiracy and what does not, I adopt the point-of-view of the 
regime in power and never that of the conspirator, however sympathetic. It 
ought not, after all, be the role of the historian to treat those plots he 
sympathizes with as revolutions and those he does not as conspiracies. In a 
powerful and wide-ranging 1968 essay on “Political Conflict in the Italian City 
States,” Lauro Martines provided the justification for my approach to the 
problem of secret political opposition, noting that (1) the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate political opposition in medieval and Renaissance 
Italy was blurry because “the legal identity of the state itself was in doubt,” that 
(2) looking at the least ambiguous form of illegitimate political opposition—
conspiracy, “which was frankly illegal and which the jurists had no trouble in 
condemning”—is the best way of approaching this issue, and that (3) the 
methods regimes chose to punish conspirators are also meaningful in this 
regard, especially in the more extreme case of execution, which was justified 
when “lawyers, arguing from Roman law, gradually gave currency to the 
concept of the crime of laesa majestas—a concept that developed pari passu
with the emergence of the sovereign city state.”13 My method therefore is to 
ask, as far as possible given the surviving documentation: Who conspired and 
12 “Coercion, Assassination, Conspiracy: Pejorative Political Language,” Polity
6 (1974): 418-23, quote at p. 422. 
13 Lauro Martines, “Political Conflict in the Italian City States,” Government 
and Opposition 3 (1968): 69- 91.
8why? How did conspirators plan, keep secret, and carry out their plots? And 
how were such plots uncovered, repressed, and punished? In order to answer 
these questions, the vocabulary of conspiracy in fourteenth-century Italy must 
be understood. 
Machiavelli notes that conspiracies are especially dangerous because 
they hurt princes even when they fail; for even “if [the plot] is discovered and 
the conspirators are killed, people will always believe that it was an invention 
of the prince to vent his avarice and cruelty against the families and property 
of those he killed.”14 A similar problem attends the use of criminal processes 
against conspirators, one of the primary sources of this thesis. There will 
always be doubt about whether the governments in power invented the 
charges and the details of the plot to maintain power, punish their enemies, 
and profit from the attendant property confiscations. Knowing that there is risk 
of appearing naïve in saying so, I have usually erred on the side of believing 
the criminal records, even quoting the confessions of conspirators as if they 
were accurate records of what was said and done. Of course, as I say in 
chapter 3, I am well aware of the fact such criminal confessions were
“extracted through torture, crafted by the confessors, influenced by the 
questions asked by the judges…, and modulated by the conventions of the 
legal process,” not to mention possibly molded by political pressures. All 
historians of crime must be cautious, as Renato Rosaldo warns (with regards 
to Ladurie’s problematic method in Montaillou), to not separate the “data from 
14 Discorsi, III.6, “se la si scuopre, e loro ammazzino i congiurati, si crede 
sempre che la sia stata invenzione di quel principe, per isfogare l’avarizia e la 
crudeltà sua contro al sangue e la roba di quegli che egli ha morti.” 
9the instrument through which they were collected.”15 That said, in order to 
combat the more glaring problem of possible invention and falsification, I 
attempt in every case to corroborate the details of these confessions with a 
variety of other sources. In chapter 3, for example, I describe a large plot 
against the guild government of Florence in the winter of 1379 for which we 
have extensive, surviving criminal records. From the fifteenth through the 
twentieth century, as readers of Machiavelli on conspiracy might have 
suspected, there have been claims that this plot was invented in some 
respects by the government. Nonetheless I am comfortable with using these 
condemnations for two reasons. First, in this particular case, we possess 
writings by conspirators and their allies that largely corroborate the nature of 
the plot and many of its details, not to mention other government records. But, 
more importantly and even in the absence of such corroboration, judicial 
records are often the best and sometimes the only way for historians of pre-
modern conspiracy to approach their subject. And, at the very least, they allow 
us to understand how regimes in power suspected that conspirators spoke to 
and interacted with one another. The use of judicial archives for any purpose 
is fraught with difficulties, such as those elegantly and thoughtfully described 
by Arlette Farge in her account of working in French judicial archives,16 but to 
investigate secret crimes, to investigate conspiracies, in a judicial archive is to 
confront the limits of historical knowledge in a unique way. Since conspiracies 
15 “From the Door of His Tent: The Fieldworker and the Inquisitor,” in James 
Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 77-97, 
quotation at p. 79.
16 Le gout de l’archive (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1989). 
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are by their nature secret, we tend to know of them qua conspiracies only 
when and to the extent that they are repressed.
The Vocabulary of Conspiracy
To conspire (con-spirare) is, etymologically speaking, to breathe 
together; thus, though the word was used only rarely in a musical context, the 
first-century writer Columella could properly speak of the harmony produced 
by a chorus as a conspiratio.17 The more common sense of the word in 
antiquity—a union or consensus of men working in concert for some end, 
whether good or evil—is seen clearly in Cicero, who could speak of a 
“conspiratio of every rank to defend liberty” as well as of a “very wicked 
conspiratio of enemies.”18 What we call a conspiracy was, in the Roman 
political vocabulary, generally called not conspiratio but coniuratio,19 literally “a 
swearing together,” although that word too was ambivalent, or, in the 
expression of the grammarian Servius, had “a neutral sense.”20 Coniuratio’s 
ambivalence is striking; understood historically, it becomes almost an auto-
antonym. In moments of great or sudden emergency (tumultus), Servius 
17 De re rustica, 12.2.4.
18 Epistulae ad familiares, 12:15 (“conspirationem omnium ordinum ad 
defendendam libertatem”) and 11:11 (“sceleratissimam conspirationem hostium”). 
19 Victoria Emma Pagán, Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2004), 11.
20 Ad Aeneidem 8.5, “nam coniuratio tōn mesōn est”; on the ambivalence of 
the term in practice, see Thomas Habinek, The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, 
Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
76-8. I have transliterated the Greek in the quotation. 
11
explains, when there was no time for individual oaths of allegiance, the leader 
of the army “would say, ‘whoever wishes the republic to be safe, let him follow 
me,’ and those who were present would all swear allegiance together at the 
same time, and this kind of military campaign was called a coniuratio.”21 Just 
as coniuratio could signify this oath-bound body of men dedicated to saving 
the republic, so, of course, could it (and more often did) signify the oath-bound 
body of men dedicated to destroying it, as in Sallust’s statement that he will 
accurately describe the “coniuratio of Catiline,” most notorious of the 
conspirators against the Roman Republic.22
As in antiquity, late medieval Florentines employed a complex and often 
ambivalent vocabulary of conspiracy and political crime. These terms may be 
divided into three groups, terms for political crimes (and their perpetrators), 
terms for the elements of these crimes, and terms for the effects or results of 
these crimes. The penchant of medieval legal and legalistic writing to provide 
lists of words, often synonymous or with overlapping meaning, is especially 
clear in this area. For clarity, I underline vernacular terms and italicize Latin
ones in this discussion; and note that the terms sometimes overlap. In both the 
vernacular chronicles and legal texts, trattato (tractatus) and congiura
(coniuratio) are the most common terms for political conspiracy, with 
cospirazione (conspiratio) being used much less often. A number of crimes 
could be committed by conspiring, among them especially seditio (sedition), 
rebellio (rebellion), and proditio (treason), all of which, under certain 
21 Ad Aeneidem 8.5, “…dicebat qui rem publicam salvam esse vult me 
sequatur, et qui convenissent simul iurabant: et dicebatur ista militia coniuratio.”
22 Bellum Catilinae 4.3, “igitur de Catilinae coniuratione quam verissime 
potero,” etc. 
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conditions, could be or become the crimen laesae maiestatis (lèse majesté or 
high treason). Those who committed such crimes became homines seditiosi
(seditious men), rebelles (rebels), and proditores (traitors), and sometimes 
though rarely traditores (traitors), or inimici, emuli, and hostes (enemies).  
Many conspiracies were launched, as noted above, by members of the party 
out of power, most of whom were “exiles” of some type, colloquially called 
usciti, fuorusciti, cacciati and sometimes esuli in the chronicles, and who were 
mostly people that had been placed under the commune’s criminal ban, 
sbanditi, banniti, exbanniti; or confined or relegated to a territory outside of the 
city, confinati or relegati. A number of deprecatory terms were regularly 
applied to conspirators— for instance, they were often called perfidi
(treacherous)—as were a number of deprecatory expressions, like iniquitatis 
filii (sons of iniquity) and perditionis filii (sons of perdition). 
Conspiracies had a number of well-defined elements. As the terms 
congiura and coniuratio suggest, there was usually an oath (giuramento and 
sometimes giura), sometimes sealed with kisses and written pacts. In this way, 
as in antiquity, the coniuratio could be quite ambivalent—men who giurarono 
insieme e si baciarono in bocca, swore an oath and kissed each other on the 
mouth, could easily have been defending the city or themselves, forming a 
guild, or taking part in a nefarious plot. There was also usually a detailed plan 
that needed to be kept secret. The criminal sentences often note that the 
condemned conspirator omnia in secreto tenuit et nemini revelavit, kept 
everything secret and revealed it to no one. Most conspiracies required groups 
of men to join together; some of the terms for such groups—like 
congregationes, confederationes, and coadunationes—could refer to both 
small and large groups, while others, like conventicula, usually implied that the 
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groups were not particularly large. Men who could bring many people together 
were especially dangerous. In order to do so, less-organized political criminals 
would simply yell slogans (like “Viva la Parte Guelfa!,” that is, “Long live the 
Guelf party!”), while more committed and better-organized plotters would ring 
bells, raise banners, and shout such slogans. 
The goal of the conspirator was, most often, to take or retake the stato
and then to re-organize the city’s political constitution. Stato or status had 
many shades of meaning, but suggested nothing like the modern “state.”23  It 
was something possessed, taken, retaken, held, and lost. It was the 
government, the regime, power, authority, and the condition of the city.  
Families, factions, parties, and even individuals could seek to have it or have it 
again. Since so many conspirators were exiles it is not uncommon for them to 
speak of their objective as reentering or returning and retaking the stato. 
Another common expression was mutare lo stato, to change the regime or 
overthrow the government. Additionally, regimes in power often accused 
23 Among the best semantico-historical analyses of the polyvalent meanings of 
“status” and “stato” are Nicolai Rubinstein, “Notes on the Word stato in Florence 
before Machiavelli,” in Florilegium Historiale, ed. John Gordon Rowe and W.H. 
Stockdale (Toronto: Univerity of Western Ontario Press, 1971), 314-26, and Alberto 
Tenenti, “Archeologia medievale della parola stato,” in Tenenti, Stato: Un’idea, una 
logica: dal comune italiano all’assolutisimo (Bologna, 1987), 15–52, as well as the 
important discussion in Lauro Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance 
Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), for example, at p. 390. Even 
though these words eventually became our “state,” other words (or combinations of 
words) also employed by pre-modern Italians might actually have been closer in 
meaning to it, for example “commune” or “civitas” or “res publica” and their vernacular 
equivalents. That said, it would be anachronistic to think that any pre-modern terms 
actually approximate our own term “state,” which is laden with meaning derived from 
the German state doctrine or Staatslehre, formulated in a very specific, legal context 
in the nineteenth-century, on which see Michael Stolleis, Public Law in Germany: 
1800-1914 (New York: Berghahn, 2001).
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plotters of trying to subvertere or pervertere, ruin or overthrow, their status. As 
in the classical usage, subversive Florentines wished to bring about res novae
or novitas (pl. novitates), that is, new things. The chroniclers often speak of 
novità or novitadi occurring in the city when they wish to speak of successful 
conspiracies or revolutions, but sometimes also of attempted ones. The 
terminology for what conspirators planned to do was not always explicitly 
political; nearly every group of conspirators hoped or was said to hope to 
correre la terra or correre la città, to run through the land or city, which was 
sometimes a way of taking power (that is, running around and causing a riot) 
and sometimes the result of success (that is, running through the city gloating 
and possibly taking revenge and settling scores). Plots in their early stages 
could cause or be manifested through murmurationes (whispering), but their 
outbreak would bring about louder noises, especially romore (rumor) and 
tumulto (tumultus). The word rumor or romore, which literally signifies a loud 
noise, nearly always announced and implied political unrest, and that 
dangerous unrest was called tumultus or tumulto. In times of political agitation, 
the chronicles are replete with expressions like si levò un romore, a riot 
erupted. Almost every tractatus, coniuratio, and conspiratio resulted in rumor
and tumultus, which formed a nearly inseparable linguistic pair. Romore was 
also used in verbal phrases, like levare il romore (to cause a riot), and could 
itself become a verb, like romoreggiare (to riot or cause a riot). Seditious men 
could be said, for example, to levare la terra a romore or romoreggiare la terra, 
to riot or cause a riot in the whole city. The regimes governing the cities in 
which rumor and tumultus broke out called themselves and/or the condition of 
their cities peaceful and quiet (the so-called status pacificus et tranquillus of 
the criminal records). All of the above terms (for conspiracies and their 
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elements and results) could be and readily were combined in court records 
and chronicles, sometimes precisely and sometimes haphazardly. But there 
was an established set of terms, based in large part on Roman legal and 
political usage, which was employed in fourteenth-century Italy to talk about 
conspiracy. 
Organization and Argument
Although nearly every political historian of fourteenth-century Florence 
has discussed conspiracy in passing—indeed, it would be impossible not to—
none has treated the subject in detail as I do here nor uncovered the patterns 
of conspiracy in the era. The first chapter of my thesis, “Political Conspiracy in 
Florence, 1340-1368” discusses four major elite plots hatched in Florence and 
examines the problem of worker conspiracies and revolts, treating especially 
secret labor organization in the 1340s and a major grain riot in 1368. The 
second chapter, “Conspiracy and the Tumult of the Ciompi,” completely 
recasts the famous Ciompi tumult of 1378 as part of the history of Florentine 
conspiracy, showing how the Ciompi participated in a series of plots hatched 
by the city’s popular faction and then conspired against the government they 
helped to create.  Chapter three, “Conspiracies against the Guild Government, 
1379,” discusses a year that saw more conspiracies than any other in 
Florentine history, showing in detail how plotters formed conspiratorial 
networks outside of Florence and revealing a regime obsessed with repressing 
conspiracy. The fourth and final chapter, “Baldo degli Ubaldi on Conspiracy 
and Treason in late Trecento Florence,” focuses on several opinions written by 
the prominent jurist Baldo on conspiracy and its repression in Florence in 
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1380-81, illuminating the way that political conspiracy and treason were 
understood in Italian jurisprudence from the 1350s until Baldo’s influential 
opinions.
Three essential points emerge from this study: (1) Political conspiracy 
between 1340 and 1382 was chiefly a practice of factionalism or party politics. 
The infamous factional strife that had pervaded the late medieval city survived 
and flourished in the new, conspiratorial politics of the urban parties. Still 
grounded in the old dichotomies (friend/enemy, party-in-power/purged party), 
conspiracy subordinated public power to private power and worked (often 
intentionally) to undermine communal institutions. In this respect, conspiracy in 
Florence was a central mechanism of political change and was the city’s 
predominant expression of political dissent. (2) Conspiracies were especially 
common in periods of popular government. These governments faced almost 
constant conspiratorial resistance from elite factions that been expelled from 
the city or had had their political power restricted, and who often sought 
assistance from foreign rulers and powerful families in the countryside. And 
these governments also commonly inspired increased worker unrest and 
secret labor organization. Since guild membership was a requisite of political 
participation in Florence and central to the ideology of popular regimes, the 
ambiguity already present in the Roman term coniuratio was magnified in the 
response to labor organization, in which political communities that had 
founded their legitimacy upon oath-bound associations especially feared and 
violently repressed other oath-bound associations. And (3) Although historians 
have often located the origins of the “state” in the early Renaissance cities of 
northern and central Italy, the prevalence of secret political opposition, the 
strength of conspirators and their allies, and the ability of conspiratorial 
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networks, large worker congregations, and even powerful families to vie with 
weak regimes for power and legitimacy seriously calls this into question. 
Indeed, conspiracy, in this way, delineates the very limits of the “state.” Even 
though most conspiracies failed, the following chapters often reveal precarious 
governments in fear of collapse, unable to defend their territorial possessions, 
and unable to monitor dangerous exiles plotting their destruction. 
At least since Federico Chabod’s famous 1957 lecture, which asked if 
there was one in the Renaissance, the question of the existence of a “state” 
has pre-occupied historians of pre-modern Italy.24 Political historians of late 
medieval and early Renaissance Florence have tended to place the origins of 
a “state” in that city somewhere between the establishment of the 
government’s public debt, or Monte comune, in 1345 and the return of the 
Medici in 1434.25 My own opinion, offered tentatively here, is that, for the late 
Trecento, “the state” is at best a red herring, diverting attention from complex 
and crucial issues in legal and institutional history, and at worst a false 
construct and nominalist illusion that causes scholars, otherwise cautious 
about anachronism, to read back into pre-modern contexts an idea (and 
method of thinking about governance) only truly formalized in the nineteenth 
century and perhaps never truly accurate. In this respect there are parallels 
with the idea of a “feudal system” in medieval Europe, an idea now largely 
24 “Y a-t-il un état de la Renaissance?,” in Actes du colloque sur la
Renaissance, Société d’histoire moderne (Paris: Vrin, 1958), 57-73. The essays in 
Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, and Pierangelo Schiera, eds., Origini dello stato: 
Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1994) show that debate along these lines has continued.
25 A list of such historians and their works is found in Samuel K. Cohn, 
Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and Rebellion, 1348-1434 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-2, notes 4-6.
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demolished in Anglophone scholarship.26 Even though one must speak, say, 
of the stato in Guicciardini’s thought, the word “state” now brings with it a wide 
range of exceptionally heavy and unnecessary baggage: notions of absolute 
sovereignty associated with Bodin (d. 1596) and later thinkers, the conception 
of states in an international public law system, still inchoate at the time of 
Grotius (d. 1645), the self-contained and unitary jurisdiction of private law 
(privatrecht), which is conceptualized along with “conflict of laws”-theory only 
in the nineteenth century; and especially sociological and political-science-
oriented ideas about the modern (bureaucratic, centralized) state, associated 
especially with the insights of Max Weber (d. 1920) and his followers. It is 
crucial to note that I do not dismiss the existence of a “state” along the same 
lines as P.J. Jones, first in his famous essay “Communes and Despots,”27
where this dismissal is a relativistic and not-too-veiled expression of contempt
for politics; nor do I do so along the lines of Paolo Grossi in his masterful and 
controversial L’ordine giuridico medievale, 28 where the dismissal is part of a 
Catholic polemic and historicist reconceptualization of the European “common 
law,” or ius commune. I believe that the governments of late-Trecento Italy 
were radically unlike “states” as we in the twenty-first-century understand the 
26 On this see the classic article of Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “The Tyranny of a 
Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,” American Historical 
Review, 79 (1974): 1063–8, and Susan Reynolds’ convincing argument, Fiefs and 
Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994).
27 “Communes and Despots: The City-State in Late-Medieval Italy,” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 15 (1965), especially at 
pages 92 and 95.
28 Rome: Laterza, 1995.
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term. A better case could certainly be made for the regional powers of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but it is now widely agreed that, even in the 
sixteenth century, power in these territorial “states” was almost entirely de-
centered, fluid, and negotiated. Even in the age of the grand dukes, subject 
communities and individual holders of “feudal” rights negotiated on an ad hoc
basis with the Florentine government and continued to resist the tug of 
centralization, leaving a web of corporate as well as individualistic 
particularities. Marino Berengo presented a persuasive early case along these 
lines (along with an overview of some of the early scholarship on this topic) in 
1970; his view was confirmed, though tempered, by the more nuanced works 
of Elena Fasano Guarini and Giorgio Chittolini; and studies continue to confirm 
it for other areas of Italy. 29 In the mid-Trecento, city governments did not 
control the territories around them in any meaningful sense: powerful families, 
as I will show in this thesis, were regularly able to challenge the power of the 
Florentine government in the nearby Arno valley and sometimes within the city 
itself. Moreover, outside their walls, these governments were at the mercy of 
what political scientists now might call “violent non-state actors,” be they 
29 Berengo, “Il Cinquecento,” in La storiografia italiana negli ultimi vent’anni
(Milan: Marzorati, 1970), 485-518; Fasano Guarini, Lo stato mediceo di Cosimo I
(Florence: Sansoni, 1973); Chittolini, La formazione dello stato regionale e le 
istituzioni del contado (Turin: Einaudi, 1979). That similar conditions existed outside 
of Tuscany is made clear in a number of recent articles, among them Sergio 
Zamperetti’s “Magistrature centrali, rettori e ceti locali nello stato regionale veneto in 
età moderna,” in Comunità e poteri centrali negli antichi Stati italiani: alle origini dei 
controlli amministrativi , ed. Luca Mannori (Naples: Cuen, 1997), 103-116, and 
Andrea Gamberini’s “Principi, comunità e territori nel ducato di Milano: spunti per una 
rilettura,” Quaderni storici 127 (2008): 243-266.
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mercenary armies or militant bands of exiles.30 Within the cities themselves, 
governments were not and did not understand themselves to be ultimately and 
indivisibly sovereign. Their de facto power was bolstered by networks of 
patronage, secured with party-centered exclusionary practices, and often 
shared with powerful families, corporate bodies, and ecclesiastical entities. 
Outside of the issue of sovereignty, these ideas have been current in Italian 
late-medieval historiography for at least the last thirty years; and the last 
decade, in particular, has seen a veritable explosion of scholarship in Italy on 
the role of party-centered acts of political exclusion.31 Most importantly, for a 
discussion of the period 1340-1382 in Florence, it is simply unnecessary to 
use the term “state,” which rather than clarifying the outlines of political and 
institutional practice confuses them and makes them murkier. Worse, to say 
that the governments in this period were “proto-states” or “early states” or in 
the process of “becoming states,” or to call them “medieval states” to 
distinguish them from the modern state, is to become trapped in a teleology in 
which the “state” is inevitable and pre-ordained.
Riccardo Fubini has memorably called the late fifteenth century in Italy 
the “age of conspiracies,”32 and the most famous political conspiracies of the 
30 I understand this term in the sense used by Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. 
Kiser, and William D. Casebeer’s Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-state 
Actors (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2005).
31 Giuliano Milani, L’esclusione dal comune: conflitti e bandi politici a Bologna 
e in altre città italiane tra XII e XIV secolo (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il 
Medioevo, 2003), is representative of the lattermost trend.
32 Riccardo Fubini, “L’età delle congiure: i rapporti tra Firenze e Milano dal 
tempo di Piero a quello di Lorenzo de’ Medici (1464-78),” in Italia quattrocentesca: 
politica e diplomazia nell’età di Lorenzo il Magnifico (Florence: FrancoAngeli, 1994), 
220-252.
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Italian Renaissance (such as the so-called “Pazzi conspiracy” against Lorenzo 
de’ Medici) indeed come from that period. But the era I discuss in this thesis, 
1340-1382, can also (and, indeed, perhaps more properly) be called an “age 
of conspiracies” in Florence, especially the two extended periods of popular 
government (1343-48 and 1378-82), which saw myriad plots and almost 
constant unrest. While many aspects of Machiavelli’s (d. 1527) extraordinary 
discussion of conspiracy, the longest chapter (III.6) in his Discourses on Livy
and almost certainly the first and most sophisticated excursus ever dedicated 
to the subject, are applicable to conspiracy in the late fourteenth century, a 
reader of Machiavelli and of this thesis will see how remarkably the practice 
and discourse of political conspiracy in Florence changed over the course of 
what we might call the “long” fifteenth century. Plots of and against princes, 
informed by classical examples and models, barely resemble the large-scale 
conspiracies and secretly-orchestrated rebellions of the fourteenth century, 
which sprang out of and expressed deep class and political tensions and 
which, crucially, were plotted in and around a vibrant city where the question 
of how and by whom the city would be governed had not yet been answered 
and where politics were played out by citizens of every rank, with words and 
when necessary with actions, in the taverns and in the public assemblies, in 
the piazzas and in the streets, and not in the palaces of bankers and princes.
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CHAPTER 1:
POLITICAL CONSPIRACY IN FLORENCE, 1340-1368
Elite and Magnate Conspiracies
More so than any other decade in Florentine history, the tumultuous 
1340s were marked by pronounced class tensions that found their expression 
in plots, conspiracies, and secret alliances as well as in outright insurrection, 
revolt, and revolution. These multi-polar and complex tensions were 
conceptualized and understood by contemporaries as resulting from the 
struggles and alliances among three groups contending for political 
dominance: the magnates, a giuridically-defined class of large and powerful 
families known for their violence and ostentatious displays of power that, 
beginning in 1293, were excluded from the priorate (the city’s executive 
magistracy) and subjected to numerous restrictions and penalties; the so-
called popolo grasso, an elite of wealthy non-magnates, who like the 
magnates were often involved in banking and international trade, but who 
were represented in the priorate through their membership in the major guilds 
(as lawyers, international merchants and bankers, wool and silk 
manufacturers, and, to a lesser extent, spice-importers and furriers) and, in 
that capacity, had formed for four decades the core of Florence’s ruling class; 
and the popolo, a middle-class of predominantly non-elite major guildsmen 
whose politics were founded upon the corporate ideology of the guild 
community and civic principles borrowed from Roman thought and diffused 
23
throughout Florence’s notarial culture.33 The years 1343-48 saw the creation 
of a popular government that further chastised the magnates and challenged 
the political dominance of the popolo grasso. But in the early years of the 
decade, amidst economic and political turmoil, magnates, long bristling under 
the handicaps imposed by the Ordinances of Justice of the 1290s, conspired 
to regain their share of political power in Florence.
The Bardi-Frescobaldi Plot of 1340
On 1 November 1334, the faction controlling Florence created a new 
office of seven captains or bargelli who were put in charge of 175 soldiers 
(fanti armati) and tasked with maintaining public order, but who, according to 
the chronicler Giovanni Villani, were actually appointed to protect the regime 
itself and to intimidate its enemies before January 1335’s scheduled general 
scrutiny, the procedure that qualified citizens for possible election to the 
priorate.34 Exactly one year later, the regime replaced the seven captains, 
consolidating their function in a single new office, that of the “Captain of the 
Watch and Guardian of Peace and of the Government of the City [Capitano 
33 On the definition of the Florentine elite and popolo, their struggles, and 
“dialogue of power” throughout the history of the Florentine republic, see John M. 
Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 5-62 and 
passim; and the still concise statement in Najemy, “The Dialogue of Power in 
Florentine Politics,” in Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, and Julia Emlen, eds., City-
States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991), 269-88. 
34 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 16. These captains and Villani’s criticism are 
discussed in John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral 
Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 120. 
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della guardia e conservatore di pace e di stato de la città],” who would be a 
foreigner like Florence’s other traditional “rectors” or judicial officials (the 
Podestà, Capitano del Popolo, and Esecutore), who was invested with “great 
authority and power over those under the criminal ban [con grande arbitrio e 
balìa sopra li sbanditi],” and who had the executive capacity to perform 
“executions as he pleased, without following statutory procedures [faccendo 
iustizia di sangue come li piacea, sanza ordine di statuti].”35 Messer Iacopo de’ 
Gabrielli, a knight from a noble Guelf family in Gubbio that had long provided 
the city with trusted foreign officials, was chosen as the first such Captain.36
Bringing a force of fifty knights and one hundred foot soldiers with him, he 
zealously and rigidly meted out justice, beheading Rosso di Gherarduccio 
Buondelmonti “against the wishes of most Florentines [contro al volere de la 
maggiore parte de’ Fiorentini]” for joining the Tolomei of Siena in attacking the 
commune of Montalcino, executing a number of other citizens, and 
condemning “nearly every commune and parish in the contado,” Florence’s 
demarcated countryside, “for harboring people under the ban [quasi tutti i 
Comuni e popoli di contado per cagione di ritenere sbanditi].”37 Messer Iacopo 
proved extremely unpopular in Florence, as did his successor, Accorrimbono 
da Tolentino, whose illicit intervention in the syndication of a Podestà from 
Gubbio led to legislation forbidding the selection of any foreign officials from 
35 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 39. See also STEFANI, rubr. 510, 178. 
36 Robert Davidsohn, Forschungen zur Geschichte von Florenz, vol. 4 (Berlin: 
Mittler und Sohn, 1908), 535-57, has reconstructed a partial list of Podestà and 
Capitani del Popolo between 1251 and 1330 from numerous archival sources; the list 
includes five members of the Gabrielli of Gubbio: Rubeus (page 540), Cante (541-3), 
Binus (543), Philippus (547), and Binus Novellus (557). GIOVANNI VILLANI, xi, 165, 
notes that a Cantuccio di Messer Bino Gabrielli was also elected Capitano in 1331.
37 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 39. 
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Gubbio for a decade.38 This legislation was overlooked four years later, when 
the office of Captain of the Watch was fully re-instituted and Messer Iacopo, 
now called by Villani “an impetuous man, cruel, and a butcher [uomo subito e 
crudele e carnefice]”, was again chosen for the position, given an enormous 
salary and greater power than the other rectors, and put in charge of one 
hundred knights and two hundred foot soldiers.39 Villani’s description of 
Messer Iacopo highlights the perception that he wielded super-legal powers in 
order to do the bidding of the ruling faction (i reggenti): 
Like a tyrant, or an administrator for tyrants [esecutore di tiranni], 
he acted as he wished in civil and criminal matters, an authority 
put in his hands by the ruling faction, and he did so without 
following the laws or statutes; as a result, he wrongly convicted 
many innocent men in their persons and property. And he kept 
the citizens, both great and small [grandi e piccoli], greatly afraid, 
except his rulers, whose vendettas, offenses, and political 
corruption he carried out with his rod.40
38 Ibid., and, for the legislation against officials from Gubbio, see ASF, PR, 28, 
77v. Syndication was the process by which the acts of judicial officials were examined 
after their tenure; on the process, see Gino Masi, Il sindacato delle magistrature 
comunali net sec. XIV (con speciale riferimento a Firenze) (Rome: Sampaolesi, 
1930); and, for a revisionist, comparative approach, see Moritz Isenmann, Legalità e 
controllo del potere (1200-1600): Uno studio comparativo sul processo di sindacato: 
Firenze, Castiglia e Valencia (Doctoral Dissertation, European University Institute, 
2008). 
39 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 118 and, for the salary figures, 93. According to 
Villani, the salaries for the “Conservadore del popolo” (another name for Iacopo’s 
position) and his soldiers amounted to 26,040 lire, or 120 lire more than the combined 
salaries of the three traditional foreign rectors and their full staffs (famiglie). 
40 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 118: “Il quale a guisa di tiranno, o come esecutore di 
tiranni, procedea di fatto in civile e cherminale a sua volontà, come gli era posto in 
mano per li detti reggenti, sanza seguire leggi o statuti, onde molti innocenti 
condannò a·ttorto inn-avere e in persona, e tenea i cittadini grandi e piccoli in grande 
tremore, salvo i suoi reggenti , che col suo bastone faceano le loro vendette e talora 
l’offese e·lle baratterie…” 
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Among the victims of Messer Iacopo’s reign were Pietro Bardi, who was fined 
6000 lire for having attacked a vassal (fedele) of his in Vernio (sometimes 
Vernia), at the edge of the Florentine contado, and Bardo Frescobaldi, who 
was forced to pay 3700 lire for an offense he denied having committed in the 
the pieve of San Vincenzo, on the outskirts of Florence. The Bardi had 
acquired Vernio and Mangona from the counts Alberti, a branch of the 
powerful counts Guidi, who still controlled much of the mountainous territory 
north of Prato and exerted influence throughout the valley of the river Bisenzio, 
a small tributary of the Arno; just as they had acquired another castle near Stia 
in the Casentino, a valley east of Florence, from the related counts of 
Porciano.41 The schematic map below shows some of the important towns and 
fortresses in the northwest (or, Santa Maria Novella) quarter of the Florentine 
contado, and the location of Vernio and Mangona.
The late 1330s had put a great strain on the Bardi company, a vast 
international economic enterprise, which found itself under increased pressure 
to lend to both king Edward III in order to finance England’s campaigns in 
France and to the Florentine commune to finance its war against Lucca,
41 These towns and their histories are described in Emanuele Repetti, 
Dizionario geografico, fisico, storico della Toscana, in six volumes (Florence, 
Mazzoni, 1833-45): Vernio, v, 696-700; Mangona, iii, 42-7; Porciano, iv, 583-5; Stia, 
v, 467-472. All of these towns were located in valleys surrounded by mountains more 
than 600 meters tall. 
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recently acquired by the Veronese lord Mastino della Scala, a war which upset 
the Bardi financial relationship with the Neapolitan king Robert of Anjou.42  
The looming bankrupty of the Bardi company has often been invoked in 
discussions of the Bardi-Frescobaldi conspiracy of November 1340, but, when 
they actually speak of causes, the chronicles report that its efficient cause 
was, in fact, the “tyranny” of Iacopo Gabrielli and the oligarchic faction then
ruling Florence. For example, an anonymous chronicler of Pistoia says that in 
1340
the popolo grasso was ruling Florence and the men of good 
families [gentili uomini] were completely excluded from office and 
from the honors of the Commune; because of the rigid laws the 
popolani had adopted, they did not dare to ask for justice from 
any popolano and frequently, at the behest of the popolani, they 
were condemned without cause. As a result, certain noble 
citizens decided that they wanted to bring down the haughtiness
of these popolani, so they conspired together [feciono insieme 
una giura] to take over the city and kill certain popolani.43
42 Armando Sapori, La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi
(Florence: Olschki, 1926), 77, estimates that the Bardi extended credit of between 
535 and 900 thousand florins to the English crown in the 1340s; on lending within 
Florence, see Bernardino Barbadoro, Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina: Imposta 
diretta e debito pubblico fino all’istituzione del Monte (Florence: Olschki, 1929), 571-
83; for an outline of Florence’s relationship with King Robert generally, see Samantha 
Kelly, The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309-1343) and Fourteenth-Century 
Kingship (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 227-35, but on the financial relationship, see David 
Abulafia, “Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370,” Economic History 
Review 33 (1981): passim, but especially at p. 83. 
43 Istorie pistolesi, ovvero delle cose avvenute in Toscana dall’anno 1300 al 
1348, ed. Antonio Maria Biscioni (Prato: Guasti, 1835), 345-6: “reggea Firenze lo 
popolo grasso e gli gentili uomini erano in tutto scrusi degli offici e degli onori del 
Comune e quasi per gli stretti ordini che aveano addosso non ardiano a domandare 
ragione a nessuno popolare e spesso a stanza de popolani erano condannati senza 
cagione. Onde certi nobili cittadini si propuosono di volere abbattere la superbia de 
detti popolani e però feciono insieme una giura per tollere la città ed uccidere certi 
popolani di quelli…” 
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ILLUSTRATION I
Schematic of the Santa Maria Novella quarter of the Florentine contado circa 
1340, showing important towns and fortresses
Villani adds that the conspirators planned to “cause a riot, run through the city, 
and kill Messer Iacopo Gabrielli and the leaders of the ruling faction, and to 
destroy the office of the priors and install a new government in Florence,” 
indeed, “some said to destroy the popolo.”44 Villani describes the events in 
44 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 118: “…levare il romore e correre la città, e uccidere 
mesere Iacopo Gabrielli e’ caporali de’ reggenti, e abattere l’uficio di priori e rifare in 
Firenze nuovo stato, e·cchi disse disfare il popolo.”
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detail: The plot was uncovered on All Saints’ Day, 1 November 1340, when 
Andrea Bardi, one of the conspirators, discussed it with Iacopo Alberti, his 
brother-in-law and a member of the ruling faction. Iacopo Alberti quickly told 
the priors, who, at around 7:30 PM, rang the alarm bell in the palace in spite of 
the objections of Taldo Valori and the lawyer messer Francesco Salviati, both 
of them Bardi allies on the priorate. In response to the alarm, the city gates 
were closed and the civic militias gathered in the piazza, shouting “Viva il 
popolo and death to the traitors [muoiano i traditori]!”45 With their foreign allies 
still outside the city and their plot discovered, the Bardi and Frescobaldi set fire 
to two of the bridges across the Arno, intending to turn the Oltrarno, their area 
of the city south of the river, into a fortress. While Iacopo Gabrielli waited, 
seemingly paralyzed with fear, the Brescian Podestà Maffeo Pontecarrali 
bravely crossed one of the other bridges and convinced the conspirators 
“using wise words and courteous threats [con savie parole e cortesi minacce]” 
to flee, saving the city from further destruction.46 A chronicler from a magnate 
clan, Simone della Tosa, describes the participation of a relative of his in the 
45 Although used on this occasion, the word “traitor” and the rhetoric of 
“treason” were rarely used in the context of political conspiracy in fourteenth-century 
Florence. But Christiane Klapisch-Zuber has shown that, according to tamburazioni
delivered to the Esecutore, magnates most commonly insulted their victims in the 
1340s by calling them traitors (traditori) and also that they regularly denounced the 
popolo as a whole when attacking those of an inferior class, as in February of 1349, 
when a member of the Bardi clan was accused of destroying the property of a 
contadino in the rural parish of San Cristofano in Perticaia (in the pieve of Rignano) 
and announced, “We already broke the Popolo of Florence, surely it wouldn’t be hard 
to break that of San Cristofano!” See Retour à la cité: les magnats de Florence, 1340-
1440 (Paris: EHESS, 2006), 122; in the text Klapisch translates ASF, Esecutore, 
119bis, f. 1r, “noi abbiamo gìa volte rotto il popolo di Firenze bene possiamo rompere 
sicuramente quello de Santo Cristofano” [my transcription]. 
46 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 118.
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resistance against the plotters: “the Bardi and Frescobaldi, with many soldiers 
and exiles [sbanditi], fled and went away, and messer Giovanni della Tosa 
with some men of the popolo [con certo popolo], and also with Manno Donati 
and some of the Cavicciuli, went to the piazza of the priors to help the 
popolo.”47 With magnates like the Donati and della Tosa joining forces with the 
popolani grassi and popolo on 1 November, it is clear that Simone wants to 
make the point (at least partially true) that the Bardi-Frescobaldi plot was not a 
conspiracy of magnates generally, but of certain magnates against the 
otherwise unified city. 
On 2 November 1340, the priors of Florence dispatched a brief letter to 
the commune of San Miniato, a small but strategically important town in the 
lower Arno valley , announcing the repression of the terrible conspiracy. “This 
morning,” they wrote, “our Capitano held an inquest against the persons 
named below, condemning them in their persons and to the confiscation and 
destruction of their property… the names of the condemned are these: messer 
Piero, messer Gerozzo, messer Simoncino, messer Iacopo di messer Guido, 
and Andrea di Filippozzo,” all from the powerful magnate clan of the Bardi. 
“Without a doubt,” they added, “we believe that many other magnates were 
accomplices in their crime, and they will be similarly condemned when the 
truth is revealed.”48 Eight days later, when the priors officially placed all the 
47 Annali di Simone della Tosa, in Cronichette antiche di vari scrittori del buon 
secolo della lingua toscana, ed. Domenico Maria Manni (Milan, Silvestri: 1844), 237: 
“…i Bardi e Frescobaldi con molti fanti e sbanditi si partirono e andarono fuori e 
messer Giovanni della Tosa con certo popolo trasse alla piazza de Priori e ancora 
messer Manno de Donati e altri de Cavicciuli in servigio del popolo.”
48 ASF, Signori, missive, originali, 3, f. 2r: “Hoc mane per capitaneum nostrum 
dictos infrascriptos processum est ad condempnationem personarum et bonarum 
confiscationem et devastationem… nomina vero condempnatorum sunt hec vz. 
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conspirators, who had fled the city and taken refuge first in nearby Bardi 
properties and then in Pisa, under the commune’s criminal ban, the list 
included the names of thirty-one additional conspirators: ten more Bardi, 
thirteen Frescobaldi, two Rossi, one Nerli, and five men from the contado and 
upper Arno river valley.49 In an official letter to the signore of Bologna and a 
number of other key allies sent on 9 November, the priors of Florence again 
declared the discovery and repression of the Bardi-Frescobaldi plot, a plot too 
vast to conceal, especially “since rumors fly faster than the wind, stirring up 
countless tongues.”50 “Certain treacherous citizens of ours from the houses of 
the Bardi and Frescobaldi,” they wrote, “hoping to tyrannically and lawlessly 
subject the Florentine people to themselves, and having everywhere conspired 
dominus Pierus, dominus Geroçius, dominus Simoncinus, dominus Iacobus domini 
Guidonis, [et] Andreas Phillippoççi… et creditur tamen indubie quod plures alii ex 
magnatibus dicti facinoris sunt consortes contra quos deliberate veritate reperta 
similiter procedetur.” 
49 ASF, PR, 30, 27rv. These are the Florentines named: “Dominus Petrus 
domini Gualterocti [de Bardis], Dominus Jacobus domini Guidonis Accolti [de Bardis], 
Dominus Simon Gerocçi [de Bardis], Dominus Gerocçus domini Gualterocti [de 
Bardis], Dominus Nepus domini Nepi [de Bardis], Bindus Andree domini Gualterocti 
[de Bardis], Bartolomeus domini Francischi [de Bardis], Simon et Ciprianus Gerii [de 
Bardis], Francischus et Toctus Filippocçi [de Bardis], Aghinolfus domini Gualterocti 
[de Bardis], Pierus Ciampi [de Bardis], Bindus Benghi [de Bardis], Jacobus domini 
Bardi [de Frescobaldis], Dominus Albanus Gerii [de Frescobaldis], Dominus Angelus 
Bernardi [de Frescobaldis], Dominus Bardus Lamberti [de Frescobaldis], Giramonte 
et Lapus Frescobaldi [de Frescobaldis], Niccolaus et Frescobaldus Guidonis [de 
Frescobaldis], Mangiere domini Lapi [de Frescobaldis], Jacobus alias vocatus 
Paperino [de Frescobaldis], Geri Bonaguide domini Geri [de Frescobaldis], Johannes 
et Bartolus domini Freschi [de Frescobaldis], Silvester Bartoli domini Guidonis [de 
Rubeis], Robertus domini Baronis [de Rubeis], Johannes Marchi de Nerlis populi 
Sancti Fridiani.” Additionally, the provvisione lists men in the employ of Iacopo di 
Bardo Frescobaldi, the Prior of San Jacopo. 
50 ASF, Missive, 5, 9rv, letter to “Marchionibus Extensibus et Marcie Ancone et 
Duci Spoletano et Domino Bononie et multis aliis”, quotation at 9r: “quoniam fama 
volabilis vento celerior et infinitas linguas exagitans…”
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with our enemies, yours, and those of Holy Mother Church, thereby 
endangering all of her cities and doing damage to all of Italy, have plotted to 
reduce our city to a nefarious workshop of evil men.”51 Two days later, in a 
letter to pope Benedict XII, the priors denounced the conspirators as “sons of 
perdition [perditionis filii],” a biblical expression associated with the Antichrist 
and regularly applied to traitors (proditores) and rebels, who had undertaken 
“conspiracies, seditions, and plots with enemies and rebels of Holy Mother 
Church and of those devoted to her in order to subvert the peaceful 
government of the city and people of Florence, thereby bringing about 
tyrannical wickedness harmful to the Church and to this city [i.e., Florence].”52
The Florentine government hoped to establish that the magnate Bardi and 
Frescobaldi conspirators were enemies of Guelfs all over Italy, possibly 
representing the vanguard of a dangerous Ghibelline resurgence, and, with 
these letters and many others to allied cities and subject towns in Tuscany, 
they hoped to gain necessary assistance in making sure that the plotters 
would be unable to find refuge in nearby communities where they could 
continue to conspire. 
The repression of the Bardi and Frescobaldi conspiracy, it is clear, 
occurred in two stages: first, the actual events of All Saint’s Day, long 
51 Ibid., “quidam perfidi nostri cives de domibus de Bardis [9v] et de 
Frescobaldis… cogitantes tirapnice et enormiter sibi subicere populum florentinum 
factis undique conspirationibus cum nostris et vostris et sancte matris ecclesie 
inimicis in aliarum suarum periculum et totius ytalie preiudicium manifestum civitatem 
nostram ordinaverunt reducere ad scelestorum nefariam officinam.”
52 ASF, Missive, 5, 10r-11r, quotation at 10r: “conspirationes seditiones et 
insidias cum inimicis et rebellibus sancte matris ecclesie et devotorum suorum in 
subversionem status pacifici Florentine civitatis et populi, ut illam perducerent ad 
turapnicam pravitatam in defractionem sancte matris ecclesie et civitatis eiusdam.”
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remembered in the political consciousness of the popolo, in which the different 
classes of the city joined forces, under the lead of men like the Podestà, to 
defend guild government and expel the conspirators and their forces from the 
city while also locking out their non-Florentine allies; and, second, the long 
struggle, beginning with these letters, to monitor and punish the Bardi and 
Frescobaldi and their allies.  The anonymous chronicler of Pistoia describes 
succinctly the immediate efforts of Messer Iacopo, now called in official 
documents the capitaneus ad guerram, or war captain: “The Captain 
sentenced those he found guilty, dismantled their houses in the city and 
contado, and destroyed all their goods.”53 Meanwhile, Messer Piero de’ Bardi 
went to Vernio with his men and holed up there, until the forces of the 
commune besieged his castle, ultimately forcing him to sell it and the nearby 
castle at Mangona in January.54 In the same month, nine of the counts Guidi 
were also condemned for participating in the plot.  More than a year later, 
another plot was uncovered involving more of the Bardi and Frescobaldi, 
among them Schiatta Frescobaldi, who was beheaded, and members of the 
Bardi company, like Biordo di messer Vieri Bardi, as well as an Adimari and a 
Pazzi, all of whom were declared rebels of the commune.55 In the same year, 
Florence purchased Lucca to end its war with Mastino della Scala and thereby 
provoked a war with Pisa. Just as the Bardi and Frescobaldi in November had 
53 Istorie pistolesi, 348: “Lo Capitano fece processi contro a quelli, che trovò 
colpevoli e disfece loro le case in città e in contado, e guastò tutti i loro beni.” 
54 ASF, PR, 30, 27v, for the initial efforts at Vernia; ASF, PR, 30, 37r-v, and 
Cesare Guasti, ed., I capitoli del Comune di Firenze (Florence: Cellini, 1866), vol. 1, 
107-8 for the sale of Mangona on 15 January 1340[41]. 
55 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xii, 119. 
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expected the support of their allies in the contado and Arno valley—most of 
the counts Guidi, the Tarlati of Arezzo, the Pazzi of the Valdarno, the Ubertini 
and Ubaldini of the Tuscan Apennines, the Guazzalotti, the Belforti of Volterra, 
and others—so again did the Florentine rebels join forces with the counts 
Guidi and the Ubaldini on behalf of Ghibelline Pisa. Within a year, the Ubaldini, 
with Milanese help, had besieged and burned the Florentine subject town 
Firenzuola, and the Pazzi Valdarno and Ubertini had started a revolt in 
Castiglione, Campogiallo, and Treggiaia in the upper Arno river valley (near 
San Giovanni Valdarno on the map below).56 Indeed, the full story of the 
Bardi-Frescobaldi plot ends only in October of 1343 when the Duke of Athens, 
who came to power with the support of the Bardi and other magnates, 
absolved all of the Florentine plotters for their crimes in November of 1340 and 
after.57 And before long they would plot against him.
The Conspiracies against the Duke of Athens
The fall of the Duke of Athens, who had only ten months earlier 
declared himself lord-for-life (signore a vita) of Florence, was achieved, like so 
many of the great political upheavals in Florentine history, through 
56 Ibid., 131 and 139. 
57 ASF, Balie, 2, ff. 12-13v (26 October 1343).
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conspiracy.58 According to the chronicler Giovanni Villani’s account, three 
discrete “sects (or factions) and plots [sette e congiurazioni]”existed in the 
early summer of 1343, each committed to killing the Duke and driving his men 
from power. Villani’s detailed list59 of the participants in each plot can be 
summarized: the first plot, led by the bishop Agnolo Acciaiuoli, included mostly 
magnates, many of the Bardi, some of the Frescobaldi, Vieri degli Scali; and 
some elite popolani from the Altoviti, Magalotti, Strozzi, and Mancini families; 
the second, led by messer Manno and Corso di messer Amerigo Donati, 
included several Pazzi, Cavicciuli, and Albizzi; and the third, led by Antonio di 
Baldinaccio Adimari, included a number of Medici, Bordoni, and Rucellai, Luigi 
di Lippo Aldobrandini, and others of the middle-rank (popolani mediani). All of 
these groups were strongly motivated, Villani explains, because the Duke had 
tricked them and, metaphorically, treated them like whores, 
stripping from the grandi, who had made him lord, all their 
boldness, and from the people [popolo] their liberty and all their 
political power [balìa] and offices, other than the name of prior; 
and he disbanded the office of the standard-bearers of the 
58 The best account of Duke’s lordship remains the classic work of Cesare 
Paoli, Della signoria di Gualtieri Duca d’Atene in Firenze (Firenze: Cellini, 1862); the 
plots against the Duke, his expulsion, and the creation of the new government are 
discussed at pages 41-44. 
59 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.16, Di certe congiurazioni che furono fatte in Firenze 
contro al duca d’Atene che n’era signore, “…della prima fu capo il nostro vescovo 
degli Acciaiuoli… e co·llui tenieno i Bardi; ciò furono principali: messere Piero, 
messere Gerozzo, messere Iacopo, e Andrea di Filippozzo, Simone di Geri, tutti della 
casa de’ Bardi, e rimessi in Firenze per lo duca, e di Rossi Salvestrino e meser Pino, 
e più suoi consorti. E de’ Frescobaldi i caporali il priore di Sa·Iacopo meser Agnolo 
Giramonte anche di rimessi in Firenze per lo duca, e Vieri delli Scali, e più altri grandi 
e popolani, Altoviti, Magalotti, Strozzi, e Mancini. Dell’altra congiura era capo meser 
Manno e Corso di meser Amerigo de’ Donati, Bindo e Beltramo e Mari de’ Pazzi, e 
Niccolò di mesere Alamanno, e Tile Benzi de’ Cavicciuli e certi degli Albizi. Della 
terza era capo Antonio di Baldinaccio degli Adimari, e Medici, e Bordoni, Oricellai, e 
Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, e più altri popolani mediani.”
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companies of the people, and took away their flags, and 
eliminated all the other laws and officials of the people, as he 
pleased, allying himself with the butchers, wine-sellers, wool 
carders, and minor guildsmen, giving them consuls and rectors 
as they wished, dismembering the old laws of the guilds to which 
they were subjected because they wanted higher salaries for 
their work.60
For the leaders of the second group, Manno and Corso Donati, city records 
reveal an additional and more tangible insult: on 30 December 1342 the two 
men appealed to the Duke about a decision that one of his judges had made 
against them in a property dispute.61 All of these groups and perhaps others 
plotted separately, seemingly unbeknownst to each other, developing distinct 
and competing plans: while some conspirators dealt in secret with foreign 
allies (Pisans, Sienese, Perugians, and, of course, the Counts Guidi) to 
receive troops and support, others conspired to murder the duke while he was 
going to the council, or watching the palio (public horserace) on the feast of 
San Giovanni (24 June), and so on. “The third sect had decided,” Villani says, 
“[to attack the Duke] at the house of the Bordoni at the [narrow piazza by the] 
Croce all Trebbio because he regularly rode there to meet his mistress.”62
60 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.8, Quello che ‘l duca d’Atene fece in Firenze mentre 
ne fu signore: “E così puttaneggiava e disimulava il duca co’ cittadini, togliendo ogni 
baldanza a’ grandi che·ll’aveano fatto signore, e togliendo la libertà e ogni balìa e 
uficio, altro che ‘l nome de’ priori, e al popolo; e cassò l’uficio di gonfalonieri delle 
compagnie del popolo, e tolse loro i gonfaloni, e ogni altro ordine e uficiali di popolo 
cassò, se non a suo beneplacito ritegnendosi co’ beccari, vinattieri, scardassieri e 
artefici minuti, dando loro consoli e rettori al loro volere, dimembrando gli ordini 
antichi dell’arti a·ccui erano sottoposti per volere maggiori salari di loro lavorii.”
61 Described in Paoli, Della signoria, document 210, 99. 
62 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.16, “La terza setta aveno ordinato, imperò ch’egli 
cavalcava sovente per amore di donna da casa i Bordoni alla Croce a Trebbio.”
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It was the third sect, led by Antonio Adimari, which was first brought to 
light when a member of the allied Sienese contingent (uno masnadiere 
sanese) discussed the plot with his friend Francesco Brunelleschi, who 
revealed it to the Duke’s men, already on heightened alert. On 18 July, the 
Duke had two of the lowliest men implicated in the plot, Pagolo di Francesco 
del Manzeca and Simone da Monterappoli, arrested and tortured. When they 
revealed the full scope of the conspiracy, the Duke had its capo Antonio 
Adimari and several others imprisoned; but, says Villani, “finding the 
conspiracy against him so great, and with so many great and powerful citizens 
taking part in it, he did not dare to execute the prisoners,” sending instead for 
his own soldiers and requesting three hundred additional knights from his ally 
Taddeo Pepoli, the lord of Bologna.63 When word arrived that these forces 
were approaching Florence, the Duke summoned more than three hundred 
leading citizens, “magnates and popolani from every family and house [grandi 
e popolani d’ogni famiglia e casato],” to the palace on 26 July intending, 
according to Villani, “to have the windows barred to seal off the entire hall, to 
kill and behead everyone inside, and to run through the city [correre la terra] 
as the pitiless Totila Flagellum Dei had done when he destroyed Florence.”64
63 Ibid., “trovando la congiura contro a·llui sì grande, e·cche tanti grandi e 
possenti cittadini vi tenieno mano, non ardì di fare giustizia de’ detti presi…”
64 Ibid., “…che come fossono ragunati nella sala del palagio, ch’avea le 
finestre ferrate, come detto avemo, di fare serrare la sala, e quanti dentro ve 
n’avesse fare uccidere e tagliare, e correre la terra al modo fece l’empissimo Totila 
Fragellum Dei quando distrusse Firenze.” The title “Flagellum Dei (scourge of God)” 
is more correctly given to Attila, but the Ostrogoth Totila attacked Florence in the sixth 
century AD. The expression “correre la terra” is discussed in Richard C. Trexler, 
“Correre la terra: Collective Insults in the Late Middle Ages,” Mélanges de l’Ecole 
française de Rome: Moyen-Age, Temps modernes 96 (1984): 845-902, but it does 
not here [or later in this dissertation] mean to hold a race to ritually insult an enemy, 
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With their murderous plots uncovered and the Duke’s forces growing, the 
conspirators decided to act; this time:
The Adimari, Medici, and Donati were the leaders; the bells for 
None [around 4PM] on Saturday having rung, the workers having 
left their shops for 26 July, the feast of Saint Anne, AD 1343, 
they arranged in Mercato Vecchio and the Porta San Piero for 
some thugs [ribaldi fanti] to start a fake brawl and cry, “To arms! 
To arms!,” which they did. … And right away, as was planned, all 
citizens took up arms, whether they fought on foot or on 
horseback, each in his own neighborhood, bringing out flags with 
the arms of the popolo and the commune, as was planned, 
shouting, “Death to the Duke and his men [seguaci], and long 
live the popolo and Commune of Florence and liberty!” …Those 
in the sesto [“sixth,” an official distict] of the Oltrarno [south of the 
river], both magnates and popolani, swore an oath and kissed 
each other on the mouth, and they blocked the ends of the 
bridges, so that even if the whole city on the other side were lost, 
they would courageously control their side.”65
As their plans to murder the Duke collapsed, the various “sects” combined—
with the Adimari, Medici, and Donati representing at least the second and 
third—and conspired to begin a general insurrection. Corso Donati, who had 
led the second “sect,” broke open the communal jail called the Stinche “with 
his brothers and other followers,” releasing all the prisoners within, including a 
signifying instead either “to sack a town or rise up in revolt,” a meaning noted by 
Trexler on page 847.
65 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.17, Come la città di Firenze si levò a romore, e 
cacciaronne il duca d’Atene che·nn’era signore: “Gli Adimari, e Medici, e Donati 
principali, sabato sonata nona, usciti i lavoranti delle botteghe dì XXVI di luglio, il dì di 
santa Anna anni Domini MCCCXLIII, ordinarono in Mercato Vecchio e in porta San 
Piero che certi ribaldi fanti fitiziamente s’azzuffassono insieme, e gridassono: 
«All’arme, all’arme!»; e così feciono. …e di presente, com’era ordinato, tutti i cittadini 
furo armati a cavallo e a piè, ciascuno alla sua contrada e vicinanza, traendo fuori 
bandiere dell’armi del popolo e del Comune, com’era ordinato, gridando: «Muoia il 
duca e’ suoi seguaci, e viva il popolo e ‘l Comune di Firenze e libertà!». … Quelli del 
sesto d’Oltrarno, grandi e popolani, si giurarono insieme e baciarono in bocca, e 
abarraro i capi de’ ponti, con intenzione che se tutta la terra di qua si perdesse, di 
tenersi francamente di là.”
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number of friends and kinsmen. Elsewhere, his brother Manno, along with 
men from the Medici, Cavicciuli, Pazzi, and other families, stormed the palace 
of the Podestà and the communal treasury, the Camera del Comune, where 
“they took the books containing the names of bandits, rebels, and convicted 
criminals and burned them all.”66 On the night of Sunday 27 July, the troops 
that had been summoned to the city by the plotters began to arrive, including 
three hundred knights and four hundred crossbowmen from Siena, two 
thousand footsoldiers from San Miniato and Prato, and four hundred soldiers 
led by the Count Simone Battifolle and his nephew Guido. Five hundred 
knights were dispatched from Ghibelline Pisa, but when this was discovered, 
vociferous complaints were heard against the magnates who had called them 
(grande mormorio contro a que’ grandi a·ccui richiesta venivano) and they 
were sent back. 
According to a later account of the chronicler Marchionne di Coppo 
Stefani, the Duke, still shut inside the palace, called upon his priors for advice: 
They counseled him to release all those he had arrested right 
away, and he wanted to make Antonio di Baldinaccio [Adimari] a 
knight… Having exited to the outside, [Antonio] and the other 
prisoners went to their houses. Believing it would pacify the 
people, the Duke hung the banners of the People and of the 
Commune on top of the tower. But this was not enough for the 
people, who barricaded the piazza on every side and kept it well 
guarded, so that no one could enter or leave the palace.67
66 Ibid., “…e poi ruppono la camera del Comune, e di quella tratti tutti i libri 
ov’erano scritti gli sbanditi e rubelli e condannati, e arsi tutti…” Paoli, Della signoria, 
document 371, 149, shows that funds to rebuild the Camera del Comune were 
dispensed in March of 1344. 
67 STEFANI, rubr. 579, 206: “Li quali lo consigliarono che subito lasciasse tutti i 
presi, onde volle fare cavaliere Antonio di Baldinaccio… Ed uscito di fuori egli e gli 
altri pregioni se n’andarono alle lor case. E così il Duca credendo rappacificare il 
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While the Duke and his men were barricaded within the palace, where they 
would stay until finally surrendering on 3 August and leaving Florence three 
days later, the bishop Agnolo Acciaiuoli called a great council (parlamento) 
and created an ad hoc plenipotentiary commission (balìa) of fourteen men 
(seven magnates and seven popolani) to reshape the government: Rodolfo 
Bardi, Pino Rossi, Sandro di Cenni Biliotti, messer Giannozzo Cavalcanti, 
messer Simone Peruzzi, Filippo Magalotti, messer Giovanni Gianfigliazzi, 
Bindo di messer Ottone Altoviti, messer Testa Tornaquinci, Marco Strozzi, 
messer Francesco de’ Medici, Bindo di messer Biligiardo della Tosa, messer 
Talano Adimari, and Bartolo Ricci;68 one of whom (Pino Rossi) had been 
named by Villani as a conspirator, half of whom came from families implicated 
in those plots, and all of whom were magnates or came from the narrow elite 
of families accustomed to ruling Florence. In his account of the year 1343, 
another chronicler, Simone della Tosa, begins by explaining that “the grandi of 
Florence reached an agreement with the popolo grasso, making certain pacts 
before the revolt on 26 July about how Florence would be ruled [patti di 
reggimento].” 69 Under the bishop’s guidance, the balìa (and then a second, 
popolo, misse le bandiere del Popolo e comune in sulla torre. Questo non bastò al 
popolo, ma asserragliata la piazza d’ogni parte, e fatte buone guardie, che niuno non 
entrasse, nè uscisse di palagio.”
68 An official list is transcribed in Paoli, Della signoria, document 316, 126: 
“dominus Rodulfus de Bardis; dominus Pinus de Rubeis; Sander Cennis Biliocti. 
dominus Giannoczus de Cavalcantibus; dominus Symon de Peruzzis; Philippus de 
Magalottis;  dominus lohannes de Gianfigliazzis; Bindus domini Oddonis de Altovitis; 
 dominus Testa de Tornaquincis; Marchus de Strozzis;  dominus Francischus de 
Medicis; Bindus domini Biligiardi de la Tosa;  dominus Talanus de Adimaribus; 
dominus Bartholus de Ritiis.”
69 Annali di Simone della Tosa, 239: “i grandi di Firenze s’accordarono col 
popolo grosso con ordine posto intra loro, di certi patti di reggimento di Firenze, il 
quale poi non fu bene attenuto per li popolani.”
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larger one that subsumed the first) brought into existence a short-lived 
oligarchic and magnate-friendly regime in which the Ordinances of Justice 
were abolished and the priorate expanded to twelve men (four of whom were 
magnates).70 It would not be at all surprising if, in secret discussions before 
the revolt, in which conspirators from different plots joined together, the outline 
of these electoral and political reforms had already been hammered out. 
Simone della Tosa, himself a prominent magnate, also noted of this 
agreement, however, that “it was not well-kept by the popolani,” and, indeed, 
on 22 September popular forces expelled the magnate priors from the palace 
of the priors and re-made the government. And already, within a year, at least 
one of the men who had plotted against the Duke would plot against the new 
popular government. 
The story of the 1343 plots against the Duke of Athens, as told by the 
chronicler Giovanni Villani, provides a rough yet succinct template for the 
conspiracies of the fourteenth-century: the party or faction of elite Florentines 
hoping to claim the stato for themselves, the swearing of oaths, the request for 
foreign troops and assistance, the outbreak of armed violence (the romore), 
often scheduled for a special feast day; the burning of buildings, the use of 
banners and political slogans, the seizure of a government palace, and, finally, 
the creation of a balìa or commission to remake the government in favor of the 
plotters and legitimate their conspiratorial activities as a revolution. In the 
thirty-five years between the summers of 1343 and 1378, however, no other 
plot would reach this last stage.  Again, in this respect, the events of 1343 
70 Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus, 130-2. 
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provide a template, this time for how Florentine conspiracies came to be foiled: 
the conspirator who tells the wrong person of his involvement, the arrest and 
torture of named participants, the ultimate disclosure of the full extent of the 
plot, and the dispatching of armed guards to quell any disturbance. The extent 
to which plots were investigated and the ferocity with which they were 
repressed varied, with some regimes being unwilling to execute conspirators 
or even to fully investigate their plots, and others willing to go to bloody, if 
perhaps necessary, extremes. Whatever the strategies employed by the 
regimes in power, however mild or harsh, the history of conspiracy between 
1343 and 1378 is the history of a political practice seemingly doomed to 
failure.
The Corso Donati Plot of 1344
In the history of early fourteenth-century factionalism in Florence, there 
is undoubtedly no figure more notorious than Corso Donati, whom the 
chronicler Dino Compagni described as “a knight resembling the Roman 
Catiline, but more cruel… with a spirit always dedicated to wrongdoing”71 and 
whose eternal punishment Dante prophesied in the voice of Corso’s brother 
Forese: “I see the one who is most at fault being dragged by a beast to a 
71 La cronica delle cose occorenti ne’ tempi suoi, ed. Isidoro del Lungo 
(Florence: Le Monnier, 1908), ii.20, 100: “Uno cavaliere della somiglianza di Catellina 
romano, ma più crudele! …con l’animo sempre intento a malfare…”; on the image of 
Catiline in the Florentine context, see Patricia J. Osmond’s fascinating article, 
“Catiline in Fiesole and Florence: The After-Life of a Roman Conspirator,” 
International Journal of the Classical Tradition 7 (2000): 3-38.
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valley where no one is pardoned.”72 Not surprisingly, Corso’s death in October 
of 1308 immediately followed his condemnation as a traitor and rebel for 
having plotted and made an alliance (fatta lega e giura), with his father-in-law, 
the Ghibelline mercenary captain or condottiere Uguccione della Faggiuola, to 
“betray the popolo, and overthrow the government of the city [tradire il popolo, 
sovvertire e sommettere lo stato della cittade].”73 And in the case of Corso’s 
grandson and namesake, Corso di Amerigo di Corso Donati, the proverbial 
fruit did not fall far from the tree.  As we have already seen, Corso was, with 
his relative messer Manno, leader of the second “sect and conspiracy” formed 
to murder the Duke, and he played an active role in the events of 26 July. Less 
than one year later, in the spring of 1344, Corso, like his grandfather, would be 
condemned for a plot to overthrow the government of Florence with foreign 
assistance.
The chronicles of Giovanni Villani and Stefani are, in this case, short on 
details. “Corso di messer Amerigo di messer Corso Donati was condemned in
contumacy in his person and property,” says Villani, “for some letters that were 
found, which he was exchanging with certain Lombard tyrants, with whom he 
was engaged in a conspiracy [trattato] against the people [popolo] of 
Florence.”74 To this, Stefani adds only two details, that Corso’s house was 
72 Purgatorio, 24, ll. 82-4: “…che quei che più n’ ha colpa / Vegg’ io a coda 
d’una bestia tratto / in ver la valle ove mai non si scolpa.” 
73 GIOVANNI VILLANI, ix, 96, Come fu morto il nobile e grande cittadino di 
Firenze messer Corso de’ Donati.
74 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.32, Di certe novità state in Firenze in questi tempi: 
“Ancora nel detto tempo fu condannato Corso di meser Amerigo di meser Corso 
Donati nell’avere e nella persona per contumace, per certe lettere che furono trovate, 
che mandava ed erano mandate a·llui da certi tiranni di Lombardia, con cui tenea 
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searched to find the letters, and that the Lombard tyrant was Luchino 
Visconti,75 the condottiere and lord of Milan, whose armies were then in the 
nearby Lunigiana, a strategic region to the northwest of Lucca, skirmishing 
with those of his one-time ally Pisa. The sentence against Corso of the 
Capitano, messer Paoluccio da Calboli of Forlì,76 a famous knight and 
condottiere from a family that had long provided Florence with rectors, states 
that “in writing and receiving the letters, he conspired and plotted with enemies 
and adversaries” of Florence,77 but the list of named enemies does not include 
Luchino Visconti or any of the tyrants of Lombardy; they were instead 
adversaries closer to home: the brothers Guido, Bustaccio, and Francesco di 
Biordo Ubertini, along with three of their sons, the Count Bandino di Uberto of 
Romena, and Trenta di Ficazzaio of the Pazzi family of the Valdarno.78  In the 
alcuno trattato contro al popolo di Firenze…” 
75 STEFANI, rubr. 605, 220: “…trattato co’ tiranni di Lombardia, cioè con 
messer Luchino Visconti… la casa fu cerca, e trovarsi le lettere che davano colore 
alla materia.”
76 For some of Paoluccio’s exploits, see Leone Cobelli, Cronache forlivesi 
dalla fondazione della città sino all’anno 1498, eds. Giosuè Carducci and Enrico Frati 
(Bologna: Regia Tipografia, 1874), 104 and 419. One may also find biographical 
sketches for him, his father (Fulceri), and son (Francesco), on Roberto Damiani’s 
impressive website www.condottieridiventura.it, note biografiche 0328-0330. 
77 The sentence “contra Corsum domini Almerighi Donati de Florencia de 
populo Sancti Petri maioris de Florencia magnatem et potentem et de domo 
magnatum et potentum civitatis Florencia” is located in ASF, Capitano, 11, f. 1r: “…et 
sic rescribendo et literas recipiendo tractavit et tractatum habuit cum predictis inimicis 
et emulis dicte civitatis…”; see also f. 73r, for the condemnation of a Sienese 
conspirator named Alberto who assisted Corso. 
78 Ibid.: “Guidonem, Bustacium, [et] Francischum, fratres et filios Biordi de 
Ubertinis… Nicolaum filium dicti Guidonis, Gualterium filium dicti Bustaccii, 
Bustacinum filium dicti Francisschi, Bandinum Uberti comitem de Romena, Trentam 
olim Figazaie de Paçis vallis Arni…”
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months following the Bardi-Frescobaldi plot of 1340, some of these families 
had conspired along with the Visconti and other Ghibellines against Florence, 
but their resistance to Florentine supremacy and their alliances with Florentine 
magnates and, earlier, Ghibellines, is part of a longer story. 
Before merging with the Sieve river and flowing west to Florence, the 
Arno forms a large loop made up of three distinct regions: the Casentino, the 
plain of Arezzo (la piana di Arezzo), and the upper Arno valley (il valdarno 
superiore). Throughout the thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, dominant 
clans in these regions had regularly challenged the power of Florence, which 
was always pressing to extend and expand its territorial dominion; and, among 
these clans, the Counts Guidi, of which the Counts of Romena were a branch, 
the Ubertini of Arezzo, and the Pazzi of the Valdarno were the most 
prominent.79 Below is a map of the Arno river valley east of Empoli. It is 
impossible here even to adumbrate the history of this resistance against 
79 The literature on these regions and families is vast, particularly on the Conti 
Guidi and the Casentino. On the early history of that region and family, see Chris J. 
Wickham, The Mountains and the City: The Tuscan Apennines in the Early Middle 
Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 151-344; Currado Curradi, “I conti Guidi nel 
secolo X,” Studi romagnoli 28 (1977): 17-64; and Natale Rauty, Documenti per la 
storia dei conti Guidi in Toscana. Le origini e i primi secoli, 887-1164 (Florence: 
Olschki, 2003). By the mid-eleventh century, the Guidi controlled Romena, Castel 
Castagnaio, Porciano, Papiano, Stia, Lonnano, Battifolle, Poppi, Buiano, and other 
towns. On the later history, one may consult Giovanna Benadusi, A Provincial Elite in 
Early Modern Tuscany: Family and Power in the Creation of the State (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), especially 14-16, but passim; and Marco 
Bicchierai, Ai confini della repubblica di Firenze. Poppi dalla signoria dei conti Guidi al 
vicariato del Casentino (1360-1480) (Florence: Olschki, 2005). On the Valdarno, see 
the essays in Lontano dalle città: il Valdarno di sopra nei secoli XII-XIII. Atti del 
convegno di Montevarchi-Figline Valdarno (9-11 novembre 2001), eds. Giuliano Pinto 
and Paolo Pirillo (Florence: Viella, 2005). On the reach of the Ubertini, see Giovanni 
Cherubini, “La signoria degli Ubertini sui comuni rurali casentinesi di Chitignano, 
Rosina e Taena all’inizio del Quattrocento,” Archivio storico italiano 126 (1968):151-
169.
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Florentine power, but three elements of it are crucial. First, Florentine policy in 
the region was often explicitly directed against them. When, in March of 1337, 
for example, the condottiere Pier Saccone Tarlati sold Arezzo to Florence for 
just under fifty thousand florins, the official act of submission required the 
Aretines to forbid any members of the Ubertini or Valdarno Pazzi from entering 
or residing in the city.80 Second, these families were, to a large extent, 
interrelated by blood and marriage and politically allied. 
It is telling, given Corso Donati’s fellow conspirators, that, for example, 
when Count Aghinolfo di Guido of Romena made his testament in 1338, 
Trenta Pazzi was present as a witness.81 And, third, these families were often 
tied by similar bonds to Florentine magnates. For example, Dino Compagni 
notes in his chronicle that Corso’s infamous grandfather and namesake had 
married the daughter of Accirrito da Gaville, who was himself one of the 
Ubertini of the Valdarno superiore, but Dino appears to have been in error as 
he actually married Tessa, the daughter of Ubertino degli Ubertini.82
80 The “Submissio civitatis aretii anno millesimo trecentesimo trigesimo sexto, 
indictione v, die septimo mense martii,” [7 March 1336[7]), is printed in Annales 
Arretinorum maiores et minores, eds. Arturo Bini and Giovanni Grazzini (Città di 
Castello: Lapi, 1902), 51-60; see the article on 53: “Item quod pro pacifico et 
tranquillo statu civitatis Aretii et ad omne scandalum evitandum, nullus de domo 
Ubertinorum nec de domo de Pacis vallis Arni… nec eorum vel alicuius eorum filii et 
descendentes per lineam masculinam possint venire, habitare, stare vel morari in 
cìvitate, comitatu et districtu Aretii, per totum dictum tempus decem annorum, nec 
prope dictum comitatum et districtum Aretii, per decem millaria.”
81 The testament is transcribed in Delizie degli eruditi toscani, ed. Ildefonso di 
San Luigi, volume 8 (Florence: Cambiagi, 1777), appendix to the second volume of 
Stefani’s Istoria fiorentina, 116-121, quotation at 121: “…presentibus nobilibus viris… 
Trenta quondam nobilis viri Figazzai de Pazzis Vallis Arni…”
82 La cronica, i.20, 84; for Accirrito as an Ubertini, see Paul Scheffer-
Boichorst, Florentiner Studien (Leipzig: Herzl, 1874), 126-7; on the correct name, see 
Davidsohn, Forschungen, iv, 259-60.   
Map of the Arno River Valley east of Empoli circa 1340
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ILLUSTRATION II
48
Samuel Cohn has recently argued that the Florentine “state” was 
created in the early fifteenth century by negotiating with rebellious and largely-
autonomous mountain peasants,83 but it is clear that in the mid-1340s the 
same kind of revolts were being orchestrated and led by members of these 
powerful families who had large peasant followings or clienteles, just as many 
Florentine magnates had retainers throughout the contado and Arno valley. In 
December of 1344, for example, the Ubertini attempted to reclaim their 
ancestral castle at Cennina (near Montevarchi, see map above), bringing with 
them a large contingent of peasants.84 It is not clear exactly what relationship 
Corso di Amerigo Donati had with these rebellious Tuscan lords and their 
peasant clienteles, or what relationship, if any, they had with Luchino Visconti 
in 1343, but it is clear that Corso’s plot may fruitfully be viewed in two parallel 
contexts—the repeated attempts of the Florentine magnates to regain their 
political dominance and break the popolo, as well as the widespread feudal 
resistance—and, in this way, Corso’s plot is remarkably similar to the Bardi-
Frescobaldi efforts in the earliest years of the decade. Remarkably, as we will 
see, magnate disaffection and hopes to end popular government in Florence 
would persist even as the factional lines in the city began to be redrawn 
between the dueling Ricci and Albizzi factions. 
83 Samuel K. Cohn, Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and Rebellion, 
1348-1434 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For the crux of his 
argument, see especially chapter 9, “What the Peasants Won,” 244-268. 
84 ASF, Podestà, 116, f. 18rv. 
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Corso Donati’s plot was likely the most serious plot against the popular 
government that was instituted in 1343 and would ultimately crumble in 1347-
8, but the entire period was one of seemingly smaller-scale conspiratorial 
tensions within the city and outside of it.  Late in November of 1343, little more 
than two months after the expulsion of the magnate priors and the creation of 
the popular regime, the Podestà fined the magnate Tommaso di Riccardo de’ 
Bardi one hundred florins for a conversation he had had in the shop of a tailor 
named Bartolo di Lapo. According to the sentence, Tommaso boasted to 
Bartolo, “I’m telling you, the popolani grassi want to get rid of the men of the 
Popolo [populares minores] who are now in charge in Florence and the grassi
have already asked many magnates to help them trample and crush the lesser 
popolani, and one day soon, when the Popolo doesn’t see it coming, it’ll really 
be check mate!”85 The Podestà’s sentence declares that these words “were 
not and are not true,” but notes that the words themselves, spoken to create 
“strife and trouble,” were capable “of disturbing the peaceful and tranquil 
government [turbare statum pacifichum et tranquillum]” of the city. Such 
scandalous words were not, at the time, uncommon. In another sentence from 
1346, for example, a furrier (pelliparium) named Brunaccio Sulli was speaking 
to one Iacopo di messer Spina (called variously “Tengna” and “Tengha” in the 
record) and said something likely to cause trouble and conflict (scandalum et 
85 Transcribed in Niccolò Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, document 18, 107-08: 
“…infrascripta verba acta ad inducendam zizaniam et scandalum in dicta civitate 
Florentie, et firmiter tibi dico quod populares grassi dicte civitatis Florentie volunt 
deponere populares minores modo regentes in dicta civitate et iam dicti populares 
grassi requiserunt plures magnates dicte civitatis ad hoc ut sint cum eis ad 
conculcandum et deprimendum dictos populares minores, quod si dicti populares 
minores sibi non providebunt una die cito firmiter habebunt scaccho macto, que verba 
dicta per dictum Thomassum non fuerunt et nec sunt vera…”
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divisio): “that the magnates, the popolani grassi, and bankrupt persons ought 
to start a riot, using this slogan, ‘death to the Ghibellines and viva il popolo and 
the guilds!’”86 Both of these statements (and others like them in the criminal 
records) speak to the possibility of larger plots against the government, but 
such conspiracies did not materialize.  Nonetheless, unrest did occur. On 26 
June 1347, for example, Lotto di Giovanni da Sassoferrato, the Capitano del 
Popolo of Florence, condemned a certain Monte di Lippo of the parish of 
Santa Lucia in Ognissanti who, the sentence reads, 
shouted in the garden of the church of San Michele against the 
Lords priors of the People and Commune of Florence, and, 
running, came to the piazza of the priors with a very great 
multitude of men, both citizens of Florence and foreigners, crying 
out and shouting against the priors; and in the piazza he cried 
out and exclaimed in this way, “To the ground! To the ground! 
From the windows! Thrown them down!” As a result, great 
masses of people came together in the piazza of the Priors, and 
riot and tumult and trouble and strife arose in the city of 
Florence, and because of these things, the good and peaceful 
and tranquil government of the city of Florence and its contado
and distretto was able to be disturbed and was disturbed.87
86 The words are recorded in the sentence “contra Brunaccium Sulli 
pelliparium de populo Sancti Remoli” and others, in ASF, Capitano, 42, 11r: “debet 
fieri rumor per magnates, populares grossos, et per fallitos sub hoc colore et nomine, 
vz., moghano i ghibellini et viva ‘l popolo et l’arti.”
87 The sentence “contra Montem Lippi populi Sancte Lucie omnium sanctorum 
de Florentia” is in ASF, Capitano, 48, f.31rv: “…exclamavit in orto sancti michelis 
contra dominos priores populi et communis Florentie, et currendo venit ad plateam 
dominorum priorum cum maxima multitudine hominum civium et forensium gridando 
et exclamando contra predictos dominos priores et in ipsa platea gridavit et 
exclamavit hoc modo videlicet adterra adterra, dalefenestre bulliatelgiusu 
bulliatelgiusu [a terra, a terra, dalle finestre, Buttateli giù su] propter que infinite 
gentes trasserunt ad plateam predictorum dominorum priorum et rumor et tumultus, 
scandalum et divisio orti fuerunt in civitate florentie et propter que omnia et singula 
bonus, pacificus, et tranquillus status civitatis Florentie eiusque comitatus et districtus 
turbari potuisset et turbatus fuit…” Monte’s accomplices and followers, “eiusque 
complices et seguaces,” are not named. Monte brought with him both cives and 
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The reasons for Monte’s angry denunciation of the priors are unclear, but his 
ability to attract a large crowd of men attests to an environment of widespread 
political unrest. This environment of unrest was largely eliminated after the fall 
of the popular government, which ushered in a twelve-year calm before the 
next major conspiracy against the government, which would prove to be the 
only serious elite plot between the 1340s and 1370s.88
The Ricci-Magnate Plot of December 1360
By the mid-1350s the tumultuous relationship between Guelf Florence, 
which produced vast quantities of goods for export, and Ghibelline Pisa, which 
controlled the great seaport where the Arno emptied into the Ligurian Sea, had 
already twice erupted into full-scale war, first in 1315-16 and then (as 
discussed above) in 1340-42—the latter conflict ending, in the words of 
Giovanni Villani (xiii.25), with a fake peace and lingering ill-will (la infinta pace 
co’ Pisani rimanendo la mala volontà). In June of 1356, under the influence of 
a popular party calling themselves the Raspanti, the Pisans violated the fragile 
peace by imposing a two-denarii-per-pound impost on all Florentine goods 
forenses, citizens and likely men of the contado, where unrest was common at this 
time; for another example of men from the contado causing trouble in the city, see the 
sentence contra “Ser Johannem ser Lapi de artimino comitatus florentie” in ASF, 
Esecutore, 17, 17rv. 
88 I do not, in this thesis, discuss the well-known conspiracy undertaken by two 
men from Prato to turn their city over to the papacy in 1375, described in Alessandro 
Gherardi’s masterful article, “Di un trattato per far ribellare al comune di Firenze la 
terra di Prato, nell’anno 1375,” Archivio storico italiano, iii, 10 (1869): 3-26, which 
precipitated the war against the papacy. 
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passing through the port, to which the Florentines quickly responded by 
reaching an agreement with the Sienese to use Talamone, a small port-city on 
the coast of the Maremma, as an alternative.89 By early November, the 
Florentines had left the Porto Pisano; but the move proved, to some extent, a 
double-edged sword: harming the Pisan economy and inciting political unrest 
there, but also damaging the all-important Florentine wool industry,90 and 
possibly contributing to a general decline in the Florentine economy between 
1358-1360.91 Early in 1360, word reached Florence of a plot resulting directly 
from the move to Talamone; “the guildsmen of the city of Pisa, and especially 
those of the minor guilds,” Matteo Villani explains, 
89 Luciano Banchi, “I porti della Maremma Senese durante la Repubblica,” 
Archivio storico italiano, 3rd series, nn. 55-56, 58-60 (1869-70): 58-84, 79-91, 73-106, 
92-105, 39-129; especially chapters 4 and 5, at n. 58 (1870): 73-106, with the treaty 
of 1356 transcribed at n. 60 (1870): 74-87. These events are also described very 
briefly in Charles C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De militia
of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 26. Even after the 
subsequent war with Pisa (1362-4) had ended, Florentines continued to use 
Talamone and Florentine commercial use of Porto Pisano did not return to pre-1357 
conditions until 1369; on the conclusion of that conflict, see Dante Catellacci, “La 
pace tra Firenze e Pisa nel 1364,” Archivio storico italiano, 5th series, n. 167 (1888): 
145-165, with the transcribed pacts beginning at page 148 and containing no mention 
of the port. 
90 Larger and more secure, Porto Pisano was naturally superior to Talamone 
as a port for Florentine merchants, for reasons discussed in Marco Tangheroni, 
Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento (Pisa: Pacini, 1973), chapter 5. 
On Siena’s largely-failed efforts to transform Talamone into a major and fully-capable 
port in the fourteenth century, see William M. Bowsky, The Finance of the Commune 
of Siena, 1287-1355 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 23-5. The impact of the move 
to Talamone on the Florentine wool industry is discussed in Hidetoshi Hoshino, L’arte 
della lana in Firenze nel basso Medioevo: il commercio della lana e il mercato dei 
panni fiorentini nei secoli XIII-XV (Florence: Olschki, 1980), 163-4. 
91 Brucker, Florentine Politics, 15, has noted that there were twelve 
bankruptcy commissions initiated in those two years, compared to seven in the 
preceding nine years (1349-57) and only two in the following five years (1361-5), as 
evidence that this was a recessionary period. 
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seeing a loss of income due to the Florentines’ decision to 
prohibit the export of goods through their port, were mumbling, 
grumbling, and speaking ill of them. When these complaints did 
not go away, many of them very secretly swore oaths together [si 
giurarono insieme molto occultamente] and decided among 
themselves that on 3 April, which was Good Friday, they would 
kill many of the most important men [maggiorenti] in the city’s 
government, wherever they could be found either together or 
apart.92
This plot, aimed ultimately at a regime change in order to come to terms with 
the Florentines over the port controversy (riformare la terra, e pacificare co’ 
Fiorentini, per riavere il porto), included, in addition to the lower guildsmen, 
“some religious, both priests and other clerics” [religiosi alquanti, e preti, e altri 
cherici assai],” one of whom was arrested after being spied upon cursing and 
speaking obscenely (sconciamente) with other lay conspirators (secolari della 
congiura) about the plan. The disgraceful priest’s confession led to the arrest 
by Pisan officials of four priests, seven friars, and one hundred minor 
guildsmen (cento artefici d’arti minute), and to the discovery of a wider plot 
that was quickly and cruelly suppressed with the hanging of twelve of the chief 
conspirators. But “this political unrest [novità],” Villani concluded, “troubled and 
impoverished the city greatly by destroying the regime of the faction which was 
then ruling; and there was still great rivalry in the city and the popolo minuto
92 MATTEO VILLANI, IX.78, “Gli artefici della città di Pisa, e massimamente 
quelli dell’arte minuta, vedendo loro mancare i guadagni per la partita de’ Fiorentini, i 
quali il loro porto teneano in divieto, se ne doleano, e mormoravano e parlavano 
male; e perseverando nelle querele, una quantità di loro si giurarono insieme molto 
occultamente, e presono ordine tra loro, per il quale il venerdì santo, a dì 3 d’aprile, 
doveano uccidere gran parte de’loro maggiorenti ch’erano al governo della città dove 
e come trovar gli potessono insieme o divisi…”
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remained unhappy and in a worse condition.”93 In many respects the contours 
of this Pisan plot, as described by Matteo Villani, follow the same pattern as
the plots in Trecento Florence—secret meetings and oaths, the planned 
outbreak of violence on a holy day, even the involvement of clergy; but, in its 
scope and in the viciousness of its repression, the Pisan was greater than any 
such plot at Florence until December of 1379. More representative of 
Florentine plots in this era was the conspiracy uncovered in December of 
1360, eight months after the bloodshed in Pisa, and also possibly causally 
linked to the closure of the Pisan port.  
Just as wool manufacturers were suffering on account of their city’s 
foreign policy decisions, magnates and members of the Ricci faction found 
themselves in a precarious political situation on account of the vicissitudes of 
Florentine internal affairs. The year 1355, in which the emperor Charles IV 
entered Italy to be crowned in Milan and then Rome, saw in Florence a 
renewed debate about the political status of magnates that resulted, against 
sometimes fervent opposition in the councils, in legislation that loosened 
restrictions on magnate office-holding and abolished the use of the tamburo, a 
box in which magnates could be secretly denounced to the Esecutore for 
crimes and offenses against popolani.94 On 12 September 1360 this measure 
was overturned, and the tamburo was re-instated. This revival of secret 
denunciations followed the creation, in 1358-9, of ammonizione, a method of 
93 Ibid., “Questa novità molto conturbò e impoveri la città con guasto dello 
stato della setta che allora reggea, la quale ne rimase in grande gelosia, e il popolo 
minuto malcontento e peggio disposto.”
94 See, for example, the debate in ASF, CP, 1, f. 148rv, about magnate office-
holding; and for the measure eliminating tamburazioni, see ASF, PR, 41, 137v-138r. 
MATTEO VILLANI describes the emperor’s journey to Rome in IV.92 and V.2.
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proscription employed by the Parte Guelfa to declare their enemies 
Ghibellines and thus exclude them from office-holding without trial.95 Both 
techniques of political warfare were associated at that time with the 
ascendancy of the Albizzi faction over that of the Ricci,96 who were then 
interested in reaching out to magnates for political support, as well as with the 
Albizzi faction’s alliance with the oligarchic leadership of the Parte Guelfa, an 
alliance that truly ruptured only in January of 1373, when the Guelf extremist 
and oligarch Migliore Guadagni brought about the 10-year exclusion of both 
the Ricci and Albizzi from office-holding, and that healed itself to some extent 
during the war against the papacy (1375-8).97
In December of 1360, the Podestà of Florence repressed a plot to 
overthrow the government with the help of several foreign lords. The official 
list98 of conspirators included twelve men—of these, a full half were from 
95 For the renewed tamburo, see ASF, PR, 48, ff. 32rv; for the measures 
which created ammonizione, see chapter 2 at page 95-6. The practice of 
ammonizione in the early 1360s is best discussed in Gene Brucker’s classic article, 
“The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani (1362),” Medievalia et Humanistica 13 (1960): 
48-55.
96 This is clear, for ammonizione, in the pratiche of January-February 1360, 
with notable Albizzi partisans like Bindo Strozzi favoring it and Ricci partisans like 
Filippo Capponi opposing; see ASF, CP, 2, 159v-161v. 
97 On Guadagni’s role, see STEFANI, rubr. 733; for the legislation, ASF, PR, 60, 
143r-144v. 
98 ASF, Podestà, 1525, f. 57-58r contains the sentence, pronounced by the 
Umbrian rector dominus Lodovicus Juvenalis domini Cardoli de Narnia, against 
“Nicholaum Bartholi Boni quarterii Sancti Spiritus, Dominichum Donati Bandini populi 
Sancti Fridiani, dominum Pinum domini Johannis de Rubeis, Ubertum Ubaldini 
Infangati populi sancte Cecilie, Beltramum Bartholomei de Pacçiis, Andream Thelli 
populi Sancti Jacobi, Niccholaum Guiddi Samontane de Freschobaldis, Andream 
Pacchi de Adimariis, Pacçinum domini Apardi de Donatis, Pelliciam Bindi Sassi de 
Gerardinis, Lucham Fey populi Sancti felicis inpacça [sic] et fratrem Christo[xpo]farum 
Nuccii de Florentia, solitum morari in Palatio dominorum Priorum Populi civitatis 
Florentie” (at 57r). Pellicia Gherardini would be later pardoned in ASF, PR, 56, 161r. It 
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magnate clans (messer Pino di messer Giovanni Rossi, Beltramo di 
Bartolomeo Pazzi, Niccolò di Guido da Sammontana Frescobaldi, Andrea di 
Pacchio Adimari, Pazzino di messer Apardo Donati, and Pelliccia di Bindo di 
Sasso Gherardini), while a third of them had been declared Ghibellines, two 
through the use of ammonizione in 1358 (Niccolò di Bartolo del Buono and 
Domenico di Donato Bandini) and two in earlier trials (Uberto di Ubaldino 
Infangati and Andrea di Tello Lischi);99 and three of them (Luca di Feo Ugolini, 
who had just served as prior in May-June, and the already named Andrea 
Lischi and Niccolò del Buono) were wool manufacturers.100 The twelfth plotter 
was the friar Christoforo di Nuccio who regularly stayed in the priors’ palace
with other religious and thus, from his position of trust, had access to the keys.  
To the official list, chroniclers like Villani and Stefani added several other men, 
including the reputed ringleader Bartolomeo di messer Alamanno de’ Medici, 
and two other men from ancient families that had recently been victimized by 
the Parte Guelfa: Attaviano di Tuccio Brunelleschi and Tommaso Adimari, who 
had himself been proscribed in 1359.101
is interesting to note here that at least two of these plotters, Niccolò del Buono and 
Pino Rossi, were close friends of Boccaccio, who dedicated his Commedia delle ninfe 
fiorentine to the former and sent a letter of consolation (on his unjust “exile”) to the 
latter in 1361; for the letter, see Francesco Corrazzini, ed., Le lettere edite e inedite di 
messer Giovanni Boccaccio (Florence: Sansoni, 1877), 67-97.
99 See STEFANI rubr. 678 and 681 for the ammoniti of 1358-9; and the 
documentary appendix to volume 8 of Stefani’s Istoria florentina in Delizie degli eruditi 
toscani, vol. 13, ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi (Florence: Cambiagi, 1780) for the 
1347Ghibelline trials. 
100 This was discovered by Brucker in his investigation of the plot in Florentine 
Politics, 147, n. 148, where he cites records of the Arte della Lana. Brucker, following 
Villani, calls one of the men Andrea dell’Ischia, but I believe Andrea di Tello came 
from the “famiglia di ghibelllini, chiamati Lischi”; STEFANI rubr. 718, 273, and this is 
supported by the Podestà’s sentence. 
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The Podesta’s sentence declared that these “sons of iniquity plotted, 
conspired, and made a plot, a deliberation, a conspiracy, and an illicit alliance” 
with “the spirit and intention of overthrowing, disturbing, and removing the 
peaceful government and replacing it with another.”102 And their daring, if ill-
conceived plan called for them “forcefully, violently, and with weapons in hand, 
a group of foreign foot-soldiers with them, to invade, seize, and occupy during 
the night the palace of the People and the residences of the Lords Priors of 
the People of the city of Florence, and, having taken the palace, to seize and 
take over the city by means of a revolt and thereby to completely overthrow 
the current, peaceful government of the city.”103 In seizing the palace, they 
hoped to be aided by the friar Christoforo, who would turn over the keys to the 
plotters at the right time. And, if successful in taking control of the city, these 
men intended to govern Florence with a new constitution (novis modis), under 
which the number of priors would be increased to twelve and the Ordinances 
of Justice would be abolished. The Podestà sentenced all of the condemned 
101 Although Bartolomeo de’ Medici was not officially condemned, his 
participation seems to have followed him well after the plot; for example, Franco 
Sacchetti in novella 180 relates, “Ed è vero che poco tempo innanzi del MCCCLX era 
stato un trattato in Firenze di molti cittadini, e furonne due dicapitati; il qual trattato 
nell’effetto era di cacciare alcune famiglie; e in questo fu Bartolommeo di messer 
Alamanno de’ Medici; e ancora tra’ Medici e gli Ubaldini non fu mai né pace né buona 
volontà”; in Trecentonovelle, ed. Antonio Lanza (Florence: Sansoni, 1984), 405. 
102 ASF, Podestà, 1525, 57r: “animo et intentione dictum pacifichum statum 
subvertendi turbandi et removendi et ipsum statum in alium conmutandi… iniquitatis 
filii tractaverunt conspiraverunt tractatum ratiocinium et conspirationem et 
confederationem fecerunt”.
103 Ibid., 57v: “Per vim et violentiam et manu armata cum aliqua forensium 
peditum conmitiva noctis tempore invadere capere et occupare palatium populi et 
residencias dominorum priorum populi dicte civitatis et dicto palatio prehabito ipsam 
civitatem capere et occupare ad rumorem ita et taliter [quod] ipse presens pacificus 
status civitatis predicte firmiter mutaretur.”
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to death, to have their property confiscated, and to have their images painted 
on the walls of his palace to publicize their infamy; but only two, Niccolò del 
Buono and Domenico Bandini, were actually beheaded, while the rest were 
declared rebels, placed under the ban, and forced to leave Florence.104
In his description of the plot (x.24-5), Matteo Villani claims that these 
two ammoniti, in looking for ways to achieve their conspiratorial ends, had 
discovered that Uberto Infangati, a “greedy and seditious man [uomo cupido e 
vago di novitadi] ,” had already discussed a possible plot with Bernarduolo 
Rozzo, the Milanese secretary (cameriero) of Giovanni da Oleggio, then the 
beleaguered ruler of Bologna, a plot interrupted only when, under assault from 
Bernabò Visconti, Giovanni surrendered the city to cardinal and papal legate 
Gil Albornoz.105 With Giovanni out of the way, Bernarduolo offered the plot first 
to Albornoz, who refused to participate and ultimately revealed its existence to 
the Florentine ambassador, and then to Bernabò Visconti himself, who 
showed interest. Villani also reveals two fascinating details about the plot’s 
exposure and repression. First, Bartolommeo de’ Medici, concerned that the 
plot could not remain secret, confessed to his brother Salvestro, who promptly 
revealed it to the priors in order to “save his brother from danger and infamy 
104 Ibid., 58r; the practice of painting defaming portraits of criminals in public, 
which likely began in thirteenth-century Bologna, was often used in central Italy in 
cases of treason; on the practice, see Gherardo Ortalli, “... pingatur in palatio”: La 
pittura infamante nei secoli XIII-XVI (Rome: Jouvance, 1979) and Gino Masi, La 
pittura infamante nella legislazione e nella vita del comune fiorentino: secoli XIII-XVI 
(Rome: Società del foro italiano, 1931); I discuss the nature of the criminal ban 
throughout chapter 4. 
105 A good account of the events of 1360 in Bologna is found in Salvatore 
Muzzi, Annali della città di Bologna, vol. 3 (Bologna: San Tommaso, 1841), 295-316; 
on Giovanni, see Lino Sighinolfi, La signoria di Giovanni da Oleggio in Bologna, 
1355-1360 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1905). 
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[per trarre il fratello di pericolo e d’abominio]” and to preserve the honor of his 
whole family, which explains his absence from the Podestà’s list. Second, 
once implicated, the treacherous Bernarduolo offered to provide a full list of 
conspirators in exchange for a reward (ultimately of 500 florins), but when he 
turned in a lengthy list of questionable veracity compiled by Uberto Infangati, 
“the whole council assembled and the list was burned in everyone’s 
presence.”106
Villani is entirely clear that the Parte Guelfa’s new technique of 
proscription led to the plot, concluding his account with these words of 
prophecy and discontent: “The law that for the most part had been the reason 
and cause of so much trouble, and that promised worse in the future, was not 
amended at all, nor changed, nor adjusted in any way.”107 And Villani and 
Stefani alike also attribute the birth of the conspiracy to the factional struggle 
then underway in Florence, with Stefani going one step further, voicing 
suspicions that magnates in the Ricci faction (grandi della setta de’ Ricci) were 
implicated in the plot but escaped punishment because “big fish and large 
animals break through the nets.”108
Assuming that the objectives of the plotters described in the Podestà’s 
sentence are accurate, Stefani’s suggestion gains credence, especially since 
the so-called “new ways [novi modi]” desired by the plotters were actually old 
ways: a twelve-man priorate and the abolition of the Ordinances of Justice had 
106 MATTEO VILLANI, x.25: “Ragunato il consiglio, coram omnibus la scritta fu 
arsa…”
107 Ibid.: “La legge, ch’era stata in gran parte cagione e materia di tanto male, 
e peggio per l’avenire promettea, per tutto ciò amendata non fu , né regolata nè 
agiustata in niuna sua parte.”
108 STEFANI, rubr. 685, 257: “…chè li grossi pesci e bestie rompono le reti.”
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been the central features of Agnolo Acciaiuoli’s magnate constitution in 1343. 
If the leaders of the plot were magnates, as the objectives suggest, the 
question of why so many other non-magnates would have joined in the plot 
remains. It is not possible to say much about these conspirators’ motivations, 
but the identities of the condemned certainly speak to a plot coordinated in 
response to the threat of ammonizione, a plot that likely sought to expel the 
leaders of the Parte Guelfa and Albizzi faction and to institute an elite 
government of compromise among magnates, elite Ricci partisans, and the 
enemies of the Parte. The Sienese chronicler Donato di Neri alludes to 
another possible motivation in his discussion of the year 1360: “there was a 
great conspiracy undertaken in Florence,” he says, “by the leaders of the wool 
guild, who were all ruined because, without having access to the port of Pisa 
any longer, the guild was not working.”109 The presence of wool manufacturers 
among the ranks of conspirators does not entirely corroborate Donato di Neri’s 
claim, but it does add to our picture of a plot that took shape amid many 
brewing varieties of discontent—political, personal, and economic. In light of 
this climate, what seems at first glance most striking about this plot—the 
government’s cautious and public decision not to prosecute, or even 
investigate, everyone implicated—makes sense; as Stefani puts it, a large 
investigation could have brought about a great deal of trouble (avrebbe gittato 
grande scandolo) in the city, laying bare irresolvable tensions and perhaps 
even further inciting a sizeable, though inchoate, opposition. Whatever the 
109 Cronaca senese di Donato di Neri, in Cronache senesi, ed. Alessandro 
Lisini and Fabio Iacometti (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1935), 595: “In Firenze si fe’ uno 
grande trattato... per certi caporali dell’arte de la lana, i quali erano tutti disfatti 
peroché l’arte non lavorava per non avere più el porto di Pisa”; in using this source, I 
follow Brucker, Florentine Politics, 187 and n. 147.
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causes of the 1360 plot, the growing arrogance of the Parte Guelfa faction and 
its political weapon, ammonizione, would, within two decades, motivate 
Florence’s best known group of conspiracies, the so-called Ciompi tumult, and 
begin a period of more than three years that saw the city engulfed by 
conspiracy.  
Workers’ Conspiracies and Revolts
The conspiracies against the Duke of Athens, described earlier, and the 
popular revolt that occurred only one and a half months later are the essential 
context for the series of workers’ riots and revolts that erupted in Florence in 
1343. The popular backlash against the elite and magnate government 
created by bishop Agnolo Acciaiuoli’s fourteen-man balìa began even before 
its first priorate was seated.  After the scrutiny of August 1343, the chronicler 
Giovanni Villani tells us, “word spread through the city that Manno Donati and 
similiar leaders of overly powerful families were going to be priors, so the 
people [popolo] became very upset and nearly took up arms in resistance until 
the new priors were drawn and disclosed,” and those men had not in fact been 
selected.110 It is certainly possible that Manno, who had led one of the 
conspiracies against the Duke of Athens, and others like him had been chosen 
110 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.18, Come la città di Firenze si recò a quartieri e si 
raccomunarono gli ufici co’ grandi, ma poco durò: “…fu messa una voce per la terra, 
che de’ priori dovea esere meser Manno Donati e di simili caporali di case troppo 
possenti, onde il popolo si turbò forte, e·ffu quasi in arme per contradiare infino che 
non furono tratti e palesati i nuovi priori…” 
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to serve on the new priorate, just as the conspirator Pino Rossi had served on 
the fourteen-man balìa; if so, this outburst of popular resistance, which forced 
the hand of the powerful families and produced a more moderate, but still 
magnate-inclusive priorate, presaged the events of 22 September. When, on 
that day, the popolo demanded that the magnate priors leave the palace, they 
did so after first meeting in secret and working out a plan [segretamente 
trattaro] with the bishop, some of the non-magnate priors, and a group of 
popolani knights who had given them “assistance and approval [aiuto e 
favore],” including none other than messer Antonio Adimari, who had led 
another of the plots against the Duke and been knighted by the Duke in prison 
as a sign of goodwill to his enemies. When this plan came to light, prominent 
magnates in the Bardi, Rossi, and Frescobaldi families cried out at what they 
saw as injustice: “Let’s see who will take away our share in the government 
and drive us out of Florence, we who freed her from the Duke!”111 Some of the 
plotters, like the Bardi and Frescobaldi who had turned the Oltrarno into a 
fortress on Saint Anne’s day, would be excluded from the new government 
and others, like Antonio Adimari, would help create it. It is not surprising that 
the Bardi would, as Villani tells us, call the bishop a “traitor who had first 
betrayed the commune and people [popolo] and given the government 
[signoria] to the Duke, and then betrayed and chased them out”;112 not 
surprising, especially since it had been Acciaiuoli who first conspired with the 
111 Ibid., xiii.19, Come il popolo trassono i grandi dell’uficio del priorato, e 
riformaro la terra: “Noi vedremo chi·cci torrà la parte nostra della signoria, e·cci vorrà 
cacciare di Firenze, che·lla francammo dal duca.”
112 Ibid., “E di ciò erano più principali i Bardi chiamando il vescovo traditore, 
ch’avea tradito prima il Comune e popolo, e data la signoria al duca, e poi tradito e 
cacciato lui…”
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Bardi and Frescobaldi against the Duke. When the angry magnates began to 
arm themselves, a crowd led by the knights Antonio Adimari, Giovanni della 
Tosa, and Geri Pazzi113 marched to the palace and ejected the magnate priors 
by force. On the very next day, another popolano knight would lead another 
crowd through the streets of Florence. 
The Rebellion of Andrea Strozzi
“Fearing that the magnates might revolt [fecessono novità],” the 
popolani “rebuilt the barricades all over the city, making them bigger and 
stronger than when the Duke was expelled, and they kept watch day and night 
with a large, armed force.”114 Amidst this tension, according to the Podestà’s 
later criminal sentence, the knight Andrea Strozzi, 
with the intention of disturbing and subverting the peaceful 
government of the city of Florence, formed a large mob of armed 
men [congregatio gentium et hominum armatorum], with their 
heads held high and banners raised, who started a riot, yelling, 
“To arms! To arms!;” and with them he went to the palace of the 
Lords Priors and Standardbearer of Justice and fought and 
waged war, firing crossbow bolts and hurling stones against the 
113 Ibid., “…col consiglio e ordine di sopradetti III cavalieri del popolo, 
che·nn’erano capo…” Villani calls them “knights of the people,” but STEFANI, rubr. 
595, 216, notes that Antonio and Giovanni were made popolani only after the later 
defeat of the magnates.
114 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.20, Di quello medesimo, e d’altre novità che·nne 
seguirono: “…rifeciono i serragli per la città più grandi e più forti che quando fu 
cacciato il duca, faccendo grande guardia di dì e di notte e stando sotto l’arme, 
temendo che i grandi non facessono novità.”
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honor and the government of the said city and the commune and 
people of Florence and of the Podestà and the Lords Priors.115
According to Villani, Andrea’s army was made of “scoundrels and wool carders 
and like people wanting to rob, numbering into the thousands,” whom he 
attracted by promising to “make them rich, give them plenty of grain, and make 
them lords [signori]”; and, in Stefani’s account, it was made of “around four 
thousand wool carders and men of the working classes [gente minuta] and the 
poor.”116 According to Villani, as Andrea led them to the palace, he cried, “Viva 
il popolo minuto and death to the gabelles and the popolo grasso!,” while, at 
the same time, from behind the barricades, the magnates, who hoped to ally 
themselves with the popolo minuto (presono speranza d’acostarsi insieme col 
popolo minuto), were also yelling, “Viva il popolo minuto and death to the 
popolo grasso and the gabelles!” The crowd was dispersed by the Podestà’s 
forces, who rained arrows upon them from within the palace, and Andrea, who 
115 The sentence, dated 3 November 1343, “contra dominum Andream domini 
Andree de Strozzis” is transcribed in Niccolò Rodolico, Il popolo minuto: Note di storia 
fiorentina (1343-1378) (1899, but repr. Florence: Olschki, 1968), 93: “…facta 
congregatione gentium et hominum armatorum… animo et intentione ac proposito 
turbandi et pervertendi statum pacificum civitatis Florentie, erectis cervicibus et 
banderiis elevatis cum dicta congregatione et gentibus armatis cum tumultu impetu et 
clamore gridando altis vocibus ad arma ad arma, venit ad palatium populi dominorum 
priorum artium et vexilliferi iustitie… et ad dictum palatium pugnavit et bellum dedit 
proiciendo quadrellos et lapides contra honorem et statum dicte civitatis et comunis 
[sic] et populi Florentie et domini potestatis et dominorum priorum…” The expression 
cervicem erigere, to straighten your neck or hold your head up, signified open 
rebellion; see J. W. Fuchs and Olga Weijers, eds., Lexicon latinitatis nederlandicae 
medii aevii (Leiden: Brill, 1979), s.v. “Cervix,” second meaning, at page 710, defined 
as “in opstand komen,” to rebel, and where, among several examples, one finds this 
one from a Dutch source, “in rebellionem et conspirationem erectis cervicibus”.
116 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.20: “…ragunando rubaldi e scardassieri e simile 
gente volonterosi di rubare, in grande numero di parecchie migliaia, promettendo loro 
di farli tutti ricchi, e dare loro dovizia di grano, e farli signori…”; STEFANI, rubr. 590, 
212: “…circa quattromila tra scardassieri e gente minuta e povera…”
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was captured by his kin and forced to leave the city, was later sentenced in 
contumacy to death and property confiscation, in Villani’s words, “as a rebel 
and inciter of riot and conspiracy against the republic [siccome ribello, e 
somovitore di romore e di congiura contro alla republica].” Although it is not 
entirely corroborated by any of the Florentine chronicles or criminal archives, 
an anonymous chronicler of Pistoia and contemporary of Villani has left a 
remarkable account of Andrea’s insurrection. Until the end, the account is 
similar to those of Villani and Stefani, except that he describes a crowd of five 
hundred men, made of workers drawn from every aspect of the wool industry: 
“scardassieri, battitori ad arco, vergheggiatori, tintori, ed altra gente di piccola 
condizione.” But after Andrea was taken away by his kinsmen, the Pistoiese 
adds, “a dyer named Corazza rose up and made himself leader of the popolo 
minuto,” bringing the original five hundred and an additional “eight hundred 
footsoldiers of the popolo minuto” to the palace, where the priors let him inside 
and convinced him to desist with flatteries and promises.117
Within days of Andrea’s assault on the palace, rumors spread through 
Florence that the magnates, thwarted in their improvised attempt to curry favor 
with the popolo minuto and thereby bring down the new government, were 
themselves planning to attack on 25 September.  So, on the 24th, “the 
117 Istorie pistolesi, ovvero delle cose avenute in Toscana dall’anno 1300 al 
1348, ed. Antonio Maria Biscioni (Prato: Guasti, 1835), 413-4: “E per la partita di M. 
Andrea si levò uno tintore, che avea nome Corazza, e fecesi caporale del popolo 
minuto, ed era di piccola nazione e prese tanto di baldimento, che andava al palazzo 
de’ Priori con cinquecento, e con ottocento pedoni del popolo minuto, e da’ Priori per 
tema non gli era tenuto porta, e metteanlo dentro, e gli Priori con lusinghe, e con 
buone parole lo vinceano, e davangli buone promesse e con buone parole lo 
teneano; sicché non fece novità nessuna.” This Corazza is discussed in Samuel K. 
Cohn, Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-1425: 
Italy, France, and Flanders (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2006), 128. 
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popolani of the quarter of San Giovanni, who had made the Medici, Rondinelli, 
and the lawyer messer Ugo della Stufa their leaders, and the popolani of 
Borgo San Lorenzo with butchers and other guildsmen, without the order of 
the commune, in a group numbering one thousand men, and without any other 
company or other forces” attacked the houses of the magnate Cavicciuli (a 
branch of the Adimari) and defeated them in a three-hour street battle.118 Over 
the next five days, the crowds of popolani surged and routed the magnate 
families, of which the Bardi put up the longest struggle before being 
overwhelmed and having their houses ransacked and burned. “The angry 
popolo,” says Villani, “robbed, set fire to, and burned twenty-two palaces of the 
magnates and wealthy families [or, possibly of the Bardi alone], resulting in 
damages of more than sixty thousand gold florins.”119 The forces that defeated 
the magnates on 24-29 September were not likely drawn entirely from the 
ranks of prominent popolani grassi and guildsmen: Villani speaks of a very 
large “force of popolani from Borgo San Frediano and Cuculia and the 
Fondaccio of Santo Spirito [forza di popolani di borgo San Friano e della 
Cuculia e del Fondaccio]” that expelled the Nerli from their houses, a force 
almost certainly (given the areas described) made of unrepresented 
woolworkers and laborers of all types. 
118 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.21, Come il popolo di Firenze assaliro e combattero i 
grandi e rubarono i Bardi e missono fuoco in casa loro: “…i popolani del quartiere di 
San Giovanni, onde si feciono capo i Medici e’ Rondinelli e meser Ugo della Stufa 
giudice, e’ popolani di borgo Sa·Lorenzo co’ beccari e altri artefici, sanza ordine di 
Comune, in quantità di mille uomini sanz’altra compagnia o forza di gente…”
119 Ibid., “E·ll’arabbiato popolo, rubate le case, misono fuoco in casa loro, e 
arsonvi XXII tra palagi e case grandi e ricche, e stimossi il loro danno tra di ruberie e 
d’arsione il valere di più di LXM fiorini d’oro.”
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On the next day, 30 September, it was not the magnates who rose up, 
but the popolo minuto. The chronicler Stefani provides the most detailed 
account of these events, which began when a crowd of “perhaps thirteen 
hundred wool carders and other gente minuta” gathered at the church of the 
Servites. The chronicler says that “it wasn’t known what they wanted to do or 
ask for.”120 In response, the  rectors and other forces went out with the “axes 
for beheading, the chopping blocks, and the nooses [mannaie e ceppi e 
capresti]”. The very same forces that had risen up against the magnates one 
day earlier were now, it seems, ready to defeat or suppress the popolo minuto, 
either with swift public punishments and executions, or the fear of them. 
“When [the forces of the commune] were at the loggia of the Pazzi, they heard 
the riot [romore] and saw the crowd [of the popolo minuto] fleeing, [the men in 
the crowd] having already gone to the house of the Visdomini, and already 
defending themselves from attack.”121 The Podestà, who was the marquis 
Giovanni of Monte Santa Maria in the Marche, stepped forward and asked the 
crowd why they were revolting, and “they said that messer Ciritieri had ruined 
Florence and committed robberies; and that, because they were poor, they 
wanted some of the property of the Duke which was put in the house of the 
Visdomini.” 122 They were unable to reach an agreement, and a fight broke out 
120 STEFANI, rubr. 593, 215: “si ragunarono tra scardassieri ed altra gente 
minuta forse 1300 uomini; li quali si ragunarono tutti a’ Servi, e non si sapea quello 
volessero fare, e non richiedieno…”
121 Ibid., “Quando furono alla loggia de’ Pazzi, sentirono il romore, e vidono la 
fuga. Questi erano mossi, ed iti già a casa li Bisdomini, li quali già si cominciavano a 
difendere, che erano assaliti.”
122 Ibid., “dissero che messer Ciritieri fu quello che guastò Firenze, e che avea 
di ruberie fatte, e della roba del Duca messa in casa Bisdomini, che la voleano, 
ch’erano poveri.”
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that ended with two workers punished—one having his hand cut off, and one 
his foot. According to Stefani, the workers said, “We will grow very much, so 
we can be very rich; for, the poor will one day be rich.”123 This messer Ciritieri 
(or Cerretieri) Visdomini had been a counselor of the Duke of Athens and had 
been knighted by him, and, early in 1344, would be painted on the wall of the 
Podesta’s palace along with him as a sign of his infamy124; but it is not clear 
why the crowd on 30 September blamed him for ruining Florence or what 
goods, if any in particular, of the Duke they wanted from his house. One 
possibility is that messer Ciritieri had somehow been complicit in the Duke’s 
downfall and that the robberies he had committed were (in addition to the 
metaphorical robberies of high gabelles) against the Duke himself, which 
would explain how the Duke’s goods ended up in his house—goods that the 
workers thought belonged more to them than to the treacherous messer 
Ciritieri, since the Duke had been their benefactor. Another possibility is that 
this crowd was related to the one that had followed messer Andrea and then 
Corazza a week earlier, and that they rose up again after the priors’ false 
promises proved empty. 
123 Ibid., 216: “Noi cresceremo tanto, che noi faremo grandi ricchezze; sicchè i 
poveri saranno una volta ricchi.”
124 Ibid., rubrics 556, 567, and 608, at pages 196, 200, and 221. In the 
“Frammento di altra cronica,” covering the period 5 August 1342 to 24 May 1345, 
appended to the Cronica di Firenze di Donato Velluti dall’Anno MCCC in circa fino al 
MCCCLXX, ed. Domenico Maria Manni (Florence: n.p., 1731), 141-8 [hereafter 
“Frammento”] it is also noted that “Messer Cerretieri Bisdomini” stayed with the Duke 
on St. Anne’s day. This “chronicle” is actually the ricordanze or “memorie” of the 
merchant Francesco di Giovanni di Durante, located in the Biblioteca Nazionale 
Centrale di Firenze, Magliabechiana, 2, 3, 280. 
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The Tumultuous 1340s
The events of late September initiated a period of great tension in 
Florence, with men from all ranks of society plotting, rioting, and brawling in 
the streets. Tommaso Bardi’s frightful boast that the popolani grassi and 
magnates would crush the popolo and Corso di Amerigo Donati’s nefarious 
plot to enlist the aid of Florence’s Tuscan enemies against the government 
have already been noted. But it was not only magnates who threatened, or 
appeared to threaten, the stability of the regime. In December, what started as 
a street fight in the parish of San Paolo seems to have become a riot. 
According to the Capitano’s sentence, a group of about two dozen men 
“armed with offensive and defensive weapons, to wit, swords, daggers, 
helmets, bracers, and other arms, formed a mob” and “caused a riot… to 
which many people were attracted… shouting, ‘Viva il popolo!’” The crowd 
went to the houses of Francesco di ser Segna, called Mazzone, and 
Francesco di Tura, called Cece, fighting and “shouting and saying, ‘Die, you 
dogs!’”125 No Florentine chroniclers mention this case, and it is not known why 
or to what effect the mob shouted the political slogan, “Viva il popolo!,” but it is 
125 ASF, Capitano, 3, ff. 5r-6v, quotation at 5v: “armati armis offensibilibus et 
defensibilibus vz. spatis cultellis feritoriis corbelleriis bracciavolis et aliis armis 
fecerunt congregationem contra statum pacificum et tranquillum communis et populi 
Florentie… fecerunt clamorem et tumultum… ad quem rumorem multe gentes 
trasserunt… clamantes viva el pupolo [sic]”; “clamantes et dicentes mora li cani.” The 
sentences originally pronounced against “Franciscum ser Segne vocatum Maçone 
populi Sancti Blancatii” and “Franciscum Ture vocatum Cece populi Sancte Lucie 
omnium sanctorum” were later cancelled. None of the condemned persons had 
surnames and many had nicknames, such as a Lapo di Chele called Lapocchio and 
Filippo di Ciccho called Capostaccia. 
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a cry that surely accompanied the exploits of similarly armed bands less than 
two months earlier. 
After another street fight in early March 1344, a certain Agnolo di 
Terrino of the parish of Santa Maria Maggiore, “armed with offensive and 
defensive weapons, that is, with a sharp lance in his hand and a small shield 
on his arm and with other weapons, ran, shouting and saying, “Long live the 
guilds and the people! And death to the Rucellai!,” and he shouted in a loud 
voice, saying, “Fire! Fire! To the house of the Rucellai! Death to the popolani 
grassi!” And Agnolo’s neighbor and associate Betto di Vannuccio di Cialdieri, 
likewise “armed with an unsheathed sword in his hand and a buckler, ran, 
shouting and saying, “Long live the Guilds! And death to the Rucellai traitors! 
Swords! Fire! To the house of the Rucellai!” As a result, a large crowd 
gathered and “there was a very large riot and many people shouted ‘Long live 
the guilds!’”126 Again, it is not clear why these people wanted to incite a riot 
against the Rucellai—one diarist notes that the Rucellai were also attacked 
when the Duke’s notorious gabelle official, ser Arrigo Fei, was cruelly 
126 The sentence “contra Phillipum Cenni Nardi…, Angnolum Terrini et Bettum 
Vannutii Cialderii populi Sancte Marie Maioris de Florentia,” dated 6 March 1343[4], is 
transcribed in Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, 108-9; quotation at 109: “armatus armis 
offensibilibus et defensibilis videlicet quadam lancea ferrata in manu et quadam 
rotella in brachio et aliis armis cucurrit clamando et dicendo Vivat artes et populus et 
moriantur Orcellarii et clamavit alta voce dicendo Al foco al foco ad casa delli Orcellari 
mora li populari grassi. Et… dictus Bectus armatus quadam spata nuda in mano et 
quodam bocchiolerio cucurrit clamando et dicendo viva viva larti et mora li Orcellari 
tradituri, al fero al foco ad casa delli Orcellari. Ad quem rumorem factum per predictos 
et quemlibet ipsorum multe gentes trasserunt et factus est maximus rumor et 
clamabatur per multos viva larti…”
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murdered in July 1343, so it is possible that this crowd hoped to settle 
unresolved disputes from the days of the Duke’s expulsion.127
In early September, two men were fined five hundred florins each for 
having spoken with “many persons capable of creating a scandal and tumult 
among the people, saying that there should have been a riot and revolution in 
the city” on 28 August, the day on which the names of the September-October 
priors would be drawn.128 The sentence does not address the motivation of 
these men, but the priorate of July-August had been marked by the presence 
of two men from families in the oligarchic core of the popolo grasso, an Albizzi 
and a Strozzi. Although nothing can be said with certainty, it is likely that the 
two men calling for a revolution spoke to (and perhaps for) a contingent within 
the lesser ranks of the popolo or popolo minuto that was unhappy with the 
character of the government. 
And, of all the criminal cases pertaining to tumults and riots in this 
period perhaps none is more remarkable than that of Pagnozzo di messer 
Andrea Strozzi who, fewer than six months after his father had led an attack 
on the palace of the priors, was condemned by the Capitano for seditious 
behavior. According to the sentence, a crowd of men had gathered in the 
small street in front of a wine shop and tavern called the Cella di Ciardo in the 
127 “Frammento,” 144, “…allora vi s’abbatterono gli Oricellari…”
128 The sentence “contra Francischum Bandini populi Sancti Remixi de 
Florentia et Phillippum Iohannis Balisteri populi Sancti Pauli de Florencia,” dated 3 
September 1344, is located in ASF, Capitano, 11, f. 16r: “…pluribus personis que 
poterant generare scandalum et turbacionem in populo videlicet dicendo quod rumor 
tumultus et novitas debebat esse in dicta civitate et maxime quando casetta 
dominorum priorum debebat portari ad palatium pro extrahendo priores de mense 
augusti…” The September-October 1344 priorate, led by Lapo da Castiglionchio’s 
son Ruggiero as Standardbearer of Justice, was unremarkable. 
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parish of San Lorenzo,129 and Pagnozzo incited them to riot, revolt, and 
weaken the regime (in turbationem, seditionem, et diminutionem presentis 
status) by shouting loudly (alta voce clamando): “Rabble! Rabble! You rabble 
who are dying of hunger, and have thrown out the one who would have given 
it to you at ten soldi per staio!”130 According to Villani, grain was recently being 
sold at twenty soldi per staio (that is, imperfectly translated into English, twenty 
shillings per bushel), so Pagnozzo was inciting them to riot by telling them that 
they should be getting bread at roughly half the current cost, and possibly that 
his father would have supplied them with grain at that price.131 It is not clear if 
129 In the sentence (see the note immediately below), this place is described 
as the “cantum Celle olim Ciardi” and later as the “cantum Ciardi positum in popolo 
Sancti Laurentii iuxta viam a duobus lateribus et domos Dominici et Nuti olim dicti 
Ciardi…”; this tiny street now appears to be called the Via dell’Amorino (formerly 
dell’Amoricchio) and stretches from present-day Piazza Madonna to Via
Sant’Antonino (formerly dell’Amore). A traditional story about the street is repeated in 
Gene Brucker, Florence, the Golden Age, 1138-1737 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 267, where he states that the “Cella di Ciardo” was the 
location of the wineshop of Ciardo di Betto, who was “condemned to death for leading 
the Ciompi revolution.” One of the July Ciompi leaders was Betto di Ciardo, a wool 
beater (vergheggiatore), who lived in the area, but SER NADDO, 17, also lists a 
“Ciardo di Berto, vinattiere” who was one of the “tassatori sopra gli sbanditi” 
appointed in August 1378 along with Salvestro de’ Medici. The name “Cella di Ciardo” 
clearly refers to a wineseller named Ciardo who operated a tavern and/or wine store 
(“Cella”) there and who died before 1343, leaving at least two sons, Domenico and 
Nuto. 
130 The sentence is transcribed in Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, 94: “…dixit 
canallia, canallia, canallia, che morete di fame, che avete cacciato quello che 
v’avrebbe dato ad dece soldi lo staio, ma anch’io ne farò una manecata di questa 
canallia.” The word “canallia,” rabble or mob, derives from cane, dog. At page 93 in 
Rodolico’s appendix, this sentence is accidentally misdated 18 March 1342[3]; the 
correct date, found in ASF, Capitano, 3, f. 62r, is of course 18 March 1343[4]. 
131 GIOVANNI VILLANI, xiii.13; this year is not covered in Domenico Lenzi, Il libro 
del Biadaiuolo: Carestie e annona a Firenze dalla metà del ‘200 al 1348, ed. Giuliano
Pinto (Florence: Olschki, 1978); but on prices generally in the period, see Richard 
Goldthwaite, “I prezzi del grano a Firenze dal XIV al XVI secolo,” Quaderni Storici 28 
(1975): 15-36.
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the angry Pagnozzo was simply berating the workers standing outside the 
Cella di Ciardo or if, perhaps, he shared his father’s grandiose ambitions and 
hoped to start a revolution of his own; but he denied the charges and was sent 
into confinement in Siena with a 1000 lire fine.
Since the criminal court records before 1343 were destroyed on Saint 
Anne’s day and no extant chronicles treat the subject extensively, we cannot 
determine the extent of earlier secret labor organization among the popolo 
minuto, but the mid-1340s clearly saw an increase in agitations among those 
employed in the wool industry. In early October 1343, just after the defeat of 
the magnates, the Podestà executed two workers. The first, a Sienese named 
Aldobrandino Ciecharini, was condemned to death and later hanged for 
inciting “many men in the city of Florence, and especially the workers” of two 
wool manufacturers, Salvi di messer Lotto Salviati and Matteo di Panizzo degli 
Albizzi, to revolt “on many different days and times”; the second, a certain 
Francesco di Lapo called Grello from the Florentine contado, was condemned 
and hanged a day later for stealing a sword and for having violently “incited a 
riot” among the workers in the parish of San Lorenzo; in this he was joined, 
says the sentence, “by many men, his associates and accomplices, both men 
from the city and foreigners.”132 Whether the two condemned were in 
communication or not is unclear, but it is clear that their crimes emerged out of 
an historical moment in which such violent insurrections and political 
upheavals were an almost daily occurrence. Yet, whereas the forces of the 
132 ASF, Podestà, 23, f. 87r: “…pluribus diversis diebus et horis invitavit et 
requisivit multos et multos homines per civitatem Florentie et maxime discipulos et 
operarios…”, and f. 91r: “cum pluribus et multis hominibus suis sociis et complicibus 
tam civibus quam forensibus… tumultum fecit oriri….”
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popolo and the popolani grassi succeeded in creating a new government and 
expelling the magnates, the demands of the popolo minuto went unanswered. 
Less than two years after the executions of Aldobrandino and “Grello,” yet 
another Florentine in the woolen cloth industry was hanged, this time for 
conspiring to create a guild of wool workers. In his diary of the early 1340s, the 
merchant Francesco di Giovanni di Durante records the execution, devoting 
more words to this crime and punishment than he does to the popular revolt 
and defeat of the magnates: “On 24 May 1345,” he writes, 
the Capitano of Florence, Messer Neccio [de’ Gabbrielli] of 
Gubbio arrested the wool carder Ciuto Brandini and his two sons 
at night because Ciuto wanted to form an association, group, 
and gathering of workers at Santa Croce; on the same day, as 
soon as they heard and knew that Ciuto had been taken that 
night in his bed by the Capitano, the workers, i.e., the combers 
and carders, refused to work unless they got Ciuto back, and 
they went to the priors and asked that he be released safe and 
happy, and said they would bring the whole city to a boil if he 
was not, and that they wanted to be paid better. Ciuto was 
hanged by the throat.133
133 “Trattato,” 148: “A dì 24 di Maggio 345. il Capitano di Firenze cióe fue 
Messer Neccio da Gobbio prese di notte Ciuto Brandini iscardassiere e suoi due 
figliuoli, imperocchè ‘l detto Ciuto volea fare una compagnia a Santa Croce, e fare 
setta, e ragunata cogli altri lavoranti di Firenze, e in questo medesimo dì i lavoranti di 
Firenze, cioè pettinatori e scardassieri sì incontanente, ch’udirono e seppono che’l 
detto Ciuto era istato preso di notte in sul letto dal Capitano, incontanente veruno non 
lavorò, e istettonsi e non voleano lavorare se ‘l detto Ciuto non riavessono e 
andaronne i detti lavoranti a Priori pregandogli che ‘l detto Ciuto faciessono ch’ eglino 
il riavessono sano, e lieto, e detti lavoranti tutta la Terra misono a bollire, che sela 
sarebbono, se ‘l detto Ciuto non riavessono sano e lieto, e anche voleano essere 
meglio pagati. Il detto Ciuto fue poi impiccato per la gola.” Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, 
37, quotes this passage, though making several changes. Brucker, Florentine 
Politics, 110-11, partially translates this account, citing the original manuscript of the 
ricordanze (see note 147 above), at f. 23v.
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The Capitano’s sentence describes Ciuto as “odious and hateful to Florentine 
citizens because of the illicit gatherings he incited and other criminally 
subversive activities” and describes these activities in some detail: 
He devised a brotherhood of carders, combers, and other wool 
workers, as many as he could… and, so that they might have the 
means to gather together and have consuls in their meeting and 
illicit gathering, so that they could bring about these things and 
worse, he organized and encouraged a meeting and illicit 
gathering of very many of the aforementioned disorderly and 
lowly persons on several occasions on different days; and in 
these meetings, among other things, Ciuto proposed and 
arranged for the collection of a certain quantity of money to be 
collected from those who attended the meetings and illicit 
gatherings so they could be stronger and sturdier in this evil 
association and illicit assembly.134
The “modern” aspects of this iniqua societas have been pointed out—with, for 
example, Cohn calling Ciuto’s postura seu collectio a “strike fund” and Brucker 
openly discussing the “parallels between this episode and modern industrial 
conflict”—as well as some of the contemporary features—with Najemy calling 
134 The sentence is transcribed in Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, 102-3: “quod per 
scardazerios pettinatores et alios laboratores in artificio lane, in maiori numero 
quantum habere posse, fingeretur quedam fraternitas… et ad hoc ut haberent 
materiam se ad invicem congregandam et possent consules et capitudines habere in 
eorum congregatione et conventicula, ut facilius predicta et peiora ad effectum 
deducerent, subiessit procuravit solicitavit et fecit adunantiam congregationem 
invitatam et conventiculam pluries et pluribus vicibus et diversis diebus multorum et 
multorum hominum predictorum inordinatorum et male conditionis; et in dictis 
adunantiis et conventiculis inter alia dictus Ciutus proposuit arengavit deliberavit et 
ordinavit quod in dicta cohadunatione congregatione et conventicula fieret postura 
seu collectio inter ipsos certam quantitatem pecunie colligende seu exigende a 
quolibet predictorum de dictis adunantiis congregationibus et conventiculis ut fortiores 
et duriores essent in dicta iniqua societate et conventicula…”
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the association “a guild, complete with consuls.”135 Whatever words we use to 
describe Ciuto’s actions, the Capitano and his judge described them, as we 
would expect, as conspiracies (tractationes ordinate per eum) that caused 
sedition and unrest (propter que tumultus seditio et turbatio fuit). We are left to 
wonder to what extent men like Aldobrandino and “Grello” had been similarly 
attempting to form guilds or other protective or fraternal associations, and to 
what extent Ciuto and his colleagues were responding to the wider 
environment of political and social unrest. This environment certainly provides 
the context in which Ciuto’s associates presented their demands to the priors 
and threatened to riot, as well as the context for Ciuto’s swift hanging—in the 
early years of its tenure, the popular government of 1343-48 was governing a 
city in which enemies were or seemed to be plotting everywhere, magnates, 
popolani grassi, and woolworkers alike.  In such a period, all kinds of 
troublemaking and unrest were described in the familiar language of 
conspiracy. Just after Ciuto’s hanging, for example, a group (conmictiva) of 
only nine men, among them Niccolò di messer Giovanni de’ Medici and Piero 
di Bandino dell’Ischia, were accused of bringing about an illicit gathering 
(choadunationem et congregationem non licitam) that caused a great riot (cum 
maximis rumoribus clamoribus et tumultis) in the piazza of San Marco.136
During the tenure of the popular government, excluding plots clearly 
undertaken by magnates or popolani grassi, more than a dozen groups of men 
135 Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in 
Medieval Europe, 1200-1425 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006, 211; 
Brucker, Florentine Politics, 111; and John M. Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-
1575 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 157. 
136 ASF, Capitano, 19, f. 38rv: “conmictiva hominum et personarum civitatis 
Florentie choadunata esset in platea Sancti Marci de Florentia,” etc. 
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were condemned for having started riots and tumults by the Capitano alone, 
who was charged with maintaining political stability and public safety. 
According to my survey of conspiracies and political crimes in the courts of the 
three foreign rectors from 1343 to 1382, the period 1343-48 (about 15% of the 
total time) witnessed about 40% of such crimes, or 2.7 times as many as one 
would expect with an even distribution. Yet the nature of labor unrest and 
“conspiracy” in this period can perhaps be best understood by examining two 
incidents that occurred in 1346. In the first case, the Podestà condemned a 
group of sixteen wool spinners, predominantly from San Frediano, who first 
created a gathering (congregationem et cohadunationem) “in the street that is 
called the ‘Street of San Pancrazio among the Stamaglioli’” and then walked to 
the house of a cloth manufacturer named Lorenzo di Buonaccorso, where an 
employee of his named Filippo di Piero, a stamaiuolo, and Filippo’s clerk 
(factor) Iacopo di Buonsignore were staying.137 There, says the sentence, the 
group “forcefully and violently expelled Filippo and Iacopo from the house with 
the intention of injuring and harming Lorenzo and of taking and depriving him 
of his house.”138 In the second case, nine workers were harshly punished by 
the Capitano for fighting in the street. This “brawl and unrest [rixa et rumor],” in 
which the participants were armed “with lances, swords, knives, iron spears, 
137 Combed wool was called stame, and a stamaiuolo was “the man who gave 
out combed wool to be spun”; see Florence Edler [De Roover], Glossary of Mediaeval 
Terms of Business: Italian Series, 1200-1600 (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval 
Academy of America, 1934), 413. 
138 The sentence is transcribed in Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, 104-5, “in via cui 
dicitur via di San Prancaçio tra gli stamaglioli; …et ipsum Filippum et Iacobum de ipsa 
domo expulerent per vim et violentiam animo et intenctione iniurandi et molestandi 
dictum Laurentium et tenentes pro eo in possessionem dicte domus et ipsum 
Laurentium sua possessione privandi.” 
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and large and small shields [lanceis, spatis, cultellis, et lançonibus de ferro, 
pavexiis, rotellis, et tavolacciis],” as well as with stones (sassis et lapibus), 
pitted one group of four wool nappers (cardatores)—
Antonio di Vieri of Campognanno (parish: S. Maria in Campo) 
Giovanni di Caurigia called Caurillia (S. Maria in Campo) 
Lappo di Zenino (S. Michele Visdomini) 
Pagnuccio di Rustico (S. Pier Maggiore), 
against a group of five dyers (tintores)—
Ciappo di Chele (S. Iacopo tra Fossi) 
Bonella di Bindo (S. Maria in Campo)
Iacopo di Dinco called Thonica (S. Maria in Campo)
Giovanni di Gherardo (S. Maria in Campo)
Giovanni di Lapo called Soccha (S. Maria in Campo).139
The men identified in the sentence as the instigators of this brawl, Antonio di 
Vieri and “Caurillia,” were, like three of the five dyers, from the parish of Santa 
Maria in Campo. It is not clear if the clash resulted from disagreements 
between the nappers and dyers as occupational groups, or from some 
personal disagreement between men from the same neighborhood, who 
brought friends and fellow laborers into the dispute. Even in the mid-1340s, 
when the memory of the Duke’s guild for dyers was fresh, such acts of 
retribution against employers and worker-on-worker violence were far more 
common than the more celebrated efforts of men like Ciuto to form a 
woolworkers’ guild, and all of these crimes were severely suppressed by the 
139 ASF, Capitano, 62, ff. 60r-61v.
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authorities.140 Words like coadunatio and rumor were multivalent enough to 
encompass a very wide array of illicit behaviors, all of which were considered 
politically subversive and especially dangerous when undertaken by workers.
The Grain Riot of 1368
Samuel Cohn has pointed out that, quite unlike the contemporary 
peasant insurrections of England and France, worker unrest in Florence was 
rarely occasioned by grain or food shortages. In this sense, as he says, “the 
accepted models of insurrectionary activity in a preindustrial period” do not 
apply to insurrection in the urban Florence of the Trecento.141 Only a single 
grain riot is recorded in the Florentine criminal records between 1343 and 
1382; and if we exclude unrest in the contado, that grain riot’s eruption in 1368 
came after nearly two entire decades without serious political upheaval caused 
by workers or the urban poor. On 19 August 1368, the Podestà messer Guido 
de’ Fortebracci of Montone absolved four men—
Massario di Bertino (parish: San Pier Maggiore)
Betto di Stefano (San Piero di Monticello [in the Valdarno superiore])
Frogino di Tano (San Quirico [a Legnaia, in the contado])
Piero di Berto (San Pier Maggiore)
140 For another example, see ASF, Podestà, 127, f. 336rv (1345), in which a 
group of workers came to the rescue of a delinquent debtor. 
141 “Florentine Insurrections, 1342-1385, in Comparative Perspective,” in 
Rodney Hilton and T. H. Aston, eds., The English Rising of 1381 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 148.
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—and sentenced one, Berto di Puccio (San Pier Scheraggio), to death in 
contumacy for having participated in a grain riot that had been suppressed in 
July by the former Podestà messer Ungaro di messer Giovanni degli Atti of 
Sassoferrato. These five men are described in the sentence as having rioted 
“with more than five hundred others, whose names were for the best not 
mentioned in this criminal process.” This large group, yelling “Viva il popolo!” 
the entire time, went to the grain market and spilled many sacks of grain on 
the ground there before bringing more than twenty staia each of grain and 
flour to the palace of the priors. There, they spilled the grain and flour on the 
ground and threw rocks at the priors’ and Podestà’s staff and guards (familia), 
and “the good and peaceful government of the commune of Florence could 
have been disturbed by any of these acts.”142 At this moment in the late 1360s, 
as in the early 1340s, the criminal records reveal a great deal of tension on the 
streets of Florence, not all of it political. In the previous summer, a mob had 
attacked the forces of the Capitano Francesco di Matteo degli Alperini while he 
was moving through Santo Spirito searching for illegal weapons, and, at nearly 
the same time as the grain riot, a child rape led to a riot described in precisely 
the same terms as political tumults (propter que magnus rumor tumultus 
insurexit et multe gentes trasserunt).143
142 This sentence is transcribed by Rodolico, Il popolo minuto, 97-9, quotations 
at 98 and 98-9: “cum pluribus aliis ultra numerum quingentorum quorum nomina in 
dicta inquisitione tacebantur ad presens pro meliori…”; “…ex quibus omnibus et 
singulis verisimiliter bonus et pacificus status communis Florentie turbari debuit et 
potuit…”
143 For the mob, see ASF, Capitano, 145, f. 7r; for the rape, Esecutore, 568, 
quotation at 41r; the sentence was “contra Soldum Nuttini populi Sancte Lucie 
omnium sanctorum de Florentia,” who attacked the seven-year-old daughter of 
“Bandinus quondam Matthey populi sancti pauli de florentia.”
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The history of workers’ revolts and conspiracies before the summer of 
1378 will always be seen as precursory. Nearly one hundred and ten years 
ago Niccolò Rodolico first combed the Florentine criminal archives in search of 
the men “who were the Ciompi before the tumult.”144 Rodolico’s approach was 
flawed in one crucial way. He began, as it were, in 1378 and looked back to 
find proto-Ciompi, when he should have started in 1343 and seen the workers’ 
revolts and conspiracies of 1343-8 as the product of the revolutionary 
atmosphere surrounding the expulsion of the Duke and the destabilizing 
environment created by the popular government. As we have seen throughout 
this chapter, the period of the popular government was one of unrest in 
Florence at both ends of the socio-economic spectrum, as the period 1378-82 
would also be. Popular revolutions in Florence stirred up conspiratorial 
passions among magnates and the elite who were excluded from power or 
who had their power reduced; but, at the same time, they stirred up the 
working classes, who, in the radically expanded office-holding classes of those 
periods, were able to see the real possibility of political representation through 
guild membership. “Some historians,” wrote Gene Brucker in 1972, 
referencing Rodolico, “have argued that the clothworkers developed a strong 
sense of solidarity, and even after their initial efforts to organize were crushed 
in the 1340s, … kept alive their ideal of a laborers’ guild. But given the 
instability of the poor and the wave of epidemics that periodically decimated 
the urban population, this does not seem credible.”145 Brucker’s tendentious
144 Il popolo minuto, 4, “che furono i Ciompi prima del tumulto.” 
145 “The Florentine Popolo Minuto and its Political Role, 1340-1450,” in Lauro 
Martines, ed., Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian cities, 1200-1500 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1972), 155-183, quotation at 171.
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point, while perhaps supported by the nearly three-decade lull in labor unrest 
between 1348 and 1378 is also flawed in one crucial way. In many respects, 
the events of 1378 clearly reveal that the summer revolutionaries, both Ciompi 
and non-Ciompi, were consciously re-enacting the drama that had been 
played out in the summer of 1343 and that they were also working within the 
traditions of Florentine political conspiracy. When Salvestro de’ Medici set the 
events of the “Ciompi tumult” in motion, he chose for his model the expulsion 
of the magnates in 1343—enlisting the aid of the men from San Frediano and 
Cuculia, dismantling and burning down the houses of his enemies, even re-
promulgating the Ordinances of Justice against the magnates when his real 
enemies were the mostly non-magnate leaders of the Parte Guelfa faction. In 
the same way that the popolani grassi lost control of events in 1343 and saw 
their revolution become a revolution of the guilds, Salvestro’s revolution 
likewise came to be co-opted by the minor guildsmen and, momentarily, by the 
workers themselves. Just as the workers of Florence in 1343 would not cease, 
going to the palace of the priors with demands, neither would the workers of 
1378. 
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CHAPTER 2:
CONSPIRACY AND THE TUMULT OF THE CIOMPI
Non sia alcuno che muova una 
alterazione in una città, per credere 
poi, o fermarla a sua posta, o 
regolarla a suo modo [No one should 
start a revolution in a city, thinking he 
can then stop it where he wants or 
control it his way]. –Machiavelli, 
speaking of Salvestro de’ Medici, in
Istorie fiorentine, III.10146
The unidentified fifteenth-century author of a brief set of concluding 
additions to the chronicle of Alamanno Acciaiuoli supplies the preceding story 
of the tumult of the Ciompi with a bitter moral, “how necessary it is to prevent 
similar troubles by not allowing bad seeds to sprout in any way, because once 
they start growing, they spring up too much in the Florentine air”; and he adds, 
“whoever reads Giovanni Villani, the Aretine [Leonardo Bruni], Poggio 
[Bracciolini], and the writings of other historians will surely understand that one 
needs a scissors more than a comb to keep this bit of hair tidy,” suggesting 
both that future class tensions need to be nipped in the bud and that 
Acciaiuoli’s narrative needs heavy pruning to meet the standard set by the 
leading lights of pre-modern Florentine historiography.147 The account that 
146In this conclusion, Machiavelli seems to mirror a passage in the the rabidly 
pro-Guelf chronicle of ser Nofri di ser Piero, which he clearly used as one of his 
sources; see NOFRI, 55, quoted below in note 205.
147 AGGIUNTE, 41: “Dove si potrebbe facilmente cognoscere, allargandosi 
discorrendone, quanto è necessario per fuggire simili inconvenienti non lasciare in 
modo alcuno germogliare nelle città i cattivi semi, quali poi, cominciati a crescere, si 
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follows would surely disappoint our anonymous author because it seeks to 
further uncover and understand the political and class tensions that flowered 
violently in the summer of 1378 and to give a greater voice to both the laborer-
insurgents (as they were and not as we would like them to be) and, crucially, 
to their non-Ciompi allies, leaders, instigators, and fellow conspirators; and it 
resolutely proceeds with a comb instead of a scissors, attending to often 
overlooked details, carefully untwisting them in an attempt to disentangle one 
of the knottiest issues in Florentine history: the conspiratorial politics of the 
Ciompi tumult. 
The events of June-August 1378 and the leading interpretations of them 
are well enough known as to require no more than a brief summary: On 18 
June, in response to the Parte Guelfa’s campaign of proscription 
(ammonizione), Salvestro de’ Medici presented an anti-magnate petition to the 
priors and colleges that is passed only after a riot and an armed show of force 
on the streets. On 22-23 June, a crowd of guildsmen and workers destroy the 
houses of prominent members of the Parte Guelfa faction, while workers also 
attack several churches and public buildings; a balìa (executive commission) 
is created; and forces of the government suppress the riots. On 26 and 28 
June, the temporary balìa is transformed into a long-term entity and new 
names are drawn for the priorate, to be seated three days later. On 19 July, 
the existence of a large working-class conspiracy mostly centered in the 
Oltrarno is betrayed to the priors. Over the next four days, 20-23 July, these 
men rise up, destroy the Standardbearer of Justice’s house, seize the 
innalzan troppo nell’aria fiorentina; … E chi leggerà Giovanni Villani, l’Aretino, e il 
Poggio, e degli altri istoriografi, che hanno scritto, intenderà molto bene, che a tenere 
bene assetta questa treccia, ci fa più di bisogno della forbici che del pettine.”
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Standard of Justice, knight more than sixty men, force the government to 
accept a series of petitions after meeting en masse with allies and advisors at 
the church of San Lorenzo, force the priors to flee, and appoint a new priorate 
led by Michele di Lando. Between 23 and 31 July, a new government is 
created along with three new guilds and a corps of crossbowmen, and the 
bags containing the names from the old scrutinies are destroyed.  The new 
scrutiny ends on 21 August. On 27-8 August, a radical group within the ranks 
of the Ciompi148 (temporarily allied with Luca da Panzano) elects a group of 
148 Ciompi is a term properly used to describe unskilled workers in the textile 
and woolen cloth industries (the men who would be incorporated into the 
revolutionary twenty-fourth guild), but it is sometimes expanded in general 
discussions to describe even skilled (but historically not corporately-recognized) 
workers from the popolo minuto. Contemporary chroniclers often used both terms 
(Ciompi and popolo minuto) without much discrimination. The enormous complexity of 
the terminology is explored with gusto in Stella, La rèvolte des Ciompi, passim, but 
especially in the appendices; at pages 333-6, for example, he lists the nearly four 
hundred different occupations that might have fallen within the twenty-fourth guild. 
STEFANI, rubr. 575, 203, famously locates the origin of the word “Ciompi” in the 
language of worker solidarity following the fall in 1343 of the Duke of Athens, the 
Frenchman Walter of Brienne: “Having overheard the French saying “Compar, allois a 
boier [that is, compère allons boire]: Compare andiamo a bere … il popolo rozzo di 
vocabolo francesco diceano: Ciompo, andiamo a bere; e così diceano: Ciompo, 
Ciompo; e quasi erano tutti ciompi, cioè compari.” For brief discussions, see Samuel 
K. Cohn Jr., The Laboring Classes in Renaissance Florence (New York: Academic 
Press, 1980), 88, and recently Patrick Gilli, Au miroir de l’humanisme: les 
représentations de la France dans la culture savante italienne à la fin du Moyen Âge 
(c. 1360-c. 1490) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1997), 521. Trexler calls Stefani’s 
etymology “ridiculous” and, following a suggestion of Rodolico, believes “Ciompi” was 
originally the name of a festive organization created by the Duke of Athens in 1342 in 
Camaldoli, a working-class neighborhood in the Oltrarno, and derived from the name 
of the town of Sompuis (about 35 kilometers from the Duke’s ancestral castle, 
Brienne-le-Château); see “Follow the Flag: The Ciompi Revolt Seen from the Streets,” 
page 41 and n. 40, in Trexler, The Workers of Renaissance Florence (Binghamton, 
NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993). The accuracy of Stefani’s 
etymology notwithstanding, what is striking is that, like the Ciompi standard, Stefani 
and his contemporaries well understood that the origins of the term were to be found 
in the Duke’s reign; on the Duke’s relationship with the working classes, see John M. 
Najemy, A History of Florence 1200-1575 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 136-7 and, 
briefly, in chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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eight leaders, the so-called Otto Santi del Popolo di Dio (Eight Saints of the 
People of God), calls mass meetings first at the Dominican priory of San 
Marco and then at church of Santa Maria Novella, and forces the government 
to accept a petition. At the end of August, the Ciompi are betrayed and 
defeated by Michele di Lando’s government, and the twenty-fourth guild (of the 
Ciompi) is disbanded. 
Much of the historiographical debate about the Ciompi tumult in the 
twentieth century has focused on the question of just how revolutionary the 
Ciompi were—the extent to which they acted spontaneously, independently of 
more elite forces, and in pursuit of class-conscious economic and political 
reforms—with some scholars (Bertelli, Brucker) denying their revolutionary 
credentials, some accepting them (Rutenberg, Stella, Cohn, Rodolico), and 
others accepting but problematizing them within their socio-political context 
(Trexler, Najemy).149 I can add nothing new to our understanding of the 
149 The scholarship on the Ciompi is enormous and varied, and thus cannot be 
properly surveyed in a note, but some key and representative works of the named 
scholars on this issue are: Sergio Bertelli, “Oligarchies et gouvernement dans la 
Renaissance,” Social Science: Information sur les sciences sociales 15 (1976): 601-
23; Gene Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society 1343-1378 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1962), the final chapter; and idem, “The Ciompi 
Revolution,” in Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. 
Nicolai Rubinstein (London: Faber & Faber, 1968) [it is often said that Brucker 
withdrew some of the claims in this article or even recanted, but he did not do so in 
print]; Viktor Rutenberg, Popolo e movimenti popolari nell’Italia del ‘300 e ‘400, trans. 
Gianpiero Borghini (Bologna: Mulino, 1971); Alessandro Stella, La révolte des 
Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail (Paris: EHESS, 1993); Samuel K. Cohn Jr., 
The Laboring Classes in Renaissance Florence (New York: Academic, 1980), and 
idem, “Florentine Insurrections, 1342-1385, in Comparative Perspective” in Rodney 
Hilton and T. H. Aston, eds., The English Rising of 1381 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 143-64; Niccolò Rodolico, Il popolo minuto. Note di storia 
Fiorentina, 1343-1378 (Florence: Olschki, 1899), and idem, I Ciompi: Una pagina di 
storia del proletariato operaio (Florence: Sansoni, 1945); the three essays collected in 
Richard C. Trexler, Power and Dependence in Renaisssance Florence, vol. 3: The
Workers of Renaissance Florence (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance 
Texts and Studies, 1993); and John M. Najemy, “Audiant omnes artes: Corporate 
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personnel, neighborhood organization, and political vocabulary (Trexler) of the 
Ciompi, of their economic and social conditions (Stella, Cohn), or the milieu of 
guild foment out of which their revolt and program in part sprang (Najemy). 
Rather, from Gene Brucker’s evocative description of Florence in the summer 
of 1378—”the city was transformed into a pulsating network of conventicles, 
groups which met secretly in churches, in taverns and private homes to 
discuss events and issues, and perhaps to plot”150— I will remove the 
“perhaps,” showing that not until late August can the actions (and even the 
political program) of the Ciompi and popolo minuto be extricated from the 
conspiracies undertaken to purge the government of the leaders of the Parte 
Guelf faction. Salvestro de’ Medici and his allies, knowing that the Parte 
Guelfa faction planned to overthrow the government on the feast of John the 
Baptist in 1378, preemptively overthrew it with the help of the minor guilds and 
the popolo minuto. When the temporary executive commission (balìa) meant 
to legitimate the regime change failed to entirely eliminate the influence of their 
political enemies and to completely re-integrate those who had been 
proscribed (ammoniti), this was done through the famous political petitions of 
July, which were orchestrated with the help of the leaders of the war party, 
representatives of the whole guild community, and moderate elements in the 
popolo minuto. The radical forces of the Ciompi in August, finally, rose up 
against the newly created regime and the men who had inspired and were fully 
implicated in the earlier events. This discussion will add, I believe, a crucial 
Origins of the Ciompi Revolution,” in Il tumulto dei Ciompi. Un momento di storia 
fiorentina ed europea (Florence: Olschki, 1981), pp. 59-93. 
150 Brucker, “The Ciompi Revolution,” in Florentine Studies, ed. Rubinstein, 
326. 
88
additional dimension to our knowledge of the Ciompi: the summer of plots and 
counter-plots must be understood, in part, within the context of the history of 
late-Trecento political conspiracies.    
The Plots of June 1378
The technique of ammonizione (literally “warning”) or proscription, 
which effectively deprived “suspected Ghibellines” of office-holding rights 
without trial, was pioneered in 1358-9 by the Captains of the Parte Guelfa.151
Nearly twenty years later, the most conservative and pro-papal forces in the 
Guelf hierarchy finally took full advantage of this, their most devastating 
weapon, in what can only be described as an evolving and long-term152 “legal” 
151 Many of the records of the Parte Guelfa are no longer extant, but their 
program, which began after the famous provvisione of December 1358 (ASF, PR, 46, 
ff. 62-3), was given communal sanction in May of 1359 in ASF, PR, 46 144v-146r. 
152 Although his data are incomplete, Modesto Rastrelli, Priorista fiorentino 
istorico, vol. 2 (Florence: Tofani, 1784), passim between pages 62-148, provides 
yearly lists of ammoniti (years in modern style here) which show the striking trend in 
the Parte Guelfa’s use of proscription from 1358 to 1378:
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coup d’ètat: from September 1377 through June 1378, they proscribed well 
over one hundred citizens,153 who came largely from the pro-war faction, from 
the anti-Albizzi and popular camp, and from the swelling ranks of those whose 
families had in the 1360s and 1370s entered the priorate for the first time.154
By the end of 1377, it had become clear that the Eight of War and the 
Captains of the Parte were set on a collision course. In a communal assembly 
on 26 December, Gino di Bernardo Anselmi, a vocal opponent of the Parte 
faction, called for peace not between Florence and the Papacy but between 
the two factions: “The priors should make the Captains and the Eight of War 
remain happy and at peace.”155 That the situation had reached a boiling point 
is made abundantly clear by the imprisonment of Alessio di Borghino 
Baldovinetti, who was accused in a criminal trial of shouting “Viva il popolo!” 
outside of the Parte’s palace, and of threatening to set it on fire, burning the 
Guelf Captains alive.156 In January, the Parte enacted a series of internal 
measures to defend the Captains from prosecution by other communal 
magistracies, to create an ad hoc committee (balìa) of forty-eight men 
153 Writing decades later and only possibly exaggerating, Giovanni di Pagolo 
Morelli, Ricordi, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence: Le Monnier, 1956), 318, claimed that 
around 200 families were proscribed in the two-year period: “[a]l tempo di questi Otto
della guerra, e quasi nell’ultimo, s’ammunì gran gente, circa di 200 famiglie quasi in 
tempo d’anni due.” 
154 See Appendix 1, in which I construct a list, compiled from various sources, 
of 133 ammoniti. 
155 ASF, CP, 15, 67v: “Et [the priors] faciant ita quod Capitanei et Octo guerre 
remaneant contenti et concordes”.
156 ASF, Capitano, 1089, ff. 3-4v; the context of Alessio’s threats is given in 
STEFANI, rubr. 779, 310, and his imprisonment decried as a “cosa stranissima ed 
abominevole e fuori d’ogni ragione ed equità,” something very strange and 
abominable, without any reason or justice. 
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dedicated to defending the group and doing its business for one year, and to 
fashion a new banner for the Parte, which was to be adorned with the arms of 
Charles of Anjou and entrusted to the party’s new standardbearer, Benghi 
Buondelmonti.157 The chronicler Stefani understood the full import of these 
measures: “so the Captains were lords (signori) of the Parte for a year, and 
whoever was lord of the Parte was lord of Florence; and messer Lapo [da 
Castiglionchio] reserved that power for himself for life.”158 The power to 
proscribe gave the Captains almost complete de facto (and, within the 
constitution as it was, de iure) power to ensure that their enemies would not 
serve on the priorate, and the creation of the year-long balìa would extend 
their influence far into the future.159 Stefani’s choice of words, signori, could 
157 ASF, Capitani di Parte Guelfa (rosso), 1, ff. 46v-52r. 
158 STEFANI, rubr. 778, 310: “sicchè erano signori i detti capitani per uno anno 
della Parte, e chi era signore della Parte era signore di Firenze. E messer Lapo serbò 
la balìa a sè a vita.”
159 Official Parte lists of Captains do not survive, but these can be 
reconstructed for 1378 from ANONIMO 347, 351, and 355; STEFANI rubr. 778; the 
document published in Ildefonso di San Luigi, ed., Delizie degli Eruditi, vol. XV 
(Florence: Cambiagi, 1781) corresponding to STEFANI rubr. 789; and the list of the 72 
men whose names had been drawn for the office, “le pallottole ch’avieno fatte i 
Capitani,” which would be destroyed on 5 July 1378; see ANONIMO, 362. Generally, 
“pallottole” were waxen pellets that contained parachment name slips, as is made 
clear in a passage from Donato Velluti’s Cronaca discussed in John M. Najemy, 
Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 141 and n.31; here they seem to be hand-
picked groups or electoral slates of names. Those who took office on 20 January 
were: messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, Bonaiuto Serragli, messer Benghi 
Buondelmonti, Domenico di Cassiano called Tessinaia or Tassinaia (calzolaio), 
Adoardo de’ Pulci, Giovanni di Ser Donato (ferrator) [OR Giovanni di ser Dato 
(maliscalco)], Veri di Cambio de’ Medici, Antonio di Guidotto de’ Pazzi, and Giovanni 
di Cambio (balestriere). Those who took office on 20 March were: Ristoro Canigiani, 
Filippo di Fornaino de’ Rossi, Tommaso Soderini, Istoldo Altoviti, Simone del Chiaro 
(fabbro), Alessandro di messer Francesco Buondelmonti, Francesco di Donato 
Marchi, Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi, and Matteo di Iacopo Arrighi. Monaldi, 513, 
perhaps noting who were the leaders in that group, described them as “Tommaso 
Soderini, e Benedetto di Simone di Ranieri Peruzzi, e la loro compagnia.” And those 
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not have been entirely accidental—in a sense the signori of the Parte Guelfa 
would control, and thus even supplant, the signori (as the priors were called) 
of Florence. On 22 April 1378, the Captains, having fortified themselves for the 
struggle, finally and boldly struck directly at the heart of the Eight with their 
policy of ammonizione, proscribing the spice merchant Giovanni Dini, one of 
the so-called “Eight Saints” charged with undertaking the war against the 
papacy.160 Whether the Parte Guelfa intended to indefinitely continue their 
gradual coup and thereby achieve their ends, or whether they had already 
been plotting to hatch a more decisive coup in the near future, their hand was 
forced when Salvestro de’ Medici was elected Standardbearer of Justice. 
Having been drawn for the position of Standardbearer of Justice at the 
end of May, Salvestro di Alamanno de’ Medici, a long-time foe of the Parte 
hierarchy and staunch supporter of the war, found himself serving on a 
priorate alongside men loyal to the Parte Guelfa who were capable of blocking 
attempts at reform and delaying any move against Lapo and his allies.161
who took office on 20 May are additionally listed in ASF, CR, 11, ff. 124v (24 June 
1378): Giovanni di Bartolo Biliotti, Tommaso di Serotino Brancacci, Bese di Guido 
Magalotti, Iacopo di Giovanni Risaliti, Ghino di Bernardo Anselmi, Bernardo di Andrea 
(corazarius), Iacopo di Iacopo Gherardini, Bettino di messer Bindaccio Ricasoli, and 
Taddeo di Cantino degli Agli.
160 As the records of the war balia reveal, Dini was immediately replaced for 
this reason by Niccolò Gianni; see Alessandro Gherardi, La guerra dei fiorentini con 
papa Gregorio XI, detta la guerra degli otto santi (Florence: Cellini, 1868), Document 
391, p. 219: “...loco dicti loannis Dini a dicto offitio remoti die vigesimasecunda seu 
vigesimatertia mensis aprilis presentis anni Mccclxxviii, esistente probo viro Niccholao 
Niccholai Gherardini lannis...”
161 On Salvestro’s career, the old monograph of Brunetto Dami, Un demagogo 
del secolo decimoquarto: Salvestro de’ Medici (Florence: Seeber, 1899), has largely 
been superseded by Brucker, Florentine Politics, passim; and Gene Brucker, “The 
Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” in Speculum 32 (1957): 1-26, especially at 17-20. 
Brucker’s grim appraisal of Salvestro as “a petty politician whose major asset was 
demagogic oratory” is particularly striking for the summer of 1378 given how little he 
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According to the chronicler Stefani’s account, which is replete with detail, 
when dissatisfaction with the “damned faction [maladetta setta]” and its 
political skullduggery grew unbearable, Salvestro declared, “We’ll settle things 
when I am proposto” (when he served his week, that is, as presiding chairman, 
charged with presenting business to the other priors), and he sprung into 
action, mobilizing a network of allies: “he sent for those whom he trusted, and 
came to an understanding with them in person, with the others he did so 
through go-betweens.”162 What happened next—a conspiratorial meeting to 
overthrow the government, to mutare lo stato— had happened many times 
before in the political history of Florence. “After Salvestro de’ Medici had 
spoken to his allies, many people gathered together secretly at night in the 
house of Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, who was a great citizen, had a discussion 
with the Standardbearer, and made a plan.”163 Upon becoming proposto, 
Salvestro made his move—an unexpected and understated gambit. Afraid that 
he would propose retaliatory legislation or worse, the leaders of the Parte 
Guelfa swung into action, preparing themselves for violence in the streets, as 
the chronicler describes:  
spoke according to the chronicle literature; a similar point is astutely made by Samuel 
K. Cohn in relation to both Salvestro and Michele di Lando; see his Lust for Liberty: 
The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-1425: Italy, France, and 
Flanders (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2006), 200. Rodolico, I Ciompi, 184, more 
accurately describes the Salvestro of 1378 as “furbescamente prudente e silenzioso,” 
cunningly prudent and silent. 
162 STEFANI, rubr. 789, 317: “‘Noi l’acconceremo quando sarò Proposto.’ E 
mandò per quelli di cui si fidava, e intesesi con loro personalmente, con alquanti ed 
altri per mezzani…”
163 STEFANI, rubr. 790, 317: “….Avendo parlato Salvestro de’ Medici a cui gli 
parve, ed essendo in casa di Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, il quale era grande cittadino, 
ragunatosi di notte molta gente segretamente, sollecitarono il gonfalonieri della 
giustizia, e dato l’ordine.”
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the Captains gathered together right away at the palace of the 
Parte and quickly called on all the leaders of the families of the 
grandi who liked their policies, and nearly all of them came 
armed with hauberks and knives, some even had swords hidden 
at their side. They also called on all the heads of the popolani
families who supported and favored their policies. And present at 
this gathering were the men who were the cornerstone of the 
whole thing: messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, Carlo degli Strozzi 
and his sons, Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, Niccolò Soderini, and 
Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti, who is called Mastino. They were 
the strength of the whole endeavor.  And it is also true that one 
of the Parte’s other champions was not among them, namely 
Stoldo di messer Bindo Altoviti, who was away on a peace 
mission to Rome.164
Stefani then lists, dividing them among the quarters of the city, all the major 
supporters of the Parte Guelfa. The list includes more than forty named 
individuals and a handful of families, including “all” of the Albizzi, Altoviti, and 
Buondelmonti, and “some” of the Acciaiuoli and Ardinghelli.165 On behalf of 
164 STEFANI, rubr. 790, pp. 317-8: “…i capitani subito furono al palagio della 
Parte ragunati, e feciono richiesti subito, e quasi tutti i capi delle famiglie de’ Grandi, a 
cui piaceano le materie che essi teneano alla Parte, e tutti quasi con panziere e 
coltella, e chi stocchi celatamente allato. E furvi richiesti tutti i capi delle famiglie 
popolane, le quali faceano alla materia adiuto e favore, e quivi furono questi, li quali 
erano il bilico di tutta la materia: messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, Carlo degli Strozzi 
con gli figliuoli, Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, Niccolò Soderini, Bartolo di Giovanni 
Siminetti, detto Mastino: questi erano il fermo di tutta la faccenda. È vero che 
appresso di loro non era uno, ch’era l’altro campione: ciò era Stoldo di messer Bindo 
Altoviti, il quale era in ambasciata per la pace a Roma.” 
165 STEFANI, rubr. 790, pp. 318. This is the list of men, using Stefani’s 
spellings: Bonaiuto di ser Belcaro Serragli, Giovanni di Bartolo Bigliotti, Antonio di 
Niccolò di Cione Ridolfi, Bortolommeo di Niccolò di Cione Ridolfi, Guerrieri di Tribaldo 
de’ Rossi, Piero di Dato Canigiani, Ristoro di Piero di Dato Canigiani, Uberto di 
Schiatta Ridolfi, Messer Filippo Giammori e Giovanni di Piero Bandini de’ Baroncelli, 
Michele e messer Lotto di Vanni Castellani, Simone di Ranieri Peruzzi, Benedetto di 
Simone di Ranieri Peruzzi “e consorti tutti,” Adoardo de’ Pulci, Bonaccorso di Lapo, 
Giovanni de’ Bonaccorsi, Guerriante Bagnesi, Bardo di Tingo Mancini, Bese 
Magalotti, Salice Cavalcanti, Guccio di Cino Bartolini, Iacopo di Gian Gherardini, 
“Buondelmonti tutti, Acciaiuoli alcuni, Altoviti tutti, alcuni degli Ardinghelli,” Ramondino 
Vecchietti di Giovanni, messer Albizo Rucellai e quasi tutti, Messer Pazzino degli 
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these men, Lapo and Giovanni di Bartolo Biliotti, then the standardbearer of 
the Parte, went to the palace to see what legislation had been proposed. 
Salvestro’s petition, in fact, contained no direct reprisals against the Parte and 
did not even broach the incendiary subject of ammonizione; rather, it asked 
the councils to promulgate anew the Ordinances of Justice in order to, as the 
preamble states, “resist the unbridled power of the magnates, make harming 
the weak and perverting popular government and liberty impossible, allow 
popolani to live more securely and more freely, have offices be exercised for 
the public good, and revive justice in the city.”166 In a remarkable show of 
political resolution, Salvestro and his allies had, against all expections, not 
proposed legislation against the Parte or its policy of ammonizione, instead 
invoking the transcendent revolutionary ideals of the Ordinances of Justice, 
casting the leaders of the Parte Guelfa in the role of the prepotent and lawless 
magnates167and themselves as champions of the popolo, and thereby radically 
Strozzi, Andrea e Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni, Andrea di Signino, Biagio di 
Bonaccio Guasconi “e consorti, Brunelleschi tutti i figliuoli di Boccaccio,” Iacopo di 
Messer Francesco de’ Pazzi, “gli Albizzi tutti,”Migliore Guadagni, Vieri di Messer 
Pepo de’ Cavicciuli, Pigello di messer Talano. “Andrea di Signino” is a reference to 
Andrea di Signino Baldesi. I have not been able to identify all of Carlo Strozzi’s sons. 
An examination of the data in the ONLINE TRATTE suggests that four of them were 
named Azzolino, Lorenzo, Michele, and Strozza. Boccaccio Brunelleschi had at least 
two sons, Attaviano and Jacopo. On the basis of archival and other evidence, I 
believe the “Pigello di messer Talano” in STEFANI is an error and refers instead to 
Pigello and Talano di messer Luigi degli Adimari, described in ASF, Capitano, 1198, 
55r, as “Pigellum [et] Talanum, fratres et filios quondam Domini Loigii de Adimaribus 
populi Sancte Marie Nepotecose de Florentia.”
166 ASF, PR, 67, f.49v; and transcribed in ANONIMO, 504: “ut resistatur 
ineffrenate potentie magnatum, et ut tollatur possibilitas impotentes offendi et 
popularem statum et libertatem pervertendi, et ut populares possint securius ac 
liberius vivere, et officia pro utilitate publica exercere, et ut civitas comitatus et 
districtus Florentie revivescat justitia.”
167 Although the ranks of the Parte leaders contained mostly elite popolani, 
most magnates were indeed allied with them, as is noted in STEFANI, 790, 317: 
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recasting the partisan struggle (Parte Guelfa vs. war party) as another battle in 
the ancient struggle for popular liberty. When news of this reached the Parte 
palace, “it was argued that things should be left alone, and some said that the 
banner should be brought out,” presumably to rally friends for the coming 
struggle under the recently-fashioned standard, or to broadcast the message 
of triumphant Guelphism.168 “The popolo and the guilds were in the Palace of 
the priors,” says the anonymous chronicler, when Salvestro’s petition 
appeared destined to fail in the colleges and he dramatically attempted to 
resign his post as Standardbearer, noting the presence of enemies in the hall 
who had thwarted his efforts and made working for peace and unity from 
within the priorate impossible.169 Then, Stefani recalls, “some rose up and 
went to the windows and began to shout, Viva il popolo! There was disorder 
(romore) throughout the city, and in many places men armed themselves, as 
had been ordered, saying, Viva il popolo e libertà!”170 It is apparent that this 
order, given to men all over the city to arm themselves, was part of the plan 
formulated in the secret night meeting in Luigi Aldobrandini’s house, and that 
the men who conveyed the order were part of Salvestro’s network of trusted 
“…generalmente quasi tutti i Grandi voleano, e studiavano l’ammonire, se non era 
alquanti buoni, ch’ erano in alcuna delle famiglie de’ Grandi, li quali erano pochi…”
168 STEFANI, rubr. 790, 318: “quivi si ragionò di lasciar fare, e chi dicea di trar 
fuori il gonfalone.”
169 ANONIMO, 357: “…e ‘l popolo e l’Arti erano nel palagio di nostri Signiori…”; 
Anonimo records Salvestro’s speech, the part referred to: “I’ò qua su di quegli che mi 
sono contrai per volere questa vostra città mettere in pace ed in unità.” 
170 STEFANI, rubr. 790, 318: “Alcuno si levò, e fecesi alla finestra, e cominciò a 
gridare: ‘Viva il popolo’. Il romore fu per la città, ed in molte luogora s’armò, come era 
ordinato, dicendo: “Viva il popolo e libertà.” My emphasis. 
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friends and intermediaries. While Salvestro and his allies plotted, so, it is clear, 
did the leaders of the Parte Guelfa faction, who were, however, divided on 
how to proceed. The chronicler Stefani, who obviously had connections and 
informants on both sides of this conspiratorial factional struggle, tells us that 
he himself made inquiries and learned of a nefarious plot: 
On the night before John the Baptist’s day [24 June], Piero di 
Filippo [degli Albizzi] planned to have in his house the standard 
of the Parte Guelfa covered with lilies, the arms of France, the 
standardbearer of which was Giovanni di Bartolo Biliotti. And for 
the festivities in Florence, everyone in their faction [setta] was to 
have at home a band of foreigners, made of villagers and men 
from all over, which was easy to do because on that day 
peasants regularly came to Florence and no one was watching.
… when fewer than twenty persons were left in the palace, they 
agreed to shout slogans, join together, and cause a tumult [di 
gridare ed essere in concio e correre la Terra], and to go right 
away to the palace of the priors, take it without a fight, run 
through the city shouting, “Long live the people and the Parte 
Guelfa,” bring their people to the houses of the proscribed 
[ammoniti] and the Ghibellines and certain of their enemies, and 
then reform the city according to their plan, leaving sixty men in 
charge of the government [nel reggimento].171
If Stefani was able to learn of this plot, so, we imagine, was Salvestro; and his 
faction was obviously not content to let the Parte leaders “bring their people to 
171 STEFANI, rubr. 792, p. 319: “Trovossi poi per domandare più innanzi che 
Piero di Filippo doveva il dì San Giovanni la notte dinanzi avere in casa sua il 
gonfalone della Parte a gigli, l’arme di Francia, del quale’ era gonfalonieri Giovanni di 
Bartolo Biliotti, e per la festa che si facea in Firenze tutti quelli di quella loro setta 
doveano avere foresterìa di villani e d’altronde in casa; ed era leggiere avere, 
perocchè di nulla si guardava in Firenze, e pure da loro i contadini si vengono in 
Firenze tal dì. ...in palagio rimane meno di venti persone, aveano diliberato di gridare 
ed essere in concio e correre la Terra, e subito ire al palagio de’ Priori, e quello sanza 
contasto torre, ed appresso correre la città, gridando: “Viva il popolo e Parte Guelfa,” 
e menare il popolo a casa gli ammoniti ed i Ghibellini ed a certi loro nemici, poi 
riformare la città a loro modo e lasciare nel reggimento, diceano, sessanta uomini.”
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the houses of the proscribed,” instead bringing the proscribed and their allies 
to the houses of the Parte leaders. 
In his record of those days, almost certainly the earliest surviving 
account of a working-class revolt left by a worker, the woolshearer Pagolo di 
ser Guido breathlessly describes the assault against the Parte leaders: 
On Tuesday a riot broke out and the people [popolo] and all the 
guilds armed themselves and ran into the piazza of the priors 
with their flags, yelling “Viva il Popolo!” At thirteen hours [about 
8:30AM] the Furriers’ guild took their flag, left, and went to the 
house of Messer Lapo da Castiglionchio and robbed and burned 
his property and that of his kinsmen; and they went to the house 
of [Bartolo Siminetti, called] Il Mastino and robbed and burned it, 
then they went to the house of Carlo [degli Strozzi] and robbed 
and burned it, and then they went to the house of the Albizzi and 
burned the property of Piero di Filippo and of Pepo di Antonio’s 
sons, and the sons of Uberto di Antonio di Jacopo di Alesso and 
a few of their kinsmen, and they burned the house of Migliore 
Guadagni, and burned those of Iacopo, Simone, and Sandro de’ 
Pazzi, and then burned those of the Buondelmonti, then they 
went to break open the Stinche [the communal jail], then they 
burned the houses of Niccolò and Tommaso Soderini, then they 
robbed that of Messer Filippo Corsini, then they robbed those of 
Bonaiuto Serragli and his brother and of Messer Coppo from San 
Frediano, then they burned the house of messer Ristoro 
Canigiani, then they robbed the [convent of the Romiti degli] 
Agnoli, then they wanted to destroy the Camera del Comune [the 
communal treasury], but it was defended by the Guild of Oil and 
Cheese Sellers, then they rested for the evening.172
172 PAGOLO DI SER GUIDO, 272: “Poi il martedì si levó il rumore e armossi il 
Popolo e tutte l’Arti corsono in su la Piazza de’ Priori co’ loro Gonfaloni gridando Viva 
il Popolo, alle 13 hore partissi l’Arte de’ Vaiai co’ loro Gonfalone e andò a casa di 
Messer Lapo da Castiglionchio e rubaro e arsono lui e Consorti, e andarono a casa il 
Mastino e arsono e rubarono, poi andarono a Carlo e arsono e rubarono, e poi 
andarono a casa gli Albizi e arsono Piero di Filippo e figli di Pepo d’Antonio, e figli di 
Uberto d’Antonio di Jacopo d’Alesso con certi Consorti, e arsono il Migliore 
Guadagni, e arsono Jacopo e Simone e Sandro de’ Pazzi e poi arsono i 
Bondelmonte, poi andarono a rompere le Stinche poi rubarono poi arsono Niccolò e 
Tommaso Soderini, poi rubarono Messer Filippo Corsini, poi rubarono Bonaiuto 
Serragli e’l fratello, e Messer Coppo da San Friano rubarono, poi arsono Messer 
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The Machiavelli chronicler similarly attributes the destruction to the 
guildsmen: “all the guilds and consuls, all of them armed, along with their 
guildsmen and the flags of their guilds, went into the piazza of the priors, 
crying out: ‘Send those traitors down to us!’ Then suddenly they ran in a frenzy 
to [burn the houses].”173 “While some say that the popolo rose up on its own 
accord,” Stefani notes, “others say that a plan came from the palace, where 
those whose houses were to be burned were written.”174 Among those writers 
who left accounts of that summer, the latter view is clearly dominant. One 
anonymous contemporary, for example, explained that “the cause of all these 
things was the authority of Salvestro de’ Medici and Benedetto Alberti, who 
Ristoro Canigiani, poi rubarono gli Agnoli, poi vollono rompere la Camera del 
Comune, difesela l’Arte de’ Pizzicagnoli, poi si ripose la sera.” It is clear from other 
sources that several of the later arsons occurred in July; see below. 
173 ANONIMO, 358-9: “Oggi, martedì [22 June], alle xii ore di dì [around 
7:30AM], andarono in sulla Piazza di nostri Signori tutte l’Arte e Capitudine, tutti 
armati , co’ loro artefici e co’ loro gonfaloni delle loro Arte , gridando : «Mandateci giù 
cotesti traditori». Onde subito corsono a furore a casa di ….” Anonimo’s order of the 
arsons is: (1) Carlo Strozzi, (2) “casa gli Albizi”, (3) Lapo da Castiglionchio, (4) Bartolo 
“Mastino” Siminetti, (5) Migliore Guadagni, (6) “casa de’ Pazzi”, (7) Filippo Corsini, (8) 
Antonio di Niccolò di Cione Ridolfi, (9) Coppo di Lippo di Cione “del Cane”, (10) 
Niccolò and Tommaso Soderini, (11) Ristoro Canigiani; then (12) Romiti degli Agnoli 
and (13) the “Frati di Settimo in Cafaggiuolo”. 
174 STEFANI, rubr. 792, p. 319: “…e chi dice che il popolo da sè si mosse, e chi 
dice, che venne scritta di palagio, ove erano scritti quelli che dovessero essere 
arsi…”; Stefani continues, “Ma io credo che vero giudicio divino fosse che niuno altro 
che gl’infrascritti furono nè arsi, nè tocchi, nè rubati,” presenting two possible 
interpretations: that Stefani found it miraculous that the arson was limited, or that he 
believed the right houses were burned. STEFANI, rubr. 792, p. 319-20, gives this order 
for the arsons: (1) Lapo da Castiglionchio (2) Carlo Strozzi (3) Bartolo Siminetti (4-5) 
Niccolò and Tommaso Soderini, (6) Benghi Buondelmonti, (7) Ristoro Canigiani, (8) 
Piero degli Albizzi and a handful of other Albizzi, (9) the Pazzi, (10) Vieri Cavicciuli, 
(11) Migliore Guadagni, and “molte altre case e tutte di coloro che erano di quella 
maledetta setta dell’ammonire,” many other houses and all of them of the damned 
faction that used proscription, (12) the Stinche, (13) the Romiti degli Angeli, (14) 
Santo Spirito. 
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called the people [popolo] from the palace windows.”175 Alamanno Accaiuoli 
attributes the opening of the Stinche to “the plan of Bardo di Guglielmo Altoviti, 
who had two of his nephews in the jail.”176 Bardo had been a member of the 
commission appointed to impose a prestanza of 130,000 florins on church 
property in July of 1375, was a strong supporter of the commune’s anti-clerical 
position during the War of the Eight Saints, and, as such, had likely been 
present at Salvestro’s conspiratorial gathering.177 In the midst of his 
description of the burnings, the Machiavelli chronicler, possessing inside 
information for obvious reasons (see note below),178 adds a revealing detail: 
175 Quoted in Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, p. 88, n.1: “Di tutte queste cose fu causa 
l’autorità di Salvestro de’ Medici e Benedetto Alberti che chiamò il popolo dalle 
finestre del palagio.”
176 ALAMANNO ACCIAIUOLI, in SCARAMELLA, 15: “per operazione di Bardo di 
Guglielmo Altoriti [sic]; imperocchè il detto Bardo v’aveva due suoi nipoti carnali, 
figliuoli d’una sua sirocchia, l’uno era Alesso [di Francesco] Baldovinetti, e l’altro 
figliuolo d’Andrea [di Lapo] delle Botti.” Both of Bardo’s nephews are called “nipoti 
carnali,” the children of one’s siblings, to distinguish them from “nipoti cugini,” first 
cousins; on this distinction, see, e.g., Susannah F. Baxendale, “Alberti Kinship and 
Conspiracy in Late Medieval Florence,” in Florence and Beyond: Culture, Society and 
Politics in Renaissance Italy, ed. David S. Peterson (with Daniel E. Bornstein) 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 340; but it is not clear how, unless she 
married twice, Alesso Baldovinetti and Andrea delle Botti’s son could both be sons of 
one of Bardo’s sisters. In his account of these events, almost certainly indebted to 
Alamanno Acciaiuoli’s, the sixteenth-century historian Scipione Ammirato appears to 
describe only the son of Andrea delle Botti as Bardo’s nephew; see the Istorie 
fiorentine di Scipione Ammirato, ed. F. Ranalli, vol. 3 (Florence: Batelli, 1847), p. 282.
177 ASF, PR, 63, 69r-72r. These men were called the “Otto dei preti”; see 
Richard C. Trexler, “Who were the Eight Saints?,” Renaissance News 16 (1963): 89. 
Bardo would go on to serve the guild government outside of the city; see Carlo 
Fabbri, Origini e istituzioni di Castel San Giovanni tra Medio Evo ed età moderna
(Fiesole: Servizio editoriale fiesolano, 2001). I have lost the page reference. 
178 Roberto Davidsohn, “L’avo di Niccolò: Machiavelli cronista fiorentino,”
Archivio storico italiano 355 (1935): 35-48, argues that Buoninsegna was the author 
of the chronicle; Brucker, Florentine Politics, 128, is not convinced, but accepts that a 
member of the Machiavelli wrote it. 
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“Buoninsegna Machiavelli kept watch because he was afraid that the Scali 
wanted to rob him and burn down his house; so the priors sent for Giorgio 
Scali and Buoninsegna and made them drink together and they made peace 
and with Michele di Vanni Castellani ended their dispute. God be praised.”179
The chronicles all make clear that those who burned the houses of the Parte 
leadership were (at least led by) guildsmen, from both minor and major guilds 
(like the Furriers); they are also clear that the violence was quickly co-opted by 
a band from the popolo minuto, who wreaked havoc upon communal and 
religious institutions. For example, the Machiavelli chronicler (as the 
woolshearer Pagolo had) reveals that the popolo minuto was, in some of their 
attempts, even blocked by guildsmen: “On this day, he says, “the popolo 
minuto went and broke into the Stinche, and let out all of the prisoners, who 
altogether had debts of more than 40,000 gold florins, and even those who 
had been sentenced to death. And they destroyed it and burned it down and 
did great damage to our commune. God make them pay for this! And then 
they went to the Camera del comune of Florence, but there were guildsmen 
there who would not let them destroy it, and enough of them got hurt that they 
couldn’t destroy it.”180 Stefani likewise attributes the attacks on religious 
179 ANONIMO, 359: “Boninsegnia Machiavelli ebbe paura che gli Scali 
noll’andassono a rubare e mettervi fuoco, onde istette a buona guardia; e in questo 
mezzo i Signiori mandorono per Giorgio degli Scali, e’ nostri Signiori mandorono per 
Boninsegnia, fecio’gli bere insieme, e fu fatto pacie e fine co’ Michele di Vanni [dei 
Castellani]. Lodato Iddio.” 
180 ANONIMO, 359: “Dì xxii di giugno 1378. Questo dì andò il popolo minuto e 
ruppono le Stinche, e tutti i prigioni se n’uscirono fuori, che v’aveva prigioni per più di 
40 miglia’ di fiorini d’oro, e anche ve n’avea assai ch’erano per perdere la persona; e 
ruppono e arsono e feciono gran danno al nostro Comune. Iddio gliene paghi. E 
andarono alla camera del Comune di Firenze; onde vi furono l’Arte e nolla lasciarono 
rompere, e furonvene fediti assai, e nolla ruppono.”
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institutions to “una gente minuta,” a crowd of men from the popolo minuto; “on 
the next day,” he explains, this crowd “raised a hat on a lance, ran to the 
convent of the Hermits of the Angels and the church of Santo Spirito and 
robbed them… looting reliquaries as well as the goods and merchandise 
stored there by just men and sinners alike.”181 As we will see, fear of 
retribution for these thefts at religious institutions would become a major factor 
in later popolo minuto plotting, but the assault against the Parte leadership first 
allowed Salvestro’s faction to begin remaking the city’s laws according to their 
wishes. Always a true believer in the Guelf cause and full of bile for the 
popular leadership, the chronicler Ser Nofri explained that the fiery events of 
June were orchestrated by “suspected Ghibellines, malcontents, and their 
leaders,” namely Tommaso Strozzi, Salvestro de’ Medici, Benedetto Alberti, 
Giovanni Dini “and other inciters of such evil and scandal,” who used the 
popular uprising in order to gain balìa before giving the order for it to stop. 
“But,” he added, “the masses, when they are incited, don’t always stop where 
those who incite them stop, and this is what happened in Florence.”182
181 STEFANI, rubr. 792, 320: “…corsono una gente minuta, e rizzarono uno 
cappello in su una lancia, ed andarono ne’ Romiti degli Angeli e nella Chiesa di S. 
Spirito… rubarono infino all’orliquie insieme colla roba e mercanzia, che v’era dentro, 
del giusto e del peccatore.” 
182 NOFRI, 55: “…tutto operarono i ghibellini sospetti e macontenti [sic] e capi 
d’essi… Ma la grande [part of the populace], quando è mossa, ispesse volte non ristà 
a posta di chi la muove; e così fe la citta di Firenze; non si fermò dove averebbe 
voluto messer Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi, messer Salvestro de’ Medici, messer 
Benedetto degli Alberti, Giovanni Dini e gli altri movitori di tanto male e scandalo, 
quanto ne seguì; come che alla fine tutti ne capitarono male.” This is the passage 
referenced in the first note of this chapter. 
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From 23 to 30 June 1378, a balìa of more than eighty men addressed 
themselves to pacifying the city in the aftermath of the violent events, aware 
that the city still seethed with conspiratorial tensions (considerantes murmur et 
scandalum).183 With one arm they punished the leaders of the Parte—
183 The measure that created the balia is in ASF, PR, 66, 51r-52v; a summary 
of its decisions is in ASF, CR, 11, 124r-158r, and, in part, edited in Falletti-Fossati, at 
pages 333-45; the quotation (“considerantes…”) is at f. 125r. In order to maintain 
consistency with the other lists used in this chapter, the names have been volgarizzati 
(from the original Latin contained in ASF, PR, 66, 51rv, and CR, 11, 124r-v and 
alphabetized by given name, with additional details sometimes added in brackets, 
and the quarters (Santo Spirito = SS, Santa Croce = SC, San Giovanni = SG, Santa 
Maria Novella = SMN), offices (Gonfaloniere di Giustizia = 01, Priori = 08, Sedici 
gonfalonieri = 16, Dodici buonuomini = 12, Capitani di Parte Guelfa = CPG, Dieci di 
Libertà = DL, Otto di balìa e guerra = OG, Guild representatives = A-guild name), and 
occupations when available noted in parentheses. The members of the balìa were: 
Agostino di ser Piero (A-Cuoiai), Alessandro di messer Riccardo Bardi (OG), Andrea 
di messer Francesco Salviati (OG), Andrea di Segnino Baldesi (16, SMN), Angelo di 
Borgognone (12, SG), Antonio di Spigliato (A-Vaiai, pellipaio), Barduccio Cherichini 
(12, SS), Bartolo di Michele (A-Correggiai), Bartolo di ser Tino (16, SC, tavolaio), 
Bartolomeo di Leone di Simone (16, SC), Benedetto di Nerozzo Alberti (A-Calimala), 
Benozzo di Francesco di Andrea (16, SS), Bernardo di Andrea (CPG, corazzaio), 
Bernardo di Iacopo Beccanugi (DL), Bernardo di Ligi (A-Chiavaioli, calderaio), 
Bernardo di Matteo Velluti (12, SS), Bese di Guido Magalotti (CPG), Bettino di 
messer Bindaccio Ricasoli (CPG), Buonaccorso di Lapo di Giovanni (12, SC),
Buonaccorso di Vanni (12, SC, orafo), Cenni di Marco (A-Albergatori), Cristofano di 
Barbarino (A-Corrazzai), Domenico di Tieri Magalotti (16, SC), Donato Busini (16, 
SC), Filippo di Rinaldo Rondinoli (A-Lana), Firenze di Pancia (A-Calzolai), Francesco 
di Feduccio [di Cione] Falconi (08, SS), Francesco di Salvestro Peruzzi (DL), 
Francesco di Spinello (08, SC, vaiaio), Francesco di Tieri called “Calcagno” (A-
Beccai), Gentile di Lippo Belfredelli (16, SS), Gerozzo di Nastagio Cacciafuori (16, 
SS), Ghino di Bernardo Anselmi (CPG), Giovanni di Bartolo Biliotti (CPG), Giovanni di 
Federigo (A-MSM, speziale), Giovanni di Gherardino [Canacci] (A-Maestri), Giovanni 
di Lapo Corsi (DL), Giovanni di Mone (OG, biadaiolo), Giovenco di Daniello Arrigucci 
(16, SG), Giovenco di messer Ugo della Stufa (16, SG), Grazia di Nardo (A-Fornai), 
Guccio di Dino Gucci (OG), Iacopo di Bernardo (A-PSM, ritagliatore), Iacopo di 
Giovanni Risaliti (CPG), Iacopo di Iacopo Gherardini (CPG), Iacopo di Neri Paganelli 
(DL), Iacopo di Schiatta Mangioni (12, SMN), Lapo di Orlanduccio (A-Oliandoli, 
biadaiolo), Lapo di Vanni Rucellai (12, SMN), Leonardo di Neri di ser Benedetto (12, 
SG), Lorenzo di Matteo Buoninsegni (08, SMN), Marco di Giotto Fantone (16, SMN), 
Mariotto di Simone Orlandini (12, SC), Matteo di Federigo Soldi (OG, vinattiere), 
Matteo di Pacino (A-Legnaioli), Michele di Neri (A-Fabbri), Neri di Riccuccio (A-
Vinattieri), Niccolò Cambini (A-Rigattieri), Niccolò di Bartolo Cini (12, SMN, 
ritagliatore), Niccolò di Bono Rinucci (12, SS), Niccolò di Geri Geri (16, SG), Niccolò 
di Lippo Alberti (08, SS), Niccolò di Niccolò di Gherardino Gianni (OG), Nofrio di 
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declaring Lapo da Castiglionchio a rebel of the commune; making Piero degli 
Albizzi, Carlo Strozzi, Bonaiuto Serragli, messer Ristoro Canigiani, messer 
Benghi Buondelmonti, Francesco and ser Taddeo di Donato Marchi, and all of 
Lapo’s agnatic kin (omnes et singuli consortes et coniuncti per lineam 
masculinam) magnates; making the magnates Adoardo Pulci, Attaviano 
Brunelleschi, Alessandro Buondelmonti, Vieri Adimari, Iacopo Pazzi, and 
Guerrieri di Tribaldo Rossi “supermagnates”; and excluding a handful of men 
from office-holding without declaring them magnates: Bartolo Siminetti (for ten 
years), Niccolò Soderini (for life), and Piero Dell’Antella (from the Captainate 
of the Parte Guelfa for life).184 With the other arm they embraced the ammoniti, 
but not entirely—they put to a vote the question of whether a long list of 
recently proscribed citizens should be re-integrated into the commune, 
accepting many, but with a divieto blocking them from office for three years, 
and also rejecting a number of them, including messer Donato Aldighieri, the 
ropemaker Maso di Neri, Giovanni Mozzi, messer Giovanni da Poggibonsi, 
and messer Giovanni di messer Scolaio.185 A petition officially presented “on 
behalf of all the consuls [capitudini] of the twenty-one guilds of the city of 
Giovanni di messer Lapo (A-Cambio), Paolo di Matteo Malefici (DL), Piero di Cenni 
[Ghetti] (08, SG, spadaio), Piero di Fronte (08, SC, lanaiolo), Piero di Rosso (16, SS, 
fornaio), ser Piero Nelli (A-Giudici e notai), Salvestro di messer Alamanni de’ Medici 
(01, SG), Salvi di Guglielmo (DL, beccaio), Simone di Bartolino (08, SG, calzolaio), 
Simone di Benedetto di Gherardo [Del Bello] (08, SMN), Simone di Rinieri Peruzzi 
(OG), Stagio di Bartolo (DL, ferraio), Taddeo di Cantino degli Agli (CPG), Temperano 
di Manno del Chiaro (16, SMN), Tommaso di Bartolo (12, SG, pellipaio), Tommaso di 
Marco Strozzi (OG), Tommaso di Meglio Fagioli (16, SMN, lanaiolo), Tommaso di 
Serotino Brancacci (CPG, lanaiolo), Vieri di Cambio de’ Medici (DL), and Zanobi di 
messer Marabottino Tornaquinci (DL).
184 ASF, CR, 11, 126v.
185 Ibid., ff. 145v-148v.
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Florence, and of each and every guildsman of those guilds” and approved as 
law on 9 July officially legitimized the destruction of the Parte Guelfa’s 
weapons of terror, and did so in the name of the entire guild community. It 
stripped from the Captains of the Parte Guelfa the power to proscribe 
(ammonire) any Florentine citizen from a lineage that had held major 
communal or guild office since 1312, to send Florentines into confinement 
outside the city borders, and to proscribe foreign officials; and it invalidated 
“every scrutiny made by the Parte Guelfa during the tenure of Lapo da 
Castiglionchio and his associates.” The law also certified the powers and 
privileges of Salvestro de’ Medici and his fellow priors as well as all legislation 
between 24 and 30 June (i.e., the acts of the balìa), established new 
guidelines for scrutinies for the priorate and communal councils and for the 
name selection process (imborsazione), and it seemingly converted the wide-
ranging authority of the emergency balìa of June into what could have become 
a stable, consent-driven guild government.186
186 The measure of 9 July 1378, now found in ASF, PR, 66, ff. 57r-59v, is 
completely transcribed in Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, as document VII in the appendix at 
pages 346-56: “per parte di tucte le Capitudini delle ventuna Arti della città di Firenze, 
et per parte di tutti et singuli artefici delle decte Arti” (346)… “ogni scruptinio facto alla 
Parte Guelfa al tempo di messer Lapo da Castiglionchio et de compagni” (351)…” 
Najemy, “Audiant omnes artes,” 63-4, has shown how this legislation arose out of the 
corporate principles of the Florentine popolo, principles that had been stressed anew 
in recent communal assemblies.
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The Plots of July 1378
No extant chronicle of 1378 more readily attributes the events of the 
summer to conspiratorial activity or reveals more about those conspiracies 
than that of Alamanno di messer Alamanno Acciaiuoli, who was drawn for the 
priorate on 28 June and thus provides a level of detail possible only from a 
first-hand witness.187 On the afternoon of Monday 19 July, he reports, an 
informant came before the priors and claimed that a group of ammoniti were 
planning to revolt (romoreggiare e levare la terra a romore) on Tuesday.188 “If 
you want to know the truth about these things,” he said, “go apprehend 
someone named Simoncino, who’s called Bugigatto and lives near the Porta di 
San Pier Gattolino [the city’s southernmost gate], or Pagolo del Bodda, or 
187 On the identification of Alamanno Acciaiuoli as the author of the chronicle 
formerly attributed to Gino Capponi “il vecchio,” see Gino Scaramella, “Avvertenza” to 
the “Cronache e ricordanze di pubblici magistrati del giugno-luglio 1378” in 
SCARAMELLA, 5-9, and, more importantly, his “Questioni varie intorno alle cronache 
capponiane pubblicate dal Muratori,” Archivio muratoriano 1 (1913): 307-325. 
Alamanno was moderately wealthy (his forced loan assessment before the summer of 
1378 was 2 f., 15 s., 4 d.; see ASF, Prestanze, 334, 8v), a traditionalist and critic of 
the war against the papacy (SCARAMELLA 18, and David S. Peterson, “The War of the 
Eight Saints in Florentine Memory and Oblivion,” in Society and Individual in 
Renaissance Florence, ed. William J. Connell [Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002), 207], and had served the government previously as one of the 16 
gonfalonieri in early 1377 (ONLINE TRATTE). He was also a vociferous critic of 
Salvestro de’ Medici and this undoubtedly colors his account. One of the manuscripts 
containing ACCIAIUOLI has recently been edited entirely in Luciano Formisano, ed., 
Iddio ci dia buon viaggio e guadagno: Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, ms. 1910, 
Codice Vaglienti (Florence: Polistampa, 2006). 
188 ACCIAIUOLI, 20: “In quello medesimo dì del lunedì, in sull’ora della nona 
[around 4PM] si sentì per li priori d’alcuno, lo quale aveva nome [....], come per questi 
amuniti il martedì si dovesse romoreggiare e levare la terra a romore.” The names of 
the informant and possibly of one or more of the ammoniti are missing; this lacuna is 
present in all of the manuscripts. That the informant describes the conspirators as 
“amuniti,”and not as Ciompi, is noteworthy, as we will see.
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Lorenzo Ricomanni from San Frediano; and whichever of these three you 
bring in can tell you all about the planned conspiracy [trattato] and what was 
planned.”189 The first of the three, having been quickly brought in and 
questioned by the proposto (possibly Acciaiuoli himself) in front of an altar in 
the priors’ chapel, admitted that he and his associates were afraid because 
they had committed a number of robberies and heard that a police official 
(bargello) named ser Nuto from Città di Castello had been hired to capture and 
hang them, and that, on account of this fear, twelve of them (including Pagolo 
del Bodda, Lioncino di Biagino, Lorenzo Ricomanni, Nardo di Camaldoli, Luca 
di Melana, Meo del Grasso, Zoccolo, Guido Bandiera, Salvestrino da San 
Giorgio, Guanda di Gualfonda, and Galasso) had gathered at the Spedale de 
Preti (Priests’ Hospital) in via San Gallo and called together a group of men 
from Belletri and San Gallo.190 “We agreed there to cause a revolt [levare il 
rumore] at around 8:30 in the morning,” Simoncino explained. “It was planned 
by certain syndics we’d elected a few days earlier at Ronco outside the Porta 
di San Pier Gattolino. Know this, my lord prior, we have conspired together 
[congiurati insieme], and we have with us a lot of guildsmen and men from 
good families [ben dell’artefici assai e de’ buoni], and most of the proscribed 
[grandissima parte dell’ammoniti], who are very willing to help, are with us 
189 Ibid., “Se voi volete sapere la verità di questi fatti, fate avere uno che ha 
nome Simoncino, chiamato Bugigatto, dalla Porta a San Piero Gattolino o Pagolo del 
Bodda o Lorenzo Ricomanni da San Friano. E quale avete di questi tre, eglino vi 
diranno tutto el trattato per ordine, che è ordinato.” Simoncino’s nickname Bugigatto 
(now more commonly “bugigattolo”) means “a little room” 
190 Two of the manuscripts used by Scaramella add that more than fifty men 
from Belletri came to the hospital at the call of the conspirators; see the note to line 4 
in SCARAMELLA, 21: “piu di 50 de’ belletrani.”
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too.”191 The proposto then asked Simoncino “if any citizen, popolano o grande, 
was their leader,” and he replied that they were lead by “certi amuniti”
including “the spice merchant Giovanni Dini, the pavers Guglielmo [or 
Giuliano] and Andrea [di Feo], and the ropemaker Maso [di Neri],” adding: “But 
be certain of this, my lord prior, that many ammoniti were eager to bring about 
these events.”192
Later that night, the priors summoned most of the government, 
including all the gonfalonieri and guild consuls, and they decided together that 
Simoncino should be forced to tell the truth about the conspiracy (il vero di 
questo trattato) under torture. Simoncino broke under the pain of the 
strappado (parecchi tratti of rope) and added one crucial element to his earlier 
description of the plot: “that the leader and organizer of the conspiracy was 
Salvestro di messer Alamanno de’ Medici”.193 Following the interrogation, an 
assembly was held in which various representatives of the government 
weighed in on what to do about Simoncino’s revelation. Marco di Giotto 
Fantoni, one of the gonfalonieri from the quarter of Santa Maria Novella, 
191 ACCIAIUOLI, 21: “quivi si determinò di levare il rumore in sul l’ora della terza; 
e così era dato l’ordine per certi sindachi, che noi facemmo nel Ronco fuora della 
Porta a Sanpiero Gattolino più di sono. E sappiate, signor mio, che noi siamo bene 
[… ] congiurati insieme , ed ecci in fra noi ben dell’artefici assai e de’ buoni; e sono 
con noi grandissima parte dell’ammoniti, e quali ci si sono molto profferti.” The lacuna 
is present in all manuscripts, and it is likely only a number of plotters that is missing.
192 Ibid., “…Giovanni Dini, speziale, e di Guglielmo e Andrea, lastraiuoli… e di 
Maso funaiolo….” Two of these individuals can easily be identified (as in the brackets 
above), but the third, the lastraiolo Guglielmo (or, in one manuscript, Giuliano) resists 
identification. “Ma tenete di certo, signor mio, che da molti amuniti sono stati 
sollecitati di fare commovere a questi fatti.” 
193 Ibid., 22: “che capo e guida di questo trattato era Silvestro di messer 
Alamanno de’ Medici.”
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argued that the confession should be believed and called on the Capitano del 
Popolo (who had administered the interrogation) to take into custody all those 
named by Simoncino while he was under interrogation “in order to understand 
the basics of the whole crime.”194 Niccolò di Bono Rinucci, on behalf of the 
Twelve, agreed, but asked that force not be used in their capture and added, 
crucially, that Salvestro be sent for without any delay.195 Speaking on behalf of 
the consuls of the guilds, the banker Francesco di ser Santi Bruni presented a 
cautious plan, requesting that the matter be kept secret, that an armed guard 
(pretending to hold a demonstration) be placed in the piazza in the morning, 
that the city’s shops remain open, and, as the others had, “that in the 
meantime all the persons named should be brought in, and that Salvestro di 
messer Alamanno [de’ Medici] should be brought in immediately”.196 According 
to Alamanno Acciaiuoli’s account, it was Giovanni di Cambio di Geri 
(sometimes called “el Balestriere,” the crossbowman), one of the sixteen 
gonfalonieri in May-June and a member of the late-June balìa, who found 
Salvestro and questioned him about the plot. Unable to deny (disdire) what 
Simoncino had revealed, Salvestro admitted that he had spoken with the 
194 ASF, CP, 17, f. 10r: “Marcus Giotti pro Gonfaloneriis dixit: Quod detur 
credentia et cum sollicitudine et diligentia fiat quod nominati per examinatum omnes 
seu illi qui possunt haberi capiantur et ponantur in manibus Capitanei Populi, ita quod 
sciatur fundamentum totius rei.”
195 Ibid., “Nicholaus Boni pro Duodecim dixit idem quod Gonfalonerii salvo 
quod non fiat aliqua captura per vim, sed requirantur nominatim per magistratus et 
non fiat aliquis apparatus armorum. Et quod mittantur indilate per Salvestrum.” 
196 Ibid., “Franciscus ser Santi pro Capitudinibus dixit: Quod preparetur gens 
armorum et sub pretextu mostre sit in platea in aurora diei. Et quod interim procuretur 
quod habeantur omnes nominati, et subito habeatur Silvester d. Alamanni. Et quod 
nullus mercator aliquid cesset sed stent apothece aperte, et iuretur secretum.”
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Ronco conspirators (lo confessò), but claimed that he had refused to listen to 
their plans because they were “dangerous to the government” (pericolose allo 
stato), adding, “they told me that they had discussed the plot with certain other 
citizens, Barna di Valorino [Ciurianni] and others, who had advised them to 
ask for these things [presumably, i.e, their list of demands].” “Lords priors,” 
Salvestro explained, “I know well that I made a mistake by not coming to tell 
you about this, but considering that these people are not very much worth 
mentioning to lords of your power, I didn’t bother to tell you.”197 The priors 
were merciful and did nothing to punish Salvestro but, Acciaiuoli adds, they 
were later very sorry (molto ripentiti) that they had not. 
Acciaiuoli describes the men who met at Ronco as “li ribaldi e gente 
minuta e di vile condizione” who feared retribution for their crimes, particularly 
those against Church property at the Romiti degli Agnoli and Santo Spirito, but 
he invests their meeting with a strange, almost liturgical solemnity: 
In order to be joined together one to the other in life and death 
and to defend each other from anyone who would want to harm 
them, they bound themselves with great promises and oaths 
[sagramenti e leghe] and kissed each other on the mouth. They 
gave the order to go to all of their peers in the places and 
neighborhoods where they lived and to administer the oath and 
receive promises. And they selected certain representatives 
[sindachi] to remain alert and ready so that, if any crime or harm 
197 ACCIAIUOLI, 23: “Di che eglino mi dissono, che n’aveano avuto 
ragionamento con alcuno altro cittadino, il quale gli avea consigliati dovessino queste 
cose domandare, e questi erano suti il Barna Valorini e altri. Di che, signori, ben 
conosco che io fallai a non venirevelo a dire; ma considerato che gente son queste 
da farne poca menzione alla possanza della vostra signoria, non mi curai di 
significarvelo.” 
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was done against any one of them, they would all come to his 
defense; for this reason they were on high alert.198
It has been argued that these men could have been forming in their “fraternal 
binding together and oathtaking” the “rudimentary organization” that would 
become the guild of the popolo minuto,199 and that may very well be true. But 
the same binding and oathtaking are also central to the coniuratio or 
conspiracy. Whatever the Roncans were up to, Acciaiuoli is clear about who, 
ultimately, was responsible for the fear that drove them to take the oath, and 
why:
The ammoniti were going around day and night inciting and 
stirring up the popolo minuto, saying, “You wicked people, you’ll 
all be hanged for robbing citizens and churches; the priors have 
called in police officials [difensori e bargelli] for this very reason.” 
They were saying these things and putting fear in their hearts in 
order to start another revolt to get everything they wanted.200
198 ACCAIUOLI, 19: “…quivi con grandi sagramenti e leghe si legorono insieme 
e bacioronsi in bocca d’essere alla morte e alla vita l’uno coll’altro e difendersi contro 
a chi li volessi offendere; e dierono ordine d’andare a tutti e loro pari, per li luoghi e 
contrade dove dimoravano, a dare il sagramento e ricevere promessioni; e ferono 
certi sindachi, che questi fussino e stessino avvisati e attenti, che, se a nullo fussi 
fatto villania o ingiuria, d’essere tutti in difesa di quello tale; di che eglino stavono in 
grande riguardo.”
199 Najemy, “Audiant Omnes Artes,” 61. 
200 ACCIAIUOLI, 19: “Li amuniti … andavano di dì e di notte commovendo e 
sottraendo questi del popolo minuto, dicendo loro: ‘Cattiva gente, voi sarete tutti 
impiccati per la gola per le ruberie che avete fatte a cittadini e alle chiese; imperochè i 
priori hanno ordinato di fare venire difensori e bargelli, per questa cotale cagione.’ E 
questo dicevano, a fine che altra volta si romoreggiasse per avere interamente loro 
intenzione; e mettevono loro questa paura in corpo. 
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It is also interesting, in this respect, that Salvestro would claim that they had 
formulated their demands and plotted along with Barna di Valorino Ciurianni, a 
prominent and politically independent merchant who had served on the 
priorate in the middle of 1377, and who was only loosely allied with Salvestro’s 
faction.201 Assuming that Acciaiuoli’s account is accurate, and we have no 
reason to believe otherwise, it is possible that Salvestro was himself only 
tenuously tied to the plotting in July, plotting in which his allies were obviously 
active participants. It is also possible, though, that Salvestro was simply biding 
his time, knowing that violence would again soon erupt.
The accuracy of Acciaiuoli’s description of the extent to which fear of 
being caught and executed by ser Nuto or other police officials drove 
Simoncino and his colleagues likewise cannot be entirely verified, but it is 
strongly supported by the account of the wool shearer Pagolo di ser Guido, 
who devotes a great deal of space to the city’s and the wool guild’s efforts to 
physically punish thieves in the summer; they went searching all over the city, 
he says at one point, bringing with them the savage tools of capital 
punishment—“col ceppo e con la mannaia e con capresti”—the chopping 
block, the sword for beheading, and nooses.202 That ser Nuto in particular was 
201 On Barna, see Marvin Becker, Florence in Transition, vol. 2, 141. Writing to 
his father more than twenty years after the tumults of 1378, this same Barna would 
note the change that had occurred in the practice of Florentine politics: “nowadays 
vendettas are fought in the palazzo; there are no more street battles with knives”; see 
Brucker, Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence, 29-30. This is striking because 
the plots and counter-plots of 1378-82 undoubtedly helped lead to the consensus 
politics of later years that spelled the end of street battles. 
202 PAGOLO DI SER GUIDO, 273. The ominous list comes from Pagolo’s 
description of the hunt for the fiamminghi, a group of northern European robbers who 
exploited the political unrest of June. Pagolo claims, contrary to other accounts 
including the Anonimo, that all five were caught, and notes that they were hanged in 
prominent spots thoughout the city, “l’uno in su la Piazza de’ Priori, l’altro in mercato, 
112
feared and hated is clear from the gleeful pleasure that Pagolo takes in 
reporting that he got his just desserts in July: “At Vespers [around 7:30PM], 
ser Nuto was spotted, so those following the banner of the wool shearers ran 
over, grabbed him, killed him, dragged him into the piazza of the priors, and 
strung him up by the feet; blessed is he who was able to have a little bit of him, 
nothing more than a foot and half a leg were left of him.”203
Even after the balìa had finished doing its work, the streets and houses 
and shops of Florence bristled with tensions and smoldered with talk of 
conspiracies. As John Najemy has shown, the records of the communal 
advisory assemblies (consulte) for these days are full of rumors of heated 
discussions and secret rumblings—colloquia, murmurationes, and discordie—
within the guilds, rumblings to which the likely and proffered solution appeared 
to be a full embrace of corporatist principles.204 But on 12 July, only days after 
he had called for all the guilds to be heard (audiant omnes artes), Niccolò di 
Bono Rinucci of the Twelve would also call for the Capitain of the People to 
“pursue conspirators and those holding secret gatherings day and night,” just 
as Giovenco di messer Ugo della Stufa for the Sixteen had called on the same 
day for the rectors to “prosecute plots and conspiracies in whatever way they 
l’altro a Santa Maria Novella, l’altro da Borgo Ognissanti, l’altro a Santo Spirito,” 
presumably to maximize the fear-inducing impact of the executions. 
203 Ibid., “Poi in sul vespro fu insegnato Ser Nuto, corsevi il pennone de’ 
Cimatori e presonlo e uccisonlo e strascinaronlo in su la Piazza de’ Priori e 
appiccaronlo pe’ piedi, beato chi ne potè avere un poco, non vi rimase altro che un 
piede e mezza la gamba.” 
204 “Audiant omnes artes,” 62-4. 
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think most expedient”205 It is impossible to say exactly who was conspiring and 
for what ends in these meetings (presumably distinct from those occurring 
within the guilds), but eight days later word of one such plot reached the 
priorate. Having only heard second-hand of Simoncino’s arrest, the 
Machiavelli chronicler reported for 20 July that the priors “had heard that, in 
Camaldoli and in other places, that is, San Piero Gattolino and Belletri, there 
were many sworn together to do a great evil, that is, to burn all the houses of 
the popolani and the houses of those who had destroyed Florence through the 
policy of proscription which they had created in the Parte palace.”206 Before 
long the planned riot erupted, and the crowd was joined, says Stefani, by “all 
the laborers of the minor guilds and most of the major guilds.”207 First, when 
the priors seemed reluctant to release Simoncino and his allies, they burned 
the houses of Luigi di messer Piero Guicciardini, the Standardbearer of 
Justice, and those of his kinsmen. Then they attacked the houses of ten other 
men,208 making a show of not robbing anything: 
205 Quoted in Gherardi’s documentary appendix to ANONIMO, 513: “…de die et 
de nocte persequantur conspiratores e facientes adunatas… inquirant de 
tractatoribus et conspirationibus prout ipsis videbitur expediens…” 
206 ANONIMO, 366: “ch’e nostri signiori avieno sentito che in camaldoli e 
inn’altre luogora, cioè in San Piero Gattolino e in Belletri erano istati molti giurati 
insieme di far un gran male, cioè d’ardere tutte le case de’ popolani e le case di 
coloro ch’avieno guasta Firenze per quello ammonire ch’avieno fatto nel Palagio della 
Parte…”
207 STEFANI, rubr. 795, 322: “…tutti i fattori di tutte l’Arti minori e molti delle 
maggiori…”
208 Stefani’s list: ibid., 322-3: (1) messer Filippo Corsini, (2) Antonio di Niccolò 
di Cione Ridolfi, (3) messer Coppo di Lippo di Cione del Cane, (4) Michele di Vanni 
Castellani, (5) Simone di Rinieri Peruzzi, (6) Andrea di Segnino de’ Baldesi (7) 
Bernardo di Iacopo Beccanugi, (8) Alessandro and Bartolomeo degli Alessandri, (9) 
Domenico di Berto Ugolini, (10) ser Piero di ser Grifo, the notary of the Riformagioni; 
and Luigi Guicciardini.
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And so that it could not be said that they went to commit 
robberies, they worked in this way: when they gathered to set a 
house on fire, they took whatever others dragged out, fine cloths, 
pearls, silverware, and beds and burned it all in the fire.209
The arsonists, it seems, were consciously and intentionally distinguishing their 
work of political violence from the robberies committed in June, which had 
created so much fear of retribution, and which to at least some extent had 
been the work of opportunists and even foreigners. An enraged ser Nofri 
declared that the arsons committed by the “gente minuta and the rabble” were 
done “through the working of Benedetto degli Alberti and other citizens” 
adding that 
the last house burned in Florence by the Ghibellines and rabble, 
through the working of the criminal Benedetto Alberti, who had 
the help of the foolish and cocky Tommaso di Marco Strozzi and 
the others who followed them in rioting and house-burning, was 
that of [the writer Ser Nofri’s father] ser Piero di ser Grifo di ser 
Bruno who was the notary of the Riformagioni [i.e., the legislative 
notary] of the people and commune of Florence.210
The accusation of a fanatic like ser Nofri must be taken with a grain of 
salt, but, as we will see below, the selection of houses for destruction 
209 Ibid., “E perchè non si dicesse che andassero rubando, tennono uno modo 
che quando giugneano per mettere fuoco alla casa, pigliavano ciò che altri ne 
traevano, drappi, perle, ariento e letta, e in sul fuoco ardevano ogni cosa.”
210 SER NOFRI, 57: “…dalla giente minuta e dal popolazzo di Firenze, per 
fattura di messer Benedetto degli Alberti e d’altri cittadini… l’ultimo casamento el 
quale fu arso in Firenze da’ ghibellini e dal popolazo, per fattura di messer Benedetto 
degli Alberti, il quale era reo uomo, coll’aiuto di Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi, el 
quale fu poco savio e baldanzoso, e d’altri e quali costoro seguitavano, feciero fare 
romore e ardere le case di ser Piero di ser Grifo di ser Bruno, el quale era notaio 
delle Rinformagioni del popolo e comune di Firenze.”
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does reveal the planning, at least, of the men who wished to go further  
in remaking the city and re-instating the proscribed than the balìa had 
been able to. 
The Knights of the Ciompi
The creation of more than 60 knights on the evening of 20 July in 
the Piazza della Signoria has inspired a variety of historical 
interpretations. Gene Brucker, noting that it was a group of “prominent 
citizens” who were knighted, has signaled the event, in an essay of 
conservative revisionism, as an example of how the Ciompi “went out of 
their way to resurrect antiquated ideals and symbols”;211 and 
Alessandro Stella, an open supporter of the revolutionary left, has seen 
in it a “ritual of inversion,” or reversal, in which those of the lowest social 
orders created a knighthood of “merchants, wool manufacturers, and 
bankers” to defend them.212 Yet while these modern observers, 
notwithstanding the enormous differences between their approaches, 
both found it striking that the Ciompi would have knighted men of higher 
social rank, at least one contemporary was struck by something 
211 “The Ciompi Revolution,” 352-3. 
212 La révolte des Ciompi, 68: “…il s’agit bien d’un rite d’inversion. Ce n’est ni 
l’empereur, ni la caste des chevaliers, ni le popolo grasso, mais les derniers dans 
l’échelle sociale, les minuti, les pedites qui nomment (par l’intermédiaire, bien sûr, 
d’un chevalier) des chevaliers. De plus, oh l’horreur!, des marchands, des lainiers, 
des banquiers auraient dû devenir les défenseurs de la piétaille (minutaglia).”
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different: in his cantankerous yet comical description (written in the late 
fourteenth century) of the decline of the dignity of knighthood (from 
cavalleria to what he calls cacaleria), the novelliere Franco Sacchetti 
recalls how “not many years ago, craftsmen and minor guildsmen, 
down to the bakers, and even lower, wool carders, usurers, and 
shameful criminals” were all made knights.213 Contemporary accounts 
of the knighting ceremony are not entirely harmonious, with the 
chronicler Stefani providing the most complete version: The crowd 
“grabbed certain citizens and knighted them by force,” and 
because they were afraid of being robbed and having their 
houses burned down many of them agreed to be knighted in this 
way. And they acted shrewdly: they went into the piazza of the 
priors, where the Capitano del Popolo and the soldier Count 
Averardo di Lando were, and those who wished to be knighted in 
order not to have their houses burned, because they were 
members of the faction that used ammonizione, had friends in 
the piazza and they were saying, ‘Next, next, now this one, now 
that one!’ And they moved about. The people [popolo], longing 
for revolution [novità], ran here and there, leading them around. 
There were some whose houses were burned, and some who 
were elevated to the dignity of knighthood; and it was such that 
some whose houses had been burned were made knights and 
others were made knights who had their houses burned a little 
while later. It was il più nuovo e strano viluppo che mai si 
facesse.214
213Trecentonovelle, ed. Antonio Lanza (Florence: Sansoni, 1984), nov. 153, 
325: “…non sono molti anni, far cavalieri li meccanici, gli artieri, insino a’ fornai; 
ancora più giù, gli scardassieri, gli usurai e rubaldi barattieri.” In the traditional order 
of the guilds, the bakers’ guild (“fornai”) was lowest. 
214 STEFANI, rubr. 795, 323: “Ed eglino presero certi cittadini, e per forza li 
faceano cavalieri, come che in quello fare dei cavalieri molti se ne facessero per 
paura di non essere arsi e rubati. E teneano questa cautela: mandavano in sulla 
piazza de’ Priori, dove era il Capitano del popolo ed il conte Averardo di Lando che 
era soldato, e quegli che si volea fare cavaliere da sè per paura di non essere arso, 
perocch’era della setta di quelli ch’ammoniano, avea gli amici in sulla piazza, e dicea: 
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It was, in Brucker’s translation, “the most incredible disorder that had ever 
occurred,” but this removes the obvious sense of novelty (and, perhaps, even 
of political subversion) in nuovo and of knottiness in viluppo.215 And, as we will 
see, these revolutionary grants of knighthood would provide a tangle of knots 
to be untied over the next two days and later that summer. Having offered a 
similar account, Alamanno Acciaiuoli also opined, “it was a hard thing to 
believe”.216 Unlike Stefani’s nameless crowd, the Machiavelli chronicler 
provides some possible details about who initiated and undertook the 
knighting: “this group of the people [popolo] and the consuls and guildsmen 
took Salvestro di messer Alamanno, brought him onto the ringhiera [a raised 
platform in front of the palace], and made him a knight. And then he went to 
the houses of Giovanni Dini and Tommaso di Marco [Strozzi] and made them 
knights, together with Guccio di Dino Gucci and many other citizens.”217 Ser 
Nofri, in an account that must be read with suspicion due to its author’s rabid 
‘All’altro, all’altro, al cotale, al cotale’. E moveansi. Lo popolo, vago di novità, correa 
qua e là, e menavanlo. E chi ardeano, e chi levavano a dignità di cavalleria; e a tale 
era arsa la casa sua, che in quello stante era fatto cavaliere; e tale fatto cavaliere, 
che ivi a poco gli era arsa la casa. E fu il più nuovo e strano viluppo che mai si 
facesse.”
215 Brucker translated only the final line, in Florentine Politics, 381. 
216 ACCIAIUOLI, 25-26: “Forte cosa era a crederlo.” 
217ANONIMO, 366: “E l’altro dì, Salvestro di messer Alamanno, la brigata del 
popolo e Capitudine e artefici sì presono Salvestro, e menoro’lo in sulla ringhiera e 
feciollo cavaliere. Ed egli andò a casa Giovanni Dini e Tommaso di Marco , e fecissi 
cavalieri, e Guccio Dino Gucci e molti altri cittadini.” Anonimo incorrectly places this 
event on 21 July, and his assertion that Giovanni Dini and Tommaso Strozzi were 
knighted at home differs from other accounts, such as that of the SQUITTINATORE, 73, 
where it is noted that the Otto della Guerra (of which those two were members) were 
all knighted “in sulla porta di signiori priori,” that is, in the doorway of the palazzo. 
MONALDI, 518, similarly, notes that “Silvestro fece Cavaliere M. Tommaso di Marco 
degli Strozzi”. 
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biases, adds that Benedetto Alberti and Tommaso Strozzi “made themselves 
knights or made each other knights [si ferono cavalieri],” if not meaning that to 
be taken literally then at least suggesting that they were complicit or somehow 
involved in the granting of knighthoods.218 The chronicles differ on precisely 
how many men were knighted on 20 July—the Squittinatore (pp. 73-4), for 
instance, lists fewer than 60—but, taken together, around 70 different men are 
named as knights in all the available sources.219 What was so nuovo and 
218 SER NOFRI, 57.
219 Gaetano Salvemini reconstructed a list of those knighted in 1378 from a 
variety of (primarily chronicle) sources in his monograph on Florentine knighthood; it 
is now found in Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295; seguito da La dignità 
cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze (Turin: Einaudi, 1960), 467-9. For the sake of 
greater completeness, I have added those names found in either RASTRELLI, 152-3, 
or in the chronicle sources in SCARAMELLA, which are not found in Salvemini’s list. 
Those who affirmed their knighthood on 18 October 1378 are underlined; their names 
(derived from archival sources) are published in the documentary appendix of 
Alessandro Gherardi, ed., Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dall’anno 1358 al 1389, in 
Marco Tabarrini, ed., Cronache dei Secoli XIII e XIV [Florence: Cellini, 1876], 523). 
Three of them confirmed their knighthood through a procurator whose name is listed 
in double brackets after their names. Alphabetized by given name, the knights were: 
(1) Alessandro di Messer Riccardo de’ Bardi, (2) Alessandro di Niccolò Alessandri, (3) 
Andrea di Messer Francesco Salviati, (4)Andrea di Lippozzo Mangioni, (5) Antonio di 
messer Nicola degli Alberti, (6) Antonio di Michele Tanagli, (7) Arnaldo di Messer 
Coppo Pontigiani [Mannelli], (8) Bartolomeo di Lapo Bombeni, (9) Bartolomeo 
Petriboni, (10) Benedetto di Nerozzo degli Alberti, (11) Bernardo di Chiarissimo di 
Meo Cionacci, (12) Bettino di messer Covone Covoni, (13) Biagio di Bonaccio 
Guasconi, (14) Chimento, scardassiereA; (15) Cristofero di Anfrione degli Spini, (16) 
Donato di Iacopo Acciaiuoli, (17) Filippo di Rinaldo Rondinelli, (18) Filippo di ser 
Lippo Magalotti, (19) Forese di Giovanni Salviati, (20) Francesco di Neri degli Spini,
(21) Francesco di Uberto degli Albizzi, (22) Fruosino di Francesco di Spinello, vaiaio; 
(23) Fuligno di Conte de’ Medici, (24) Gagliardo di Neri de’ Bonciani, (25) Gaspare di 
Francesco di Uberto degli Albizzi, (26) Gino di Bernardo Anselmi, (27) Giorgio di 
messer Francesco degli Scali, (28) Giovanni di Francisco Zati, (29) Giovanni di 
[messer] Francesco Rinuccini, (30) Giovanni di Bingieri Rucellai, (31) Giovanni di 
Cambio de’ Medici, (32) Giovanni di Mone, biadaiuolo; (33) Giovanni Dini, speziale; 
(34) Giovenco di messer Ugo della Stufa, (35) Gregorio di Pagnozzo Cardinali, (36) 
Guccio di Cino Bartolini, (37) Guccio di Dino Gucci, (38) Guerriante di Matteo 
Marignolli, (39) Guido [di Giovanni] de’ Machiavelli [[procurator: messer Alessandro di 
messer Riccardo Bardi]; (40) Guido di Salvestro, called “el Bandiera,” scardassiere; 
(41) Iacopo di Bernardo, biadaiolo, (42) Iacopo di Piero Sacchetti [[procurator: Iacopo 
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strano about the ceremony to Stefani, as it was to Alamanno Acciaiuoli who 
used similar language,220 was that they destroyed the houses of some of the 
very same men that they knighted. But, for all the chroniclers’ amazement, 
only two of the 70 or so knights (the standard-bearer Luigi Guicciardini and 
Alessandro Alessandri) had had their houses burned that day; similarly only a 
small group were proponents of ammonizione or of the previously targeted 
Parte faction (Biagio Guasconi, Simone Baroncelli, Francesco di Uberto degli 
Albizzi and his son Gaspare, Ramondino di Giovanni and Vanni di Iacopo 
di Bartolomeo Bombeni]]; (43) Lionardo di Tommaso Peruzzi, (44) Luca di Totto da 
PanzanoB, (45) Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, (46) Luigi di messer Piero Guicciardini, 
(47) Marco di Francesco Vigorosi, (48) Matteo di Federico Soldi, vinattiere; (49) 
Matteo di Iacopo Arrighi, (50) Meo [Bartolomeo di Lorenzo] del Grasso, fornaio; (51) 
Meo de’ Cocchi [Bartolomeus Bartoli de Cocchis], (52) Nastagio di ser Francesco, 
(53) Niccolò di Alesso [di Borghino] Baldovinetti, (54) Nozzo di Vanni Manetti, (55) 
Palmieri di messer Arnaldo Altoviti, (56) Palmieri di messer Francesco degli ScaliC, 
(57) Piero di Bindo del Benino, (58) Ramondino di Giovanni Vecchietti, (59) Rinieri di 
Luigi Peruzzi, (60) Ruberto di Piero di Lippo Aldobrandini, (61) Salvestro di messer 
Alamanno de’ Medici, (62) Simone Baroncelli, (63) Simone di Baldo della Tosa, (64) 
Simone di Rinieri Peruzzi, (65) Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi, (66) Tommaso di 
Neri di Lippo del Palagio, (67) Vanni di Iacopo Vecchietti, (68) Vanni di Simone 
Quaratesi [or: da Quarata]; (69) Vieri [di Gherardo] del Poggio [Bardi] [[procurator: 
Benedetto di Nerozzo degli Alberti]]; (70) Vieri del Porcello, fornaioD; and (71) Vieri di 
Cambio de’ Medici. Notes: A = Named only in SCARAMELLA, p. 110 (Cronaca seconda 
d’anonimo) and almost certainly the Chimento di Noldino in ASF, Arte della Lana, 76, 
f. 5r; B = Knighted on 28 August 1378, see e.g. SCARAMELLA, 80 (Cronaca prima 
d’anonimo) (unlike the others here who were knighted throughout the day and night 
on 20 July 1378) and he is not included when I speak of the July knighthood; C = 
Listed by Salvemini, but possibly confusion with #26; D = Named only in 
SCARAMELLA, 110 (Cronaca seconda d’anonimo). On the knighthood ceremony and 
its significance, one may also consult the little cited work of Eugenio Branchi, “Della 
croce vermiglia in campo bianco, arme del popolo fiorentino, divenuta insegna dei 
cavalieri del popolo,” in Periodico di numismatica e sfragistica per la storia d’Italia 4 
(1870): 78-89. 
220 ACCIAIUOLI, 25, says that “nuova cosa era a vedere,” it was a new thing to 
see, someone whose house was burned being made a knight later that day. 
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Vecchietti, Andrea di Lippozzo Mangioni, and possibly Giovanni Rucellai).221
Monaldi adds that Salice Cavalcanti, another supporter of the oligarchy, 
refused (non accettò) his knighthood.222
The bulk of remaining knighthoods did not surprise our chroniclers. 
Seven of the new knights had themselves been recent victims of 
ammonizione, and another five had just had close relatives proscribed.223 The 
grain dealer Iacopo di Bernardo, while not ammonito, was a thorn in the side 
of the Parte faction who had been denounced in a tamburazione (almost 
certainly written by a Parte lackey) as the descendant of Ghibellines who had 
supported the tyrant Castruccio Castracani;224 likewise, Vanni di Simone 
Quaratesi came from a family long opposed to the Guelf faction that had also 
been denounced to the Esecutore.225 The son of Alessio Baldovinetti, who had 
threatened to burn down the Parte’s palace, was also knighted. The eight 
221 The composition of the leadership of the Parte has been established 
above. Andrea di Lippozzo Mangioni (4) is described in STEFANI, 731, as “a member 
of the Albizzi faction, very haughty” (“della setta degli Albizzi, molto fiero”); his Son 
Nicola and brother Cipriano would be major plotters against the guild government of 
1378-82. While perhaps not a member of the inner core of the Parte faction, Simone 
Baroncelli was certainly considered a papal stalwart; in addition to the sources given 
by Brucker, Florentine Politics, 230, n. 146, see also Bernard Guillemain, La Cour 
pontificale d’Avignon, 1309-1376: Étude d’une société (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966), 
596.
222 MONALDI, 519.
223 The seven ammoniti are nn. 7, 12, 27, 33, 51, 52, 54 in the list. The fathers 
of nn. 29 and 47, the brothers of 56 and 57 (i.e., Giorgio di messer Francesco Scali 
and Stefano di Bindo del Benino), as well as the cousin of 37 (i.e., Alessandro di 
Benedetto Gucci) were ammoniti as well.
224 ASF, Esecutore, 811, 137v.
225 For the denunciation, see ASF, Esecutore 811, ff. 174-5r; on the family’s 
opposition to the Guelfs, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, 30 and passim. 
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members of the Otto della guerra, charged with carrying out the war against 
the papacy, were also knighted, as well as three others who had had family 
members among the Otto dei preti or the Otto della guerra.226 Not including 
the Otto, six of those knighted had served on Salvestro de’ Medici’s balìa, as 
had the father of one of them.227 Among the knights were also a number of 
other leaders of the popular and anti-oligarchic faction, men like Gino di 
Bernardo Anselmi, who had been active in the popular movement in the 
quarter of Santa Maria Novella as early as the 1350s, and Giovanni Rinuccini, 
the son of one of the richest men in Florence.228 The knight Tommaso del 
Palagio, whose family was a re-named popolano branch of the magnate Bardi, 
was a leader in the movement as well, as was the knight Filippo Rondinelli’s 
cousin Andrea.229 The Aldobrandini, from which two of the knights came, were 
allies of the Ricci and remained strongly tied to the popular and anti-oligarchic 
faction; it was, for example, in the newly knighted Luigi di Lippo’s house that 
226 The Otto are nn. 65, 1, 37, 64, 32, 48, 33, and 3. Giovanni di Francesco, 
the cousin of 18, had previously served on the Otto della guerra. Bardo di Guglielmo, 
the cousin of 55, and Antonio di Forese, the cousin of 42, were among the Otto dei 
preti. With the exception of Simone Peruzzi, these men were all among the strongest 
supporters of the war; for example, Andrea Salviati is described by Marvin Becker, 
Florence in Transition, vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 222, 
as one of the patricians most in favor of the war against the papacy on the basis of 
his participation in communal assemblies.
227 On the balìa were nn. 10, 17, 26, 34, 41, and 71; and the father of 22, 
Francesco di Spinello. 
228 On Anselmi, Brucker, Florentine Politics, 33 and 69; on Rinuccini, ibid., 31 
and 298; Rinuccini was also tied to the Alberti by marriage; see Susannah K. Foster 
[Baxendale], “The Ties that Bind: Kinship Association and Marriage in the Alberti 
Family, 1378-1428” (Doctoral Thesis, Cornell University, 1985), 261.
229 Brucker, Florentine Politics, 298, n. 5, and 184, n. 138. 
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Salvestro and his faction conspired.230 The knight Piero di Bindo del Benino 
entered the office-holding ranks with other gente nuova in the 1340s and
came from a family notoriously opposed to the Albizzi faction.231 And the 
knight Bartolomeo di Lapo Bombeni, his ally, similarly came from a new family, 
with his father having served on the priorate under the Duke of Athens.232
Many of the men who were knighted that day were bound to one another by a 
shared political ideology, but they were also connected by commercial and 
marriage ties233: Gagliardo di Neri de’ Bonciani, for instance, had been a 
230 On the Aldobrandini, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, especially 209 and 
298, but passim. Luigi’s alliance with Salvestro is noted in Becker, Florence in 
Transition, 135; he had also been a communal ambassador during the War of the 
Eight Saints, on which see Gherardi, La guerra dei fiorentini con papa Gregorio XI, p. 
156.
231 Brucker, Florentine Politics, 127 and 217; his account book has been 
published as Il libro segreto della ragione di Piero Benini e compagni, ed. Piero Ginori 
Conti (Florence: Olschki, 1937).
232 See the entry on the Bombeni family in Lorenzo Cantini, Saggi istorici 
d’antichità toscane, vol. 7, 112 (Florence: Albizziniana, 1797); Bartolomeo was a 
member of the Calimala guild and client of the Del Bene; on this see Hidetoshi 
Hoshino, L’arte della lana in Firenze nel basso Medioevo: il commercio della lana e il 
mercato dei panni fiorentini nei secoli XIII-XV (Florence: Olschki, 1980), 171. 
233 Such ties are not, of course, always meaningful in understanding one’s 
political affiliation or ideology, a good case in point being Biagio Guasconi (number 
13), who was a leader in the Parte Guelfa faction; for a brief biographical sketch, see 
Giovanni da Prato, Il Paradiso degli Alberti, ritrovi e ragionamenti del 1389, ed. 
Aleksandr Nikolaevich Veselovskīĭ (Bologna: Romagnoli, 1867), at pp. 227-8; he was 
a member of the Arte della lana and served as consul on a number of occasions; see 
Raffaella Maria Zaccaria, “Documenti su Biagio Guasconi e la sua famiglia,” in 
Interpres 11 (1991): 308-26, reprinted in Studi sulla trasmissione archivistica: secoli 
XV-XVI (Florence: Conte Editore, 2002), 111, and Hidetoshi Hoshino, L’arte della 
lana in Firenze nel basso Medioevo, 182. In this capacity he was involved in business 
with Cipriano di Duccio degli Alberti, and, in the mid-1370s, took part in an arbitration 
on behalf of Marco di Francesco Alberti; his son also married an Alberti; on this, see 
Foster [Baxendale], “The Ties that Bind,” 149 and 433.
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business associate of the Alberti,234 while the the newly knighted and recently 
proscribed Meo de’ Cocchi had a daughter, Ginevra, married to another of the 
new knights, Francesco Spini.235 Fruosino di Francesco di Spinello had 
brothers married to both the knighted Tommaso Strozzi’s daughter Bice and to 
Antonia Alberti, whose kin included two new knights.236 Although it cannot be 
proved on the basis of the existing sources, it would surprise no one if 
Monaldi’s claim that “seventeen close associates [diciasette compagni]” of 
Tommaso Strozzi were among the first men knighted.237
Though we cannot know with certainty why many of the men were 
knighted or even precisely how or by whom,238 the image that emerges from a 
close examination of the sources is striking: although the knighting ceremony 
234 See Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power: Republican Florence Under 
Interdict (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 86, n. 189. 
235 Armando Sapori, “L’interesse del danaro a Firenze nel Trecento (Dal 
testamento di un usuraio)”, in Archivio storico italiano VII.x.2 (1928): 161-186, at page 
172; Monaldi calls Meo a “malvagio uomo e usuraio”; this is possibly the knighted 
usurer mentioned by Franco Sacchetti. 
236 Philip Jacks with William Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence: The Fortunes of 
a Renaissance Merchant Family (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2001), 24. Another interesting case is that of Filippo Magalotti (number 18), 
who later married his daughter Selvaggia to Benedetto Alberti’s son-in-law, whose 
drawing for the office of Standardbearer of Justice while he was still a “minor” (under 
40 in that case) in 1387 precipitated Alberti’s stunning fall from power, see Brucker, 
Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence,78, and ASF, Missive, 20, f. 249; and 
Susannah F. Baxendale, “Alberti Kinship and Conspiracy in Late Medieval Florence,” 
in Florence and Beyond, ed. David S. Peterson with Daniel Bornstein, p. 343. 
237 MONALDI, 518.
238 While our sources say little about a number of the knights, it is easy to 
surmise their political sympathies in some cases: Guccio di Cino Bartolini (number 
36), for example, was a non-elite member of the guild Cambio who was active in guild 
politics and would serve the 1378-82 guild government; see Saverio Lasorsa, 
L’organizzazione dei cambiatori fiorentini nel medio evo (Cerignola: Scienza e Diletto, 
1905), 90, and the ONLINE TRATTE. 
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devolved into chaos, with some men being knighted by force and others 
offering themselves up for knighthood to save their houses from destruction, 
the core of the new class of knights were all representatives of a well-defined 
and now ascendant political movement, the popular and broad-based faction 
led by Benedetto Alberti, Tommaso Strozzi, Giorgio Scali, and Salvestro de’ 
Medici.  It is, I believe, entirely possible that Salvestro de’ Medici and 
Tommaso Strozzi themselves co-orchestrated the knighting ceremony (or, 
almost certainly, the early stages of it) along with leaders of the popolo minuto, 
selecting for the new dignity their friends, allies, and fellow conspirators. The 
men who plotted with Salvestro de’ Medici in June, who stripped from the 
Parte Guelfa its authority and targeted its leaders with physical and political 
violence, were knighted on the evening of 20 July 1378. However many 
Ciompi participated that night in some capacity, only two, carders both, were 
included in the raucous, moving procession of knights: Guido di Salvestro, 
called “el Bandiera,” who had conspired with Simoncino at Ronco, and 
Chimento di Noldino; also knighted that evening, the baker (and later 
carpenter239) Meo del Grasso was classed along with them in the popolo 
minuto by contemporaries like Stefani. While the scholarship often refers to 
these knights as the “knights of the Ciompi,” the woolshearer Pagolo di ser 
Guido notes that Salvestro was made a “knight of the popolo minuto and the 
guilds,” as, presumably, were the others that day,240 and all the accounts are 
clear that the crowd was comprised of guildsmen and popolo minuto (not 
239 See the copy of a later list of Florentines, divided by quarter, contained in 
ASF, Manoscritti, 171, f. 4r. 
240 PAGOLO, 273: “…fecionlo Cavaliere del Popolo Minuto e dell’Arti…” 
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restricted only to Ciompi), presumably a mixture of major guildsmen with larger 
numbers of minor guildsmen and wool workers. 
The Petitions of July
On the next day, fearing that the crowd would do more damage, the 
priors sent a group of intermediaries (Stefani, 325, calls them uomini mezzani) 
to meet with the leaders of the popolo minuto to discuss their demands, and 
from these discussions emerged three lengthy petitions.241 An anonymous 
letter written in 1378, which betrays a close familiarity with the events of July, 
gives us a glimpse into how the petitions (or at least one of them) were written, 
and, crucially, who wrote them: 
That night they sent for the Eight of War and for the Syndics of 
the Guilds, and they held a meeting there and together decided 
that a petition should be written; they would ask for all the things 
they wanted, and present it to the priors, who would approve it. 
And so they did this, with around twenty or thirty of them retiring 
to San Lorenzo with a majority of the Syndics of the guilds, and 
they began to make the petition and worked on it until past terce 
[after 8AM] .242
241 The approved petitions are found in ASF, PR, 67, ff. 1-13v. The first 
petition (ff. 1-5v) was published as document IX (“Petizione del Popolo minuto, 
approvata nei Consigli”) and the second (ff. 6r-8v) as document VIII (“Petizione dei 
Sindaci delle Arti, approvata nei Consigli”) in Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, 356-64. The first 
petition has also been published (with corrections) by Ottavio Banti, “Notarelle sul 
tumult dei Ciompi,” in Scritti di storia, diplomatica, e epigrafia, ed. Silvio P.P. Scalfiati 
(Pisa: Ospedaletto, 1995), 523-534. For the first, I use Banti’s text, for the second, 
Falletti-Fossati’s, for the unedited third, ASF, PR, 67, ff. 9r-13v. 
242 LETTERA, 142: “…. la notte mandarono per gli otto della guerra e per i 
sindachi dell’arti; et quivi preser consiglio, et deliberossi in fra loro che si facesse una 
petitione, et domandassino quanto per loro si volessi, et che ella si porgesse a 
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The presence of the Eight of War and representatives of all the guilds, major 
and minor, reveals clearly that the revolutionary political program of the 
“Ciompi” belonged to a certain extent to the wider guild community (of which 
the Ciompi were not yet part) and to the pro-war party of Tommaso Strozzi 
and his allies; two of the petitions produced that night were presented “pro 
parte Populi minuti,” but the third was presented by the syndics of the twenty-
one guilds. In his masterful essay “Neighbors and Comrades: The 
Revolutionaries of Florence, 1378,” Richard Trexler has demonstrated 
conclusively that first minuto petition “committed the homines de populo 
minuto to a non-revolutionary settlement of the issues,” that the syndics of the 
popolo minuto who offered it did not represent the more radical elements of 
the Ciompi, and that one third of them were already guildsmen; but he says 
nothing of the second petition, except to refer to it as “less important” in a 
footnote to his other essay on the Ciompi, “Follow the Flag.”243 Unlike the 
other two petitions, which predominantly addressed political and economic 
issues and only secondarily addressed what might be called personal or 
private provisions (punishing or rewarding named individuals), the second 
petition of the popolo minuto contains only personal or private provisions (see 
the chart below for the persons named in each petition). One article of the first 
petition of the popolo minuto makes clear that the knighthoods conferred on 
victims of arson, which had so startled Stefani and the other chroniclers, were 
signori, che ella si vincerebbe. Et così feciono, et ritrassonsi in San Lorenzo circa 20 
in 30 di questa brigata con alcuni sindachi dell’arti et la maggiore parte; et 
cominciorno a acconciare questa petizione e questo si penò a fare fin passato terza.” 
243 The Workers of Renaissance Florence, 73-79, with the quotation at 73; and 
page 44, n. 56. 
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for the most part, if not performed through error or misplaced exuberance, 
regretted the next morning: “no one whose house was burned or who was 
robbed in the riots that recently occurred in the city of Florence is or should be 
understood to be a knight of the Florentine People,” excluding only Luigi 
Guicciardini.244 Guicciardini, with whom they were now “negotiating,” was, 
almost uniquely among the victims of their terror, not a chief supporter of the 
Parte Guelfa or the Albizzi faction. Among the other knights, two are singled 
out for further honors,245 each for having worked in many ways (laboravit 
multipliciter) for the popolo minuto. First, the carder Guido called “El Bandiera,” 
a “new knight made and created for the popolo minuto [novus miles factus et 
creatus pro Popolo minuto],” is to be awarded two thousand florins (to be 
taken from the sale of rebel property) within one month as a payment for his 
work on behalf of the popolo minuto; in his brief summary of the petition, 
Alamanno Acciaiuoli declares that Guido was promised the money because he 
was “uno dei primi che levò il rumore,” one of the instigators of the riot.246
Second, Salvestro de’ Medici “who, exposing himself to danger in a bold and 
manly way, worked for the free and popular government of the People and 
Commune of Florence and to honor and maintain the merchants and 
guildsmen of Florence,” is given all the proceeds from the rents (pensiones et 
244 Banti, “Notarelle,” 532: “Item, quod nullus cui in tumultibus qui noviter 
fuerunt in civitate Florentie fuit combusta domus, vel qui fuit derobatus, intelligatur 
esse vel sit miles Populi florentini, salvo quod hec non preiudicent domino Luisio de 
Guicciardinis.” 
245 Ibid., and 527-8. 
246 ACCIAIUOLI, 28. 
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redditus, totaling more than 70 florins per year) from Ponte Vecchio for life, 247
says Acciaiuoli, “per sostentare sua cavalleria,” to maintain his knighthood.248
In the petition of the guild syndics, another three knights are rewarded: 
Giovanni di Mone, one of the leaders in the Eight of War, is praised for having 
“worked tired tirelessly with great labors and resourcefulness for the People 
and Commune of Florence” and is given 300 florins per year from the 
proceeds of the Mercato Vecchio; Giovanni Dini, the member of the Eight of 
War who had been proscribed in April, is declared “to be and to have always 
been a Guelf and faithful to the Guelf Party, and not a Ghibelline nor a 
suspected Ghibilline,” is restored fully to his rights, and is re-instituted as a 
member of the Eight; Giorgio Scali, likewise, is declared a perpetual Guelf and 
restored entirely, along with “all of his agnatic kin.”249 The lawyer Donato 
Aldighieri, who had been rebuked by the balìa in his attempt to have his 
proscription overturned, was declared a Guelf and fully restored in the petition 
of the syndics of the guilds; while the similarly rejected ropemaker Maso di 
Neri was restored in the second petition of the popolo minuto.250 In fact, in that 
petition, nine other articles filling one and a half folios (11r-12r) are devoted to 
overturning ten remaining proscriptions.  And two similar articles appear in the 
247  Banti, Notarelle, 528: “…pro statu libero et populari Populi et Comunis 
Florentie, et pro honore et manutentione mercatorum et artificum civitatis Florentie 
laboravit quibusque periculis audaciter et viriliter se subiecit…”
248 ACCIAIUOLI, 28. 
249 Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, 361-2: “…cum maximis laboribus et solertia pro 
Populo et Comuni Florentie assidue laboravit…”; “…constat semper fuisse et esse 
guelfum et Parti Guelfe fidum, et non ghibellinum vel suspectum Parti Guelfe…”; “eius 
consortes et descendentes et agnati per lineam masculinam.”  
250 For Donato, Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, 363; for Maso, ASF, PR, 67, 11r.
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first minuto petition, including one restoring the paver Andrea di Feo, “Andreas 
Fei lastraiuolus.”251 This is striking, first, because Alammano Acciauoli, in his 
account of the ammoniti stirring up Simoncino and his allies, had stressed that 
the troublemakers included both those who had not yet been restored 
(smuniti) and those who had been restored by the balìa, but who still suffered 
under a three year divieto blocking them from office because more than sixty 
of the commission’s members had not voted in their favor;252 and secondly 
because, in Acciaiuoli’s account, when Simoncino was asked who was in 
charge of the conspiracy (see above), he named four individuals: “the spice 
merchant Giovanni Dini, the pavers Guglielmo and Andrea [di Feo], and the 
ropemaker Maso [di Neri].” 
Taken together, the petitions name and reward some of the men who 
had conspired to orchestrate (or, at least, to encourage and facilitate) the 
revolt of July, and who used that revolt to achieve their ends: Salvestro de’ 
Medici, Giovanni Dini, Giovanni di Mone, Giorgio Scali, Andrea di Feo, Maso 
di Neri. Of the thirteen men who had conspired at Ronco, five—Filippo di 
Simone, Leoncino di Franchino, Cambio di Bartolo called “Galasso”, Lorenzo 
di Riccomanno, and the newly knighted Guido “Bandiera”—were appointed 
syndics of the popolo minuto and helped draft the petitions.253 We find 
251 Banti, “Notarelle,” 530. 
252 ACCIAIUOLI, 19: “…li quali molti di loro non n’erano ancora smuniti, e etiam 
quelli ch’erano smuniti e aveano il divieto di tre anni, quelli per essere più tosto 
smuniti perchè il numero delle sessanta fave scemassino, e perchè fusse levato loro 
il divieto de’ tre anni.” 
253 Trexler has reconstructed a list of Roncans in Workers of Renaissance 
Florence, 69, and he lists the syndics at page 74; the names of the syndics in Latin as 
written in the petition are found in Banti, “Notarelle,” 529.
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ourselves here at the center of a conspiratorial nexus.  It is impossible to know 
with any certainty how this conspiratorial nexus was forged, but at least one 
tantalizing possibility is available to us: that the links among these 
revolutionary conspirators (whether Ciompi, guildsmen, or leaders of the 
popular faction) were hammered out and hardened in the also revolutionary 
war against the papacy. In 1968, Gene Brucker discovered that at least seven 
of the Ciompi leaders (including the Roncan Leoncino di Franchino) had 
served as caporali and others as foot soldiers in the communal army during 
the war; and he inferred, if only apophastically, that these men might have 
become revolutionaries because they were unhappy about “the termination of 
their military service and high salaries” at the war’s end.254 The more likely 
possibility, given the content of the petitions, is that these men who fought the 
war were supporters of it and thus would reasonably have allied with the pro-
war faction of Salvestro de’ Medici, Giovanni Dini, et al., especially since the 
ideology of that faction offered (at least in theory) the possibility of an 
expanded and non-elite office-holding class; and that they would have 
harbored strong animosity against the Parte Guelfa faction that opposed the 
war and worked tirelessly to restrict the office-holding class. Either way the 
prominent service of several key Ciompi in the war provides a clear context in 
which the ties between the Ciompi and the Eight of War could have been 
made. What is certain is that the writers of the petitions used them to finish the 
unfinished business of the balìa, and what will be clear below is that they also 
used them to finally and inexorably destroy the Parte faction. Since it is clear 
254 “The Ciompi Revolution,” 328-9; “The evidence does not permit us to 
conclude that the revolution was primarily the work of disgruntled army veterans…,” 
he says. 
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that the men of the popolo minuto feared retribution for the crimes they had 
committed, an article in the first petition of the popolo minuto granting amnesty 
for those crimes is not surprising, but its wording is revealing—no rector or 
other official, it states, can or ought to punish “any crime, transgression, or 
offence, of whatever kind, howsoever or for whatsoever reason committed, 
done, said, or carried-out, even if only verbally, from the eighteenth day of 
June to the day on which this measure is approved [23 July]”255 Another 
article, this time in the petition of the guild syndics, states “that each and every 
person who, either in June or in the current month of July, had his house 
burned down or was robbed should be understood to be and is, along with all 
his sons, brothers, and kin, unable to hold any office of the commune of 
Florence of the Guelf Party for ten years beginning now.”256 Both articles 
clearly present the violence of June and of July as being part of a single, 
unbroken continuum; and they link the arsons that swept over the houses of 
the Parte leaders with the other property crimes committed in the city. They 
also link the crimes of violence and the thefts to the whole assault on the 
Parte: in eleven articles (at ff. 9v-11r) the second minuto petition sent Piero 
degli Albizzi, Bartolo “Mastino” Siminetti, Carlo Strozzi, the brothers Matteo 
255 Banti, “Notarelle,” 525: “…de aliquo maleficio, excessu vel delicto, 
qualitercumque, quomodocumque, et quacumque de causa conmissis, factis, dictis 
vel perpetratis, etiam verbo, a die decimo octavo mensis iunii proxim[e] preteriti 
usque in diem qua presens provisio firmata fuerit…” 
256 Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, 359: “quod omnes et singuli, quibus de mense iunii 
proxim[e] preteriti vel de presenti mense iulii in tumulto populì fuerunt combuste 
domus vel fuerunt derobati, et eorum filii, fratres et patrui, excepto Smeraldo Stroze 
de Strozzis, intelligantur esse et sint, ex nunc usque ad decem annos proxime 
secuturos, privati et remoti ab omnibus quibuscumque officiis Comunis Florentie et 
Partis Guelfe…”
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and Giovanni dello Scelto Tinghi, and four others into confinement at least 
thirty miles from Florence; stripped office-holding rights from them and eight 
other men including Migliore Guadagni, Piero Canigiani, and Tommaso 
Soderini; declared five men magnates including Niccolò Ridolfi, and called for 
three magnates (Niccolò Bardi, Bertacchino Frescobaldi, and Bettino Ricasoli) 
to be treated as and punished as magnates to the fullest possible extent. 
An article of the guild syndics’ petition had even called for the Guelf 
Party to hand over its vexillum regale, the lily-covered flag that Lapo da 
Castiglionchio had had made earlier in the year and that would have called the 
Guelf forces to action on the feast of John the Baptist;257 and even some of the 
most famous politico-economic measures of these petitions were, ultimately, a 
platform for announcing the defeat of the Parte Guelfa faction: the 
government, for example, decided to have the Parte pay for the new popolo 
minuto guildhouse because it had been “cives veri et propri guelfi” that had 
created the new guild.258
An article of the guild syndics’ petition had even called for the Guelf 
Party to hand over its vexillum regale, the lily-covered flag that Lapo da 
Castiglionchio had had made earlier in the year and that would have called the 
Guelf forces to action on the feast of John the Baptist;259 and even some of the 
most famous politico-economic measures of these petitions were, ultimately, a 
platform for announcing the defeat of the Parte Guelfa faction: the 
257 Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, 364. 
258 See Niccolo Rodolico, Democrazia fiorentina, 181; the measure is found in 
ASF, Capitani della Parte Guelfa (Rosso), 5, ff. 77r-78r. 
259 Falletti-Fossati, Ciompi, 364. 
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TABLE I
Personal provisions in Ciompi petitions, 1378
PRO PARTE 
SINDICORUM
PRO PARTE POPULI 
MINUTI (#1)
PRO PARTE POPULI 
MINUTI (#2)
In favor of:
-Giovanni Dini
-Giorgio di Francesco 
Scali 
-Donato di Ricco 
Aldighieri 
-Giovanni di Mone
In favor of:
-Guido di Silvestro “el 
Bandiera”
-Salvestro di Alamanno 
de’ Medici
-Andrea di Feo
-Niccolò di Ammanato 
Tecchini
In favor of: 
-Maso di Neri 
-Giovanni di Luigi Mozzi
-Francesco di Martino
-Giraldo di Paolo di 
Giraldo
-Mazza di Andrea
-Piero di Fastello Petriboni
-Francesco and 
Alessandro, sons of 
Benedetto di Guccio
-Zanobi di Guidotto 
-Bernardo di Piero della 
Rena
-Guerriante di Biligiardo 
Bagnesi 
-Serotino di Silvestro 
Brancacci
Against:
-Lapo da Castiglionchio
Against:
-ser Piero di ser Grifo 
delle Riformagioni 
Against:
-Ludovico di Banco di ser 
Bartolo
-Selvolo di Lippo di Cione
-Priore and Pera, brothers 
of Pera Baldovinetti
-Simone di messer Bindo 
degli Altoviti
-Piero di Dato Canigiani 
-Tommaso di Guccio 
Soderini 
-Niccolò di Sandro de’ 
Bardi
-Bertacchino de’ 
Frescobaldi
-Bettino di messer 
Bindaccio Ricasoli
-Antonio di Niccolò di 
Cione Ridolfi 
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TABLE I (Continued)
-Anibaldo di Bernardo 
degli Strozzi         
-Corrado di Paolo degli 
Strozzi         
-Alessandro and 
Bartolomeo, sons of 
Niccolò Alessandri
-the Serragli family
-Migliore di Vieri Guadagni
-Matteo and Giovanno 
dello Scelto Tinghi       
-Piero di Filippo degli 
Albizzi
-Maso di Luce degli Albizzi
-Bartolo “Mastino” di 
Giovanni Siminetti               
cont.
-Niccolò di Geri Soderini 
and son
-Manetto di ser Ricciardo 
-Carlo di Strozza Strozzi
government, for example, decided to have the Parte pay for the new popolo 
minuto guildhouse because it had been “cives veri et propri guelfi” that had
created the new guild.260 The petitions rewarded the leaders of the popular 
party, the supporters of the war against the papacy, and those who had been 
victims of proscription; the petitions punished the leaders of the oligarchy, the 
opponents of the war, and the leaders of the Parte Guelfa faction. If we 
compare, say, Stefani’s lists (see notes 197 and 231) of the houses burned in 
June and July, excluding Luigi Guicciardini, with the Parte leaders identified in 
260 See Niccolo Rodolico, Democrazia fiorentina, 181; the measure is found in 
ASF, Capitani della Parte Guelfa (Rosso), 5, ff. 77r-78r. 
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his list (note 188) and my list of Captains in 1378 (note 182), we see nothing 
more than the obvious and oft-stated fact that the crowds destroyed the 
houses of the Parte leaders; if we compare the victims of arson with those 
punished in the three petitions, we see again what should not surprise us, that 
the petitions punished most of the June victims and some of the July victims. 
What is striking is that a core of those whose houses were burned in July had 
served on Salvestro de’ Medici’s balìa, among them the Guelf leader who had 
replaced Giovanni Magalotti on the Eight of War, namely Simone Peruzzi.261
It becomes clear, as I suggested above, that the July riots were in part the 
work of men disgruntled about the outcome of the balìa because it had failed 
to re-instate all of the ammoniti and because it left many of them under the 
three-year divieto.  And we can well imagine that, when voting blocks were 
forming, it was men like Simone Peruzzi, Andrea di Segnino Baldesi, and 
Bernardo di Iacopo Beccanugi, all staunch Guelfs and supporters of rigid and 
closed oligarchy, who undermined the efforts of the balìa.
Though little-discussed, the pages262 that Alamanno Acciaiuoli devotes 
to the creation of Michele di Lando’s priorate—laden with eye-witness detail, 
overflowing with rage, amazement, and pathos—and with which he ends his 
account of the summer of 1378 are, without question, a miniature masterpiece 
of Trecento diary-writing. Upon receiving the petitions of the popolo minuto
and the guilds, he explains, the priors summoned the advisory colleges and 
261 On Simone, see Salamone Morpugo, “La guerra degli Otto Santi e il 
tumulto dei Ciompi nelle ricordanze di Simone Peruzzi,” Miscellanea fiorentina di 
erudizione e storia 2 (1892): 3-15. 
262 Beginning at p. 30, l. 17, in SCARAMELLA.
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the Eight of War to the palace and immediately approved them (furono vinte di 
subito), all the while their voices being drowned out by the crowd outside. After
TABLE II
Parte Guelfa leadership, petition and arson victims, 
and balìa participation, 1378
(In the chart, GL = Guelf Leaders, P = Petition victims, and B = Balìa 
members)
having explained that he would go out to announce that the petitions had been 
passed and to guard the door, Guerriante Marignolli, one of the priors, left the 
palace and did not return. Seeing him leave, the crowd shouted, “They should 
263 Serragli was not listed by Stefani, but appears in other lists, such as that in 
Pagolo di ser Guido, who to some extent conflates the two waves of arson. 
HOUSES 
BURNED IN 
JUNE
GL P B HOUSES 
BURNED IN 
JULY
GL P B
Lapo da C. 
C. Strozzi 
B. Siminetti 
N. & T. Soderini
B. Buondelmonti
R. Canigiani, 
P. Albizzi et al. 
I. Pazzi et al. 
V. Cavicciuli
M. Guadagni
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
F. Corsini
A. Ridolfi
C. Cione
M. Castellani
S. Peruzzi
A. Baldesi
B. Beccanugi
A. & B. Alessandri
D. Ugolini
P. di Grifo
B. Serragli263
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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all come down because we don’t want them to be priors anymore” (Scendano 
tutti, che noi non vogliamo siano più priori). Quickly, Tommaso Strozzi entered 
the priors’ audience hall, revealed that Guerriante had gone home, and 
explained the crowd’s wishes; and Pierozzo di Piero Peri explained this to the 
colleges, saying: 
“Messer Tommaso [Strozzi], on behalf of the people and the 
guilds, told us that they want us to go home, so give us your 
counsel.” The colleges were weeping, some wringing their 
hands, some striking their faces; all were astounded and didn’t 
know what to do. The Eight appeared [si mostravano] sad and 
distraught. The priors were dumbstruck. There was very great 
unrest [romore] outside; [with the crowd] saying they wanted the 
priors to go home and the Eight to remain in the palace, or else 
the city would go up in flames and they would burn their houses 
and those of the college members and of all their families and kin 
and would take their women and children and kill them all in their 
presence unless they left right away. They used all of these 
threats, as they had been instructed to do [come era insegnato 
loro]. As the priors waited to hear from the colleges and the Eight 
[of War], messer Benedetto Alberti went to the priors and told 
them, “The people and the guildsmen want two of them to come 
up and sit with you priors”. The priors replied, let’s hope for the 
best, and that they were happy to have them come. So messer 
Tommaso [Strozzi] and messer Benedetto [Alberti] went to 
negotiate whom they wanted to come and sit with the priors. 
Ultimately they did not want to come, saying in fact, “We could 
never trust these priors, since we offended them so much.” And 
they said, “We want all of them to go home or else we’ll burn 
down their houses and those of their families and kin. The Eight 
[of War] should remain in the palace and no one else.”264
264 ACCIAIUOLI, 31: “‘messer Tommaso per parte del popolo e dell’arti ha 
detto a noi, come e vogliono, che noi ce ne andiamo a casa nostra tutti, e però 
consigliate’. I collegi piangevano, chi torceva le mani, chi con esse si batteva il 
viso; e tutti sbalorditi non sapevano pigliare partito. Li otto si mostravano tristi e 
dolorosi. I priori erano smemorati. El romore di fuora era grandissimo, dicendo 
che al postutto vogliono che i priori se ne vadino alle loro case, e vogliono che 
li otto rimanghino in palazzo; altrimenti questa città andrà a fuoco e fiamma, e 
che arderanno le case loro, e de’ collegi, e di tutti i loro parenti e consorti; che 
piglierebbono le loro donne e figliuoli, che gli ucciderebbono tutti in loro 
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After long deliberations, an armed throng (buona parte del popolo… e bene 
armati) followed Niccolò di Tendi da Carlona, who along with his brother 
Benedetto would be one of the leaders of the guild government of 1378-82, 
into the palace. The priors went home and Michele di Lando—”he was wearing 
shoes without socks [era in iscarpette sanza calze],” Acciaiuoli adds with 
either mockery or amusement—was proclaimed Standardbearer of Justice 
and signore of Florence by acclamation of the crowd. It is clear from 
Acciaiuoli’s account that Salvestro de’ Medici, Benedetto Alberti, and 
Tommaso Strozzi had already created a rapport with the leaders of the crowd, 
and that the crowd intended to re-make the government (just as they had 
made their petitions) with their help and that of the Eight of War. “Before the 
priors had left the palace,” Acciaiuoli adds, 
the Eight of War, who had arranged everything to achieve their 
ends [condotte le cose al loro volere], believed they would 
remain in the palace and create a new political order [riformare la 
terra] and hand-pick the new priors; there were entirely true and 
convincing signs that this is what they wanted. They had already 
sent someone to tell messer Giorgio degli Scali that he had been 
named prior. However, when the people heard them name 
messer Giorgio, they said that they didn’t agree, and wanted to 
be the signori themselves. Since they said this, Salvestro de’ 
Medici and messer Benedetto degli Alberti sent word to messer
presenza, se di subito non ne uscissino. Tutte queste minacce usavano, come era 
insegnato loro. Intanto che i priori attendeano i consigli da loro collegi e dalli 
otto, messer Benedetto delli Alberti venne alla signoria e disse loro: ‘Il popolo e 
l’arti vogliono, che due di loro venghino quassù a sedere con voi priori’. Fu 
risposto pe’ signori che erano contenti che venissino con buona ventura. Allora 
andò messer Tommaso degli Strozzi e detto messer Benedetto, a trattare che due 
di loro, chi eglino volevano, venissino a sedere su co’ priori. E poi nell’ultimo 
non voleano anzi dicevano: ‘Noi non ci potremo mai fidare di questi priori, tanta 
offesa abbiamo fatto loro’. E dicevano: ‘Noi vogliamo del tutto se ne vadino a 
casa loro, altrimenti noi arderemo loro e i loro consorti e parenti. Rimanghino li 
otto in palazzo e non altri.’
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Giorgio not to come. … After the priors were picked by hand, the 
Eight of War thought that they had been badly tricked because 
they had been sure that they would re-make the government 
[riformare la città].265
Given his animosity toward Salvestro de’ Medici, we must be wary of 
accepting Acciaiuoli’s conclusions, but the facts in his account add up all too 
well with the other evidence. Salvestro de’ Medici and the other leaders of his 
party had plotted with leaders in the minor guilds and the popolo minuto, first 
in June and then July; when it became clear that (from their point of view) the 
unrest on the street had grown too dangerous and the demands of the people 
too great, these leaders reached a compromise with the working classes 
which, they obviously hoped, would accept a limited share in the government, 
but leave the actual business of governing to them.  The resistance to Giorgio 
Scali’s selection as a prior shows that these hopes had been overly optimistic. 
265 Ibid., 33: “Innanzi, che i priori uscissino di palazzo, li otto della guerra, 
li quali aveano condotte le cose al loro volere, credendosi eglino rimanere in 
palazzo, e riformare la terra, e rifare li priori a mano, e di questo se ne vide 
segnali assai veri e efficaci, che così voleano. E già aveano mandato a dire a 
messer Giorgio delli Scali e a significarli, come era chiamato priore. Il perchè, 
quando il popolo udì nominare messer Giorgio, dissono, che non lo volevano, 
ma che volevano essere i signori eglino. Pel qual dire messer Salvestro dei 
Medici e messer Benedetto degli Alberti mandarono a dire a messer Giorgio, che 
non venisse. ... Poi fatto i priori a mano, li otto della guerra si tennono 
fortemente ingannati; perchè si credevano’ certi di avere a riformare la città 
eglino, come abbiamo tocco di sopra.”
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The Plots of August 1378
Near the end of August, a group of wool workers and their allies 
(including many who had revolted in July), coming primarily from the outlying 
working-class districts of the Oltrarno, conspired along with the Luca da 
Panzano against the new regime. In almost every major respect they followed 
a plan that had already been laid out in the earlier events of the summer; they 
elected a group of syndics calling them the Otto Santi del Popolo di Dio, the 
Eight Saints of the People of God, just as the Eight of War had been called the 
Otto Santi; they knighted Luca da Panzano, just as the leaders of the popular 
party had been knighted; and, on 27 August in the piazza of the Benedictine 
house at San Marco, they gathered en masse to write a petition spelling out 
their demands, just as three petitions had been written and forwarded to the 
priors in July. The best witness for the events of late August is, undoubtedly, 
the chronicler called the Squittinatore, or Scrutiner, whom Richard Trexler has 
identified as the notary Bernardo Carcherelli in his essay “Herald of the 
Ciompi.” Though Trexler has, incredibly, said of Bernardo that, despite his 
vocal Guelfism, “his revolutionary credentials are impeccable,”266 the 
Squittinatore was in fact a reactionary who supported the Parte’s policy of 
proscription, derided the leaders of the popular faction, and supported the 
endless conspiracies launched against the popular government of 1378-82.267
266 The Workers of Renaissance Florence, 28. 
267 SQUITTINATORE, at 86, calls the leaders of the guild government 
“ghibellines” and “enemies of the Parte Guelfa,” he supports the “noble” and “guelf” 
conspirators against the regime, for example at 93 and later, and so on.
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Regardless of his politics, Bernardo was present at San Marco when the 
petitions were drawn up and gives us a clear picture of their demands:
The decided to make a petition in this way; they got a notary who 
could write it up, and dictated to him: because the syndics had 
failed, none can hold office for ten years; that the Eight of War, 
who have been getting fifteen florins a month for their salary and 
produce nothing for it, should not have more than five florins per 
month; and those who deserve it, and those who failed should be 
sent into confinement, and the Consorteria268 that was made 
should be invalidated; that messer Salvestro should not have 
[the proceeds from] Ponte Vecchio; that messer Giovanni di 
Mone should not have [the proceeds from] Mercato Vecchio; that 
no knight should hold any office; that for the next two years no 
poor man from the new guilds should be imprisoned for a debt of 
less than fifty florins; that messer Luca da Panzano, who was a 
grande, should be made popolano; and that Betto di Ciardo 
should have ten florins per month and arms for himself and one 
friend.269
Other than the article protecting poor guildsmen from imprisonment for debts, 
this petition adds no substantive political or economic demands to the petitions 
of July; instead it seeks to unmake many of the personal ones.  Whereas the 
268 Presumably the Conserteria della Libertà, a large commission that 
developed out of and extended the power of the earlier and temporary balìa. 
269 SQUITTINATORE, 80: “Deliberaro di fare una pitizione per questo modo: e 
sì tolsono un notaio sofficente a ciò fare, e dissoro così: per lo fallo ch’e’ sindachi 
aveano fatto, niuno potesse avere uficio per di qui a x anni; e che gli otto della 
guerra non avessono di salare altro che fiorini 5 d’oro il mese, che 
n’avevano xv il mese, per loro salare, e non n’usciva nulla; e chi fosse degno, 
o ch’avesse fallato, fosse confinato; e che la consorteria ch’era fatta non valesse; e 
che messere Salvestro non avesse il Ponte Vecchio; e che messere Giovanni di 
Mone non avesse Mercato; e che niuno cavaliere non potesse avere niuno uficio; e 
che niuno povero dell’arti minute non potesse essere preso per niuno debito, da 
fiorini L in giuso, per di qui ad anni due che verranno; e che messere Luca 
di Totto da Panzano fosse fatto di popolo, ch’era grande; e che Betto di 
Ciardo avesse fiorini x il mese e l’arme per se e per compagno.”
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July petitions had rewarded Salvestro de’ Medici, Giovanni di Mone, the Eight 
of War, and the new knights, this petition punishes all of them. The enemies of 
the August petition-writers seem to be the men who, from their point of view, 
had co-opted the July revolts or possibly betrayed them and were now 
profiting from doing so. It is not clear if they knew the full list of those who had 
been knighted in July, but if they did, their petition would have excluded from 
office-holding nothing less than the entire inner core of the popular faction and 
its leaders, like Salvestro, Giovanni, Benedetto Alberti, and Tommaso Strozzi. 
Perhaps even more strikingly the petition-writers chose to reward a man 
whose credentials were perhaps even more reactionary than the chronicler 
Bernardo’s, namely the aristocrat and Guelf extremist Luca di Totto da 
Panzano, who delivered the petition on behalf of the crowd and was thereupon 
made a knight of the people. “Upon being made a knight,” Bernardo reports, 
[Luca] said to a certain part of the people: “Let’s go get the flag 
[confalone] of the Parte Guelfa!” Then many people rose up and 
went with him to the [palace of the] Parte Guelfa to seize the 
flag. They did not find it; and some people were happy that they 
didn’t find it and some were very sad. This man [Luca] was 
looking to run through the city with the flag of the Parte Guelfa 
and to shout, “Long live the Guelfs and death to the Ghibellines!” 
because he was a Guelf, and he and his family had always been 
guelfs, and he was one of the leaders of the Parte Guelfa.270
270 SQUITTINATORE, 80: “Fatto che fu cavaliere, ed e’ disse a certa parte di 
popolo: ‘Andiamo per lo confalone della Parte guelfa.’ Allora sì si mosse molta gente 
con lui e andaronne alla Parte guelfa, per torre il confalone di Parte guelfa. Non vi si 
trovò; e molta gente, chi ne fu lieta e chi dolente, che non vi si trovò il confalone. 
Costui guardava di correre per la terra, con questo confalone della Parte guelfa, e per 
gridare: “Vivano i guelfi e muoiano i ghibellini,” perchè gli era guelfo, egli e suoi istati 
sempre mai, e capo di parte guelfa. 
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This confalone of the Parte is, of course, the very vexillum regale that Lapo 
had had made and that the petition-writers of July had wanted the Parte to 
surrender. It is entirely possible that the whole late-August movement had 
begun as an ill-conceived attempt on Luca’s part to emulate the conspiratorial 
endeavors of the popular faction in June and July.  Just as Salvestro’s men, 
working either directly or indirectly on his behalf, had plotted with the Roncans 
and incited their friends and colleagues to action, so Luca had met in secret 
with a group of Ciompi in a place called the Canto della Cuculia in the working-
class district of Camaldoli around 25 August. Not all of the crowd in late 
August was happy that Luca wanted to find the Guelf flag, though—as 
Bernardo noted, some were happy and others sad when his mission failed—
and, as Trexler has noted, the Eight themselves later turned on Luca when it 
became clear that they would lose some of their following if they were allied to 
the strident Guelf.271 At the very moment when the new crowd of Ciompi were 
massing at San Marco and drawing up their petitions, having chosen as their 
representative a self-proclaimed chamption of the faction they had only 
recently overthrown, the government announced the confinement of twenty-
seven leaders of that faction (Appendix 2), nearly all of whom had previously 
been singled out for punishment in the second petition of the popolo minuto
and many of whose houses had been destroyed.  It is hard to draw too strong 
a conclusion from this act, especially since a preliminary list of confinati had 
been established between 25-27 August (Appendix 2a), when the new Ciompi 
movement was still significantly smaller and essentially confined to Camaldoli; 
but the government likely already knew of embryonic plots to re-take the city 
271 Workers of Renaissance Florence, “Follow the Flag,” 51. 
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and may well have understood the swelling worker discontent as the 
conspiratorially-motivated vanguard of a Guelf counter-offensive. And in 
response to the petition and election of the new Eight Saints, the notary 
Bernardo tells us that the old Eight Saints and the standard-bearer Michele di 
Lando conspired together to disband the twenty-fourth (or Ciompi) guild: 
“questo trattato,” he says (p. 81), “ordinorono gli otto della guerra e col 
confaloniere di giostizia.”272 And, indeed, by 1 September, the government had 
disbanded the guild and defeated the forces of the Eight Saints with a brilliant, 
public show of force and guild unity.
In the communal debates on the issue of how to deal with the Eight and 
their followers, men like the proscribed lawyer Donato di Ricco Aldighieri, who 
had been rebuked by the balìa and only re-instituted as a Guelf by petition in 
July, argued “that the leaders of those who caused the revolts must be swiftly 
punished”. As did Benedetto Alberti, who also wanted men dispatched to 
strategic locations in order to resist the illicit meetings and conspiracies 
(adunationes vel coniurationes) to come, a call that would echo repeatedly 
over the next forty months.273 By 20 September nearly fifty Ciompi, among 
them the omnipresent Guido called ‘Bandiera’, were indeed condemned by the 
new regime, but only one complete sentence from the court of the Capitano 
del Popolo has survived. On 17 December 1379 a sentence was announced 
272 SQUITTINATORE, 81. Although trattato had a number of meanings, among 
them treaty and plan, “trattato ordinorono” closely mirrors the official language of 
political conspiracy, “tractatum ordinaverunt” regularly being used synonymously with 
“conspirationem fecerunt.”
273 ASF, CP, 17, f. 18rv: Donato: “…quod celeriter capita illorum qui fecerunt 
novitates puniantur…”; Benedetto: “et quod celeriter fiat iusticia de captis 
culpabilium… quod gentes teneantur in locis opportunis ita quod resistatur ne fiant 
adunationes vel coniurationes….”
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“contra Pierum Ciri scardazerium” for his involvement in a plot (discussed in 
the next chapter) to capture the town of Figline and wrest it from Florentine 
control. In the course of that later sentence, the Capitano excerpted the entire 
sentence that had been passed against Piero in contumacia more than a year 
earlier for his role in the events of late August. Piero, the sentence claims, 
gathered together with messer Luca da Panzano, several other Ciompi 
leaders like Luca di Melana and Meo del Grasso, and more than two hundred 
others in a field near the convent of the Convertite in the Oltrarno. There, it 
says, “they conspired to disturb and to harm the free and popular government 
of the city and also to depose the priors and deprive them of their rule and 
governance” by electing eight men “like chiefs and overseers and almost like 
lords of the whole city of Florence, naming and calling them openly and in 
public ‘the Eight Saints of the Balìa of the People of God’.”274 The Eight Saints 
and their followers along with Piero “swore, touching the Holy Gospels with 
their hands, that they would be united in life and death as a single body and 
will, and that they would all conspire together and unanimously undertake a 
sworn conspiracy against the syndics of the guilds then in office and against 
the officials of the government [regimina] of the city of Florence.”275 Even the 
274 The sentence has been transcribed in the documentary appendix of 
Rodolico, Democrazia fiorentina, and the original is in ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 39r-
44r. I quote from Rodolico’s text, 442: “tractatum habuerunt de turbando et 
molestando liberum et popularem statum dicte civitatis… ac etiam de deponendo et 
privando de regimine et gubernatione dicte civitatis dominos Priores… in maiores et 
superstites et quasi dominos totius civitatis Florentie et ipsos cognominaverunt 
apellaverunt publice et palam ‘li otto Santi de la Balia del popolo de Dio’.” 
275Ibid., “…iuraverunt… unus alteri et alter alteri corporaliter manu tactis 
scripturis ad Sancta Dei Evangelia esse ad mortem et vitam ad invicem et unum et 
idem corpus et unum et idem velle et sic se ad invicem tenere et tractare et omnes 
unanimiter fecerent coniurationem conspirationem contra sindicos Artium tunc 
existentes et contra alia regimina civitatis Florentie…”
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mass meeting at San Marco is described in the Capitano’s sentence as a 
conspiracy: “they held an illicit meeting and conspired,” it says, “with many 
others, five thousand or more in number.”276 Remarkably, the sentence also 
contains the words of Simone d’Andrea called Morello, who was one of the 
Eight Saints, and who addressed the priors themselves, saying, “We are here 
on behalf of our lords and ourselves, that is, for the Eight Saints of the Balìa of 
the People of God and their followers, and we want you to swear an oath, 
touching the Holy Gospels of God with your hands, that you will approve and 
vote for and pass each and every one of our petitions and that you will not act 
against the government of the Eight and their followers,” an oath which the 
priors “not being powerful enough to avoid it,” accepted by touching the 
gospels and swearing.277 Here we find the language of guild, conspiracy, and 
mass political movement conflated, exposing the political anxieties at the core 
of Florentine political culture. Whose oath-bound bodies were legal? Whose 
Eight Saints? Whose balìa? Whose public assemblies? Whose petitions? At 
the moment that the priors accepted the petitions because they were not 
strong (valentes) enough to resist, who were the lords of Florence and who 
276 Ibid., “fecerunt coadunationem et conspirationem insimul cum 
quampluribus aliis numero quinque milium et ultra…”
277 Ibid., 444: Nos venimus ex parte nostrorum dominorum et nostra, videlicet 
ex parte Octo Sanctorum Baylie populi Dei et eorum sequacium et pro nostra et pro 
ipsorum parte volumus omnino quod vos omnes iuretis in manibus nostris ad sancta 
Dei Evangelia corporaliter manu tactis scripturis quod vos admittetis et facietis vinci et 
obtineri omnes et singulas nostras petitiones et quod non eritis contra statum 
dictorum Octo et eorum sequacium.” The priors agreed, “non valentes evitari dictum 
iuramentum…”
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were the conspirators? Was it the new Eight, as the Capitano’s sentence 
states, or the old Eight, as the Squittinatore had said?
After the Tumult
In Janury 1379, the wool napper Bartolomeo del Bello, called “Zoccolo,” 
who had conspired with Simoncino at Ronco, presented a petition to the priors 
in which he asked them to annul his condemnation for having participated in 
the conspiracy uncovered in the Capitano’s investigation, but, crucially, not for 
having taken part in the events of 31 August. It was argued that he was 
innocent and had, in fact, been an “enemy, opponent, and adversary” 
(inimicus et contradictor et adversarius) of the August plotters (illorum qui 
predicta ordinaverunt et tractaverunt) on that day; and also that his 
condemnation “was brought about more by the enemies of the present regime 
[emulos presentis status] than by his enemies.” Trexler has suggested that 
Zoccolo was “intimating that he had been sentenced for what he had done in 
June and July, and if that were to be pursued, the regime itself could be 
accused.” While such a reading may be somewhat hyperbolic, it is clear that 
Zoccolo was stating that those who had accused him—people within the late 
August plot—were enemies of the regime, whereas his activities earlier in the 
summer had been ones of which the current regime would likely have 
approved; and it is also clear that Trexler was more than intimating that the 
events of June and July had been encouraged and likely orchestrated by the 
leaders of that regime, whereas those of late August had been those of their 
enemies, a fact he derived from his prosopographical investigation into the 
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neighborhood solidarities of the Ciompi, which revealed that the syndics of the 
popolo minuto had largely come from north of the Arno (the Citrarno), whereas 
the Popolo di Dio was almost exclusively an Oltrarnan group.278 What is 
obscured by Trexler’s overly neat contrast between Citrarnan moderates and 
Oltrarnan radicals is that the inner core of Roncans linked to the popular 
faction included a mix of Citrarnans (among them Zoccolo, Bandiera, and 
Calasso) and Oltrarnans, and that some of that group participated in both the 
more moderate and the more radical stages of the summer. 
When, in Alamanno Acciaiuoli’s account, the proposto of the priors 
asked the recently-captured Simoncino what he and his friends wanted, he 
spoke for the workers, for the “scardassieri, pettinatori, vergheggiatori, tintori, 
conciatori, cardaiuoli, pettinagnoli, lavatori, e altri,” who were subject to the 
wool guild, who were “martyred” by the guild’s police official for minor offenses 
(per ogni piccola cosa ci martoria), and who were underpaid by the big 
woolen-cloth producers (maestri lanaiuoli); and on their behalf he said that 
they wanted their own consuls (consoli per loro) and their own guild through 
which they could enter the city’s ruling group (avere parte nel reggimento della 
città). 279 And their struggle for incorporation into guilds and representation had 
been underway, as we have seen, already for at least thirty-five years. Hoping 
to find in the Ciompi entirely self-motivated revolutionaries, some historians 
have extolled the conspirators of August who after 31 August 1378 threw in 
their lot with the exiled leaders of the Guelf faction—a faction that relentlessly 
278 “Sed predicta condempnatio procurata fuit contra ipsum Bartolomeum 
potius per emulos presentis status quam sue persone,” quoted (from ASF, PR, 67, f. 
141r) in Workers of Renaissance Florence, 111, where the passage quoted from 
Trexler also appears. 
279 ACCIAIUOLI, 21. 
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tried to limit the size of the reggimento—and opposed those men who had 
created the largest and most democratic reggimento in Florentine history. 
Implicated in conspiracies with elite and non-elite alike and dragged into a 
factional struggle, the men of June and July who achieved representation for 
the Ciompi; and it was the men of August who lost it.  From whatever direction 
one views these events, one thing is clear: in the summer of 1378, 
revolutionary politics meant conspiratorial politics. 
Students of the Ciompi have clearly shown that the Ciompi and the 
popolo minuto used the events of the summer of 1378 to present, and struggle 
for, their own political agenda, an agenda they shared to a large extent with 
much of the unrepresented and underrepresented population of the minor 
guilds, an agenda that emerged from the unrealized corporatist ideals of the 
guild republic. Others have shown that they did so in the face of systemic 
economic and political oppression, that they found their friends and allies in 
their neighborhoods and shops, and their political vocabulary in solidarities not 
forgotten over more than forty years. What had not been told, though, is the 
complete story of what transpired (and was conspired) in the summer of 1378 
and what role the Ciompi played was in those conspiratorial events. When, in 
a public assembly in September of 1378, a speaker praised Salvestro de’ 
Medici as “author of the present regime,”280 he could not have been more 
right. The tumultuous changes wrought in the summer were the product of a 
secret plan set in motion by Salvestro and his allies, one that involved and 
men of the lower guilds and of the working classes. It was they who did the 
280 Quoted and translated in Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century”, 
20. 
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work of destroying the Parte Guelfa faction. Yet by mid-July the conspiracy 
had run off-course. The balìa and other legal measures that had been meant 
to legitimate and conclude the plot failed to please all the plotters. What was 
once a single plot now likely became a group of interconnected conspiracies, 
some more and some less coherent. More importantly, the men of the minor 
guilds had demanded a greater role in the coming government while the 
working classes had realized that there was power in numbers and, thus, 
came to involve the June plotters and their allies in their own revolution. Only 
in August did the Ciompi truly emerge free of conspiratorial links with the war 
party and the popular faction, but now they were in league with an aristocrat 
and ardent Guelf; and when they did emerge, their demands sought nothing 
less than the punishment of the men who had first incited their brothers to 
action in June and July. Consequently, they were defined as conspirators and 
political criminals by the very men who had themselves conspired to mutare lo 
stato of Florence and who, by summer’s end, had succeeded. 
In understanding what actually happened in the summer of 1378, one 
last fact may be revealing: on 28 August 1378 the names for a new priorate 
were drawn, including the comber Bartolo di Iacopo Costa as Standardbearer 
of Justice and the carder Giovanni di Domenico del Tria as prior from quarter 
of Santa Maria Novella. On 1 September, the new priors took office and, on 
their first day, ordered all of the city’s forces to assemble under their 
neighborhood standards in the piazza. “Upon seeing this beautiful crowd with 
their banners,” says the Machiavelli chronicler, the forces of the popolo minuto
turned back from the palace and went home, their revolutionary moment 
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having come to an end.281 On the next morning, the two woolworker-priors 
were replaced because their guild had been disbanded; Bartolo was replaced 
by a cloth-dealer named Francesco di Chele and Giovanni by messer Giorgio 
di Francesco Scali, whose selection at the hands of the June plotters had, it 
seems, only been briefly delayed.
281 ANONIMO, 380: “Onde veggiendo il popolo minuto questa bella giente, 
co’gonfaloni… tutti si partirono.”
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CHAPTER 3:
CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE GUILD GOVERNMENT, 1379
In his Trecentonovelle, Franco Sacchetti tells a story about a great feast 
held by Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, at which a certain Messer Valore de’ 
Buondelmonti showed up uninvited, carrying with him a long nail. When Piero 
greeted him, Messer Valore put the nail on the fireplace where all could see it, 
saying, 
I see that you are at the top of the wheel and cannot move at all 
unless you fall down headfirst. For this reason, I have brought 
the nail that you see on the fireplace, so you can hammer the 
wheel stuck with it. And if you don’t, since it turns as it does, you 
will start to fall and possibly wind up at the bottom.282
To this, Piero replied that he was not even half way to the top of the wheel and 
that, even if he were, he would not nail the wheel stuck because “it would do a 
great injustice to those at the bottom, in the middle, and on the sides who want 
it to turn in order to improve their condition.”283 Pleased with Piero’s response, 
Messer Valore sat down to enjoy the meal. And at the end of the dinner, when 
Messer Valore was leaving, Piero stopped him again and said, 
282 Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, ed. Emilio Faccioli (Turin: Einaudi, 
1970), p. 575: “...io veggio troppo bene che tu se’ nel colmo della rota e non ti puoi 
muovere, che tu non scenda e capolevi. Per questa cagione io t’ho recato quello 
aguto che tu vedi a quel camino, acciò che tu conficchi la rota; e se ciò non fai, 
volgendosi com’ella fa, e’ ti converrà cominciare a scendere, e forse venire al di 
sotto.”
283 Ibid.: “sarebbe fare grandissima ingiustizia a quelli che sono di sotto e nel 
mezzo e da lato, che vogliono ch’ella volga, per migliorare stato.”
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Take your nail, because I cannot fasten the wheel where you 
said; and since Caesar and Alexander and many oters could not 
fix the wheel, I, who am only a little man, cannot; and even if I
could I would not want to, so the world does not perish.284
Feeling that he had made his point, Messer Valore gave Piero this valediction: 
“You are Peter and upon this rock is built wisdom; God be with you.”285
Nothing, then, is more certain than the turning of the wheel of fortune, says 
Sacchetti, “and how many kings, and how many lords, and how many factions 
of people and communes have experienced it!”286 Although he discusses 
numerous examples, from antiquity and the present day, of men brought up 
high and thrown down low by fortune, Sacchetti does not reveal the fate of 
Piero degli Albizzi in his story, allowing his readers to supply that information 
for themselves.287 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Piero di Filippo 
284 Ibid., p. 576: “Togliete l’aguto vostro, ché io nol potrei conficcare dove dite; 
però che Cesare e Allessandro e molti altri nol poterono conficcare, non che io che 
sono piccolo uomo: e potendolo fare non voglio, acciò che ‘l mondo non perisca.”
285 Ibid.: “Et tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram è edificata la sapienzia; e fatti 
con Dio.” 
286 Ibid.: “e quanti re, e quanti signori, e quante sètte de’ populi e de’ comuni 
l’hanno già provato!”
287 Gino di Neri Capponi, a near contemporary of Sacchetti, would tell a similar 
story in his Ricordi, making explicit what the novelliere had left implict; for the text, 
see Gianfranco Folena, ed., “Ricordi politici e familiari di Gino di Neri Capponi”, in 
Miscellanea di studi offerta a Armando Balduino e Bianca Bianchi (Padua, 1962), pp. 
37-38: “Ed a vostro essemplo, io ho veduto de’ mia dì la nostra città essere retta da 
uomini maturi; e quando uscivo dall’abbaco, circa MCCCLXIII, gridarsi pe’ fanciugli 
dello abbaco, quando uscivano: “Vivano le berrette!,” che tanto voleva dire “Viva 
portatura di uomini degni e da bene,” e: “Muoino le foggette!,” che tanto voleva dire 
“Muoino li artefici ed uomini di vile condizione.” E nel MCCCLXXVIII si rivolse tale 
detto, e dicevasi: “Vivano le foggette!” e “Muoino le berrette!”: che tanto voleva dire 
che al principio di detto tempo Piero di Filippo degli Albizi essere il maggiore Cittadino 
di Firenze e grande con la Chiesa, e nella città. Uno suo amico il presentò una 
scatola di treggea, drentovi uno aguto grande e bene fatto. Fu giudicato da molti che 
seco avea a mangiare, che quello voleva dire che conficcassi la ruota: e finalmente, 
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was expelled from Florence during the Ciompi tumult in 1378. In 1379, Piero 
would be beheaded, the nail finally placed in his wheel of fortune, as was 
Franco Sacchetti’s own brother. The fortunes of these men were tied together 
in 1379, like the fortune of Florence itself, in the nexus of conspiracy and 
repression that defined so much of Florentine political life. 
The momentous year 1378—the year of the conclusion of the war 
against the papacy, of the Ciompi tumult, and of the installation of the new 
government of the guilds—ended on March 24 [1379] in Florence. In less than 
two weeks, the new year would bring the first in the series of mixed elite-
Ciompi conspiracies that, over the course of that terrible year, would come to 
define and ultimately doom Florence’s final and most ambitious guild 
government288 and to transform the practice of political conspiracy in the city. I 
restrict my analysis in this chapter to a relatively brief period of time (one year) 
in order to illuminate the details of conspiracy and its repression in a pre-
modern city. I will show how and why Florence found itself under siege in 
1379, beset by waves of conspiracy orchestrated by elite exiles abroad, 
disgruntled Ciompi in the city, and even a foreign prince. I will examine the 
avendo lo stato mutazione, gli fu insieme con altri cittadini tagliata la testa. Venne su 
messere Tommaso di Marco Strozzi e messer Giorgio Scali: ed in capo a mesi 
quaranta a messer Giorgio fu tagliata la testa, messer Tommaso fu sbandito egli e’ 
sua discendenti, messer Benedetto degli Alberti mandato a’ confini. Venne su poi uno 
stato di mercatanti [e] artefici, e non vinceva partito, per chi aveva a rendere le fave si 
diceva, se egli andava per lanaiuolo: “Vadia a fare e’ panni”, e se egli andava per 
speziale: “Vadia a pestare el pepe”. Ed in pochi dì fu fatto de’ grandi la famiglia degli 
Alberti, che erano mercatanti, e di popolo la famiglia da Ricasoli e più altri, che erano 
gentili uomini.” 
288 The guild government of 1378-82 is the subject of a now century-old 
monograph, Niccolò Rodolico, La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto (Bologna: 
Zanichelli, 1905), and is discussed briefly in Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early 
Renaissance Florence (Princeton: Princeton, 1977), pp. 46-59.
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guild government’s response to these conspiracies, focusing on its most 
crucial elements: the internal debates on security that raged both in 
government assemblies and in the piazzas, the vast diplomatic effort 
undertaken to monitor and prosecute conspirators in other cities, and the 
capture and punishment of conspirators at home, including the executions of 
several prominent Florentines like Piero degli Albizzi. I will also examine the 
attitudes of the conspirators themselves, whose voices have been captured in 
their diaries, public statements, and confessions. 
The chronicler called the Anonimo fiorentino recorded the disturbances 
(romori) on the streets of Florence that preceded Luca da Panzano’s failed 
plot in the days before Christmas in 1378289 with terseness and seeming lack 
of concern: “And today, on the 20th of December, there was a disturbance (si 
levò un romore) in Florence, at sundown, and it was nothing”; “And today, on 
the 22nd of December, at Terce, there was a disturbance in Florence, and it 
was nothing.”290 But the leaders of the government were, at the same time, 
constantly aware of growing threats to the stability of their regime, and the 
pratica of 20 December 1378 showed, early on, the extent to which a general 
fear of conspiracy gripped the guild government as well as the wide spectrum 
of opinions among the government’s leaders about how to combat the 
possibility of such plots. The leaders of the government came from the major 
289 On Luca di Totto da Panzano, a regular plotter against the government, 
see my discussion in chapter 2 at pp. 152 and following, and later in this chapter. 
290 ANONIMO, p. 389: “E oggi, a’ dì XX di diciembre si levò un romore in 
Firenze, a’ dì 20, alle 24 ore di dì, e non fu nulla. E oggi, a’ dì XXII di diciembre in sulla 
terza, sì si levò u’ romore in Firenze, e non fu nulla.”
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guilds and from the class of scioperati (rentiers),291 including messer Giorgio di 
messer Francesco Scali, messer Donato del Ricco Aldighieri, messer 
Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi, messer Salvestro di messer Alamanno de’ 
Medici, and messer Benedetto di Nerozzo degli Alberti; and also from the 
lower guilds, including Benedetto di Tendi da Carlona (slipper-maker), Niccolo 
di Tendi da Carlona, Simone di Biagio (armorer), Feo di Piero (armorer), 
Lorenzo di Donato (dyer), Salvestro di Giovanni (dyer), and Feozzo di Casino 
(shearer).292 At the pratiche, or advisory assemblies, these men and others 
came together to share opinions, forge political alliances within the regime, 
and urge the priors to act. At the pratica of 20 December, for example, Piero 
Strada, a lanaiuolo (wool manufacturer) from the quarter of Santo Spirito293
291 On the scioperati, see Lauro Martines, The Social World of the Florentine 
Humanists, 1390-1460 (Princeton: Princeton, 1963), p. 35.
292 These men are listed in STEFANI, rubr. 814, p. 344, and confirmed in ASF, 
CP, 16-9. Stefani describes these men as the supporters of a strong guild reaction to 
the plots of early April 1379 (discussed at pages 170-76 below), and as the leaders of 
the regime: “Li capi di questi si erano delle maggiori Arti e scioperati: messer Giorgio 
di messer Francesco Scali, messer Donato del Ricco, giudice, messer Tommaso di 
Marco degli Strozzi, messer Salvestro di messer Alamanno de’ Medici, messer 
Benedetto di Nerozzo degli Alberti. Con costoro si ristrigneano degli altri dall’altre 
famiglie; ma questi erano il bilico delle 16 Arti. Chelli che più erano capi, e guidavano 
gli altri, erano questi: Benedetto […] da Carlona, Niccolò di […] da Carlona, Simone 
di Biagio, corazzaio, Feo di […], corazzaio, Lorenzo di Donato, tintore, Salvestro di 
Giovanni, tintore, Feozzo di Casino, cimatore, e questi si tiravano dietro altri capi; ma 
pure questi erano il bilico delle 16 Arti.” The lacunae are in Rodolico’s text. The actual 
composition of the leadership group in the government changed, as evidenced in the 
CP, but this is roughly accurate through 1379.   
293 Piero di Bartolo Strada had served as Gonfalonier for the Sferza district in 
Santo Spirito in 1378, as noted in Alamanno Acciaioli’s chronicle [SCARAMELLA, p. 39] 
and in the ONLINE TRATTE, where his occupation is given as “lanifex”; but he did not 
otherwise hold communal office during the Guild Regime’s tenure. 
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and a regular participant in civic assemblies after the summer of 1378, called 
for a show of force and unity on the part of “all the people of the commune” in 
order to suppress murmurationes, or rumblings.294 In this call, Piero combined 
both the revolutionary optimism about popular action that characterized the 
guild government and its more pessimistic (or realistic) and growing siege 
mentality. And, indeed, this combination was not new for Piero. As early as 
October 1378, when Florence was wrapped in an atmosphere of dangerous 
excitement (both political and prophetic), he had been calling for the swift 
punishment of “sowers of scandal and of prophecies,” while also extolling the 
corporatist principles of inclusion, representation, and consultation.295
Tommaso Strozzi, always the voice of extremism, called for a diligent 
investigation against “obstructionists and people who speak against the 
regime or say anything to bring about its ruin,” adding that such people should 
be decapitated.296 At another pratica soon after, the wool-shearer Feozzo di 
Casino called for spies to be sent to “opportune locations”297 and Tommaso 
294 ASF, CP, 16, 51r: “Quod ad tollendum murmurationes … omnes gentes 
communis … teneantur in civitate et faciant unam monstram.” In addition, he called 
for the Otto to act and the capitudini to act against exbanniti and “maleloqui”, etc.
295 ASF, CP, 16, 33r: “...quod puniantur isti seminatores scandalorum et 
divinationum...”; ASF, CP, 16, 64v: “quod respondeatur capitudinibus quod sint simul 
cum veteribus et novis consulibus et aliquibus sapientibus artificibus quelibet ars per 
se, et ita separatim per scripturam referant sua consilia cras...” 
296 ASF, CP, 16, f. 51v: “Dominus Thomas de Stroçis quod diligenter inquiratur 
contra oblocutores et dicentes contra statum vel pretendentes aliquid in causam 
ruine. … Et quod [qui] sine fundamento audeat talia dicere cuiuscumque conditionis 
existat decapitetur preveniendo usque ad ultimum qui talia verba dixerit.”
297 ASF, CP, 16, f. 59r: “Et mittantur exploratores ad locos oportunos.” Brucker 
calls this woolshearer Feo Casini in Civic World, p. 53; he is called “Feoçius cimator” 
in the CP. 
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Strozzi’s friend and fellow extremist Giorgio Scali called for the rectors (the 
foreign magistrates) to go looking throughout the city, armed with shields and 
large swords if necessary, searching for plotters; and for word to be spread 
through the city “that no one should dare to overthrow the government [facere 
novitates].”298 The mix of attitudes expressed in these pratiche was not new,299
and it would persist into the new year, the events of which would justify even 
the most extreme fear of conspiracy.  
The Good Friday Plot
On the Wednesday of Holy Week, 6 April 1379,300 Leoncino di 
Francino, a minor guildsman from the parish of San Pier Gattolino in the 
298 ASF, CP, 16, f. 59v: “Et quod rectores vadant scrutando per civitatem et si 
opportuerit faciant … portare cippum et mannariam…. Et banna mittantur per 
civitatem quod nemo audeat facere novitates.” According to the Dizionario della 
Crusca (Venice: Alberti, 1512), s.v. “mannaia,” the weapon called for by Giorgio is a 
“coltello grande, con due manichi, che l’adopra il maestro di giustizia a tagliar la 
testa.” By contrast, on the same day, the generally more even-tempered Salvestro de’ 
Medici said, “quod executori duplicetur familia et deputentur sibi quatuor cives 
presentis status, et inquiretur ne procedat novitas de culpabilibus et puniantur, et 
provideatur quod quilibet habeat partem suam ita quod civitas sit unita.” Piero Strada, 
seconding Salvestro’s suggestion, also stressed unity (“et quod provideatur circa 
unionem civium…), a theme very common in the CP of this period. 
299 See, for example, ASF, CP, 16, ff. 18-20. 
300 I have reconstructed the events leading up to the discovery of the Venerdì 
Santo plot on the basis of five major condemnations of conspirators and participants 
by the Capitano del Popolo Cante de’ Gabrielli of Gubbio, in which they are described 
in a piecemeal and often redundant way: (1) ASF, Capitano 1197 bis, 9r-12v, which 
contains the sentences against “Antonium Nicolai alias vocatum Falsia” (of the popolo 
of San Pier Maggiore), “Palmerium Luche” (San Lorenzo), and “Bernardum Bernardi” 
(San Pier Maggiore), all “homines seditiosos et proditores sue patrie,”; (2) ASF, 
Capitano 1197 bis, 99v-101r, which contains the sentence against “Leoncinum 
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Oltrarno, attended mass at the cathedral of Santa Reparata and then met up 
with Guerriante Marignolli, a former ally of Piero degli Albizzi and strong 
supporter of the Parte Guelfa’s policy of proscription (ammonizione), who had 
been nearby in the Mercato Nuovo.301 The men were acquaintances and had 
achieved a certain level of prominence together in the previous summer: 
Leoncino had served on the priorate presided over by Michele di Lando and 
was called upon to personally demand the standard of the Ciompi when they 
refused to turn it over to the priors in August302; and Guerriante had served on 
Francini piçichangnolum” (San Pier Gattolino), “hominem et proditorem sue civitatis”; 
(3) ASF, Capitano 1197 bis, 130r-132r, which contains the sentence against 
“Andream Sali vocatum Amaçça el vero”(Sant’ Ambrogio), “hominem seditiosum et 
prodictorem sue civitatis”; (4) ASF, Capitano 1197 bis, 141r-142r, which contains the 
sentence against “Nicolaum Tomasii allias vocatum Nuta” (San Jacopo tra’ fossi), 
“hominem prodictorem”; and (5) ASF, Capitano, 1197 bis, 142v-144v, which contains 
the sentences against “Dominum Pagnum Leonardi de Stroççis” (Santa Maria degli 
Ughi), “Guerriantem Marignolli” and his sons “Bartolomeum et Matheum” (San 
Lorenzo), “Bandinum Campoli de Pançano” (Sant’Apollinare), “Iacobinum Nelli” (San 
Lorenzo), “Antonium Recche” (San Pier Maggiore), “Bernardum vocatum Fusaio et 
Roschum, fratres et filios Simonis” (Sant’Ambrogio), “Nannem Laurentii alias vocatum 
Golfus” (San Pier Maggiore), “Ser Riccardum Bernardi” (San Lorenzo), and “Andream 
Grassi” (San Lorenzo), all “homines proditores sue civitatis”.
301 ASF, Capitano, 1197 bis, ff. 99v-101r, contains the 9 May 1379 sentence 
against “Leoncinum Francini piçichangnolum populi Sancti Petri Gactolini de Florentia 
hominem proditorem sue civitatis”; the details of the meeting are at f. 100r. On 
Leoncino’s profession, see the following note. See STEFANI, rubr. 775, p.308, for 
Guerriante as a leader of the Parte Guelfa and chief supporter of the use of 
ammonizioni. Throughout the 70s, according to the ONLINE TRATTE, Guerriante had 
served in higher office a number of times: as a prior in 1370, and as one of the Dodici 
Buonuomini in 1373.
302 Beginning 23 July 1378, a Leoncino di Franc(h)ino, representing the 
popolo minuto and the quarter of Santo Spirito, is said to have served as prior. The 
ONLINE TRATTE gives his name as Leoncino (di) Franchino pectinator; as does 
STEFANI, rubr. 796, p. 326; the ANONIMO, p.369, gives only “Lioncino di Francino” as 
prior, but the editor Alessandro Gherardi attests (p.369, n.2) that the Priorista
manuscript reads “Leoncinus Francini pectinator pro Popolo minuto, pro quarterio 
Sancti Spiritus,” and on p.395 the ANONIMO has a “Lioncino di Francino del popo’ di 
San Piero Gattolino” being condemned for conspiracy; the Cronaca of Alamanno 
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the priorate that was supplanted by Michele di Lando’s and was knighted by 
the Ciompi one day before being forced out of office.303 Though from very 
different backgrounds, Leoncino and Guerriante found common cause in their 
sense of disenfranchisement and hatred of the popular government currently 
ruling Florence. “Leoncino, you know how we’re treated,” Guerriante said, “so 
I’ve decided to overthrow the government of the city [fare mudare stato 
aquesta citade],” and he explained that he and fellow conspirators wanted to 
be treated well and to again have access to public office. The plot itself was 
explained simply: the plotters would cause a tumult on the night of Holy 
Thursday, and cry “Viva la Parte Guelfa,” which would cause others to join in 
the revolt. Leoncino agreed to help and his fate was sealed.304 Guerriante was 
Acciaioli has “Lioncino di Franchino, scardassiere” [in SCARAMELLA, p.33]; and the 
chronicle of the Squittinatore has a “Lioncino, pettinatore, da San Piero Gattolino” on 
the priorate and a “Lioncino da San Piero Gattolino” being beheaded in May of 1379 
[also in SCARAMELLA, p.76 and p.93]. The Capitano’s sentence is, therefore, likely in 
error in calling Leoncino a pizzicagnolo, and the condemned Leoncino is the same 
person (usually called a pettinatore, and almost certainly involved in the cloth 
industry) who served as a prior in 1378. For Leoncino’s demand of the Ciompi 
standard, see STEFANI, rubr.804, p.334. Leoncino also had also previously served as 
a caporale in the Florentine forces during the War of the Eight Saints; on which, see 
Gene Brucker, “The Ciompi Revolution” in Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in 
Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), pp.328-9.
303 STEFANI, rubr.794, p.320; and rubr.795, p.324. Alamanno Acciaioli noted in 
his Cronaca [in SCARAMELLA, p.16] that Guerriante and his fellow priors were thought 
to be “uomini pacifichi e quieti” and, therefore, reassured the city. Guerriante’s 
departure from the palazzo is wittily recounted by STEFANI, rubr.795, p.325: “due di 
loro, ch’erano il dì dinanzi fatti cavalieri del popolo, e fatti altri cavalieri, eglino si 
beneficiarono d’arme... messer Guerriante di Matteo Marignolli ch’era de’ priori, che 
fu sì buono guerrieri, che a parole fu il primo, se ne uscì fuori.” For Guerriante’s brief 
tenure as prior, see also the Ricordanza of Messer Luigi Guicciardini [in SCARAMELLA, 
p.49], who had been Gonfaloniere di Giustizia and the other of the two knights 
discussed in the Stefani quotation.
  
304 The conversation is recorded in ASF, Capitano, 1197bis, 100r: 
“...Gueriante dixit dicto Leoncino vedi Leoncino tu sai commo nui [noi] semo tractate, 
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not alone in planning this revolt. Messer Pagno di Lionardo degli Strozzi, the 
prior of the church of San Lorenzo, and he had earlier laid out all the details: 
the tumult would spread like a chain reaction from San Lorenzo and 
Sant’Ambrogio to the churches of San Giorgio, Santo Spirito, Santa Reparata, 
Santa Maria Novella, and Santa Croce. The ringing bells of the churches and 
cried-out slogans would alert the conspirators that the time had come and 
incite like-minded non-conspirators to come to their aid. All of the city would be 
out that night for Good Friday sermons and would be witness to (or 
participants in) the events that, in one night of violence, would wipe away the 
guild government. 
A similar, and more revealing, conversation had occurred a few days 
earlier in a tavern in piazza San Lorenzo, where Jacobino di Nello was 
drinking with his neighbor Palmerio di Luca. “Palmerio, we are a large group 
[gran brigata] and have resolved together to cause a tumult [levare questa 
terra a remore] on Thursday night and we want to bring back those who were 
chased out [cacciati],” explained Jaobino, “and I want you to join us in the 
group.” When Palmerio questioned how and whether this was possible, 
io [h]o deliberato se porro de fare mudare stato a questa citade e de fare che io egli 
altri che serremo de quello volere ch’essero io siamo bene tractati e abiamo degli 
offitii de che io voglio che tu te desponi de essere conmeco perche averemo grande 
seguito, et tunc dictus Leoncinus dixit dicto Guerianti e perche modo agi tu ententione 
de fare questo, et tunc dictus Gueriante dicto Leoncino nui [noi] semo molti che çi 
avemo promesso e sieme avemo ordinato de fare levare questa terra arremore 
domane de nocte e cridaremo viva la pa[r]te guelfa e con questo cridare correremo la 
terra e porremo fare cio che vorremo perchesso cierto cha acquesta voce della parte 
guelfa çi trarra multe persone in aiuto de che io voglio che tu si con nui [noi] de 
brigata e prochaccia se poi avere compangni. Et tunc dictus Leoncinus ... dixit 
supradicto Guerianti io so[no] apparechiato de essere acço che serri tu eglialtri 
chesserrenno teco e perchaçaro de avere delli compangni e serro affare quello che 
farrete voi.”
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Jacobino reassured him and laid out the details of the plan: “we’ve planned to 
ring the bell of San Lorenzo with a hammer, and we will raise the banner of the 
Parte Guelfa and that of the Angel and cry out ‘Viva la Parte Guelfa!’,” adding, 
“when you hear the bells, I want you to be ready to take up arms with us.” 
Palmerio replied, “I don’t see how this can possibly come to be done, but 
nonetheless I am ready to be with you in everything you’ll do.”305
Conversations like these, revealed in the confessions of the conspirators, 
make very clear the motivations for the conspiracy and its hoped-for results. 
Men from the lower ranks of society, with crude nicknames like “Falsia” 
(dishonesty) and “Amazza el vero” (truth killer),306 and men from the elite, like 
messer Pagno and Guerriante, were united in their hatred of the guild 
government. The elite saw themselves as excluded from office-holding and 
power and the Ciompi from a share in a government that they had helped 
305 The conversation is recorded in ASF, Capitano 1197 bis, 9r-12v, the 
sentences against “Antonium Nicolai populi Sancti Petri Maioris alias vocatum Falsia, 
Palmerium Luche populi Sancti Laurentii, et Bernardum Bernardi dicti populi Sancti 
Petri Maioris homines seditiosos et proditores sue patrie”, at f. 10v: “...dictus 
Jacobinus dixit eidem Palmerio vedi Palmerio noie simo una gran brigata che avemo 
deliberato insieme de levare questa terra a remore giovedi a nocte e volemo fare 
tornare in Fiorenza quelgli che sonn[o] chaciati de che io volglio che tu sie de brigata 
cum noie et tunc dictus Palmerius dixit dicto Jacobino per che modo farimmo noie 
che questo vengna fatto io non so vedere che podesse maii venire facto et dictus 
Jacobinus dixit non dubitare de questo perche sarimmo tanti che non po falare che 
non vengna facto e … seimo persone tucti ricchi perche porrimo menare lacosa a 
vestro muodo e avemo ordinato defare sonare la campana de san lorenzo a martello 
e levaremo la bandiera de parte Ghelfa e quella del angiolo e grideremo viva la parte 
Ghelfa e perquesto muodo ce avemo aviçado devenciare e daver nostra intençone 
de che io volglio che sie aparechiato quando udirai lecampene che traghi con letue 
arme con noii et tunc dictus Palmerius dixit io non so vedere comme questo possa 
venire facto ma niente demeno io so[no] apparechiato dessere con voii ad ongni cosa 
che farete voii.”
306 For a discussion of Ciompi nicknames, see Robert Paris, “Les ‘Ciompi’: 
cardeurs, foulons, bâtards?,” Médiévales: langue, textes, histoire 30, (1996): 109-
115.
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make.307 The conspirators wanted their revolt, sanctified (as in so many 
previous conspiracies) by the day of its outbreak, to reverse the revolution that 
installed the government of the guilds, bringing back the cacciati and purging 
the city (and, of course, the electoral purses) of the men that had expelled 
them. Such a revolution was averted when a young priest at San Lorenzo 
betrayed the plotters to agents of the government and the Capitano del Popolo 
was called upon to mete out justice.
This Capitano, Cante de’ Gabrielli of Gubbio,308 more so than almost 
any other single person, undertook the repression of conspiracy in 1379 and, 
as a result, he loomed large in the politico-legal consciousness of the 
Florentines. Gubbio regularly provided Florence with its foreign officials and 
the noble Gabrielli family had been doing so for at least a century. From 1345 
to 1425, ten Capitani (some serving multiple terms) were from Gubbio and six 
of them were Gabrielli.309 With the exception of a few trials in the court of the 
Esecutore, all of the political conspirators against the guild government in 
307 As we saw in the previous chapter, the Ciompi were excluded from any role 
in government by the parlamento of 1 September 1378; and the electoral policies of 
the guild government pleased neither the popolo minuto nor the elite, which was 
accustomed to regular office-holding; on this, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and 
Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill: North Carolina, 
1982), pp. 249-53.  
308 Cante shared his name with the Podestà who condemned Dante in 1302; 
the latter is discussed in detail by Randolph Starn, Contrary Commonwealth: The 
Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Berkeley: University of California, 
1982), pp. 60-85.
309 The four Gabrielli were: Necciolus Lelli de Gabriellibus de Eugubio (served 
in 1345), Cante, Franciscus Neccioli de G. (1385-6), Franciscus di Nemolo de G. 
(1393-4, 1395-6), Johnannes de G. (1400), and Baldus Antonii Lodovici de G. (1412-
3). Cante served from 7 March 1379 to 7 March 1380 and from 8 September 1381 to 
7 September 1382; when his tenure was extended it was not without serious debate, 
see ASF, CP, 21, f. 98.
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1379 came to justice before messer Cante, even though the statutes of 1355 
gave as much (if not more power) to the Podestà in these matters.310  Of 
course, having been created during the government of the so-called Primo 
Popolo, the office of Capitano was particularly associated with popular 
regimes (as the names of the office, Capitano del Popolo and Capitaneus et 
Defensor Artium, suggest). Cante would become essential to the security of 
the government,311 but his sentences for the Good Friday conspiracy caused 
controversy. While most of the city applauded the Capitano’s condemnations 
of these conspirators and, indeed, considered him a “good rector” at the time, 
the execution of Lioncino was despised by some Florentines (presumably 
those most sympathetic to the Ciompi) who thought that Cante did not 
prosecute the maggiori “as much as they would have wished” and seemed 
harsher towards the popolo minuto.312 The beheaded Leoncino certainly paid 
a much greater price than Pagno Strozzi, for example, who had been let go. 
310 Some of the statutes regarding conspiracy are discussed in chapter 4 
below, at pp. 247-8.
311 As the priors freely admit in a grateful letter to the Gubbines in ASF, 
Missive, 18, 99v.
312 STEFANI, rubr. 814, pp. 343-4: “[the Capitano] fu tenuto infino a questo 
tempo buono rettore da ogni gente in Firenze; ma per la morte del detto Lioncino, fu 
un poco abominato dall’una delle parti di Firenze, chè parve loro non procedesse 
contra li maggiori, come avrebbono voluto, e molto più parea loro feroce sopra li 
minuti.”
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The Plot of Giannozzo Sacchetti
While the Good Friday plot was nefarious, the plots against the guild 
government that would be uncovered in the second half of 1379 were far more 
dangerous and reveal the extent to which Florentine politics were entangled in 
the politics of the entire peninsula. In the winter of 1378, a diplomatic and 
commercial dispute over the small island of Tenedos, which served as a 
maritime gateway to Constantinople and several important Black Sea ports, 
escalated into a war between the city-states of Venice and Genoa, long-
standing rivals for control of a thriving trade in the northeastern 
Mediterranean.313 When the war erupted, the Genoese quickly negotiated a 
secret treaty with the Venetians’ most hated enemy, Louis, the king of 
Hungary, who two decades earlier had ravaged Venice’s holdings in Dalmatia 
and successfully challenged Venetian dominance in the Adriatic. Despite 
some diplomatic overtures from the Venetians, Francesco, the Carrara lord of 
Padua, also allied himself with the Genoese. In June, King Louis dispatched 
his nephew Stephen with an army of more than five thousand men to the 
Veneto and Francesco da Carrara’s armies pushed into the Trevisano, setting 
up camps from which they raided towns near the lagoon while Genoese fleets 
were readied to sail for the northern Adriatic in the spring. By May, the 
Genoese along with their Paduan allies had seized the port of Chioggia, at the 
313 On the War of Chioggia, see the now classic account of Frederic C. Lane, 
Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1973), pp. 189-96; as well as 
the lucid and detailed account (from a different perspective) of Benjamin G. Kohl, 
Padua under the Carrara, 1318-1405 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1998), pp. 205-22; 
and Richard J. Goy, Chioggia and the Villages of the Venetian Lagoon: Studies in 
Urban History (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1985), pp. 34-9.
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bottom of the lagoon, after a bloody battle, and King Louis’s armies had 
control of Treviso. Near the end of summer, Louis dispatched a second 
nephew, Charles of Durazzo, with an even larger army, to set up a camp 
outside Treviso, from which he could pursue his uncle’s short- and long-term 
goals: to negotiate the most favorable terms of peace with the Venetians, and 
to forcibly depose Joanna, the queen of Naples, who had been implicated in 
the 1345 assassination of Andrew, the duke of Calabria, King Louis’s brother 
and Queen Joanna’s consort. There, at Charles of Durazzo’s camp, nearly 
one hundred and forty miles from home, a band of exiles would plot the 
overthrow of the government of Florence.
As recently as the previous April, the leader of the conspirators, 
Giannozzo Sacchetti, had been in jail in Florence. And, according to a story 
recounted by the chronicler Stefani, the circumstances of his release reflected 
and revealed his unsavory character. “Coming to Florence one day,” Stefani 
recalls, 
Giannozzo was arrested for debt and put in the Stinche, that is, 
in jail, and he was kneeling there day and night and did this so 
much that his creditors agreed to let him out. Someone else who 
was in prison, a foreigner, either because he was afraid they 
would be taken away or to hide his things, had his jewels with 
him. Hearing Giannozzo and considering him a good person, he 
entrusted him with these jewels. But Giannozzo sold them and 
used them for his own affairs, and because of this the foreigner 
was not able to get out of prison. Giannozzo went away to 
Lombardy with the money.314
314 STEFANI, rubr. 821, p.347: “Un dì vegnendo in Firenze fu preso per debito, 
e messo nelle Stinche, cioè nella prigione, e quivi stava ginocchione dì e notte, e 
tanto fece ch’egli pure se ne uscì per concordia de’ creditori. Uno ch’era in prigione, 
forestiere, o per paura non gli fosse tolto, o per per occultare le cose, avea suoi 
gioegli; udendo costui, stimandolo di buona vita, si li accomandò questi gioelli; costui 
si gli vendè, e fecene sue faccende, e costui per lo suo medesimo non potea uscire di 
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The truth of this story—related for the express purpose of proving 
Gianozzo’s “hypocrisy”—cannot be verified, but its imputation of false 
piety would have been very bitter for Giannozzo. In his last years, 
Giannozzo had become a close associate and spiritual follower of 
Catherine of Siena, already reputed to be “santa,” who, one year
earlier, had lived in Florence at the house of his friend and co-
conspirator, Piero Canigiani.315 Word of Giannozzo’s plot came to the 
priors from the Florentine special ambassadors to Charles of Durazzo: 
Tommaso Strozzi, Donato Barbadori, and the soap-maker Marco di 
Benvenuto. The guild government’s recently formed political police 
force, the Otto di Guardia, captured Giannozzo and Bonifazio Peruzzi, 
prigione. Giannozzo se ne andò in Lombardia con quelli danari. Questa così piccola 
cattivanzuola avemo fatto menzione per provare la ipocresia sua.”
315 Some of Giannozzo’s religious poetry (in a Catherinian mode) may be 
found in Delle rime di M. Franco, Giannozzo, M. Jacopo Sacchetti, ed. Filippo Maria 
Mignanti (Rome: Pallotta, 1856), pp. 43-60. St. Catherine was run out of Florence in 
1378 and her closeness to the Parte Guelfa faction caused some to call her an 
“ipocrita e mala femmina,” STEFANI, rubr. 773, p.306. The extensive role played by 
Catherine of Siena in Italian (and, particularly, Tuscan) politics in the 1370s is 
discussed in F. Thomas Luongo, The Saintly Politics of Catherine of Siena (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006). Catherine journeyed to Padua on a peace mission at 
the same time that the Florentine Guelf exiles plotted there, and this would not be the 
first time she associated with plotters; see her angry letter of September 1377 in 
Antonio Volpato, ed., “Le Lettere di Santa Caterina da Siena,” in Santa Caterina da 
Siena: Opera Omnia, ed. Fausto Sbaffoni (Pistoia: Provincia Romana dei Frati 
Predicatori, 2002), letter 122: “Gran vergogna si fanno i cittadini di Siena, di credere o 
immaginare che noi stiamo per fare i trattati nelle terre de’ Salimbeni, o in veruno altro 
luogo del mondo.” The Salimbene were a magnate clan that had long challenged the 
authority of Siena’s government; they have been subjects of much historical analysis; 
see, for example, Alessandro Carniani, I Salimbeni, quasi una signoria: Tentativi di 
affermazione politica nella Siena del Trecento (Siena: Protagon, 1995). The letter, 
Catherine’s mission to the Salimbeni, and the charge of plotting (fare i trattati) are 
discussed in depth in Luongo, Saintly Politics, pp. 182-3.
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one of his co-conspirators, on 12 October.316 Under torture, Giannozzo 
confessed and implicated others, including Benedetto di Simone 
Peruzzi and Piero Canigiani, in the plot.317 In a large pratica later that 
day, Franco Sacchetti, who would later gain fame as a poet, statesman, 
and novelliere, called for the condemnation of his own brother: “That 
the Capitano ought to do justice against Giannozzo and the others who, 
having sinned against the fatherland, deserve the death penalty.”318
Three days later, messer Cante had Giannozzo beheaded and 
Bonifazio Peruzzi was fined 2000 florins. The plot itself, as described in 
the sentences, was simple but alluded to the larger network of 
conspirators and their allies seeking to overthrow the government of the 
316 ANONIMO, p. 402, and STEFANI, rubr. 821, p.347, describe the events. On 
the role of the Otto at this time as a political force, see G. Antonelli, “La magistratura 
degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze,” ASI 113 (1954), especially pp. 3-6. 
317 These men were condemned in ASF, Capitano, 1198, 103r-107v: 
Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi, Donato di Giacomo Strada, Guido di Francesco della 
Foresta, Piero di Dato Canigiani, and Antonio di Angelo da Uzzano. The date of the 
sentence is 20 October 1379. This Benedetto is the son of Simone Peruzzi who was 
famously denounced by his father in his account book; see I libri di commercio dei 
Peruzzi, ed. Armando Sapori (Milan: Fratelli Treves, 1934), p. 522. He is condemned 
in ASF, Capitano, 99v-101r. The volume ASF, Capitano, 1198, first cited here, 
contains the sentences of the Capitano del Popolo for 10 September 1379 to 15 
February 1379 [1380], and it includes the sentences of most of that year’s chief 
conspirators (excluding those sentenced by the Esecutore). 
318 ASF, CP, 18, 22r: “In consilio maximo: Franchus Sacchettis dixit quod 
capitaneus faciat iustitiam contra omnes et contra Giannozum qui cum in patriam 
peccaverit mortis supplicio dignus est” (12 October 1379). It should be noted that 
messer Iacopo Sacchetti (see p. 203 below), excecuted in December of 1379 was not 
in the immediate family of Franco and Giannozzo; he was the son of Messer Piero 
Sacchetti and Margherita di Scolaio da Castiglionchio. Franco and Giannozzo were 
natural brothers, both the sons of Bencio and Maria Sacchetti, but Giannozzo’s will 
(along with all later additions and codicils, the last made in the Capitano’s palace), 
transcribed in Ettore Li Gotti, “Un caso di coscienza: Giannozzo contra Franco 
Sacchetti,” in Leonardo 9 (1938): 261-271, shows that Franco and Giannozzo had 
had a financial dispute and were likely estranged. 
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guilds: Benedetto Peruzzi met with Giannozzo in the “campo 
Trevisano,” where Charles of Durazzo’s forces were encamped, and 
Benedetto said:   
Giannozzo, I’m supposed to tell you that we have the best news 
in the world, that you will definitely see the exiles re-enter 
Florence no matter who will be against it. And they will reclaim 
the state [reaveranno lo stato] and be greater in Florence than 
they ever were. And so you can be sure of it, I with some others 
of these banished citizens and rebels have arranged to lead up 
to four hundred lancie and with them we will come to Florence 
and see how to enter into and recover our state. And so that this 
can be done better, we need two thousand florins so that we can 
maintain these lancie better. 319
Benedetto then asked Giannozzo to go back to Florence and ask his friends 
for support in order to raise the 2000 florins and undertake the plot against the 
government. In order to ensure the success of the plot, Giannozzo would take 
back to Florence a set of letters (officially believed to be fake) from Charles of 
Durazzo in which he pledged to support the plot and the Guelf cause. In this 
way a great plot would be set in motion. 
This was not the first time that the guild government had become aware 
of trouble brewing in Padua and at the camp of Charles of Durazzo; they had 
319 Benedetto’s speech is recorded in ASF Capitano 1198, 103v: “o Giannoço 
io te so dire che ce sono le migliori novelle del mondo che per certo tu vedrai chelli 
usciti di fiorença rentraranno en fiorença a despecto de chi non vora; et reaveranno lo 
stato et serranno magiori en fiorença che mai fossoro. Et perche tu ne si certo io con 
piu altri de quisti exbanditi et rebelli avemo ordinate de conducere fine et numero de 
iiiic lancie et con epse venneremo versso fiorença, et vederemo modo intrare dentro 
et recuverare lo nostro stato. Et accio che questo ce vengna meglio facto elle de 
bisogno che nui abiamo do milia fiorini accio che possiamo meglio sostenere queste 
lancie.” In the earlier condemnation in ASF Capitano 1198, 100r, the conversation is 
slightly different.
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known for months, after all, that Lapo da Castiglionchio was there and it is 
unlikely that any conspirator was more hated or feared by the guild 
government or its supporters in 1379 than Lapo, the famous canonist and 
strident Guelf, whom the chronicler Stefani memorably described as “always 
acting against the commune.”320 Already by the late-1370s, Lapo’s career in 
Florentine public life had been long and tumultuous,321 but his final years were 
spent in secret, orchestrating the plot with Charles of Durazzo. During the first 
years of the War of the Eight Saints, Lapo presented himself as a reluctant 
supporter of the Florentine campaign against the Papacy: he endorsed the war 
itself, spoke in favor of having priests violate the papal interdict, served as an 
320 STEFANI, rubr. 821, p347: “...messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, ribello di 
Comune di Firenze, il quale sempre contra al Comune, si dice, facea.” The chronicler 
Sozomeno of Pistoia [Sozomenus Pistoriensis presbyter], Chronicon universale, ed. 
Guido Zaccagnini [Rerum Italicarum Scriptores XVI, part 1] (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, 
1907-8), p. 1112, even gave special “blame” to Lapo for the events that brought about 
the guild government, “…maxime causa D. Lapi de Castiglionchio et aliorum qui 
monendo cives tyranizabant.”
321 The best accounts of this career are Brucker, Florentine Politics and 
Society, passim; and the essays recently collected in Antica possessione con belli 
costumi: Due giornate di studio su Lapo da Castiglionchio il vecchio, ed. Franek 
Sznura (Florence: Aska, 2005), especially those of Lorenzo Tanzini, “Lapo da 
Castiglionchio dal regime della Parte Guelfa al Tumulto dei Ciompi,” pp. 62-79, and 
Fabrizio Ricciardelli, “L’esclusione politica a Firenze e Lapo da Castiglionchio,” pp. 
46-61, though neither of these works covers his secret activities after 1378. For 
Lapo’s work as a Florentine ambassador, see Robert Davidsohn, “Tre orazioni di 
Lapo da Castiglionchio ambasciatore fiorentino a Papa Urbano V e alla curia di 
Avignone,” Archivio Storico Italiano, Series 5, 20 (1897): 225-85. Aside from his 
political role, Lapo was a canonist of note, his Allegationes printed into the sixteenth 
century [for example, Allegationes iuris utriusque monarcae Domini Lapi de 
Castiglionchio, patritii Florentini (Venice: Franciscus Zilettus, 1571)] ; a friend of 
lawyers like Baldus, see chapter 4 at p. 239; and of humanists, see the letter to him in 
Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, volume 1, ed. Francesco Novati (Rome: Forzani, 
1891), letter 17, p.100-103.
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ambassador for the regime to the curia of Gregory XI, but also counseled that 
the anti-papal league be abolished in order to facilitate peace.322 By late 1377, 
though, his oldest and fiercest sympathies, perhaps no longer constrained by 
overwhelming popular support for the war, were again unleashed: he led the 
Parte Guelfa’s campaign of mass proscriptions (ammonizioni) against the 
leaders of the war party, and later supported a coup to restore the Albizzi 
oligarchy to power. Chance played a role in the downfall of Lapo in May of 
1378, as it had for Piero degli Albizzi, when the name of Salvestro de’ Medici 
(a strong supporter of the war and a stronger enemy of Lapo and the Parte 
Guelfa) was drawn for the office of Gonfaloniere di Giustizia, precipitating a 
political crisis and the revolt of the Ciompi. In an extraordinary enactment of 24 
June 1378, in which the Ordinamenti di Giustizia (first promulgated in 1293-5) 
were re-promulgated and reinforced and in which the Parte Guelfa’s recent 
ammonizioni were reversed, the government (acting through a balìa,or 
temporary plenipotentiary commission, of 81 citizens) declared that Lapo “is 
understood to be and is a rebel of the commune of Florence” and that all his 
heirs and male descendants “are understood to be and are in turn magnates 
and numbered among the magnates and potentates of the city of Florence.”323
322 For the endorsement of the conflict, ASF, CP, 15, f. 14r; on violating the 
interdict, ASF, CP, 15, f. 44r; for the papal mission, ASF, PR, 65, ff. 43r-44r; on 
abolishing the anti-papal league, ASF, CP, 15, ff. 66r-66v.
323 ASF, CR, 19b, f. 187r (“...intelligatur esse et sit rebellis communis 
Florentie...”) and 187v (“intelligantur esse et sint deinceps magnates et de numero 
magnatum et potentum civitatis Florentie...”). Lapo’s punishment was the harshest 
mandated by the balià. For partial transcriptions of some of the important legislation 
of 24-7 June, see the documentary appendix of Carlo Falletti-Fossati, Il tumulto dei 
Ciompi: Studio storico-sociale (Siena: Dell’Ancora, 1882), pp. 335-45. As a result of 
being declared a rebel, Lapo’s property was confiscated; on this see P. J. Jones, 
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Rebels of the commune were subject to capital punishment if seized by the 
government, but Lapo had already left Florence. Two days earlier, he had fled 
the city disguised as a friar and his houses had been the first ones looted, 
burned, and dismantled at the hands of a group of minor guildsmen and 
Ciompi.324 According to Stefani, it was rumored that when he heard his house 
was in flames, Lapo said, “Now wait until San Giovanni, Piero di Filippo, now 
you have San Giovanni,” implying that Piero degli Albizzi and his faction would 
return to power, or at least take revenge, on the approaching feast of John the 
Baptist (24 June).325 This did not happen and, not quite a month later, the 
Ciompi regime called upon the Capitani di Parte Guelfa—drawn now almost 
entirely from the minor guilds—to expel Lapo and have his name inscribed in 
their book of enemies, the so-called Libro del chiodo, as a traitor to the very 
Parte he had once ruthlessly controlled for his own political ends.326
“Florentine Families and Florentine Diaries in the Fourteenth Century,” Papers of the 
British School in Rome 24 (1956), pp.193-6. 
324 This event is widely recorded in contemporary accounts, including STEFANI, 
rubr. 792, p. 319, and the ANONIMO, p. 359; as well as in the Cronaca of Alamanno 
Acciaioli [in SCARAMELLA, at p. 15]; the Cronaca of Ser Nofri di ser Piero delle 
Riformagioni [also in SCARAMELLA, p.55]; the Cronaca seconda d’Anonimo
[SCARAMELLA, p.107], which supplies these details, “gli arsono iij ca’, e j d’uno 
consorto; disfeciono la maggior parte a mano”; and the Cronaca terza d’Anonimo
[SCARAMELLA, p.129]. I also discuss these burnings in chapter 2, around p. 87.
325 STEFANI, rubr. 792, p. 319: “...ed egli s’era fuggito in Santa Croce, ove per 
una parola che disse, secondo si dice, ch’egli quando udì che il fuoco era a casa sua 
disse: “Ora aspetta San Giovanni, Piero di Filippo, ora hai Santo Giovanni.”
326 ASF, PR, 67, f. 5v (21-2 July 1378). The condemnation was only entered 
into the Libro del Chiodo on 9 May 1379 because the notary tasked with doing so had 
refused and the counsel of two jurists loyal to the government (Donato Barbadori and 
Giovanni di Ruggero de’ Ricci) was required. On this condemnation, see Francesca 
Klein, “La condanna di Lapo da Castiglionchio e il Libro del Chiodo,” in Antica 
173
In 1379, the guild government became aware that Lapo had left his 
confinement and was plotting in Padua. On 11 June, the Florentine chancellor 
Coluccio Salutati wrote on behalf of the priors to Francesco Carrara, the lord 
of Padua, asking for extradition and explaining the many crimes of Lapo 
against Florence, calling him a “subverter of his fatherland and assiduous 
rioter against our government.”327 The Paduans would not extradite Lapo, so 
Salutati wrote again on 1 September, telling Francesco that enemies of 
Florence were flocking to Padua and now asking for Padua to punish Lapo. 
On October 14, Salutati wrote again noting that the priors had discovered that 
the outlaw Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi was now in Padua with Lapo and 
asking Francesco to punish him as well. As late as 3 December, Salutati was 
still diligently writing to Padua, asking for Lapo to be punished, but all of 
Salutati’s efforts were in vain.328 Days later, the government allowed the 
Ufficiali della Torre (the committee entrusted, from at least the late 1340s, with 
public and confiscated property) to seize and sell “the goods that once 
belonged to Messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, rebel of the Comune, for the price 
possessione, pp. 143-153. The condemnation itself is reproduced and edited in Il libro 
del chiodo, ed. Francesca Klein (Florence: Polistampa, 2004), at pp.159-60 [and 334-
35]: “Dominus Lapus de Chastiglionchio de civitate Florentie fuit expulsus tamquam 
devastator et violator partis guelfe et baracterius et parti guelfe suspectus et proditor 
(p.159/334)”. The guildsmen-Capitani listed are: “Augustinum Martini lanaiuolum, 
Bettum Bardi tiratorem, Dominum Francescum de Rinuccinis, Vannem Mannuccii 
galgarium, Nicolaum Cambini linaiuolum, Guccium domini Guccii lanaiuolum, 
Alesandrum Iacobi Guiduccii cimatorem, Tomasum Francisci fascharium, et 
Franciscum Tieri tavernarium (p.159/334)”. 
327 ASF, Missive, 18, f. 22rv: “...quod dominum Lapum de Castiglionchio 
subversorem patrie et contra statum nostrum assiduum crassatorem ab incolatu 
civitatis Padue dignaremini prohibere....”
328 The three letters at ASF, Missive 18, 60v, 73r-73v, and 191r.
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of two hundred and eighty-five florins”.329 The priors knew that Lapo was in 
Padua, that he was leading a conspiracy of Parte Guelfa partisans abroad just 
as he had led them in Florence until 1378, that other conspirators like 
Benedetto Peruzzi were flocking there to plot with him, and, most importantly, 
that Lapo and his party had forged an alliance with Charles of Durazzo. By 
December of 1379, the Florentines knew they had to deal with Lapo and his 
co-conspirators, but for the moment they could do nothing but wait. 
The Attack at Figline
In the early days of the guild government, men who had been expelled 
from the city and men who chose to leave gathered together in cities around 
Florence (like Pisa and Siena) and in more distant havens (like Padua) where 
they knew they could safely plot. Friends found each other, conspirators found 
followers, and plots were organized.330 In his famous diary, Buonaccorso Pitti 
described this activity and the reasons he joined with others to overthrow the 
government of his city. As a young man in 1375, he had formed a friendship 
and loose partnership with Matteo dello Scelto Tinghi, whom he calls a 
329 ASF, PR, 68, ff. 131v-132v, here 131v: “...bona olim domini Lapi da 
Castiglionchio rebellis dicti communis pro pretio florenorum ducentorum 
octuagintaquinque...”.
330 This process is described, particularly for Sienese exiles in a later period, 
by Christine Shaw in The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 2000), pp. 172-202.
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“merchant and great gambler”.331 They travelled together to Genoa, Pavia, 
Nice, and Avignon, where they were arrested as Florentine spies and kept in 
jail for a week.332 Their partnership continued into the next year and took them 
to Venice, Zagreb, and finally to Buda, where Buonaccorso became seriously 
ill and Matteo left him to recover or die.333 “He went on his way,” complained 
Buonaccorso, “and I remained and underwent great hardship because I was 
badly taken care of.”334 Their travels had ended and they would not (as far as 
Buonaccorso’s diary tells us) collaborate again until brought together in a great 
conspiracy. The Ciompi tumult erupted two years after Buonaccorso’s illness 
and, at the time, in August 1378, he was serving as an armed militiaman in the 
gonfalone of Nicchio (in the quartiere of Santo Spirito, in the Oltrarno) where 
he killed a vociferous stoneworker in the piazza. Immediately after relating this 
event in his diary, he abruptly and nonchalantly describes his reaction to the 
regime that followed. “I returned home,” he says 
and, seeing that many Guelf citizens and some of the best were 
being expelled, banished, and confined, I decided not to stay 
there. I went to Pisa and went to the house of Matteo dello 
Scelto, who had been confined there. A few months later, we 
heard that in Florence many Guelf citizens wanted to cause a 
331 Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti, ed. Alberto Bacchi della Lega (Bologna: 
Romagnoli, 1905), p. 36; “…merchatante e grande giuchatore…”
332 Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power: Republican Florence Under 
Interdict (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 38-9, places this incident in the context of the 
Gregory XI’s revenge against Florentine merchants at the papal court in Avignon 
during the war. 
333 Pitti, Cronica, pp. 37-9.
334 Ibid., p. 39: “Andò a suo camino e io rimasi e feci grande stento per 
l’essere male ghovernato.”
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tumult [romoregiare la terra] with the help of a band of banished 
men who were going to come from Siena, the leader of whom 
was Messer Luca di Totto da Panzano. As a result, Giovanni 
dello Scelto Tinghi and Bernardo di Lippo [Cione del Cane], who 
were among the leaders, organized a group of about 200 
banished and confined men and their friends. I went with that 
group and, as had been planned, we arrived one night at the 
gate of San Pier Gattolino; Messer Luca with his company was 
supposed to reach San Miniato late the same night so as to 
sound the alarm bell at dawn, which was the signal for the 
conspirators in Florence to arm themselves and open the gate of 
San Giorgio to us.335
But Luca da Panzano never reached San Miniato because the plot had been 
discovered and the Difensore del Contado was sent to break up his band. 
Buonaccorso’s recollection, probably recorded years after the events, of his 
reason for leaving Florence is especially telling: he simply left, he says, 
because many of the Guelfs and the best men (molti cittadini Ghuelfi e de’ 
migliori) had been expelled; and Pitti’s self-imposed exile makes sense 
because this was the political faction with which he identified. Even though he 
himself had not been banished, his side had lost and needed to return home in 
force, so he joined them. He also tells us that he and Matteo Tinghi heard 
about a plot (occorse che noi sentimo). Buonaccorso, and more so Matteo, 
335 Ibid., pp. 44-6: “Io mi tornai a chasa; e vedendo essere chaciati e sbanditi e 
confinati molti cittadini Ghuelfi e de’ migliori, diliberai nonnistarci. Andamene a Pisa e 
tornami in casa Matteo de lo Scielto che era confinato ; e stato là alquanti mesi, 
occorse che noi sentimo che a Firenze molti cittadini Ghuelfi doveano romoregiare la 
terra coli’ aiuto di molti sbanditi che veniano da Siena, de’ quali era capo messer 
Lucha di Totto da Panzane. Il perché da Pisa si mosse circha di cc. tra sbanditi e 
confinati e altri loro amici, che Giovanni de lo Scielto e Bernardo di Lippo, che furono 
de’ chapi, richiesono. Colla quale brighata io venni e arivamo la notte innanzi di a la 
porta a San Piero Ghattolino, come era stato ordinato; e messer Lucha colla sua 
compagnia dovea quella notte in sul di essere a Santo Miniato a Monte, e schiarato il 
di, dovea fare sonare le champane di San Miniato a stormo, e alora il trattato che era 
ordine [sic] in Firenze si dovea scoprire e pigliare l’arme e venirci aprire la porta di 
San Giorgio.”
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were part of a network through which information from Florence could be 
readily passed. Among the self-identified “Guelfs” and “best men” in “exile,” it 
is clear that word of plots spread like wildfire, and men like Buonaccorso and 
Matteo joined without (seemingly) giving it much thought at all. 
Buonaccorso Pitti and the the Tinghi brothers also conspired with 
Florentine exiles around Siena, where a major contingent of plotters were 
present in the early days of the guild government, as is clear in the chronicle of 
the wealthy notary ser Nofri di ser Piero delle Riformagioni. More than any 
other single source, this chronicle expresses the viewpoint of the conspirator 
against the guild government; and, speaking of himself in the third person, ser 
Nofri actually describes a conspiracy that he organized: 
In December of 1379, Nofri di ser Piero delle Riformagioni, 
seeing that Nanni di Piero Anselmi was in Siena, joined up with 
him. Nanni said to ser Nofri, “Try to capture one of the walled 
towns belonging to Florence; it will only take the smallest 
uprising [romore] for the Guelfs to take back their government 
[riavranno loro stato].” Then the two parted.
Many times in November and then December of the same 
year, ser Nofri met together with Piero Canigiani, Donato di 
Iacopo Strada, Buonaccorso Pitti, Bese Magalotti, Niccola 
d’Andrea di Lippozzo Mangioni, Giovanni dello Scelto Tinghi, 
Tommasino da Panzano, Ugolino and Toccio Gherardini, and 
many others in the house near Siena where ser Nofri was 
staying. And there they decided that ser Nofri should try to 
capture a good town.
In the same year, after vespers on the Saturday before St. 
Lucy’s Day [13 December], ser Nofri left Siena through the gate 
of San Francesco together with Bese Magalotti, Donato di 
Iacopo Strada, Giovanni dello Scielto, Iacopo del Boccaccio 
Brunelleschi, Ugolino di Noldo, Tonio Gherardini, and many 
other guildsmen and Ciompi from Florence and their friends and 
companions. According to the orders given by ser Nofri and his 
cousin Fazio di ser Mino, they were going to Figline. Ser Nofri 
had sent ahead Gualtieri della Magna, one of his staff, and at 
least twenty-six soldiers [fanti] to the house of Piero del Vita, 
where they were staying. At night, they were supposed to enter 
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Figline castle and Fazio was supposed to open the gate. As it 
happened, it rained through the night and many of the men got 
lost in the woods, so they didn’t arrive at Figline until well after 
sunrise. And because the podestà at Figline, who was a belt-
maker, had the gout and had not yet awakened, and because 
ser Dino di ser Scarfagna had kept watch throughout the night, 
the gate was not open. And Fazio, because of the time and 
because he had been up all night waiting, had gone to bed. For 
those reasons, the gates of Figline were not opened until terce 
and ser Nofri and his companions turned back, thinking that the 
whole plot had been uncovered. 
When news of this reached Florence, the Florentines 
were very afraid.336
336 Cronaca di Ser Nofri di ser Piero delle Riformagioni, in SCARAMELLA, pp. 
64-5: “Nel ditto anno 1379, del mese di Novembre, ser Nofri di ser Piero delle 
Riformagioni, vegniendo Nanni di Piero Anselmi a Siena, si ritrovò co’ lui e furono 
insieme. Disse il ditto Nanni a ser Nofri: “Ingegnati di pigliare qualche castello di quelli 
di Firenze; però che non fia sì piccolo romore, che e guelfi riavranno loro stato.” E 
così stato, si partirono l’uno dall’altro. Nel detto anno, molte volte, del detto mese di 
Novembre , e poi del mese di Dicembre , ser Nofri fu con Piero Canigiani, con Donato 
di Iacopo Strada, con Buonaccorso Pitti, con Bese Magalotti, con Niccola d’Andrea di 
Lippozzo Mangioni, con Giovanni dello Scelto Tinghi, Tommasino da Panzano, 
Ugolino e Toccio Gherardini, e più altri insieme, nella casa dove abitava il detto ser 
Nofri, appresso a Siena, e quivi’ si prese partito che el detto ser Nofri s’ingiegnasse di 
pigliare qualche buono castello. … Nel detto anno, il sabata innanzi a santa Lucia, di 
Diciembre, dopo vespro, il detto ser Nofri si partì da Siena, cioè di fuor della Porta di 
San Francesco, insieme con Bese Magalotti, Donato di Iacopo Strada, Giovanni dell 
Scielto, Iacopo del Boccaccio Brunelleschi, Ugolino di Noldo, e Tonio Gherardini, 
molti altri tra artefici e ciompi da Firenze, e loro amistà e compagnia; e andarono per 
torre Feghine secondo l’ordine avea dato ser Nofri, con Fatio di ser Mino, suo cugino. 
E avea mandato, il detto ser Nofri, Gualtieri della Magna, famiglio del detto ser Nofri, 
e bene xxvj fanti ad albergo in Feghine, I quali albergarono in casa Piero del Vita; e la 
notte doveano entrare in Feghine, e Fazio dovea aprire. E in effetto, perchè tutta la 
note piovè e smarironsi molti de’ detti per le boscora, non giunsono a Feghine che 
era levato il sole’ di buon pezzo. E perchè il podestà che era a Feghine era gottosa, 
che era un correggiaio, e non s’era risentito la mattina, e ser Dino di der Scarfagna 
avea la note vegghiato, non s’era aperto la porta. E il detto Fazio, perchè era 
quell’otta, e tutta note avea vegghiato ad aspettare, s’era ito a letto. E pertanto non 
s’apersono le porte di Feghine ch’era terza, e i detti ser Nofri e suoi compagni 
ritornarono adietro, pensando che ogni cosa fusse scoperto. Et essendo le novella a 
Firenze stettono a gran paura.” Figline, in the Valdarno, had been in Florentine hands 
for more than a century; see, for example, the cheerful words of Matteo Palmieri, Vita 
civile (Florence: Sansoni, 1982), p.130: “gli abitatori del castello di Feghine ... si 
dierono nelle braccia de’ Fiorentini... onde benignamente ricevuti furono da’ Fiorentini 
per veri cittadini acceptati”. For the earlier history of Figline, see Chris J. Wickham, 
“Figline Valdarno in the Twelfth Century,” Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome
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Ser Nofri and his friends in Siena, many in self-imposed exile, were 
surrounded by friends and associates from every rank of society (including 
members of the elite like Piero Canigiani, but also Ciompi); they had 
associates (like Piero del Vita) who could provide them with crucial assets (like 
houses in which to lodge conspirators), they were able to attract or buy the 
services of followers and soldiers (the twenty-six fanti), they were well aware 
of the security situation in Florence, they associated themselves with the 
Guelfs who were out of power, and they took part in seditious actions with a 
remarkable nonchalance. The chronicle reveals a striking network of men all 
around Siena who wanted to overthrow the government of Florence, who met 
in farm houses to plot and dream of seizing Florentine towns. Ser Nofri himself 
was a partisan of the Parte Guelfa faction and had been personally injured by 
the government of Florence: earlier in the chronicle, he calls the leaders of the 
guild regime “strong Ghibellines, suspected by the Guelf Party”337 and 
described the torture he personally endured at the hands of messer Giorgio 
Scali after being apprehended.338 Ser Nofri also tells how he and his father 
had wanted to visit Charles of Durazzo at the end of July 1379 at his camp,339
where other Parte Guelfa exiles were known to be gathering and plotting, but 
108 (1996): 7-93. Ser Nofri was influential in Figline, see Brucker, “Ciompi 
Revolution,” p. 332, n. 2, which may explain why he was particularly valuable in this 
plot.  
337 Ibid., p. 59: “…il forte ghibellini sospetti a parte guelfa…” 
338 Ibid., p. 61: “La notte il detto messer Giorgio collò molto villanamente il 
detto ser Nofri, e per modo, che più volte tramortì in sulla colla, e stette con la febbre 
più dì.”
339 Ibid., p. 62. 
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the aborted siege of Figline was the height of his conspiratorial activities. The 
full extent of ser Nofri’s plot is seen in a 2 January 1379 [80] condemnation by 
the Capitano del Popolo against twenty-one “traitors and rebels of the 
commune of Florence and men of bad condition, life, and renown”; indeed, the 
Capitano’s sentence parallels ser Nofri’s account: these men, it reads, 
with the intention of overthrowing the present, peaceful, Guelf, 
and popular government [statum] of the city of Florence, and of 
causing a rebellion at Figline Valdarno di Sopra in the contado of 
Florence, and of holding the said town against the commune of 
Florence and of making war against the commune, gathered 
together in November and December in Siena in the houses 
where messer Luca [da Panzano], Ugolino [Gherardini], and 
Iacopo [Brunelleschi] were staying, and they also joined together 
in the house where ser Piero [delle Riformagioni] was staying 
outside the gate of Siena, and in these places they held 
conversations many times about overthrowing the 
government.340
340 The condemnation, located at ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 47r-49v, is against: 
“Lanfranchum domini Luce de Pançano … Tomasinum Antonii de Pançano… 
Ugolinum Noldi de Gherardinis … Iacopum Bocacci de Brunalleschis … Toctium 
Antonii de Gherardinis… Besem Guidonis de Magalottis… Gherardinum Pieri de 
Vellutis… Iohannem Scelti alias Nannem … Donatum Iacopi Strade … Ser 
Pierum ser Grifi… Ser Nofrium, Ser Brunum, Leonardum et Francischum 
vocatum Checcho, filios dicti ser Pieri… Iustum Luce vocatum Peçotto… Iohannem 
Putii vocatum Schieggia petinatorem … Sandrum Fedutii vocatum el Ghianda 
petinatorem … Bartolum Contesse… Michaelem Laurentii vocatum Buratta de Meleto, 
Fulinum Bindi de Sancta Maria in Castello et Nerium vocatum el Pelegra de Albola 
comitatus Florentie, homines proditores et rebelles communis Florentie male 
condictionis vite et fame…”; and, the quotation: “…animo et intenctione 
subvertendi presentem statum pacificum guelfum et popularem civitatis Florentie et 
animo et intenctione rebellandi castrum Fighini vallis arni superioris comitatus 
Florentie et dictum castrum rebellatum tenendi contra communem Florentie et 
guerram faciendi contra dictum communem de presenti anno et mense 
novembris proxime preteriti coadunaverunt se in civitate Senarum in domibus 
habitationis domini Luce Ugolini et Iacopi in dicta inquisitione confinatis et anno et 
mense predictis coadunaverunt et congregaverunt se in domo habitationis 
supradicti ser Pieri posita extra portam civitatis Senarum in dicta inquisitione 
confinata et in dictis locis pluries colloquium et tractatum habuerunt de subvertendo 
presentem statum pacificum guelfum et popularem civitatis Florentie hoc modo 
videlicet.”
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The content of these conversations is recorded in the sentence as well, and 
they and most of the sentence match ser Nofri’s account,341 even if he 
somewhat overstated his own role in planning the attack. The conspiracy to 
take Figline sheds light on several crucial aspects of the conspiracies of 1379: 
they were plotted by networks of exiles, voluntary and involuntary, in the cities 
around Florence, they were carried out as much in the contado as in the city 
(as in the Good Friday plot), and they had the character of small military 
campaigns. At the very same time that ser Nofri and his friends were plotting 
to take Figline, a much larger plot was being planned by a larger network of 
exiles hoping to bring an army to Florence and the Guelf faction back home.  
The Great Conspiracy of December 1379
On 29 October 1379, the name of Marchionne di Coppo Stefani was 
drawn for the priorate of November-December, and his tenure in office allowed 
him to record the political events of those crucial months in great detail.342 His 
chronicle, along with an abundance of surviving archival documentation, 
341 For example, ibid.: “noi procuriamo de tollere qualche castello del 
contado de Fiorença et avuto el detto castello noi faremo guerra contro Fiorença 
et trovaremo per certo che en Fiorença se levara romore et cui pora esser che 
noie ce rentraremo et posto che questo non fosse noi averimo omne pacto the 
vorimo dal comune di Fiorença.”
342 On Stefani generally, see Enrico Sestan, “Bonaiuti Baldassarre, detto 
Marchionne,” in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vol. 15 (Rome: Istituto della 
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1972), pp. 105-112; and Amedeo De Vincentiis, “Scrittura 
storica e politica cittadina: la cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani,” 
Rivista storica italiana 108 (1996):230-97.
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allows for a detailed examination of the extraordinary plot that doomed the 
guild government to ruling a city under siege, unleashed the worst impulses of 
the city’s leaders, and revealed the frighteningly vast size and scope of the 
pan-Italian criminal network arrayed against them. News of the plot first came 
to the priors from an unlikely source: the Englishman John Hawkwood, who 
had already established himself as the premier mercenary captain in the 
Romagna.343  On 10 December 1379, Hawkwood sent word to the priors of a 
conspiracy under way in Florence or the surrounding territory that was, to 
quote Stefani, “sì grande che grandissima novità genererebbe,” so great that it 
would unleash the greatest revolution. Hawkwood, behaving like the worst 
kind of businessman, offered to reveal the details of this plot for a fee and 
proposed a variable scale of payment: for 50,000 florins, he would reveal the 
details of the plot and the names of the plotters (though, in that case, he also 
asked for the power to spare six of them from punishment); or for 20,000 
florins, the details of the plot alone, without any names. Either way, he asked 
that the money be brought to him at Bagnacavallo, his base of operations in 
the Romagna, which he had received along with Cotignola as a surety for back 
pay from Pope Gregory XI.344 The priors decided to deal with Hawkood and, 
343 On Hawkwood, see now the detailed biography by William Caferro, John 
Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 2006); there has recently been great interest in the mercenary with popular 
biographies written in English and Italian: Frances Stonor Saunders, Hawkwood: 
Diabolical Englishman (London: Faber, 2004) and Duccio Balestracci, Le armi, i 
cavalli, l’oro: Giovanni Acuto e i condottieri nell’Italia del Trecento (Rome: Laterza, 
2003). Hawkwood achieved his position of pre-eminence during the War of the Eight 
Saints; on this, Caferro, John Hawkwood, pp. 175-225. 
344 STEFANI, rubr. 829, pp. 352-3. See also Caferro, John Hawkwood, pp. 217-
8. On Bagnacavallo, see Luigi Balduzzi, “Bagnacavallo e Giovanni Acuto,” Atti e 
memorie della regia deputazione di storia patria per le provincie di Romagna, ser. 3, 
2 (1885):72-4. Whatever correspondence the Priors sent to Hawkwood in this matter 
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through their agent Guccio di Dino Gucci, negotiated a reduced price of 
12,000 florins. There at Bagnacavallo, “in the darkness, by the glow of 
embers, without a lamp,”345 Guccio met with Hawkwood and a secret informer 
who revealed the details of the plot: a group of Florentine exiles and “molti 
Ciompi” were in Bologna, where they had gathered arms and fashioned 
banners and flags,346 and planned to re-take Florence along with a force under 
the control of Giannotto del Protogiudice da Salerno, the “siniscalco” or 
seneschal of Charles of Durazzo, and two of his commanders named Simone 
dal Poggio and Giovanni Poccia of Perugia, who were now moving through the 
Romagna. One week later, though, the plotters themselves would be revealed. 
The nature of the plot and the involvement of Charles of Durazzo did 
not, of course, come as a surprise to the leaders of the guild government.  
Charles’s role in the plot of Giannozzo Sacchetti was suspected, and 
monitoring the location and activities of the Florentine exiles had become a 
major preoccupation of the priors’ diplomatic efforts, as we saw in the case of 
does not seem to be extant, but see ASF, Missive, 18, f. 89r, for slightly earlier 
negotiations with Hawkwood and his condottiere Lutio Sparverio conducted by 
Spinello di Luca Alberti, the trusted treasurer of the commune, called by Franco 
Sacchetti “il buon Spinello,” in Il libro delle rime, ed. by Franca Brambilla Ageno 
(Firenze: Olschki, 1990), p. 288. 
345 STEFANI, rubr. 828, p. 353: “…al buio, al fuoco di bracia, sanza lume…”
346 The description of the banners in Stefani, rubr. 828, p. 352, is striking: 
“Molte bandiere e pennoncelli erano fatti in Bologna all’arme del popolo di Firenze, e 
di sopra, a modo d’una banda, era l’arme della Parte guelfa, e di sotto avea uno 
braccio con una spada ignuda rotta.” The details of the description are partially 
confirmed in ASF, Capitano, 1198, at f. 57r, where the flag (banderia falsa) is said to 
have depicted two arms, one “tenebat bilancias” and the other “tenebat unam 
spadam fractam,” and a meaning is given: “Conquello nobele segno che de sopre 
porto, faro vendetta che me fatto torto,” carrying this noble flag above me I will take 
vengeance on whoever wronged me.
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Lapo da Castiglionchio.347 As late as 21 November, King Louis of Hungary had 
assured the priors that Charles was not harboring exiles or helping them plot 
against the government of Florence,348 but the priors now knew with certainty 
otherwise and would soon know the full extent of Charles’s involvement. As 
the forces of Charles of Durazzo moved into Tuscany in the late summer, the 
leaders of the guild government had to make peace with him, citing both the 
needs of security and of maintaining traditional alliances, but the time for 
pacification was now over.349 On 17 December 1379, Tommaso Strozzi and 
Giovanni Dini presented to the priors a letter from Antonio, one of the Counts 
of Monte Bruscoli, which was received “with great fury” in the priorate. It 
described a nefarious plot hatched in Bologna and set to be carried out on the 
night of 19 December.350 The plan, which called for the simultaneous outbreak 
of armed violence in eight places within the city of Florence, for the murder of 
347 In the period between 29 April and 21 November 1379 (in ASF, Missive, 
18), for example, at least three letters were sent to Charles of Durazzo (at 22v, 33v, 
and 82r), two to the King of Hungary (75v and 81v), and five to the Paduans (22r, 
60v, 73r, 90v, and 91r) at least partially for this purpose.
348 A rare copy, in Salutati’s hand, of the letter from “Lodovicus dei gratia Rex 
Hungarie, Polonie, Dalmatie, etc.,” is found in ASF, Missive, 18, f. 95r. 
349 See, for example, the discussions in the pratiche of late July and early 
August in ASF, CP, 19. The speech of Salvestro de’ Medici, “quod fiat concordia cum 
Domino Karolo per modum honestum, et quod nulla gens eidem detur” (33v), was 
representative of the most pacifist positions, while others like Benedetto Alberti 
demanded that Charles stop associating with conspirators (“repellat a se emulos et 
suspectos”, f. 20r). 
350Count Antonio was honored and paid well for unveiling this conspiracy, see 
ASF, PR, ff. 196v-197v, a provisio “Pro Comite Antonio de Bruschulo”; about seven 
months earlier, a 23 May 1379 provisio “pro revelantibus tractatus,” had offered 
payment to those who might reveal plots against the government, see ASF, PR, 35r-
36v; and this measure had been called for as early as December of 1378 by 
Salvestro de’ Medici; see ASF, CP 16, 59r. The account here follows that in STEFANI, 
rubr. 829; the quote “in gran furia” at p. 353.  
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Tommaso Strozzi and Giorgio Scali and of others who had been ammoniti by 
the Parte Guelfa, the display of Guelf banners, and cries of “Viva il Popolo e 
Parte Guelfa!,” was said to be supported by “many great citizens, both noble 
and popolani.”351 Alarmed by the report, the priors summoned the Otto di 
Guardia and directed them to apprehend one Bruno di Giovanni of the parish 
of San Niccolò, who was named in the letter and was said to possess one of 
the Guelf banners intended for use in the planned eruption of political 
violence. After the Otto arrested Bruno and found the banner, word spread 
through the city that the conspiracy had been discovered and many, fearing 
arrest, fled. On the night of 18 December, the Otto apprehended Lorenzo di 
Giovanni, who was called “Nencio Ciccho,” in the act of fleeing. Before long, 
he revealed the names of his co-conspirators (including many men exiled and 
confined by the government) and acknowledged the role of Charles of 
Durazzo and his seneschal Giannotto in the conspiracy.352 By the next 
evening, the commune had entrusted an armed guard to four faithful citizens 
(two representing the Arti maggiori and two representing the Arti minori) and 
they were stationed in the Piazza della Signoria.353 The palace was furnished 
with food and arms, notes the chronicler Stefani, just as it had been in July of 
1378, to prevent the priors from being expelled. Meanwhile the forces of the 
Otto, the Priors, and the foreign rectors354 were dispatched into the city and to 
351 STEFANI, rubr. 829, p. 354: “…molte grandi cittadini nobili e popolani…” 
352 STEFANI, rubr. 829, pp. 354-5. 
353 The representatives of the Arti maggiori were Tommaso Strozzi and 
Benedetto Alberti; those of the Arti minori were Lorenzo di Donato and Benedetto da 
Corlona.
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nearby places to apprehend the conspirators—Mariano di Lando degli Albizzi, 
for example, was arrested at Rovezzano, while messer Iacopo Sacchetti was 
found hiding in a mound of grain in the Badia.  By the night’s end, the 
Capitano had gained custody of, among others, Cipriano di Lippozzo 
Mangioni, Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti, messer Iacopo Sachetti, and Piero di 
Filippo degli Albizzi, while the Esecutore, Gianino of Ascoli, had seized the 
brothers Donato and Bartolommeo de’ Barbadori.355 That day, Salutati wrote a 
letter to be sent to the rulers of Perugia, who were counted among Florence’s 
strongest allies, and, as a postscript after the concluding date, tersely added 
the news that the “extraordinarily large and dangerous” conspiracy in Florence 
had been suppressed “by the grace of God.”356 A few days later, Salutati also 
wrote to the Bolognese (a new ally) defending the repression of the plot, 
thanking them for their assistance, and warning that Charles of Durazzo was 
also plotting against them.357 In order to understand the nature and scope of 
354 The precise size of the Otto’s force is unknown, but, in 1378/9, the 
Capitano del Popolo (not including the four judges and nine notaries in his familia) 
regularly had 100 men at his disposal (80 soldiers, 17 shieldbearers, and 3 knights); 
the Podestà had 73, the Esecutore 33, the Difensore del contado 102, and the Priors
themselves had 100 fanti who could be called upon; the total combined “police force” 
of the city likely exceeded 500 men; this data is provided and analyzed in Halina 
Manikowska, “Polizia e servizi d’ordine a Firenze nella seconda meta del XIV secolo,” 
Ricerche storiche 16 (1986), pp. 17-38, especially table 3 at p. 31. Not surprisingly 
given the centrality of the Capitano to the popular government, the size of his force 
increased significantly in 1378 (from 60 total soldiers), while those of the other rectors
remained at previous levels.
355 STEFANI, rubr. 830, pp. 355-6. 
356 ASF, Missive, 18, f. 91v: “Tractatus qui hic erat, per dei gratiam taliter est 
oppressus, quod quamvis magnus et periculosus fuerit…”
357 ASF, Missive, 18, ff. 93r-94r. “Vos,” the chancellor wrote to the lords of 
Bologna on 24 December, “emulos nostros, imo parentis patrie proditores, ne 
possent in Tusciam accedere, vetuistis. Vos conjurationis conscios vel suspectos per
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this plot, we can examine the condemnations of some of these men and the 
circumstances that brought them to conspire against the Florentine 
government.
Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni’s clan had been in financial decline since 
at least 1350, while the fortunes of some wealthy artisans and “new men” had 
risen to overshadow it. In the April 1378 prestanze assessment for Cipriano’s 
district (Lion Bianco in the quarter of Santa Maria Novella), for example, 
Cipriano was assessed only a fraction (3 fl., 1 s.) of what successful 
blacksmiths like Niccolò di Tieri (19 fl., 14 s.) or tanners like Bencivenni Gratini 
(10 fl., 17 s.) were.358 Whatever his financial situation, Cipriano had regularly 
held major public office in the city—he served as prior in 1363, 1368, and 
1375; as one of the Buonuomini in 1363 and 1366; as gonfaloniere of his 
district in 1367 and 1370; and, most importantly, he was one of the leaders of 
the Parte Guelfa faction and primary proponents of ammonizione.359 For this 
reason, he was confined to Milan in August 1378 by the Ciompi 
magistratus vestros fecistis examinandos cum diligentia detineri. Vos gentium 
vestrarum subsidia ad consolationem nostri populi destinatis,” at f. 94r. 
358 For the economic conditions in Lion Bianco in 1378, see Brucker, 
Florentine Politics, pp. 22-3, and especially n. 91 on p. 23, where Brucker provides 
the comparative assessments of these men and others in the district.
359 Office-holding data from the ONLINE TRATTE; Cipriano’s service on the 
Priorate is also noted in STEFANI, pp. 262, 273, and 292; and for his role in the Parte 
and as an instigator of the program of ammonizione in the quarter of Santa Maria 
Novella, see the list in STEFANI, rubr. 790, p. 318: “S. Maria Novella: Buondelmonti 
tutti, Acciaiuoli alcuni, Altoviti tutti, alcuni degli Ardinghelli, Ramondino Vecchietti di 
Giovanni, messer Albizo Rucellai e quasi tutti, messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, Andrea, 
e Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni, Andrea di Signini.” Otherwise, little is known of 
Cipriano. For example, Raymond de Roover, “The Story of the Alberti Company of 
Florence, 1302-1348, as Revealed in Its Account Books,” Business History Review 32 
(1958): 26, shows that he was employed by the company of Carroccio di Lapo degli 
Alberti in 1348, as were other members of his family. 
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government.360 His condemnation361 explains that, at some point, he left his 
confinement in Milan and travelled to Bologna, where he stayed in the hotel 
(hospitium) of Felice di Amanato and had a meeting with Niccolò di Iacopo 
Bordoni, another Florentine Guelf and exile. Niccolò, admiring the “faith and 
love” that Cipriano had for the Florentine exiles, explained the plot to re-enter 
Florence by force— “In order to return to Florence, we have given the order to 
have more than two hundred lances [i.e., 600 men and horses] assembled and 
paid for, and to have another group of friends; and with our force and the other 
to give the order that we will return to Florence either peacefully or at war”—
and he requested that, when the time came, Cipriano use all of his power to 
further their plot. Cipriano agreed. “And the said Ciprianus,” declares the 
condemnation, switching from the vernacular of their conversation back to
Latin, “kept the aforesaid things secret and revealed them to no one so that 
they might be better carried out to the grave damage and injury of the Parte 
Guelfa and of the peaceful and popular government of the guilds and 
guildsmen of the city of Florence against the law, statutes, and ordinances of 
the said city.” And for this, Cipriano was sentenced to death. 
360 See the list compiled by the Squittinatore, in SCARAMELLA, p. 78, where 
Cipriano is confined “a Melano”; as well as the Second Anonymous chronicler [in 
SCARAMELLA, p. 118] and the account of Nanni Bonifazii [SCARAMELLA, p.153].
361 The condemnation is in ASF, Capitano, 1198, f. 65rv: “…dictus Ciprianus 
[Lipoççi] reverteretur a civitate Mediolani ubi steterat ad confinia transivit per civitatem 
Bononie et dum esset in hospitio Felicis Amanati, ad ipsum adcessit Nicolaus 
Bordonis de Florentia…. Cui Nicolaus dixit Cipriano…per retornare a Fiorença avemo 
dato ordene de avere oltra doy cento lance a nostre spese e avere altra gente 
damicitia e con la nostra e con laltra dare ordene en breve che o per pace o per 
guerra torniamo a Fiorença… et predicta dictus Ciprianus in secreto tenuit et nemini 
revelavit ad hoc ut predicta habilius executionem demandarentur in grave dampnum 
et preiudicium partis guelfe et pacifici et popularis status artium et artificum civitatis 
Florentie contra formam iuris statutorum ordinamentorum dicte civitatis.” 
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Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti (sometimes called Mastino) had, likewise, 
regularly held communal office: he was prior in 1364, 1371, and 1375; among 
the Buonuomini in both 1367 and 1371, and gonfaloniere of his district (Vipera 
in Santa Maria Novella) in 1361 and 1372.362 And, like Cipriano Mangioni, he 
was strongly associated with the Parte and the policy of ammonizione.363
Before 1370, though, he had been a Ricci partisan and, for several decades, 
partner in a Ricci banking firm (with Tedaldino di Roggerio and Guicciozzo di 
Ardingo Ricci). In 1370, Bartolo was near bankruptcy and was saved by a loan 
from Carlo degli Strozzi and Michele Castellani, two of the leaders of the 
Albizzi faction. Thereafter, Bartolo was on the side of the Albizzi and, 
according to Stefani, when he was on the priorate in March of 1371, coerced 
his colleagues into passing a law that further strengthened the hand of the 
Parte Guelfa.364 In June of 1378, his was the third house burned down by the 
Ciompi mob (after Lapo da Castiglionchio’s and Carlo degli Strozzi’s) and, in 
August, the Ciompi government confined him to Mantua.365 As in Cipriano’s 
case, Bartolo left his confinement and journeyed to Bologna, where, again at 
the hotel of Felice di Amanato, he met with one Niccolò di Brunetto, who 
362 Office-holding data from ONLINE TRATTE; Bartolo’s service as Prior is also 
noted in STEFANI, pp. 264, 279, and 298. 
363 See, for example, STEFANI, rubr. 790, p. 317.
364 On the partnership with the Ricci, see Brucker, Florentine Politics, p. 127; 
on the change of allegiance and pressuring of the other priors, see STEFANI, rubr. 
730, pp. 279-80, and Becker, Florence in Transition, vol. 1, p. 134. The Cronaca of 
Alamanno Acciaioli calls the law passed by Bartolo “fortissima in favore di Parte 
guelfa” and notes that it was overturned by the Ciompi balìa, in SCARAMELLA, p. 16. 
365 STEFANI, rubr. 792, p. 319; rubr. 795, p. 312 (“confinat[o] da 30 miglia in 
là”) and rubr. 799, p. 328 (“a Mantova”); as well as most of the chroniclers in 
SCARAMELLA, pp. 37, 78, and 153. 
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explained the plan and asked for cooperation, for which he too was sentenced 
to death.366
It is harder to make sense of messer Iacopo Sacchetti’s involvement in 
the plot. Unlike Cipriano and Bartolo (or, of course, Piero degli Albizzi), messer 
Iacopo was not a central member of the Parte Guelfa faction. Indeed, Iacopo’s 
support for the taxation of clergy in the War of the Eight Saints—evidenced by 
his memorable statement, in a consulta of 1377, that the priests should be 
squeezed “to the dregs” for money before any recourse be had to the purses 
of citizens367—was likely one of the main reasons he was knighted by the 
Ciompi.368 Soon after the conferral of that honor, though, according to the 
chronicler called the Squittinatore, he (along with one Fino di Taddeo di Fino) 
was arrested and confessed to speaking against the government.369 According 
to Stefani, he was confined to Todi at the end of the summer, although another 
source claims that, on 19 October 1378, alongside men like Giorgio Scali and 
Tommaso Strozzi, he attended a feast and took an oath to uphold the 
knighthood of the popolo as well as the “peaceful and good government” ruling 
Florence.370 Nevertheless, by the time of his condemnation371 in late 
366 Condemnation at ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 64v-65r.
367 Quoted by Gherardi in his introduction to the text of the ANONIMO, p. 232: 
“Quod usque ad feces premantur clerici pro pecunia, et postea recurratur ad bursas 
civium.” 
368 STEFANI, rubr. 795, p. 324. 
369 SCARAMELLA, p. 79]: “…fu preso Fino di Taddeo di Fino, per certe parole 
che dovea avere detto contro lo stato. E messere Iacopo Sacchetti fu ancora preso, e 
confessorono che quello ch’aveano detto era il vero.” The Squittinatore also notes 
that they were imprisoned and that it was widely thought they would lose their lives. 
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December, he is described as having being confined at Fabriano, in the 
Marche, where he met Matteo dello Scelto Tinghi in the market. Matteo came 
bearing the “good news” of a plot, this time said to have been organized by 
none other than Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi,372 to re-enter Florence by force 
with more than two hundred lances. Benedetto had also asked, says Matteo, 
that all who wished to participate sign and seal a document attesting to their 
desire to carry out Benedetto’s plot. “Then the said Messer Iacobus produced 
the said writing and sealed it with his seal and gave it to the said Mattheus.” 
For this messer Iacopo was condemned to death. 
370 The best account of this ceremony is in the Squittinatore’s account, in 
SCARAMELLA, pp. 85-7. “[E] chi voleva essere, andasse a giurare, nelle mani di 
signori, la cavalleria. Sì che accettaro xxj di volere mantenerla per lo popolo” (p. 85); 
“giurando d’essere sempre mantenitori del pacefico e buono stato che regie” (p. 86). 
371 ASF, Capitano, 1198, f. 64rv: “…dum [dominus Jacobus de Sacchettis] 
esset in terra Fabriani ad confinia in mercato dicte terre cui undique sunt vie publice, 
ibidem supervenit Matheus Scielti de Florentia et dixit dicto domino Jacobo io te so 
dire bone novelle che Benedetto de Symone Peruççi [h]a ordinate per potere 
reintrare in Fiorenza, e insieme con lialtri usciti de condurre per fine e in ducento 
lance e con queste lance e con altra gente [64v] che se crede avere per certo venire 
verso Fiorença, e rientrare per certo e perche le cose abbino effecto el modo e [è] 
dato che tucti questi che volliono tenere questo ordinamento facciano una scripta de 
loro mano con loro sigello perche si mostri e sappiasi quelli, che sonno acti e pero io 
te prego da parte de Benedetto et de quelli altri usciti che tu volli fare questa scripta 
chio to dicta con lo sigello et trovarai che de corto andare rentraremo in Fiorença et 
se non ce poremmo rentrare noy faremo tanta guerra che averemo omne pacto che 
voremo dai Fiorentini, Et dictus dictus [sic] dominus Jacobus respondit, io sono 
aparechiato ma io te prego, che dicha a Benedetto che tenga si facto modo ch[‘]io 
non perda la gratia del Comune de Fiorenza, se questa cosa non venisse facta, Et 
damme ongni [ogni] modo vole fare questa scripta et tunc dictus Mattheus respondit 
tu ay a scrivere, che come tu se[i] contento de ongni cosa che fa Benedetto de 
Peruççi per reintrare en Fiorença, esso con lialtri usciti tunc dictus dominus Iacobus 
fecit dictam scriptam et suo sigillo sigillavit et tradidit dicto Matheo, Et predicta nemini 
revelavit ut effectum haberent in grave dampnum, et preiuditium partis guelfe et 
popularis status artium et artificum civitatis Florentie.”
372 Benedetto had, as we saw above, already been condemned for a 
conspiracy against the regime, see ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 99v-102v, for the details. 
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Likely due to his political power and influence in the Parte Guelfa, the 
best political histories of this period have stressed the role of Piero degli 
Albizzi in the December plot.373 His condemnation, though, does not entirely 
bear that out. 374 The sentence states that Piero left his confinement in Venice 
and was staying at a villa in the contado of Bologna when he was met by 
Bernardo di Lippo di Cione del Cane. As in the other condemnations, 
Bernardo informed Piero of the “good news [bone novelle]” that a plan is 
underway to assemble and fund more than two hundred lances to bring the 
exiles back to Florence. Piero’s reply, far from showing his involvement in the 
planning, reveals only a cautious (or, perhaps, diplomatic) acceptance of the 
plot: “Ah, with what you’ve told me you have placed before me a difficult 
choice, that if I reveal it to our lords, I will be a traitor to you and put you in 
danger, and if I don’t reveal it I am in danger of having my head cut off. 
However, I pray that you are disposed to do it in such a way that you can do it 
cautiously enough that you don’t endanger yourself and me, and I promise to 
remain faithful and, at the right time and place, do everything in my power.” 
We must, of course, keep in mind that these sentences are based on 
confessions extracted through torture, crafted by the confessors, influenced by 
the questions asked by the judges of the Capitano, and modulated by the 
conventions of the legal process. We cannot take them at face value. Even so, 
373 See, for example, Najemy, History of Florence, p. 171, and Brucker, Civic 
World, p. 56.
374 ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 63v-64r: “…et tunc dictus Pierus respondit oime 
che may [m’ai] dicto che tu mai [m’ai] messo ad un grande partito che si io lo revelo a 
li nostri signori, io sero traditore a voy e tutti vefaro pericolare, et se non rivelo et 
faciasse per altri sto a pericolo che non me sia talliato el capo e pero te prego per noi 
che sete desposti afare cosi che lo feciate si cautamente, che non pericoliate voi e 
me, e io ve promecto de tenere credença e a luoco e a tempo faro iusta el mio 
podere.”
193
Piero’s confession is strikingly different than those of his co-conspirators. If 
anyone is identified as the leader of the conspiracy, it is Benedetto di Simone 
Peruzzi, not Piero degli Albizzi; and, indeed, of all the participants in this web 
of plotting—Cipriano Mangioni and Niccolò Bordoni, Bartolo Siminetti and 
Niccolò di Brunetto, messer Iacopo Sacchetti and Matteo Tinghi, Piero degli 
Albizzi and Bernardo di Lippo di Cione—none seems less committed or less 
willing to commit than Piero. Nonetheless, he had relocated to Bologna (at the 
heart of the plot) and gave the plot his support and, as a result, was sentenced 
to death.  
The condemnations of these men would engender controversy and 
chaos in Florence, but no condemnation was more controversial than that of 
Donato Barbadori, Florence’s leading diplomat in the period (discussed in 
detail at the start of Chapter 4). When, shortly after the arrests, it became clear 
that the Capitano and other rectors were reluctant to condemn the prisoners to 
death, representatives of the Capitudini of the Guilds, the Parte Guelfa, the 
Mercanzia, and the Dieci della Libertà held a pratica aimed at convincing them 
to do so. “If the rectors don’t want to do justice,” cried Alessandro di Benedetto 
Gucci, echoing the sentiments of many, “let it be entrusted to citizens and 
guildsmen who do.”375 By the end of the riotous session, at which armed 
guildsmen demanded capital punishment for the conspirators, Alessandro’s 
call was answered and the Capitudini gave four citizens “power [balià], 
together with the rectors, to carry out justice,” and, their hands tied by the “will 
of the people,” the rectors resigned themselves to sentencing the prisoners to 
375 ASF, CP, 18, f. 55v (53v in ink): “Quod rectores nollent facere iusticiam, fiat 
commissio civibus et artificibus qui faciant.” 
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death.376 Amid commotion in the piazza, Giovanni di Piero Anselmi and Filippo 
di Biagio degli Strozzi were beheaded first as the people cried “Next, Next!
[Agli altri, agli altri].” Piero degli Albizzi, Cipriano Mangioni, Bartolo Siminetti, 
and Iacopo Sachetti were then executed in the same way, but only after the 
Capitano again expressed reservations about the sentence. When it came 
time for his execution, Donato Barbadori proclaimed his innocence and 
recounted the services that he had performed for Florence to keep her a free 
republic, but his words, recorded sympathetically by Stefani, were to no avail. 
And, before the week was over, the Capitano and other rectors had executed 
another nine Florentine conspirators.377 Among the executed was “Nencio 
Cicco”. Stefani, prior at the time, records that the Ciompi plotter, upon hearing 
his condemnation and seeing the evidence against him, protested and 
defiantly proclaimed, “I am happy to die for the Parte Guelfa!”378 Clearly 
angered by Nencio’s words, Stefani lashed out at the conspirators—”These 
men, who were trying to overthrow the government, were not more Guelf than 
the others, but, under the cover of the Parte Guelfa, they wanted to start a 
tumult in order to do evil”—and defended the Guelfness of his government.379
376 These events are described in STEFANI, rubr. 833, pp. 356-7; the quote is at 
p. 357: “balìa insieme con gli Rettori a fare dare esecuzione alla giustizia…”
377 STEFANI, rubr. 834-9. 
378 STEFANI, rubr. 839, pp. 360: “…io sono contento morire per Parte guelfa…”
379 STEFANI, rubr. 839, pp. 360: “Questi, che cercavano di sovvertere lo stato, 
non erano però più Guelfi che gli altri, perchè sotto titolo di Parte guelfa romorregiare 
volessero; ma per fare male...” And, defending the Guelf character of the regime’s 
electoral policies, he continued: “…e [the conspirators] abbominavano la città, che si 
reggea a Parte ghibellina; e diceano male, perocchè sotto titolo di parte guelfa e per li 
Guelfi si reggea la città, ma degli smoniti guelfi, e forse de’ Ghibellini smoniti ve 
n’erano nelle borse, ed alcuni ne veniano agli ufici tratti; ma era piccola cosa a 
rispetto de i Guelfi, che non erano negli ufici veduti infino a quello dì, de’ 20 l’uno”.
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Even with the conspirators eliminated, the government and its most 
vociferous supporters would not rest. “Let there be pure and undiluted justice,” 
demanded the lower guildsman Giovanni di Filippo, “it alone is the medicine 
for this city’s sickness,” and the others present in the council echoed his 
words.380 “In order to save the government,” argued Feozzo di Casino, newly 
elected as one of the Twelve, in a later pratica, “let justice be done, yielding to 
no one.”381 Calls for the confiscation of the property of the condemned and for 
the penalization of their wives and children were heard among the chief 
representatives of the regime, who also sought a rigged, hand-picked (a 
mano) election for the priorate of January-February 1379 [80] in order to 
ensure that no disloyal priors were chosen.382 The priorate was always 
invested with enormous “emergency” powers,383 and an action like this would 
have subverted the very principles upon which the guild government saw it 
itself as based. Cooler heads prevailed in the council of 26 December, when 
representatives of the guilds suggested that all the guilds should be consulted 
before subverting the electoral process, and again days later when a large 
majority (17 of 23) of the guilds voted to maintain the procedures already in 
380 ASF, CP, 18, f. 51v: Johannes Filippi farsettaius dixit quod iustitia fiat pura 
et mera que sola est medicina infirmitatis istius civitatis.”
381 ASF, CP, 18, f. 63r: “Et quod pro status conservatione justitia fiat non 
parcendo alicui.”
382 On this, see Brucker, Civic World, p. 56. 
383 See, for example, Gregorio Dati’s (significantly later) discussion, in Istoria 
di Firenze di Goro Dati dall’ anno MCCCLXXX all’ anno MCCCCV (Florence: Manni, 
1735), p. 137: “L’Uficio, e balìa, e autorità, e Potenza de’ detti Signori è grande senza 
misura, ciò, che vogliono, possono, mentre che dura il loro Uficio, ma non aoperano 
questa potenzia, se non in certi casi necessary, e stremi, e di rado…” 
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place and rejected the calls for an a mano election.384 The new priors were 
then drawn by lot, according to the law. We see here the conflict between the
elite political style, represented by leaders of the government like Tommaso 
Strozzi, and the popular political ideology of the guilds, embraced by the 
majority of the guildsmen. The nature of this conflict, which had been playing 
out in Florence for more than a century, reveals the fatal contradiction at the 
core of this government: it had been formed and secured with a factional 
purge, it was defended by its leaders with a fanaticism (and sometimes a 
disrespect for the rule of law) born out of paranoia, but, at the micro-level, the 
men and women who formed the core of its partisans were committed to the 
ideals of inclusion, representation, and broad-based consultation.
Early in February of 1379 [80], more than a month after the dramatic 
events of December but only shortly after the full convictions, Salutati crafted 
the most eloquent defense of the repression of the conspiracy in a letter to the 
pope that contrasted the moderation of the city’s response—only a few of the 
conspirators were killed, their property was confiscated legally and 
temperately—given the astonishing evil of the plans—to destroy the guilds, to 
invade and plunder the city—of the “unholy citizens, cruel men, and bellicose 
people” who were once, of course, among Florence’s chief supporters of the 
Church.385 The Albizzi, for example, had long been among the cadre of elite 
384 See also Brucker, Civic World, pp. 56-7, who rightly sees the leadership’s 
proposals as a sign of fear and lost faith in guild government, and Najemy, 
Corporatism and Consensus, pp. 256-8, who rightly sees this as a triumph of the 
“rank and file” of the guild community over the radicalism of its elite leadership and of 
their continued belief in the principles of popular government.
385 The defense is in ASF, Missive, 18, ff. 108v-109v, though the section has 
been crossed out, perhaps after the fall of guild government. The quote, at f. 109r, 
“nefandi cives, viri crudeles, et homines truculenti.” See the comments in Najemy, 
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families favored by the church in politics and for benefices: Piero degli Albizzi 
was himself the uncle of Piero Corsini, cardinal of Florence, and his relatives 
continued to support and be supported by the church during the War of the 
Eight Saints despite communal sanctions.386 Piero himself was the leader of 
the group opposed to the war and in favor of rapprochement with the pope; 
now the Florentines had killed him and needed to explain their actions. And 
even in the midst of its conspiracy mania, the government continued to try to 
make inroads with elites who supported their regime; for example, by making 
popolani several magnates from some of the city’s most “noble” lineages (like 
the Bardi and Frescobaldi) in mid-February.387 Clearly the leaders of the 
government were trying to shore up the defenses of the city, making older 
alliances firmer and forging new ones.
Somewhat earlier, in January of 1379 [80], Stefani writes, “the Capitano 
del Popolo, messer Cante, on the basis of the confession of Piero di Filippo or 
of others, conducted an investigation against many persons that he 
condemned according to the customs and laws of Florence.”388 The plotters 
arrested and already executed were only the proverbial tip of the iceberg—the 
December plot was vast and vastly complex. Due to its size (nearly fifty 
History of Florence, p. 168, on the centrality of the guilds in Florence’s self-image as 
presented in this letter. 
386 See Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, p. 112; and Alison W. Lewin, 
Negotiating Survival, p. 40, where the quid-pro-quo of Piero’s sister’s son’s being 
made cardinal and his earlier support for Urban V’s anti-Visconti war is discussed. 
387 ASF, PR, 68, ff.237v-238v; the list, at f. 238r, includes men like Bindo di 
messer Iacopo Bardi and Leonardo di Niccolò Frescobaldi. 
388 STEFANI, rubr. 845, p. 365: “…il Capitano del Popolo, messer Cante, o per 
confessione che avesse da Piero di Filippo, o d’altrui, come’è detto, fece inquisizione 
di molti, li quali, servate le consuetudini e leggi del Comune, condannò.” 
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persons condemned) and comprehensiveness (including significant numbers 
of both elite and Ciompi conspirators), this condemnation will allow an 
examination of the types of people who plotted against the guild regime and 
their motivations. A complete transcription of the list of condemned is included 
in Appendix 1. Writing about the earliest days of the Ciompi tumult in the 
Spring of 1378, the almost always reliable chronicler Stefani describes the 
events that occurred during the week of Salvestro de’ Medici becoming 
“proposto” (that is, charged with presenting business to the other priors). 
Afraid of what Salvestro had planned, the leaders of the Parte Guelfa swung 
into action:  
the Captains gathered together right away at the palace of the 
Parte and quickly called on all the leaders of the families of the 
grandi who liked their policies, and nearly all of them came 
armed with hauberks and knives, some even had swords hidden 
at their side. They also called on all the heads of the popolani
families who supported and favored their policies. And present at 
this gathering were the men who were the cornerstone of the 
whole thing: messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, Carlo degli Strozzi 
and his sons, Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, Niccolò Soderini, and 
Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti, who is called Mastino. They were 
the strength of the whole endeavor.  And it is also true that one 
of the Parte’s other champions was not among them, namely 
Stoldo di messer Bindo Altoviti, who was away on a peace 
mission to Rome.389
389 STEFANI, rubr. 790, pp. 317-8: “…i capitani subito furono al palagio della 
parte ragunati, e feciono richiesti subito, e quasi tutti i capi delle famiglie de’ Grandi, a 
cui piaceano le materie che essi teneano alla Parte, e tutti quasi con panziere e 
coltella, e chi stocchi celatamente allato. E furvi richiesti tutti i capi delle famiglie 
popolane, le quali faceano alla materia adiuto e favore, e quivi furono questi, li quali 
erano il bilico di tutta la materia: messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, Carlo degli Strozzi 
con gli figliuoli, Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, Niccolò Soderini, Bartolo di Giovanni 
Siminetti, detto Mastino: questi erano il fermo di tutta la faccenda. È vero che 
appresso di loro non era uno, ch’era l’altro campione: ciò era Stoldo di messer Bindo 
Altoviti, il quale era in ambasciata per la pace a Roma.” 
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Stefani then lists, dividing them among the quarters of the city, all of major 
supporters of the Parte Guelfa. The list includes more than forty named 
individuals and a handful of families, including “all” of the Albizzi, Altoviti, and 
Buondelmonti, and “some” of the Acciaiuoli and Ardinghelli.390 Stefani’s list 
provides us with a snapshot (probably impressionistic) of the faction of the 
Parte Guelfa and its leadership at the moment before its fall from power, and it 
allows us to say something about that faction and its role in later conspiracies. 
In Table III, I show the pattern of office holding among all the individuals 
Stefani names in the twenty years between 1370 and 1389.391 For our 
390 STEFANI, rubr. 790, pp. 318. This is the list of men, using Stefani’s 
spellings: Bonaiuto di ser Belcaro Serragli, Giovanni di Bartolo Bigliotti, Antonio di 
Niccolò di Cione Ridolfi, Bortolommeo di Niccolò di Cione Ridolfi, Guerrieri di Tribaldo 
de’ Rossi, Piero di Dato Canigiani, Ristoro di Piero di Dato Canigiani, Uberto di 
Schiatta Ridolfi, Messer Filippo Giammori e Giovanni di Piero Bandini de’ Baroncelli, 
Michele e messer Lotto di Vanni Castellani, Simone di Ranieri Peruzzi, Benedetto di 
Simone di Ranieri Peruzzi e consorti tutti, Adoardo de’ Pulci, Bonaccorso di Lapo, 
Giovanni de’ Bonaccorsi, Guerriante Bagnesi, Bardo di Tingo Mancini, Bese 
Magalotti, Salice Cavalcanti, Guccio di Cino Bartolini, Iacopo di Gian Gherardini, 
Buondelmonti tutti,Acciaiuoli alcuni,Altoviti tutti,alcuni degli Ardinghelli, Ramondino 
Vecchietti di Giovanni, messer Albizo Rucellai e quasi tutti, Messer Pazzino degli 
Strozzi, Andrea e Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni, Andrea di Signino, Biagio di 
Bonaccio Guasconi e consorti, Brunelleschi tutti i figliuoli di Boccaccio, Iacopo di 
Messer Francesco de’ Pazzi, gli Albizzi tutti,Migliore Guadagni, Vieri di Messer Pepo 
de’ Cavicciuli, Pigello di messer Talano. I have put all non-precise names in italics. 
Among the non-precise names, expressions like “Altoviti alcuni” do not allow for any 
quantitative analysis, whereas ones like “Altoviti tutti” will allow for some (even 
keeping in mind that “tutti” might not be meant literally). “Andrea di Signino” is a 
reference to Andrea di Signino Baldesi. I have not been able to identify all of Carlo 
Strozzi’s sons. An examination of the data in the ONLINE TRATTE suggests that 
Azzolino, Lorenzo, Michele, and Strozza di Carlo degli Strozzi were those sons. 
Boccaccio Brunelleschi had at least two sons, Attaviano and Jacopo. On the basis of 
archival and other evidence, I believe the “Pigello di messer Talano” in STEFANI is an 
error and refers instead to Pigello and Talano di messer Luigi degli Adimari, 
described in ASF, Capitano, 1198, 55r, as “Pigellum [et] Talanum, fratres et filios 
quondam Domini Loigii de Adimaribus populi Sancte Marie Nepotecose de Florentia”.
391 The data in the chart is based on the ONLINE TRATTE and STEFANI.
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purposes, only the years 1370 to 1378 are relevant. In those nine years, the 
41 named individual supporters of the Parte were drawn for the priorate 47 
times and as Standardbearer of Justice ten times, and served 30 and eight 
times.392 Only twelve of the men never held any of the offices called the “tre 
maggiori” (i.e., the Priors [P in the chart] or Standardbearer of Justice [GG], 
the Twelve Good Men [D], and the Sixteen Standard Bearers [S]); among the 
29 remaining office-holders, all but one were drawn as prior at least once. 
Seven of the 29 were drawn for the priorate at least three times, and nine of 
them served twice (Niccolò Soderini, Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti, Uberto di 
Schiatta Ridolfi, Simone di Ranieri Peruzzi, Guerriante Bagnesi, Iacopo di 
Gian Gherardini, Andrea di Signino Baldesi, Biagio di Bonaccio Guasconi, 
and Migliore Guadagni), and Bonaiuto di ser Belcaro Serragli even served 
three times. In addition, nearly all of the 29 office-holders also regularly served 
among the Twelve or Sixteen. Moreover, Table III only takes into account 
those individuals specifically named by Stefani, not the families that supported 
the Parte en masse. If one were to add “all” of the Albizzi, Altoviti, and 
Buondelmonti, and “some” of the Acciaiuoli and Ardinghelli, the number of 
priors who came from that group in the nine-year period, would increase by at 
392 One must keep in mind that some of the families of these men had been 
regularly providing priors since the 1280s. For example, the Strozzi served 62 times 
from the origin of the priorate to 1369. By contrast, though, the Serragli were priors
only twice before 1370.
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TABLE III (part 1)
Office-holding among the leaders of the Parte Guelfa, 1370-89
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TABLE III (part 2)
Office-holding among the leaders of the Parte Guelfa, 1370-89
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least 15 for a total of 45, and by as many as 24 for a total of 54.393 Table III
also shows that in 1376-8 the leaders of the Parte faction were more likely to 
be excluded from office after being drawn; indeed, in that period 12 of their 
drawings were cancelled by the general divieto, three of the men had their 
name slips destroyed, and two were declared ineligible for office as newly-
made magnates. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that Piero degli Albizzi’s 
associates and the adherents of the Parte Guelfa would have been strongly 
active in politics in the years before the Ciompi tumult. It is also not surprising 
that this group would have been almost entirely excluded from office holding in 
the period of the guild government, nor that their officeholding in the six-year 
period 1383-1389 would be greatly reduced (with only nine Priors from the 
group) when compared to the period 1370-78. What is striking, though, is the 
extent to which the group described by Stefani overlaps with the group of elite 
conspirators that plotted against the guild government. Of the 48 men 
condemned by the Capitano in the massive legal action of 30 January 1379 
[80], seven were also listed by Stefani among the leaders or supporters of the 
Parte: Lapo da Castiglionchio, Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi, Adoardo de’ 
Pulci, Giovanni di Bartolo Bigliotti, Pigello and Talano degli Adimari, and 
Bartolomeo di Niccolò Ridolfi. In addition, two Albizzi were condemned: 
messer Alberto di Pepo degli Albizzi and Mariano di Lando degli Albizzi. And 
Giovanni, the son of Guerrieri di Tribaldo Rossi, who appears among the Parte 
393 In the twenty year period, members of the Albizzi family served on the 
Priorate seven (7) times and the Altoviti eight (8) times, for a total of 15, which may be 
added to the previous total; as magnates, the Buondelmonti could not serve as 
Priors. Members of the Ardinghelli served four (4) times and the Acciaiuoli five (5) 
times.
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supporters, was also condemned. Among the 19 elite Florentines condemned 
on that day,394 37% were named by Stefani as Parte adherents. Including the 
two Albizzi and Guerrieri Rossi’s son, 10 of the 19 condemned elites are found 
in Stefani’s list. By 30 January 1379 [80], moreover, several men listed by 
Stefani had already been condemned for plotting against the guild 
government: Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti, and 
Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni had been beheaded in December, as we have 
seen.395 Thirteen of the nineteen elite conspirators of December (or nearly 
70%) were, then, among Stefani’s Parte leaders. Stefani also provides two 
lists of the men made grandi, declared rebels, banished, exiled, and confined 
by the commune during the summer of 1378; 14 of these men he also listed as 
being of the Parte faction.396 Stefani also provides lists of the houses burned 
394 That is, excluding Giannotto’s lieutenant messer Giovanni Poccia de’ 
Coppoli of Perugia (as a non-Florentine) and all of the non-elite (mainly Ciompi) 
plotters, discussed below. 
395 Among the men named as leaders of the Parte faction, Carlo Strozzi, 
Niccolò Soderini and Stoldo di Bindo Altoviti were not executed in December 1379 or 
condemned in January 1379 [80]. Carlo Strozzi had been exiled for five years and 
confined to Genoa in the summer of 1378, see STEFANI, rubr. 795, p. 321 and rubr. 
799, p. 328. Both of the others were popolani made grandi by the guild government in 
1379, see STEFANI, rubr. 843, p. 363.
396 The first list, at STEFANI, rubr. 795, p. 321, contains the names of men 
banished, made grandi, or declared rebels by Salvestro de’ Medici’s priorate. The list 
includes: Lapo da Castiglionchio, Migliore Guadagni, Piero degli Albizzi, Bartolo 
Siminetti, Niccolò Soderini, Carlo Strozzi, and Piero di Dato Canigiani. These seven 
are listed by Stefani as supporters or leaders of the Parte. The second list, at 
STEFANI, rubr. 799, p. 328, includes men confined more than 50 miles (miglia) away 
for a year and required to present themselves before the officials of the place of their 
confinement every day and to send proof of this once per month (with a 1000 florin 
penalty for failing to do this once, 2000 florins for the second failure, and being made 
a rebel for the third). The list includes three Buondelmonti, Niccolò Soderini, Carlo 
Strozzi, Andrea di Signino Baldesi, Bartolo Siminetti, Antonio di Niccolò Ridolfi, 
Uberto di Schiatta Ridolfi, Iacopo de’ Pazzi, Vieri di messer Pepo Cavicciuli, Attaviano 
di Boccaccio Brunelleschi, Bonaiuto di Belcaro Serragli, Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, 
and Simone di Rinieri Peruzzi. These 12 named individuals and the three 
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down by the Ciompi; among them were the houses of Lapo da Castiglionchio, 
Carlo Strozzi, Bartolo Siminetti, Niccolò Soderini, several Buondelmonti, 
Ristoro and his father Piero Canigiani, Piero di Filippo and several other 
Albizzi, Iacopo di Francesco Pazzi, Vieri Cavicciuli, Migliore Guadagni, 
Antonio Ridolfi, Michele Castellani, Simone Peruzzi, and Andrea di Signino 
Baldesi.397 In all, at least nine of the men listed by Stefani as supporters of the 
Parte had their houses burned down, as did all five of the men listed by Stefani 
as leaders (excluding the ambassador Stoldo Altoviti). As we have seen, it is 
clear that the Ciompi unleashed their fury at the leaders of the Parte (instead 
of, say, the persons most prominent in the woolen cloth industry). In the same 
way, Stefani’s lists and the massive condemnation of January 1379 [80] allow 
us to understand which men composed the core of the elite conspirators in 
1379. The elites who conspired against the guild government came, to a large 
extent, from the ranks of the leadership and core supporters of the Parte 
Guelfa, from the ranks of men who had regularly held the highest offices and 
who were most politically active before the Ciompi tumult, from the ranks of 
the men who had terrorized Florence with the policy of ammonizione, men 
whom Salvestro de’ Medici and his priorate exiled and excluded from 
government, and men whose houses were burned by the Ciompi. In order to 
secure the new government of the guilds, these men were made magnates, 
excluded from office, declared rebels, banished, exiled, confined, monitored, 
subjected to fiery violence, and killed when their attempted criminal conspiracy 
Buondelmonti are listed by Stefani as supporters or leaders of the Parte. Iacopo 
Sacchetti and Iacopo di Bartolomeo de’ Medici are also included; the former was 
beheaded in December and the latter condemned in January.
397 The five lattermost are listed in STEFANI, rubr. 795, p. 322-3; the other 
arsons are described at rubr. 791, p. 319-20, see also Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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to return failed. In many ways, this was not unlike all of the other factional 
purges that had occurred in Florence and other medieval Italian cities. As the 
14th-century chronicler and poet of Aquila, Buccio di Ranallo, says: “Omne 
parte ha probato / Che è gire de fore / da poi che è cacciato,” or “Every party 
has experienced what it’s like to wander around away from home after it was 
expelled.”398 Indeed, the leaders of the Parte faction wandered throughout 
Italy, gathered in secret places, recruited allies, and plotted the destruction of 
the faction that had expelled them. This too is traditional; “E ciascuna ha 
probata,” added Buccio later on in his poem, “che è rentrare a furore,” “and 
each party also learned how to come back with a fury.” The Parte Guelfa 
faction’s attempt to return, while marked by fury, was not successful. First, the 
great plot of December failed and the exiles were not able to return until 1382, 
when another revolution swept the guild government out of power. Second, 
even when the Guelf exiles and their Ciompi allies returned, they did not re-
establish their political power and pre-eminence in the city, as is clear in Table 
III, where one sees a sharp drop-off in office-holding in and after 1382, 
compared to 1370-1378. 
More than half of the men condemned in January of 1379 [80] were not 
from the Florentine elite; and the condemnation also permits us to say a great 
deal about these men. Between 17 and 20 September 1378, nearly 50 people 
were accused of having committed crimes against the newly consolidated 
regime of the guilds, the vast majority of them (around 37) Ciompi or members 
398 Cronica aquilana, ed. Vittorio de Bartholomeis (Rome, 1907), p.139. 
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of the popolo minuto engaged in wool production.399 The discourse of 
moderation, thought necessary to attract a broader base of supporters for the 
new regime, required not only the exclusion of the Ciompi guilds from the 
government, but the criminalization of the least moderate among the Ciompi—
of the men whom the so-called Anonimo fiorentino (himself among the group 
of moderates desired by the new regime) called “the Ciompi, thieves and 
traitors and robbers and killers and murderers and scoundrels and evil-
doers.”400 Of the 13 conspirators who met at Ronco on 18 July 1378, for 
example, nearly half were accused in September. In fact the Ciompi in these 
399 Most of the accused are listed in STEFANI, rubr. 807, pp. 336-7; but a 
somewhat fuller and more detailed list was reconstructed by Trexler in Neighbors and 
Comrades, table 6, pp. 104-5; these are their names (using Trexler’s spelling): (1) 
Messer Luca di Totto da Panzano, (2) Anibaldo di Bernardo del Magogo degli Strozzi, 
(3) Mezza di Jacopo di Mezza, (4) Luca del Melana, (5) Bartolomeo di Lorenzo del 
Grasso, (6) Fiore di ser Bartolo, (7) Zanobi di ser Bartolo, (8) Vico, (9) Niccolò di 
Betto Bardi, (10) Piero di Fede called Ciamo, (11) Paolo di Guido called Bodda, (12) 
Giusto di Luca Petrini, called Pezzotto , (13) Guasparre del Ricco, (14) Piero di 
Francesco da Melano or del Mulina, (15) maestro Andrea de’ Bartoli, called 
Melagamba, (16) Neri di Giovanni Biancardi, (17) ser Agnolo Latini, (18) ser Giustino 
Giusti [Landucci], (19) Donnino da S. Donnino, (20) Venturino Gelli, (21) messer 
Guido, called Bandiera, (22) Bartolomeo di Bartonto da Pistoia, (23) Baldo di Niccolò 
Betti, (24) Biagio di Francesco, (25) Jacopo di Piero Borsi, (26) Sandro di Feduccio, 
called Guando di Gualfonda, (27) Manetto Piccardo, (28) Talento di Pacco or Puccio, 
(29) Antonio di Giovanni [called Recca], called Guargaglia, (30) [Bartolomeo del 
Bello, called] Zoccolo, (31) Matteo [Matta] di Turino (Nerini), called Teo, (32) Piero di 
Gherardo Borsi, (33) Jacopo di Testino, called Testinella, (34) Salvestro del Tegghia, 
(35) Domenico called Mifferi, Muffori, or Musson, (36) Michele di Piero Picchini, (37) 
Francesco di Bartolo or Giovanni Guidarezzi, called Rincacato, (38) Simone d’Andrea 
called Morello, (39) Marco di Davizino, (40) Domenico di Buonaccorso, (41) Agnolo di 
Cenno [called Bacciano], (42) Nofri di Cinello, (43) Niccolò di Bartolo, (44) Luca di 
Guida, called Mogliazza, (45) Andrea di Giovanni, called Nocca, (46) Domenico di 
Tuccio, called Tambo, and (47) Matteo di ser Salvi Gai. Ten of these men (#1, 2, 3, 5, 
13, 15, 17, 18, 22, 37) were definitely or likely not woolworkers of any sort, leaving 37 
who were likely Ciompi. In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that Messer 
Guido (#21) gained his title as a knight of the Ciompi.
400 ANONIMO, p. 384: “…de’ Ciompi, ladri e traditori e rubatori e micidiali e 
assassini e ghiontoncegli e ma’fattori;” this description on 10 September 1378. 
208
two groups might be taken as a (very rough) representative sample of the type 
of men who constituted the radical vanguard of the Ciompi.401 I have listed and 
numbered the men in this group in notes 423 and 425 below; and for the 
purposes of the analysis here, I often refer to them by a number or numbers in 
parentheses. On the list (discussed above) of 48 persons condemned on 30 
January 1379 [80], six were also among those condemned in September of 
1378 (#4, 19, 29, 31, 33, and 38), and one of the January 1379 [80] group was 
the son of one of the September 1378 group (Bartolomeo, the son of Simone 
d’Andrea called Morello, #38). If we exclude elite plotters from the January 
1379 [80] list, 28 remain, most of whom were Ciompi and more than 20% of 
whom were among the radical Ciompi. Put simply, a sizeable number of the 
Ciompi enlisted in the December 1379 [80] plot were drawn from the ranks of 
the Ciompi vanguard I have described, and a smaller (but still noteworthy) 
number of the Ciompi vanguard became involved in the December plot. The 
picture becomes clearer when we expand beyond the January 1379 [80] 
condemnation and look at the fates of these 44 Ciompi during the tenure of 
401 On the conspiracy at Ronco, see my discussion in Chapter 2, pages 115 
and following above. The conspirators at Ronco are listed in Trexler, Neighbors and 
Comrades, table 1, p. 69. Six of them appear on the list in note 423 (namely, #4, 5, 
11, 21, 26, and 30). I list here the remaining seven, continuing the numeration from 
the preceding note: (48) Simoncino called il Bugigatto, (49) Lorenzo di Riccomanno, 
(50) Leoncino di Biagino [Franchino], (51) Nardo di [Manetto da] Camaldoli, (52) 
Salvestrino [di Tanuccio] da S. Giorgio, (53) [Cambio di Bartolo called] Galasso, and 
(54) Filippo [di Simone]. All of the conspirators at Ronco were Ciompi. Of the total of 
54 persons, some 44 (or roughly 80%) were definitely or very likely Ciompi; for the 
purpose of percentile analysis in the text, I use the total of 44, even though 54 men 
are listed and numbered. It is important to note that this analysis is far from precise (in 
terms both of the limited sample and the lack of precision in identifying Ciompi) and is 
meant only to give a rough picture. 
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the guild government. Two of these men (#48 and 53) were condemned in 
January of 1381 [82] along with men like Tommaso Strozzi and Giovanni Dini 
and had possibly become supporters of the guild government.402 But some 17 
others (and likely more) became conspirators or, at least, were implicated (like 
#15)403 in plots against the guild regime: at least one (#4) of them plotted 
against the regime until 1382 when he was recalled from exile along with Luca 
da Panzano (#1) and other Parte Guelfa adherents;404 at least three (#21, 33, 
38) were condemned in absentia while they plotted with other Ciompi and elite 
conspirators at Bologna,405 at least four (#6, 38, 39, and 40) were declared 
enemies of the government406; at least 9 others (including #37)407 were 
condemned for plots against the regime—one (#46)408 was executed in 
September and two (#20 and 52)409 in December 1378, and at least five of 
402 Despite the variety of patronymics and occupations, it seems clear that #48 
is the Simoncino listed in STEFANI, rubr. 910, p. 400; ANONIMO, p. 437, and the First 
Anonymous Chronicle in SCARAMELLA, p. 96. And for “Galasso,” #53, also see 
ANONIMO, p. 437
403 See ANONIMO, pp. 405 and 411.
404 See Brucker, “Ciompi Revolution,” pp. 354-5; he is also on the January 
1379 [80] list. 
405 “Bandiera” was a Ciompi hero and constant plotter, as in ASF, Capitano, 
1198, ff. 16r and 103rv.; as were “Morello” and “Testinella,” see ASF, Capitano, 1198, 
f. 56rv.
406 See I capitoli del comune di Firenze, ed. Cesare Guasti (Florence, 1893), 
vol. 2, p. 190. 
407 See ANONIMO, p. 411.
408 See the First Anonymous Chronicler in SCARAMELLA, p. 84.
409 For Venturino’s execution, see ANONIMO, p. 389. Salvestrino is reported to 
have been crying, “Viva il Popolo e Parte Guelfa,” see the account in the First 
Anonymous Chronicle in SCARAMELLA, p. 88.
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them (#10, 12, 26, 30, and 50)410 were executed in 1379 or later. This list of 17 
includes three (#4 and 33, 38) of the six men on the January 1379 [80] list, 
about whom we can say more, but not the other four. Thus, of the 44 Ciompi 
at Ronco and/or condemned in September of 1378, at least 20 (or 45%) of 
them are documented to have been involved in conspiratorial activities against 
the guild regime. These Ciompi conspirators came primarily from the quarters 
of San Giovanni and Santo Spirito; they were neighbors, often from the same 
parishes (popoli).411 As Gene Brucker has shown for the leadership of the 
Ciompi in general, many of these men were financially secure before the 
tumult of 1378 and many of them had served the commune during or before 
the War of the Eight Saints—at least 9 of the Ciompi conspirators had been 
caporali or soldiers in the militia between 1360 and 1377,412 and four of them 
410 See my discussion of Piero in Chapter 2 at pp 138-9. The condemnation 
against him (Pierum Fedis vocatum El Ciri) for crimes committed in August 1379 [80] 
is reprinted in Rodolico, La democrazia, app. 1, pp. 441-5. “Pezotto” and Sandro are 
discussed in this chapter and are in Appendix 1, condemned along with Lanfranco di 
Messer Luca da Panzano in ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 47r-49v. For the condemnation 
of “El Zocco,” see ASF, Capitano, 1198, ff. 31r-35r, and ANONIMO, p. 401. And the 
final conspirator is Lioncino di Francino, discussed in this chapter at and condemned 
in ASF, Capitano 1197 bis, ff. 99v-101r.
411 The Quarters: San Giovanni 10, Santo Spirito 7, Santa Maria Novella 3, 
Santa Croce 1. On this, I have generally followed Trexler’s data, in “Neighbors and 
Comrades,” although some discrepancies exist with the condemnations I have 
examined. For example, for #19, Trexler gives S. Maria in Verzaia and the January 
1379 [80] condemnation gives S. Frediano, though both are in the quarter of Santo 
Spirito. The information on parish (popolo) is not always reliable, consistent, or 
available; but the most common popolo was certainly San Pier Maggiore in San 
Giovanni (with five), and San Frediano was also well represented (with at least two, 
and possibly four). 
412 All are recorded in ASF, Camera del comune, Uscita: (#4) 228; (#31) 222; 
(#26) 147-222; (#50) 222; (#6) 147-95; (#39) 186-222; (#37) 207-222; (#20) 147-210; 
(#52) 147, 155; folio numbers omitted.
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had been assessed more than a florin in prestanze (#6: 2fl., 4d.; #12: 1 fl., 3s., 
9d.; #26: 1fl., 5d.; and #50: 1fl.,1s.,6d).413 The Ciompi who conspired against 
the guild regime came, to a large extent, from the ranks of the radical Ciompi 
vanguard, from the ranks of men who had conspired in 1378 and achieved 
their goals through terror and violence, from the ranks of men who had been 
marginalized and excluded from the revolutionary government that they had 
made possible, from the ranks of men who had been criminalized and exiled 
and executed by that government. If the leaders of the guild regime thought 
the exclusion and criminalization of these men would attract moderates who 
despised the “rabble” and thereby secure their rule, they made a terrible 
miscalculation. The most radical Ciompi, having already lost everything 
(including their property, their role in the government, and their homes) could 
do nothing but channel their energies against the regime that had excluded 
them. And they would channel their energies in the same way that they had in 
1378 and in nearly every other moment when they sought to increase their 
political power, namely, through conspiratorial action. The guild regime also 
miscalculated if they thought that these men would not join forces with the elite 
adherents of the Parte Guelfa. If it is true today that politics makes “strange 
bedfellows,” it was truer in the late 1370s, when the Ciompi’s politics were 
practiced before or without ideology.
The condemnation of January 1379 [80] provides us with a revealing 
look at a large and complex criminal enterprise. Although it is impossible to 
know now the full extent of the linkages between these conspirators or to 
distinguish clearly the actual structure of the plot and the structure of the plot 
413 ASF, Prestanze, 332, f. 167v; 332, f. 121v; 334, f. 118v; and 332, f. 117v.
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“revealed” by those condemned, who fashioned or refashioned it in their 
confessions, some aspects of it are clear. The two amorphous “groups” of 
conspirators—elite and Ciompi—were united in a common purpose; they 
acted in concert, perhaps according to a plan originally laid out in Padua by 
Lapo da Castiglionchio and Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi; among the 
conspirators certain men were entrusted with forging the network of 
conspirators, men like Matteo Tinghi who moved across Italy spreading the 
word from the plot’s leaders to its willing participants; the conspirators were 
drawn together at a single site, Bologna, where they could plot together and 
join Giannotto’s forces; they employed the traditional techniques of Florentine 
political conspiracy (the pact or oath of the plotters, the use of banners and 
slogans, the planned eruption of violence in multiple locales, the request of
assistance from a sympathetic foreign ruler), but were fully aware of the 
unprecendented scope of their plot and acted accordingly. To call this simply a 
“plot,” though, is surely an understatement: exiles, voluntary and involuntary, 
brought together by banishments, shared interests and sympathies, founded 
something like a conspiratorial government in exile—a pan-Italian conspiracy 
that commissioned agents, raised armies, and participated in secret 
diplomacy. 414 In the areas outside of Florence, in the zones between cities 
where mercenary armies and exiles could wander unhindered, this band of 
414 The structure of the plot might be thought of visually as similar to the 
“conspiracy art” of Mark Lombardi, such as his famous “BCCI-ICI & FAB 1972-1991” 
or “Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Reagan, Bush, Thatcher, and the arming of Iraq, 
1979-90,” which show (with hundreds of circles, lines, and arrows) the dynamic 
interaction and interconnection of the modern financial-military-criminal conspiracy. 
The two referenced works may be found in Mark Lombardi, Global Networks (New 
York: Independent Curators International, 2003), pp. 96 and 89-90. 
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conspirators created an alternative to the power of the Florentine government. 
In the minds of men like Benedetto Peruzzi, the stato belonged to them and 
the question was never whether it should be taken, but whether it could be.
The condemnation of January 1379 [80] also provides us with a 
revealing look at the nature of Italian politics at the macro-level, where one can 
clearly neither legitimate rule nor illegitimate rule, only the faction with and in 
power and the faction without and wanting it, the winners and losers, the 
victims of the political purge and the perpetrators of it. The regime in power in 
Florence, the guild government, had, like so many before it, secured its rule by 
expelling its enemies and those whom it felt undermined or threatened its 
authority. In this case, these were the men of the Parte Guelfa, who had 
supported the policy of ammonizione and the radical vanguard of the Ciompi. 
The party of exiles out of power, the conspirators of December, like so many 
parties of exiles before it, plotted to return to power, to reenter the city, to 
retake the stato.  Excluded from the city, from their homes, from the electoral 
purses, they had no other choice if they wished to have a role in government. 
As I argued in my introduction, the lack of any means of legitimate political 
opposition makes every form of political opposition a crime. And, more 
importantly, it makes criminal conspiracy the only available form of political 
opposition. As such, the members of the party out of power are left with only 
two possible identities: the exile who hopes to be brought back and the 
conspirator who plots to return home. Within the city, the popolo’s corporate 
ideology of inclusion may have bolstered the regime of 1378-82 and given it its 
spirit, but outside of the city were only those who were excluded and, as 
always, old scores that needed to be settled.
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The Roster of Guildsmen
Just as the Capitano’s lengthy sentence allowed us to examine, in 
some detail, the men who conspired against the guild government late in 
1379, another document allows us to say a great deal about the men who 
formed that government. On 17 January 1379 [80], the regime responded 
again to the conspiracies with a lengthy and solemn enactment. At its start, 
every member of the government and its magistracies was named—the Priors 
and Standardbearer of Justice, the Twelve and the Sixteen, the Captains of 
the Parte Guelfa, the Ten of Liberty, the Eight of the Watch, the Nine of 
Mercanzia, and the Capitudini of all the guilds; with guild affiliations provided 
for 80%, or all but 24, of the 115 persons listed—and all were described as 
‘being aware of the scandals and conspiracies that have occurred, and 
intending to wholesomely provide for peace, quiet, and tranquility so that the 
citizens, merchants, and guildsmen may live safely and securely”.415 (The list 
is transcribed in Appendix 2) Of the men serving on the Signoria on that date, 
none had previously served as prior or Standardbearer of Justice, and only 
three came from families that had had priors in the past: Simone di ser Matteo 
Biffoli’s family had had two priors, the first in 1356; Agnolo di Donato Barucci’s 
only one, in 1364; and Giorgio di Guccio di Dino Gucci’s family ten, with his 
father being the first in 1355 and serving three more times himself before 
1380. Only this last, Giorgio, was obviously tied to the leadership of the war 
415 The list is located at ASF, CR, ff. 89r-90v, with the quotation from 89r: 
“actentis et consideratis scandalis e novitatibus exortis … et volentes intendere et 
salubriter providere circa pacem quietem et tranquillitatem… et ut cives mercatores et 
artifices… in quiete et securitate vivant”. 
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party and the popular leadership, his father Guccio having been one of the 
Eight of War. Of the remaining six, in accordance with the government’s new 
election procedures, only one (the furrier Christofano di Bartolo) came from 
the major guilds; and the others were drawn from the traditional middle and 
minor guilds (a butcher, an armorer, and an oil dealer), or from the newly 
created guilds of 1378 (a wool napper and a wool shearer).416 The large 
presence of new men and families is not surprising; as John Najemy has 
shown, the years 1378-1381 saw 89 new families admitted to the Signoria, 
more than any other three-year period in the history of the republic (with the 84 
of 1344-6 coming closest).417 Nor is it surprising that the popular faction which, 
in part, created the government should be represented by the son of one of 
the Eight of War. Among the Sixteen Gonfalonieri, only one had previously 
served as prior (the furrier Francisco Spinelli in 1368), and only three others 
(Niccolò di Giovanni da Uzzano, Alessio di Francesco Borghini, and Zanobi di 
Taddeo Borghini) came from families previously-represented in the signoria; 
and all three came from families first admitted only in the 1360s. Similarly, 
among the Twelve Buonuomini, only two had been priors before—Baldese di 
Terino Baldesi, four times previously, and the merchant Iacopo di Bonafede, 
once in 1371—and only one other, Iacopo di Niccolò Riccialbani, came from a 
family previously admitted (twice in the 1290s, and his father in 1351). The 
document lists the two groups of Captains of the Parte Guelfa ending and 
beginning their terms on 19 January 1379[80]; among these eighteen men, 
416 All individual office-holding data here and below is from the ONLINE TRATTE. 
On the electoral procedures of the guild government, see Najemy, Corporatism and 
Consensus, 217-62.
417 Ibid., Appendix, table A.3, 321. 
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only two had been priors (Michele di Lando in 1378, and Nofri di Giovanni di 
Bartolo Bischeri in 1377), while three others came from families previously 
admitted to the priorate (Antonio di Marignano Sassolini, Manetto di Gianni 
Spini, and Guido di messer Tommaso di Neri Lippi). If we compare the last two 
groups of Captains before the Ciompi tumult, we see, of course, a very 
different picture: of those eighteen men, all but two (the blacksmith Simone del 
Chiaro and armorer Bernardo di Andrea) had surnames; of those with 
surnames, four came from families that were or had at some point been 
magnates (Rossi, Buondelmonti, Ricasoli, Agli), while the rest came from 
families that had been represented on the signoria before 1380 a total of 258 
times, including men from some of the most elite political families in Florence 
(Altoviti, Peruzzi, Magalotti, Anselmi, Gherardini, Canigiani).418 In the 
government roster of January 1379[80], only a very few elite families were 
represented among the 115 listed citizens (one Medici, one Rinuccini, etc.) 
and only a few politicians who had been part of the earlier ruling elite (like 
Baldese Baldesi). The roster itself is evidence of a remarkable political 
upheaval unlike any other in Florentine history, an upheaval which filled not 
only the priorate but every government magistracy with men of the Popolo 
and, in massive numbers, men of the minor guilds: wine retailers, innkeepers, 
sellers of oil and cheese, tanners, girdlemakers, armorers, ironworkers, 
woodworkers, bakers, doublet makers and wool shearers, dyers and sewers. 
When this roster was read aloud in the palace of the priors, in the presence of 
the whole government, it announced nothing less than a revolution; but it 
418 The 1378 Capitani are listed in Chapter 2, note 182. 
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announced a revolution already doomed to collapse under the weight of the 
“scandals and conspiracies” that it had gathered to repress.
There would never be another guild government in Florence and, not 
surprisingly, the elites of subsequent generations would remember the period 
of the last guild regime as among the worst in Florence’s history. In his 
Ricordi, for example, Giovanni Morelli would decry the “forty-two months” in 
which the guildsmen ruled for burning the houses of the great citizens, for 
beheading and exiling them, and for keeping the whole city in fear by 
dispatching “dogs, that is, spies” to every corner of the city.419 And, if the 
historian Giovanni Cavalcanti is to be believed, Rinaldo degli Albizzi railed in 
1426 against the guild government for keeping Florence in servitude for “forty 
damned months”, for exiling noble citizens to foreign lands, and for falsely 
executing them.420 Remembrances like these, though, conveniently omit the 
419 Giovanni Morelli, Ricordi, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence: Le Monnier, 1956),
p. 325: “Allora montarono in istato gli artefici, e ressono quarantadue mesi. Erano i 
Signori divisi in questa forma: sempre era Gonfaloniere un Artefice, e’ Priori per metà 
arti maggiori, e minori, ed era loro capo Messer Giorgio degli Scali, e Messer 
Tommaso di Marco, e in parte fu Messer Benedetto degli Alberti; costoro arsono 
molte case a’ grandi cittadini, feciono a molti tagliare la testa in più volte; tra questi fu 
Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, Messer Donato Barbardoro, Messer Jacopo Sacchetti, 
Messer Ghirigoro di Pagnazzo, ed a molt’ altri gran cittadini, e molti ne cacciarono, e 
teneano in gran paura, e in gran tremor la cittadinanza; aveano molti cani, coiè 
spioni, che sempre erano per Firenze, o per pigliare, o per ispiare di dì, e di notte, qui 
non si poteva nè convitare persona, nè usare punto, che tu eri abbominato agli 
Otto…” Cited and partially translated in Brucker, Civic World, p. 57. 
420 Giovanni Cavalcanti, Istorie fiorentine, ed. Filippo Polidori, (Florence: 
S.A.R., 1838), vol. 1, p. 82: “Perchè col fuoco le loro furie l’arsero e disfecero: 
quaranta maledetti mesi tennero in servitù questo popolo: tanti sbanditi, tanti 
confinati, ed ancora con veleni nobili cittadini falsamente feciono morire: e tali con el 
coltello perirono: e non era cittade che non fusse piena de’ vostri antichi: chi v’era in 
esilio, che per isbandito, e tale per rubella, e così le strane patrie abitavano.” See the 
discussion in Najemy, History of Florence, p. 177. Contemporary observers, even 
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extraordinary plots undertaken by the “noble citizens” (as Cavalcanti calls 
them) against their own city. But they were not likely omitted out of shame or 
denial: the ceaseless conspirator Lapo da Castiglionchio, for example, was 
able to discourse on “true nobility,” the nobility that men like him possessed, at 
the very moment he was plotting against the guild government.421 They were 
likely omitted because they were not unique: after the factional struggles of the 
early fourteenth century came to an end, conspiracy became a regular style of 
politics for the Florentine elite. In their scope and size and ceaselessness, the 
plots of 1379 were astonishing, but they were not unique.422 If anything was 
unique, it was the regime against which they conspired, which thwarted their 
plots, which challenged their power. The plots that would come later in the 
century, like the so-called Alberti plot of 1393, or those of Filippo Bastari 
(1394), Donato Acciaiuoli (1396), or Bastardino de’ Medici,423 were, at their 
sympathetic ones like Stefani, found fault with some of the government’s executions 
and condemnations; on this see ANONIMO, p. 431; and STEFANI, rubr. 836, p. 360, as 
well as my discussion of Donato Barbadori’s case in Chapter 4, at pp. 224-28.
421 See Allesandro Valori, “Tra orgoglio aristocratico e identità comunale: Lapo 
da Castiglionchio sulla ‘vera nobiltà’,” Archivio storico italiano 154 (1996): 437-477.
422 They were also astonishing in their frequency and number. In the three 
rectors’ courts, Umberto Dorini, II diritto penale e la delinquenza in Firenze nel secolo 
XIV (Lucca: Corsi, n.d. [1923]), p. 129, counted 48 condemnations for crimes against 
the state (delitti contro lo stato) in the three-year period 1353-5 and more than three 
times as many (148) in 1380-3. I was unable to precisely determine Dorini’s criteria, 
but his numbers are likely accurate. By my own reading of the records of the three 
rectors’ courts in the period 1379-82 (roughly overlapping with Dorini’s), almost 300 
persons were condemned for taking part in political conspiracies.
423 The supposed Alberti plot—a mixed conspiracy of exiles, mercenaries, and 
workers to invade the city with the help of supporters within—was structurally similar 
to those of 1379, but the regime chose to deal with it politically rather than criminally, 
just as its root causes were political; on the conspiracy, see Brucker, Civic World, pp. 
90-93; on the political solution, a balià, see Gino Capponi, Storia della Repubblica di 
Firenze (Florence: Barbera, 1875), vol. 1, appendix at pp. 625-27. For the other three 
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core, internecine struggles among the elite. The plots of 1379 may be seen as
expressions of a political style (elite, private, and conspiratorial) clashing with 
a set of political ideals (popular and public), but the root cause of these plots 
and their repression too often represented a triumph of the elite political style 
and a failure of commitment to popular political ideals: the political purge that 
accompanied the guild regime’s birth was Florentine business as usual, but 
the repressive tactics of the frightened guildsmen and their leaders were not. 
What François Furet said of the French Revolution, that conspiracy was its 
anti-ideology, could also be said of the revolutionary guild government.424 Men 
like Tommaso Strozzi and Giorgio Scali, themselves among the Florentine 
elite, and their cliques among the government partisans, defined themselves 
and defended their sometimes extreme actions on the grounds of being under 
constant siege by conspirators.425 This, I believe, is nowhere clearer than 
plots, see ASF, Capitano, 1988, ff. 162-163; Capitano 2012, ff. 39-41r; Capitano, 
2056, ff. 65-80r and 92-99r.
424 Interpreting the French Revolution, tr. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 55-6: “The power to govern legitimately was 
directly related to the ability to keep up the denunciation of the aristocrats’ plot: the 
constant raising of the ideological stakes was the rule of the game of the new system. 
Obsession with conspiracy thus became a discourse common to all, to be heard on 
either side of power. Those who were excluded from it used the discourse to conquer 
power. Those who held power used it to warn the people of the constant and 
formidable threat posed by that other and less fragile power.” Building upon Furet’s 
insights, Lynn Hunt more fully explored the notion that conspiracy (or, better, anti-
conspiracy) was central to French revolutionary rhetoric (as an anti-principle) in 
Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), pp. 19-51. For another similar, though more limited approach, 
see Marisa Linton, “‘The Tartuffes of Patriotism’: Fears of Conspiracy in the Political 
Language of Revolutionary Government, France 1793-1794,” in Conspiracies and 
Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe: From the Waldensians to the French 
Revolution (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 235-254. 
425 The modern problem of a “state of siege” has recently been the subject of 
much debate following the publication of Giorgio Agamben, Stato di eccezione
(Torino: Borighieri, 2003) and a renewed interest in the jurisprudence of Carl Schmitt. 
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when rigged elections for the priorate were proposed or when armed 
guildsmen co-opted the procedures of the Capitano’s court in December of 
1379. In times of turmoil, when the security of the state is threatened, law 
holds a precarious place.    
In 1861, the historian Niccolò Tommaseo wrote that “because 
conspiracies are a thing of the few and powerful, it is an aristocratic thing: the 
popolo doesn’t know how to conspire, it knows how to rise up.”426 As we have 
seen in the previous chapters, both the Florentine elite and the city’s radical 
working class knew all too well how to conspire. In this chapter we have seen 
how they conspired together to overthrow the guild government of 1378-82. 
The popolo, whose principles were perhaps better embodied in that regime 
than in any other, would never truly rise up again.
Parallels might also be found with Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: The 
Background and Consequences of American Security Policies (Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1956) and its notion a “secrecy-fearing radicalism” that is “hostile to civil 
society” (at p. 32), seen in the case of demagogues like Joseph MacCarthy. 
426 “Pensieri sulla storia di Firenze,” Archivio storico italiano, Nuova serie, 13 
(1861), p. 16: “Perchè le congiure son cosa di pochi potenti, cosa cioè aristocratica: il 
popolo non sa congiurare, sa insorgere.”
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CHAPTER 4:
BALDO DEGLI UBALDI ON CONSPIRACY AND TREASON (CRIMEN 
LAESAE MAIESTATIS) IN LATE TRECENTO FLORENCE
The Condemnation of Donato Barbadori
Within a week of the discovery of the incredible conspiracy of 
December 1379, more than a dozen men implicated in the plot had been 
beheaded, among them Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, leader of the Florentine 
faction purged in the summer of 1378, and a number of his supporters and 
allies in the Guelf Party, including Filippo di Biago degli Strozzi, Giovanni di 
Piero Anselmi, and Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti. The unwillingness of the 
judicial officials (the Capitano and Esecutore) to condemn these men had led 
to a political crisis in Florence that was resolved when the consuls (capitudini) 
of the guilds subverted the procedures of the courts by granting full power 
(balìa) to execute the alleged conspirators to a group of loyal representatives 
of the government.427 When the Capitano still refused to carry out the 
executions, saying “Put them to death yourselves, I won’t do it if I don’t find 
them guilty!,” a crowd incited by the leaders of the government even 
threatened to kill him.428 One chronicler and critic of the guild government 
427These events are described in detail in Chapter III, at pp. 195.
428 STEFANI, rubr. 334, 358: “Andate, e fategli morire voi, che se io non gli 
troverò colpevoli, io no ‘l farò.”
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ruling Florence expressed an opinion that was not uncommon in the city when 
he stated that the alleged conspirators had been killed “at the bidding of 
Tommaso Strozzi and Giorgio Scali, who were ruling the city with a group of 
bandits.”429 This judgement would persist among later Florentine historians 
who despised the guild government, like Leonardo Bruni, who wrote that the
executed men “had committed no crime” and that the guildsmen had “inflicted 
punishment on great and innocent men.”430 But even Marchionne di Coppo 
Stefani, a supporter of the government who was then serving on the priorate, 
questioned one of the executions, that of the lawyer Messer Donato Barbadori, 
who had famously defended Florence at the court of Gregory XI during the 
War of the Eight Saints and had served the guild government as an 
ambassador.431 Before being beheaded, Donato had proclaimed his 
innocence and declared himself the person “most faithful and most loyal” to 
429 Cronaca terza d’anonimo, in Il tumulto dei Ciompi: Cronache e memorie
(Bologna, 1934), ed. G Scaramella, 132-3: “per operatione di messere Tomaso di 
Marco degli Strozzi e di messere Giorgio degli Scali che governavano questa terra 
con una brigata di ladroncelli.”
430 History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, trans. J. Hankins (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), VIIII.17, 21 [orginal at 20: “…nullum in captivis 
crimen neque rei notitia ulla reperiebatur…” and “Magnis et innocentibus viris 
supplicio affectis…”] 
431 In the second half of the 1370s, Donato Barbadori was undoubtedly 
Florence’s leading diplomat; his career is sketched in Arnaoldo D’Addario, “Donato 
Barbadori,” Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, VI, 21-2 (Rome: Istituto della 
Enciclopedia italiana, 1964); on his crucial service during the War of the Eight Saints, 
see Alessandro Gherardi, “La guerra dei fiorentini con Papa Gregorio XI detta la 
guerra degli Otto Santi,” Archivio storico italiano, Series 3, volumes 5-8 (1867-8), 
passim; Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power: Republican Florence Under Interdict
(Leiden: Brill, 1974), 144-50; and, recently, David S. Peterson, “The War of the Eight 
Saints in Florentine Memory and Oblivion,” in W. J. Connell (ed.), Society and the 
Individual in Renaissance Florence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 
184 and 191.
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the government. And “if he was guilty,” Stefani wrote, “he committed a great 
sin by making such a mistake, since he was a sincere man, very wise, and 
very helpful to the commune; but if he was not guilty, he was wronged greatly 
and the person who denounced him acted wickedly.”432 The sentence 
recorded by the Esecutore against Messer Donato described the events that 
led to his death: 
Messer Donato had been sent by Florence as an ambassador to 
Lord Charles of Durazzo, the commune of Venice, and the lord 
of Padua; and he took a trip to Bologna. While staying there, he 
came upon Bartolomeo di Niccolò Ridolfi, Benedetto di Simone 
Peruzzi, and at least twelve other people under the ban 
[exbanditi] of the Florentine commune whose names he could 
not remember and had a meeting with them. They said to him 
that they had organized a plan for some Florentines there called 
“the Ciompi”, some exbanditi and some not, to enter Florence 
carrying banners with the arms of the Guelf Party, which they 
had made in Bologna, and shouting “Viva il popolo e la Parte 
Guelfa!” And they planned for some of them to cause a tumult in 
Porta San Niccolò and others in the Porta a Faenza and still 
more in other places in the city. With the tumult underway, they 
would gather at the Porta a Faenza and break open the gate and 
the exbanditi would enter with a great band of men. And they 
would do these things on 20 December and overthrow the 
government of the city of Florence. Messer Donato said that the 
plot was well-organized and will surely have its desired end, and 
that he will give his help and favor to the plot at the necessary 
and advantageous time.433
432 STEFANI, rubr. 836, 359: “Messer Donato Barbadori, letto la 
condennagione, molto si scusò, non essere colpevole, e raccontò in conclusione, 
essere stato il più fedele ed il più leale a quella cosa, cioè a quella de’ Priori, che mai 
fusse niuno. E certamente di messer Donato, se fu colpevole, gran peccato fu di lui 
che in tanto errore venisse, perocch’era franco uomo e molto savio e molto utile al 
Comune; e se non fu colpevole, gran danno ne fu, e male fece chi di ciò l’abbominò.”
433 The sentence “contra Donatum Ghieruccii de Barbadoris” is in ASF, 
Esecutore, 840, ff. 49r-50r; quotation at 49rv: “…dictus dominus Donatus fuisset 
transmissus pro parte communis Florentie in ambasciatam ad dominum Carolum 
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Since Donato did not actually give any assistance to the plotters, his alleged 
crime was remaining silent about what he had heard in Bologna; and for this 
he was beheaded. Beyond the political turmoil that the events created, though, 
the repression of the December conspiracy and the executions of these men 
(and especially Donato) raised a number of vexing legal problems. In this 
chapter, I discuss these problems and the solutions offered by the great jurist 
Baldo degli Ubaldi of Perugia (d. 1400) in order to explore the ways in which 
conspiracy and treason were understood in medieval Italian jurisprudence and 
to examine the meaning of the rule of law in times of emergency.
delapace ad commune Venetiarum et ad dominum Padue et iter facerat per civitatem 
Bononie. Et dum in dicta civitate moraretur , invenit in dicta civitate Bononie 
Bartholomeum Nicoli Cionis Rodulfi Benedictum Simonis Raynerii de Peructiis 
exbanditos dicti communis Florentie et bene xii alios exbanditos communis Florentie 
predicti de quorum nominibus dixit se non recordari. Cum quibus exbanditis dictus 
dominus Donatus infrascriptum tractatum et colloquium habuit, videlicet quod 
supradicti exbanditi disserunt dicto domino Donato quod ipsi ordinaverant quod certi 
cives Florentini qui morantur Bononie exbanditi et non exbanditi qui vocantur liciompi 
debebant venire ad dictam civitatem Florentie cum certis banderiis cum signis partis 
Ghuelfe que banderie fuerunt facte in dicta civitate Bononie et levare rumorem in 
dicta civitate Florentie cum dictis banderiis in manibus et gridare vivat populus et pars 
Ghuelfa. Et aliqui debebant incipere dictum rumorem in porta Sancti Nicolaii & alii in 
porta Fagientie et in pluribus aliis locis dicte civitatis Florentie. Et elevato dicto rumore
debebant tragiere ad dictam portam fagientie et dictam portam debebant rumpere et 
per dictam portam debebant intrare dicti exbanditi cum [f. 49v] maxima gentium 
conmitiva. Et predicta debebant fieri die xx presentis mensis Decembris et sic mutare 
statum civitatis Florentie. Ad que omnia predicta et singula respondidit dictus 
dominus Donatus quod predicta erant bene ordinata et bene facta et pro certo 
habebit finem optatum. Et quod in tempore necessario et opportuno dictus dominus 
Donatus dabit ad predicta ausilium et favorem.”
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The Legal Issues
   In late medieval Italy, rebels (rebelles), betrayers (proditores), and 
traitors (who have fallen into the crimen laesae maiestatis) were outsiders, 
inhabiting distinct physical and juridical spaces. Like criminals placed under 
the ban (banniti pro maleficio), they dwelled between cities, in the vast 
territories outside the de facto reach of the regimes they opposed, or else they 
resided uncomfortably in cities not their own. Like public enemies (inimici and 
hostes), deserters (transfugae), and banniti, they were also outside the law, 
stripped of rights and subject to being killed with impunity.434 For the 
repression of political crime, cities arrogated to themselves a range of 
extraordinary powers, from the free use of torture to the suspension of normal 
criminal procedures to swift and secret summary condemnations.435 Under 
normal procedures, convictions in contumacia for serious crimes were 
remarkably common;436 threatened with summary procedures and the 
434 Practices of exclusion have recently moved to the forefront of scholarship 
on pre-modern Italian cities; see for example Giuliano Milani, L’esclusione dal 
Comune: Conflitti e bandi politici a Bologna e in altre città italiane tra XII e XIV secolo 
(Rome: Roma: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio, 2003), Christiane Klapisch Zuber, 
Retour à la cite: Les magnats de Florence, 1340-1440 (Paris: EHESS, 2006), and 
Fabrizio Ricciardelli, The Politics of Exclusion in Early Renaissance Florence 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2007). The many types of exclusion in juridical thought is a 
subject in need of further treatment, but see Desiderio Cavalca, Il bando nella prassi 
e nella dottrina medievale (Milan: Giuffrè, 1978). 
435 See, for example, Statuta populi et communis Florentiae publica auctoritate 
collecta castigata et praeposita anno salutis MCCCCXV (Freiburg [Florence]: Michael 
Kluch, 1778-83), I, 278-80, 283-286.
436 The figures in Umberto Dorini, II diritto penale e la delinquenza in Firenze 
nel secolo XIV (Lucca: Corsi, [1923], 38, show rates as high as 87% (for murder, in 
the years 1380-3).
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severest possible penalties, political criminals fled prosecution in even greater 
numbers and fell under the ban. They formed the large bands of usciti and
cacciati that loomed so frightfully in the medieval Italian political 
consciousness and attracted to themselves not-yet-targeted friends and 
allies.437 Because it delineates so clearly the boundaries of inside and outside, 
adumbrating the very limits of state power, political crime posed for jurists the 
question to which sovereignty was the answer; it presented jurists with a set of 
problems that required them to examine and explicate the foundations of their 
thought on the lawful exercise of political power.
At the center of this answer is the Roman idea of maiestas, the 
awesome dignity and encompassing power of supreme political authority, as 
well as the creation of the corresponding “crime of injured maiestas,” the 
crimen laesae maiestatis, or treason. Defined in both Justinian’s Code and 
Digest in the Corpus iuris civilis under the title Ad legem Iuliam maiestatis (C. 
9.8 and D. 48.4), treason encompasses a wide range of “crimes against the 
state”, from gathering together for seditious purposes to turning a city over to 
the enemy, and provides for a range of penalties, including death and crucially 
the confiscation of property; the constitution Ad reprimendum (1313), issued 
by the emperor Henry VII, which was rapidly incorporated in Justinian’s 
Corpus iuris by medieval jurists, adds that traitors can be condemned 
“summarily, simply, and without commotion or normal judicial procedures.”438
437 See, for example, the events in Buonaccorso Pitti, Cronica, ed. Alberto 
Bacchi della Lega (Bologna: Romagnoli dall’acqua, 1905), 44-6. 
438 Text in Jacob Schwalm, ed., Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et 
regum inde ab anno MCCXCVIII usque ad annum MCCCXIII (1298-1313) (Hannover: 
Hahn, 1911), II, 965-6: “summarie et de plano sine strepitu et figura iudicii.” 
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Central to this chapter is an opinion, probably written early in 1380, of the jurist 
Baldo degli Ubaldi of Perugia that questions whether the commune of 
Florence possessed maiestas and whether conspirators against the city could 
be said to have committed treason.439 At first glance, these may seem to be 
conventionally narrow and legalistic questions, since even without maiestas a 
city like Florence could unquestionably prosecute such conspirators for 
sedition (seditio) and other crimes that carried severe penalties and allowed 
for abbreviated inquisition procedures. But these questions and Baldo’s 
answers will serve to challenge the master narative of the inexorable 
transformation of the late medieval commune into the early modern state or 
principato. Laced with the poison of anachronism, this master narrative reads 
back into Trecento jurisprudence later legal developments and has haunted 
the history of medieval and Renaissance politico-legal thought from at least 
the time of the right-wing legal scholar, Francesco Ercole.440 In addition, they 
will serve to problematize the widely-held view (given its most explicit recent 
439 Baldo addressed treason in a number of places in his lectures and 
commentaries, sometimes allowing for treason against cities; see, for example, Baldo 
ad C. 9. 24. 2, ad C. 9. 41. 16, ad D. 4. 5. 5. 1, ad X 1.29.1, and ad X 1.32.1 (ff. 370v, 
373r, 204r, 121v, and 155v in the Venetian edition of 1497-8). In addition to this 
opinion, Baldo also addressed treason directly in at least one other consilium; see 
BAV, Barb. lat., 1408, f.123rv (=cons I. 243 in the Venetian editions).
440 See, for example, the influential essays in Ercole’s Dal comune al 
principato: Saggi sulla storia del diritto pubblico del Rinascimento italiano (Florence: 
Vallechi, 1929) and Da Bartolo all’Althusio: Saggi sulla storia del pensiero 
pubblicistico del Rinascimento italiano (Florence: Vallechi, [1932]). On Ercole, see 
Luca Lo Bianco, “Ercole, Francesco,” in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vol.43 
(Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1993), 132-4. 
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expression by Mario Montorzi441) that jurists were almost monolithically 
instrumental in the early modern state’s triumph and legitimization by showing 
how jurists could challenge and limit the power of regimes and assert the 
primacy of law. 
Bartolo da Sassoferrato (d. 1357) had addressed a similar question in 
his influential commentary on the constitution Qui sunt rebelles of Henry VII, 
which had been issued along with the constitution Ad reprimendum as part of 
his campaign against Robert of Naples. “Should this constitution,” wrote 
Bartolo, 
also apply to one who rebels against any prince or king, or 
against any given city? It seems so, since the constitution says 
“against our officials”… [but] I say the opposite because it is not 
against the good of the emperor or the empire… Kings and cities 
can have jurisdiction from the emperor, but they exercise it 
mainly for themselves and not on behalf of the emperor and thus 
this constitution does not apply to them, since it mainly speaks of 
those who plot against the person of the emperor or the good 
fortunes of his empire.442
441 Fides in rem publicam: Ambiguità e tecniche del diritto comune (Naples: 
Jovene, 1984). 
442 Gloss on the word “rebellando,” BAV, Vat. Lat. 2641, f. 18r: “Sed an 
constitutio habeat locum in eo qui rebellat contra aliquem principem vel aliquem 
regem vel contra aliquam propriam civitatem. Quod videtur quia hic dicitur contra 
officiales nostros… Contrarium dico quia nam tunc non fit contra prosperitatem 
imperatoris vel imperii… Reges vero et civitates licet habeant iurisdictionem a 
principe tamen eam exercent principaliter propter se et non propter principem et sic 
cessat hec constitutio, que principaliter loquitur in hiis qui machinantur contra 
personam imperatoris vel eius imperii prosperitatem.” This opinion is cited in both of 
Baldo’s opinions on the December 1379 Conspiracy (discussed below); it is 
interpreted more expansively in the Vatican manuscript, which is followed verbatim by 
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This opinion speaks directly to the political rights and authority of cities, an 
issue long at the center of the scholarship on Bartolo’s political thought. And it 
suggests that Walter Ullmann’s well-known and influential claim, that for 
Bartolo “the sanctions for non-obedience to the laws of the people are exactly 
the same as those for non-obedience to the Prince’s law,” is not entirely 
true.443 As we will see, it was also not true for Bartolo’s most famous student.
The Consilia
The son of a doctor, Baldo degli Ubaldi444 was born in Perugia on 2 
October 1327 and, having proved himself a precocious student with a mind 
Nello da San Gimignano, De bannitis, II, 1, q. 16, in Tractatus universi iuris, vol. XI 
(Venice, 1584), f. 366v.
443 “De Bartoli sententia: Consilium repraesentat mentem populi,” in Bartolo da 
Sassoferrato: Studi e Documenti per il VI centenario, ed. Danilo Segoloni (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1962), vol. 2, 725. 
444 A classic bio-bibliographical treatment of Baldo is found in Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Volume 6 (Heidelberg, 
1851; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1986), 208-48, but these shorter works are now more 
valuable: Georges Chevrier, “Baldi de Ubaldi,” Dictionnaire de droit canonique, 2 
(Paris: Letouzey, 1937), 39-52; Enrico Besta, “Baldo degli Ubaldi,” Bollettino della 
Regia Deputazione di storia patria per l’Umbria 46 (1949): 140-53; Vincenzo N. 
Rizzo, “Baldo degli Ubaldi,” Annuario di diritto internazionale (1966), 359-70; Paul 
Weimar, s.v. “Baldo de Ubaldis,” Lexicon des Mittelalters, I (Munich: Artemis, 1980), 
1376, and, recently, Kenneth Pennington, “Baldo de Ubaldis,” Rivista internazionale 
di diritto comune 8 (1997): 35-61. Essential for accurately establishing the details of 
Baldo’s life are Oscar Scalvanti, “Notizie e documenti sulla vita di Baldo, Angelo e 
Pietro degli Ubaldi,” L’opera di Baldo, per cura dell Università di Perugia nel V 
centenario dalla morte del grande giureconsulto, edited by Oscar Scalvanti (Perugia: 
Università degli studi, 1901), 181-359; Torquato Cuturi, “Baldo degli Ubaldi in 
Firenze,” in L’opera di Baldo, 365-95; Domenico Maffei, “Su alcuni nodi della biografia 
di Baldo degli Ubaldi,” in Giuristi medievali e falsificazioni editoriali del primo 
Cinquecento: Jacopo Belvisio in Provenza? (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 
71-74; Patrick Lally, “New Light on the Birth and Death of Baldo de Ubaldis,” The Two 
Laws: Studies in Medieval Legal History Dedicated to Stephan Kuttner, ed. Laurent 
Mayali and Stephanie Tibbetts (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1990), 
209-20; Paola Monacchia, “La casa che habitamo: Riflessioni patrimoniali su Baldo e 
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well-suited to the rigors of law and logic, he studied at his city’s university 
under the expert tutelage of Bartolo of Sassoferrato and a group of other 
jurists including the civilian Francesco Tigrini and the canonist Federico 
Petrucci of Siena.445 Baldo attained the degree of iuris utriusque doctor, doctor 
of both laws, in the latter half of the 1340s and taught at Perugia alongside 
Bartolo and, later, his brother Angelo until 1357, when he moved on to Pisa. In 
1358, he accepted an invitation to teach at the Florentine Studium and 
remained there until 1364.446 Early in his tenure, Baldo became a citizen of 
la sua famiglia,” Ius Commune 27 (2000): 3-27, and Maria Grazia Nico Ottaviani, “Su 
Baldo e Baldeschi: Scalvanti rivisitato,” Ius Commune 27 (2000): 27-68.
445 See Paolo Nardi, “Contributo alla biografia di Federico Petrucci con notizie 
inedite su Cino da Pistoia e Tancredi da Corneto,” Scritti di storia del diritto offerti 
dagli allievi a Domenico Maffei, ed. Mario Ascheri (Padua: Antenore, 1991), 153-180, 
on Petrucci, and Johann Friedrich von Schulte, Die Geschichte der Quellen und 
Literatur des Canonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf die Gegenwart, vol. II. 
(Stuttgart, 1880; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1956), 277, on 
Tigrini. On Baldo’s most famous teacher, the bibliography is too vast to briefly survey, 
but for an introduction one may consult Francesco Calasso’s entry for “Bartolo da 
Sassoferrato” in the Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, 6 (Rome: Instituto della 
Enciclopedia italiano, 1964), 640-669; on Bartolo role as Baldo’s teacher, see 
Domenico Maffei, Giuristi medievali e falsificazioni editoriali, pp. 71-74; and for some 
important, recent contributions to the literature, see Osvaldo Cavallar et al., A 
Grammar of Signs: Bartolo da Sassoferrato’s Tract on Insignia and Coats of Arms
(Berkeley: The Robbins Collection, 1994) and Osvaldo Cavallar, “River of Law: 
Bartolus’s Tiberiadis (De alluvione),” in A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and 
Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain, ed. John A. Marino and Thomas 
Kuehn (Toronto: Center for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2004), pp. 31-
129.
446 See Torquato Cuturi, “Baldo degli Ubaldi in Firenze,” 365-6. Baldo was only 
one of four jurists invited to Florence by the Signoria on 25 June 1358; Cuturi notes 
that one of them, Ranieri da Forlì, received a salary of “florenorum auri 
quactuorcentorum triginta,” so we can assume that Baldo was well-compensated for 
his lectures at the Studio.
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Florence and matriculated into the commune’s Arte dei Giudici e Notai.447
Baldo left Florence for Perugia, where he spent more than a decade before 
accepting a position at the University of Padua in 1376 and where he would 
return in 1379 for another 11 years. For the decade before his death on 28 
April 1400, Baldo was in the employ of Giangaleazzo Visconti, duke of Milan, 
teaching at the University of Pavia and becoming an expert in feudal law.448
Throughout the course of his long career, Baldo acted more than once as a 
diplomat. He served, for example, as one of Perugia’s Tre della Guerra in 
1370 and as his city’s ambassador to Charles of Durazzo in 1379.449 Along 
with Giovanni da Legnano, he journeyed to Rome in 1380 to support Urban 
VI’s position in the Great Schism.450 His most lasting fame, though, derives 
447 A transcription of the document granting Baldo citizenship on 9 October 
1359 is included in Cuturi, “Baldo degli Ubaldi in Firenze,” 366-9, and part of his 
matriculation into the Arte has been transcribed by Julius Kirshner in “Ars imitatur 
naturam: A Consilium of Baldus on Naturalization in Florence,” Viator 5 (1974), 306, 
n.43. 
448 At the moment of his death, Baldo was writing a consilium for 
Giangaleazzo; on this, see Kenneth Pennington, “Baldus de Ubaldis,” 35, and 
Giancarlo Vallone, “La raccolta Barberini dei consilia originali di Baldo,” Rivista di 
storia del diritto italiano 62 (1989): 75-8.
449 Scalvanti, “Notizie e documenti,” 322-3.
450 James Albert Wahl, “Baldus de Ubaldis: A Study in Reluctant Conciliarism,” 
Manuscripta 18 (1974): 21-29, and Salvatore Fodale, “Baldo degli Ubaldi, difensore di 
Urbano VI e signore di Biscina,” Quaderni medievali 17 (1984): 73-85, are directly 
relevant to Baldo’s role, but Walter Ullmann, in The Origins of the Great Schism: A 
Study in Fourteenth-Century Ecclesiastical History (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1948), 143-
160, discusses the character and opinions of Baldo and Giovanni da Legnano at 
some length. See also R. N. Swanson, Universities, Academics and the Great Schism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 15-6, on the general issues 
involved.
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from his work as a teacher, legal consultant, and political thinker.451 He taught 
students such as Paolo di Castro and Francesco Zabarella, wrote 
commentaries on the entire Corpus iuris civilis, the Libri feudorum, the Peace 
of Constance, the Decretales of Gregory IX, the Clementinae, and the Liber 
Sextus of Boniface VIII; composed at least 11 tractatus, including the lengthy 
De statutis; and penned more than 2,500 consilia.452
451 It is in the lattermost role that Baldo has received the most attention. The 
best introduction is Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), which has not wholly diminished the 
value of idem, “The Corporation in the Political Thought of the Italian Jurists of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” History of Political Thought 1 (1980): 9-32; 
idem, “A Fourteenth-Century Contribution to the Theory of Citizenship in the Thought 
of Baldus de Ubaldis,” in Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and 
Government Presented to Walter Ullmann on His Seventieth Birthday (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1980), 197-212; and idem, “Ideas of the State in 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Commentators on the Roman law,” Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 33 (1983): 1-27. One of Canning’s more 
recent works on Baldo, “Permanence and Change in Baldus’ Political Thought,” Ius 
Commune 27 (2000): 283-298, traces the contours of Baldo’s inconsistent political 
philosophy. On the political, see also James A.Wahl’s “Baldus de Ubaldis’ Concept of 
State: A Study in Fourteenth-Century Legal Theory,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of St. 
Louis, 1968) and “Baldo de Ubaldis and the Foundations of the Nation-State,” 
Manuscripta 21 (1977): 80-96. Although dated, Carlo Curcio’s “La politica di Baldo,” 
Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto 17 (1937):113-39. and Walter Ullmann, 
“Baldus’ Conception of Law,” Law Quarterly Review 58 (1942): 386-99 are not without 
substantial merit. Norbert Horn, “Philosophie in der Jurisprudenz der Kommentatoren: 
Baldo philosophus,” Ius commune 1 (1967): 104-49, and Maximiliane Kriechbaum, 
“Philosophie und Jurisprudenz bei Baldo de Ubaldis: “Philosophi legum imitati sunt 
philosophos naturae,” Ius Commune 27 (2000): 299-344, explore the philosophical 
underpinnings of Baldo’s philosophy is a systematic way not attempted elsewhere.
452 On Baldo’s consilia generally, see Hermann Lange, Die Consilien des 
Baldo de Ubaldis (Mainz: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 
1973); Kenneth Pennington, “The Consilia of Baldus de Ubaldis,” Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedneis 56 (1988): 85-92, which despite its broad title, is devoted 
primarily to the printed editions; and Thomas Izbicki and Julius Kirshner, “Consilia of 
Baldus of Perugia in the Regenstein library of the University of Chicago,” Bulletin of 
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Medieval Canon Law 15 (1985): 95-115. For discussions of individual consilia, see 
the following: Guido Bonolis, “Due consigli inediti di Baldo degli Ubaldi,” Diritto 
commerciale 21 (1903): 641-72; idem, “Su alcuni consigli inediti di Baldo,” Atti del 
Congresso internazionale di scienze storiche 9 (1903): 213-215; idem, Questioni di 
diritto internazionale in alcuni consigli inediti di Baldo degli Ubaldi: Testo e commento
(Pisa: Enrico Spoerri, 1908); idem, “La condizione degli oblati secondo un consiglio 
inedito di Baldo degli Ubaldi,” Studi storici e giuridici dedicati ed offerti a Frederico 
Ciccaglione 1 (1909): 274-310; Julius Kirshner, “Messer Francesco di Bici degli 
Albergotti d’Arezzo, Citizen of Florence (1350-76),” Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 2 
(1972): 84-90; idem, “Ars imitatur naturam”; idem, “Between Nature and Culture: An 
Opinion of Baldo of Perugia on Venetian Citizenship as Second Nature,” Journal of 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies (1979): 179-208; idem, “Baldus de Ubaldis on 
Disinheritance: Contexts, Controversies, Consilia,” Ius Commune 27 (2000): 119-214; 
idem, “Baldo degli Ubaldi’s Contribution to the Rule of Law in Florence,” in VI 
Centenario della morte di Baldo degli Ubaldi, 313-64; idem and Jacques Pluss, “Two 
Fourteenth-Century Opinions on Dowries, Paraphernalia and Non-Dotal Goods,” 
Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 9 (1979): 65-77; Pluss, “Baldus de Ubaldis of Perugia 
on Dominium over Dotal Property’, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedneis 52 (1984): 
399-412; idem, “Reading Case Law Historically: A Consilium of Baldus de Ubaldis on 
Widows and Dowries,” American Journal of Legal History 30 (1986): 241-65; Diego 
Quaglioni, “Inter Iudeos et Christianos commercia sunt permissa: Questione ebraica e 
usura in Baldo degli Ubaldi (c.1327-1400),” Aspetti e problemi della presenza ebraica 
nell’Italia centro-settentrionale secoli XIV-XV (Rome: Istituto di Scienze storiche dell’ 
Università, 1983), 273-305; and Jolande Rummer, “A Fourteenth-Century Legal 
Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress 25 (1968): 179-93. Baldo’s 
work as a canonist has received far less attention than the rest of his corpus; see, 
however, these works: Thomas Izbicki, “Notes on Late Medieval Jurists: I. Juan de 
Mella: Cardinal and Canonist. II. Baldo on the Sext,” Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law
4 (1974): 53-54; Stefan Kuttner, “The Apostillae of Johannes Andreae on the 
Clementines,” in Études d’histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel Le Bras, vol. 
1 (Paris: Sirey, 1965), 195-201; Vito Piergiovanni, “La peregrinatio bona dei mercanti 
medievali: A proposito di un commento di Baldo degli Ubaldi a X.1.34,” Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 74 (1988): 348-56; Jean Portemer, 
Recherches sur les Differentiae iuris civilis et canonici au temps du droit classique de 
l’Église (Paris: Jouve, 1946), esp. 70-78; Diego Quaglioni, “Un Tractatus de Tyranno: 
il commento di Baldo degli Ubaldi alla lex Decernimus, C. De sacrosanctis ecclesiis 
(C.1,2,16),” Il pensiero politico 13 (1980): 64-77; Wahl, “Reluctant Conciliarism”; and 
Robert Feenstra, “Editions lyonnaises des lecturae de droit civil de Balde par Jean de 
Gradibus, avec un aperçu des autres éditions du XVIe siècle,” Ius Commune 27 
(2000): 345-374.
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Although he notes that the jurist’s “professional and public activity 
during December and early January of 1379-80 has never been determined,” 
one scholar has argued convincingly that, on his way back to Perugia from 
Padua, “Baldus visited Florence and delivered [an] opinion” in the case of Ser 
Orlando, a notary who had petitioned the commune for a grant of citizenship in 
the winter of 1379.453 It was, in all likelihood, on the same trip that Baldo was 
asked to give his opinion on the legal issues related to the thwarted 
conspiracy. Indeed, during the first two years of the guild government, Baldo 
returned to Florence and wrote a handful of consilia on important political 
issues there.454 At least two consilia addressing the December 1379 
conspiracy are now extant; one is preserved in manuscript in the Vatican 
Library (Vat. lat. 8069, ff. 364v-367v), the other in the Biblioteca Capitolare 
Feliniana of Lucca (MS 351, ff.89v-90v). Although the former appears to have 
been more widely cited in the fifteenth century (see below), I center my 
discussion on the latter in this chapter. Unlike the more philosophical and 
polished Vatican consilium, which focused on the condemnation of Donato 
Barbadori and the issue of whether not revealing a secret plot could be 
treason, the latter opinion (which would later be widely disseminated in the 
453 “Ars imitatur naturam,” 307. Kirshner notes that at least two other 
contemporaneous Florentine consilia of Baldo (i.e., the one central to this paper and 
Consilium III.264) are known. Coincidentally, Ser Orlando believed he deserved 
Florentine citizenship on account of a service provided to the commune in her war 
against the papacy—he had, at Avignon, recorded the plea to Pope Gregory XI 
against the imposition of interdict delivered by the jurist Donato Barbadori, who 
would, as we have seen, be executed as a conspirator in 1379.
454 In addition to those discussed in this chapter, see the consilium discussed 
in Kirshner, “Ars imitatur naturam”, with the contemporaneous opinions discussed at 
p. 307.
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Venetian editions of Baldo’s consilia) was drawn from a liber consiliorum of 
Baldo that had once belonged to his descendents and it addressed the 
question of whether the goods of the executed conspirators could be 
confiscated while also speaking to broader questions of the limits of 
governmental power.455
But why was Baldo chosen to consult on this issue? Baldo’s stature as 
a consiliarius was, undoubtedly, the foremost reason for entrusting such an 
important task to him. By 1385, in fact, Baldo’s prestige as a teacher of law 
was such that Coluccio Salutati, Chancellor of the Florentine Republic, wrote 
to Perugia in order to secure the return of the great jurist—a request that was 
denied on the grounds that it would ruin Perugia’s own school of law.456 At the 
455 In this chapter, I quote from the Lucchese manuscript, but I also provide 
variants from the Milanese incunabulum, Baldo degli Ubaldi, Consilia, cum tabula 
compilata per Ludovicum de Perego, in five parts (1489), in square brackets marked 
M. On the Lucchese manuscript, see Vincenzo Colli, “Il Cod. 351 della Biblioteca 
Capitolare “Feliniana” di Lucca: Editori quattrocenteschi e Libri consiliorum di Baldo 
degli Ubaldi (1327-1400),” in Scritti di storia del diritto offerti dagli allievi a Domenico 
Maffei, ed. M. Ascheri (Padova: Antenore, 1991), 255-282; on the printed editions, 
see Colli, “Le opere di Baldo: Dal codice d’autore all’edizione a stampa,” in VI
Centenario della morte di Baldo degli Ubaldi, 1400-2000, eds. C. Frova and M. G. N. 
Ottaviani (Perugia: Università degli studi, 2005), 25-85. According to Colli, the 
Lucchese manuscript contains a copy of a Liber consiliorum or “minutario” of Baldo 
reflecting his work as a consultor at Padua in the late 1370s that was taken from the 
library of his descendants and no longer extant, but it is not necessarily better than 
the Milanese incunabulum. The opinion (as it appears in the Venetian editions, I.59) 
has been briefly discussed in Mario Sbriccoli, Crimen Laesae Maiestatis: Il problemo 
del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna (Milan: Giuffrè, 1974), 
211, and recently in Enrico Spagnesi, “L’insegnamento di Baldo degli Ubaldi a Pisa e 
a Firenze,” Atti e memorie dell’Accademia toscana di Scienze e Lettere “La 
Colombaria” 69 (2004): 146-55. 
456 Salutati’s letter (19 July 1385) has been published in Rassenga 
bibliografica della letteratura italiana IV (1896): 318, and the Perugian reply is 
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same time, though, Baldo’s intimate familiarity with Florentine political 
institutions and his simultaneous disinterestedness as an outsider (for no local 
lawyer could be trusted to be impartial in this case) made him perfectly suited 
for the job.457 But what was the job? Recently, it has been proposed that, while 
the category “consilium” is a fluid construct, five interrelated types of consilia
can be identified in the legal procedure of late medieval Itay: 1) the famous 
consilium sapientis iudicale, which was binding on the judge in civil matters, 2)
a consilium that, while filed by a disinterested sapiens, was not binding on the 
judge, 3) an “in house” consilium meant to clarify technical points of law, 4) a 
consilium requested of a consultor by an official in order to establish the 
proper bounds of his power, and 5) the widespread consilium pro parte, which 
included in Oscar Scalvanti, “Notizie e documenti,” 325: “annilichare et destruere 
studium perusinum.” 
457 According to the ricordanze of Lapo da Castiglionchio, Baldo was (along 
with the canonist Cerretano de’ Cerretani of Siena) godfather to one of the Arch-Guelf 
canonist’s sons; ASF, Carte strozziane II, 3, f. 85r (modern): “furono miei co[m]pari a 
farlo cristiano messer Baldo da Perugia dottore di leggi e di decretali, messer 
Cerretano de Cerretani da Siena dottore di decretali”. On Lapo’s ricordi and the milieu 
in which they were written, see Philip J. Jones, “Florentine Families and Florentine 
Diaries in the Fourteenth Century,” Papers of the British School in Rome 24 (1956): 
182-205. Lapo was, perhaps, the most hated and most active conspirator against the 
Guild Regime and was implicated in the plot about which Baldo wrote the consilium at 
issue here (see Chapter III, throughout). Thus, we cannot say that Baldo was entirely
disinterested given his friendship with Lapo. For Lapo’s extraordinary role as leader of 
the Arch-Guelfs in Florence before the Ciompi tumult, see Gene Brucker, Florentine 
Politics and Society, 1343-1378 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 
passim. See also Robert Davidsohn, “Tre orazioni di Lapo da Castiglionchio 
ambasciatore fiorentino a Papa Urbano V e alla curia di Avignone,” Archivio storico 
italiano, Series 5, 20 (1897): 225-85; Alessandro Valori, “Tra orgoglio aristocratico e 
identità comunale: Lapo da Castiglionchio sulla ‘vera nobiltà’,” Archivio storico italiano
154 (1996): 437-477; and now the essays in Franek Sznura (ed.), Antica possessione 
con belli costumi: Due giornate di studio su Lapo da Castiglionchio il Vecchio
(Florence: ASKA, 2005). Although much has been written on Lapo’s condemnation in 
1378 and flight from Florence, his extraordinary activities against the subsequent 
regime of the guilds have not yet been explored other than in Chapter III. 
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was requested by a party interested in the outcome of the dispute.458
Although, as a Florentine citizen and member of the Arte dei Giudici e Notai, 
Baldo was qualified to write consilia sapientis iudicalia in Florence, statutory 
law forbade the requesting of such consilia in criminal cases or on issues that 
arose from criminal cases.459 The consilium on the conspiracy of 1379 was, 
then, not a consilium sapientis iudicale and, as such, did not have the statutory 
power to bind the judge or judges. And since Baldo was not, in the winter of 
1379, in the regular employ of any of the rectors or other officials of the 
commune of Florence, the consilium could not have been an “in house” 
consilium. The language of the opening paragraph of the consilium does not 
give full priority to any of the particular sentences, nor does the opinion 
458 Mario Ascheri, “Le fonti e la flessibilità del diritto commune: il paradosso del 
consilium sapientis,” in Legal Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition, edited by Mario 
Ascheri et al. (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), 16-7. Guido Rossi, Consilium 
sapientis iudicale: Studi e ricerche per la storia del processo romano-canonico (Secoli 
XII-XII) (Milan: Giuffrè, 1956), discusses not only consilia of the first type, but also of 
type 2, which were more common in the earlier period, on pp. 76-83, and of Type 3, 
on pp. 127-8, where the illuminating example of a Podestà reaching a decision cum 
consilio sociorum suorum is given. Osvaldo Cavallar, Francesco Guicciardini giurista: 
I ricordi degli onorari (Milan: Giuffrè, 1991) presents a detailed account of the process 
of requesting and writing consilia of the fifth type. See also Peter Reisenberg, “The 
Consilia Literature: A Prospectus,” Manuscripta 6 (1962): 3-22, for an examination of 
the nature of consilia, and Julius Kirshner, “Some Problems in the Interpretation of 
Legal Texts re the Italian City-States,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 19 (1975): 16-27, 
for a theoretical analysis of the use of such texts as historical sources. 
459 On the question of qualification, see Kirshner, “Ars imitatur naturam,” 307, 
n.44-5, and idem, “Paolo di Castro on Cives ex privilegio: A Controversy Over the 
Legal Qualifications for Public Office in Early Fifteenth-Century Florence,” in 
Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, edited by Anthony Mohlo and John A. 
Tedeschi (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University, 1971), 236-8. For the statutory 
prohibition on consilia sapientis in criminal matters, see Statuta populi et communis 
Florentiae, lib. 1, rub. 81, p.181, even though these statutes were promulgated in the 
fifteenth century. 
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explicitly take up the interests of any particular one of the condemned. In spite 
of this, some have held that the consilium was written for Donato Barbadori.460
There is, however, no evidence that Baldo’s opinion was a consilium pro parte 
written on behalf of Donato’s heirs, although they would have had an interest 
in claiming that the confiscation of Donato’s property was illegitimate. Other 
evidence points to the 1380 consilium having been requested by the Capitano 
del Popolo, Cante di Iacopo Gabrielli da Gubbio, and/or the Esecutore, 
Gianino d’Ascoli, in order to clarify the scope of their power, especially with 
regard to the confiscation of the goods of the condemned. Whether these two 
were sympathetic to the condemned and their cause or simply interested in 
the type of technical clarification that only a juridical sapiens could provide, it 
would have been wise for them to request a consilium narrowly tailored to say 
whether a confiscation of goods was proper, in the light of the ius commune, 
even if the Florentine statutory law was not silent on the issue. It is also 
possible that the opinion was requested by the Florentine government as a 
consilium sapientis on similar issues. Either way, while Baldo’s opinion would 
not have had binding authority, it would certainly have possessed persuasive 
authority on account of the jurist’s professional expertise, impartiality, and 
sacred dignity.461
460 See, for example, Spagnesi, “L’Insegnamento.” The confusion seems to 
have resulted from a conflation of the Vatican opinion, cited as “Pro Donato 
Barbadori,” by lawyers like Bartolomeo Tegio, De criminibus in genere, f. 11v, and 
Girolamo Giganti, De crimine lese maiestatis, f. 85r, both in Tractatus universi juris, 
vol. 11 (Rome, 1584-6). The Vatican opinion was never printed and influenced these 
later jurists in manuscript. 
461 Kirshner, “Consilia as Authority,” 109-128.
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In the Lucchese manuscript, as in the later printed editions, two 
successive consilia appear on the December 1379 conspiracy. The compilers 
of Baldo’s libri consiliorum as well as the later Quattrocento print editors 
treated both of these opinions as having been written by Baldo. Joseph 
Canning has more recently done so, arguing that the first opinion represents 
Baldo’s summary of the facts and presentation of pro-et-contra arguments, 
while the second opinion represents his solutio.462 To the contrary, evidence 
within the text shows that the first opinion was written by another as yet 
unidentified lawyer, presumably Florentine, and that the second opinion alone 
represents the work of Baldo. I believe the case for misattribution is clear. 
First, the first consilium (I.58) is not written in Baldo’s style. Second, Baldo 
implicitly says that the arguments in the first consilium have been prepared by 
another, as in the opening line of the second consilium (f. 89v, “Licet eleganter 
pro et contra sint inducte leges…”), where he states that “laws for and against 
have been elegantly presented”. Third, there is no reason that Baldo would 
have written two different consilia on the same case, which both proffer distinct 
and opposing arguments, as opposed to two versions of the same opinion. 
Fourth, it is clear that Baldo in his consilium is simply adding his opinion to the 
previous one, which he found to be defective. In response to Canning’s 
argument, it must be noted that, while it is true that I.58 is for the most part 
balanced in its argumentation, providing pro-et-contra arguments after the 
summary of the facts, there is actually a brief and informal solutio provided at 
the end (at f.89v), a solutio that Baldo rejects and criticizes in his opinion. The 
existence of both opinions implies strongly that Baldo’s opinion was, in fact, 
462 Canning, Political Thought, 122, n98. 
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requested by the government of 1378-82 after a Florentine lawyer had first 
treated the problem. In all likelihood the government or its officials realized that 
the case for confiscation was built on unstable foundations and, to avoid later 
legal liability, requested the ‘second opinion’ of a trusted consultor.  Since the 
convictions of the conspirators do not assert that that the crime of treason had 
been committed or bring up a confiscation of their goods, it is apparent that 
Baldo addressed these issues because they were raised in the opinion of the 
Florentine lawyer, who had supplied for Baldo his questio iuris. Legal experts 
(like the Capitano, Baldo, and likely even the Florentine lawyer) knew quite 
well that, from a legal point of view, a strong case could not be made against 
the conspirators. They also knew that asserting a charge of treason was the 
simplest way to confiscate property; indeed, in a practical sense, crimen 
laesae maiestatis means confiscatio bonorum in the Trecento because the 
person who committed treason lost control of and could no longer dispose of 
his property from the moment the crime was perpetrated. In this case, even 
the first jurist consulted by the government was unwilling to go so far. 
While the relationship between Baldo’s opinion and that of the 
Florentine lawyer is relatively clear, the relationship between the (at least) two 
versions of Baldo’s opinion is less clear, and will remain so at least until the 
original opinion surfaces. It was not uncommon for Baldo to rewrite his 
opinions after he dictated them, and the preserved opinions (as in the Vatican 
Barberini collection or the Lucchese liber consiliorum) may represent a 
preparatory stage. It is harder to say which of the two extant versions is the 
earlier draft. Baldo is more emphatic in terms of what he thought of the 
condemnation of Donato Barbadori (a friend and fellow jurist) in the Vatican 
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consilium, and it is possible that Baldo toned down his language in the later 
Lucchese version; but it is also true that the Vatican consilium seems more 
polished and may have been the refined form of the Lucchese version. 
Even though it is not Baldo’s opinion, it is nonetheless important to 
describe the first opinion (86v-89v in the Lucchese manuscript; I.58 in the 
printed editions) composed by our anonymous Florentine jurist in order to 
provide the context in which Baldo wrote. Rather than a brief summary of the 
material facts, as was the usual practice, the jurist began his opinion by 
providing lengthy, verbatim extracts from four condemnations pronounced by 
the Capitano, those of messer Iacopo Sacchetti, Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, 
Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni, and Filippo di Biagio degli Strozzi; and from 
one pronounced by the Esecutore, that of Messer Donato Barbadori.463
Structurally, the four sentences of the Capitano are nearly identical: the 
condemned conspirator is in exile and is approached by a friend who tells him 
of the plan for retaking Florence, asks him to join and sign a document 
attesting to his membership in the plot. After a brief exchange in which the 
condemned expresses concern about the plot and then decides to join it, it is 
noted that he signed the document and “kept the plot secret and revealed it to 
no one” in order to bring about “grave damage to the Guelph party and the 
peaceful and popular government of the guilds and guildsmen of Florence”464
463 BCFL, MS 351, ff. 86r-88v; the original sentence contra “Donatum 
Ghieruccii de Barbadoris” is in ASF, Esecutore, 840, ff. 49r-50r; those against the 
others are in ASF, Capitano, 1198, 54v-66r, along with many others.
464 For example, at BCFL, MS 351, f. 87r: “Et predicta [the elements of the 
plot] dictus Cyprianus in secreto tenuit et nemini revelavit ad hoc ut predicta habilius 
executioni demandarentur [mandarentur M] in grave dampnum et preiudicium partis 
Guelfe [et add. Cod.] pacifici et popularis status artium et artificum civitatis Florentie.” 
Correction in brackets from the original at ASF, Capitano, 1198, f. 65v.
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A sentence of capital punishment is then formally recounted, “that [he] be led 
to the place of justice and there be beheaded.”465 And no further penalty is 
noted. Nothing is said of treason or confiscation. The condemnation of Donato 
Barbadori is different: as noted above, Donato had met with a a group of 
Florentine exiles (exbanditi) in Bologna and learned of their plan for a band of 
Ciompi and other forces to retake Florence on 20 December 1379. In 
response, “Messer Donato said that the plot was well-organized and will surely 
have its desired end, and that he will give his help and favor to the plot at a 
necessary and advantageous time.”466 Unlike the others, he is not asked to 
join the plot or to sign the document as proof of his loyalty. Yet he too also 
sentenced to death. After the condemnations, the Florentine lawyer surveys 
the relevant statutory law of Florence, which included six statutes on issues 
such as the confiscation of goods and the penalty for creating a tumult, again 
quoting verbatim.467
Having presented the condemnations and statutes, the lawyer then 
asked whether the goods (and the profits thereof) of the executed conspirators 
should have been and may now be confiscated. He laid out the issues 
465 For example, at BCFL, MS 351, f. 87r: “quod predictus Cyprianus ducatur 
ad locum iustitie et ibidem caput ab eius [a post caput M] spatulis separetur 
[separetur om. M] amputetur,” etc; and ASF, Capitano, 1198, f. 66r.
466 BCFL, MS 351, f. 87v: “Ad que omnia predicta et singula respondidit dictus 
dominus Donatus quod predicta erant bene ordinata [et bene facta add. Cod.] et pro
certo habebit finem optatum. Et quod in tempore necessario et opportuno dictus 
dominus Donatus dabit ad predicta consilium {ausilium} et favorem.” Corrections in 
brackets from ASF, Esecutore, 840, ff. 49v.
467 Ibid., 88r-89r. For the original of those mentioned, see ASF, Statuti, 18, ff. 
36r-37v and 53r-53v.
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logically, presenting pro and contra arguments within the dual conceptual 
frameworks of the ius commune and statutory law. In favor of confiscation, he 
noted that the conspirators seemed to have committed treason and are thus 
subject to confiscation, adding that “one who knows about a conspiracy or 
other crime in his city is punished as a participant because of his knowledge 
alone, according to the lex Utrum (D. 48. 9. 6),” which states that even 
accomplices outside the family can be punished for parricide.468 Likewise, the 
Florentine statutes seemed to allow confiscation. For example, one of the 
1355 statutes of the Podestà cited in the condemnations and quoted by the 
lawyers “seems to expressly impose confiscation”469; and even “if confiscation 
were not expressly imposed in the condemnation, it may be legally inferred 
from the content of the municipal legislation.”470 To the contrary, the lawyer 
argued that treason is not applicable to the case of the Florentine conspirators 
because it applies only when one acts “against the emperor, or those who are 
at his side, or against the Roman republic, but not against other cities... as is 
proved in the final paragraph of the lex Fallaciter (C. 9. 42. 3. 4), where the 
crime of treason and that of fighting against one’s country are distinguished as 
different types.”471 As a result, the accomplice who merely knows of a plot can 
468 BCFL, MS 351, f. 89r: “conscius de turbatione civitatis sue vel de alio 
commisso in civitate sua ex sola scientia punitur ut particeps, l. utrum ad l. pompe. de 
parri.”
469 Ibid., “imponi videtur bonorum publicatio expresse”; the original in ASF, 
Statuti, 20, f. 37r-38r, De pena facientis congregationem, etc.  
470 BCFL, MS 351, f. 89v: “si in sententia bonorum publicatio non sit expressa, 
tamen intellegitur de iure vigore dictarum legum municipalium.”
471 Ibid., “contra principem vel qui iuxta latus eius sunt vel contra rem publicam 
Romanorum non in aliis civitatibus… ut probatur in d. l. Fallaciter § fi., C. de 
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still receive a punishment according to the lex Utrum “but not the punishment 
of one guilty of treason.”472 Even though Florence has many of the same 
privileges and immunities as the Roman republic, the Florentine lawyer 
continued, “the republic or fisc of Florence is still not the republic or fisc of 
Rome” and the words of the statutes do not say that it is.473 Nonetheless, “in 
the case of an offense commited against the republic and fisc of the city of 
Florence confiscation ought to follow, just as in the case of an offense 
committed against the republic or fisc of Rome, because the republic and fisc 
of the city of Florence has the same privileges, rights, etc.”474 The Florentine 
lawyer’s argument is, prima facie, a weak one and he was likely aware of this. 
His conclusion eschews the arguments presented in order to reach a 
conclusion in favor of confiscation, one that is based almost entirely on an 
expansive view of Florence’s legal status.  
Baldo would address the Florentine lawyer’s opinion in his consilium, 
but he would also implicitly be addressing the history of the jurisprudence on 
treason. The great jurist and writer of consilia Oldrado da Ponte (d.1335) had 
previously addressed the nature of treason in the conflict between Henry VII 
abolitionibus, ubi crimen lese maiestatis et oppugnationis patrie alterantur ut species 
differentes.”
472 Ibid., “non tamen rei criminis lese maiestatis.”
473 Ibid., “non tamen res publica et fiscus Florentie est res publica vel fiscus 
civitatis Romane.” 
474 Ibid., “tamen pro delicto commisso contra rem publicam et fiscum civitatis 
Florentie debet sequi publicatio bonorum, sicut pro commisso contra rem publicam 
vel fiscum civitatis Romane, quia res publica et fiscus civitatis Florentie habet eadem 
privilegia, beneficia etc.”
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and Robert of Naples in two influential consilia on behalf of Robert (numbered 
43 and 69 in the printed editions), in which he had defined maiestas as maior 
status, that is, greater rank, and as maior potestas, greater power; “by 
definition (a ratione nominis),” he could then argue, “the crimen maiestatis is 
not committed except when maior potestas is harmed (laeditur).”475 Robert, of 
course, claimed that he was not subject to Henry’s authority (and, therefore 
could not commit treason against him) because his true maior status and 
maior potestas was the Pope. Such an etymological argument would be 
followed by Oldrado’s student Alberico de Rosciate (d.1360) in his important, 
early lexicon of jurisprudence, the Dictionarium, where the headword is 
tellingly given as “Maiestas, that is, greater rank.”476 And Baldo would follow it 
as well, in spirit, but not, as we will see, before problematizing the unitary 
nature of maiestas that had stood at the center of the legal wrangling in 1313. 
475 On Oldrado’s role in the conflict, see Edward Will, Die Gutachten des 
Oldradus de Ponte zum Prozeß Heinrichs VII. gegen Robert von Neapel (Berlin: 
Rothschild, 1917) and, for a more recent approach to Oldrado’s consilia, see Norman 
Zacour, Jews and Saracens in the Consilia of Oldradus de Ponte (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), Tilmann Schmidt, “Die Konsilien des Oldrado 
da Ponte als Geschichtsquelle,” in Consilia im späten Mittelalter: Zum historischen 
Aussagewert einer Quellengattung, ed. I. Baumgärtner (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 
1995), 53-64, and now Chiara Valsecchi, Oldrado da Ponte e i suoi Consilia: 
Un’auctoritas del primo Trecento (Milan: Giuffè, 2000); for the definition, see cons. 43, 
at n.8, in Oldradus de Ponte, Consilia seu responsa et quaestiones aureae (Venice, 
1585): “maiestas dicitur maior status sive maior potestas; arguendo ergo a ratione 
nominis non committitur crimen maiestatis nisi cum laeditur maior potestas.”
476 On Alberico, see the brief biographical sketches of Paul Weimar, “Albericus 
de Rosate”, in Lexicon des Mittelalters, vol. 1 (Munich, 1980), 282-83, and L. 
Prosdocimi, “Alberico da Rosate’, in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vol. 1 (1960), 
656-57 and idem, “Alberico da Rosciate e la giurisprudenza italiana del secolo XIV”, 
Bergomum 49 (1955): 1-7; for the definition, s.v. “Maiestas idest maior status,” in 
Dictionarium iuris tam civilis quam canonici (Venice, 1581).
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The more pressing problem of whether treason could be committed 
against a city had also been treated before, in a variety of places within the 
gloss and commentary tradition of the ius commune. For example, following 
the list of crimes included under the umbrella of treason in the lex Quisquis
(C.8.8.5), the early glossator Azo (d. 1220) was not as seemingly 
discriminatory as later jurists would be. “There is treason,” he wrote, “where 
anyone undertakes anything against the City [urbem, i.e., Rome], or goes over 
to its enemies, or helps them in any way with arms, money, or advice; or 
causes subject provinces to become rebellious, or causes sedition in a city 
(vel quod seditionem movet in civitate), or kills a magistrate or the emperor or 
those who serve at his side, or takes up arms, or occupy places against the 
republic.”477 But, as we have already seen, by the mid-fourteenth century, 
Bartolo would be unwilling to expand the sphere of maiestas beyond the 
imperial dignity. In addition to the already mentioned gloss on the constitution 
of Henry VII, Bartolo would address the problem directly in a tantalizing 
passage in his commentary on the lex Proximum (D.48.4.1): “I ask,” he wrote 
there, “whether anyone who assembles a group [for illicit purposes] in a city 
other than Rome should be treated in accordance with the lex Iulia maiestatis
(D.48.4); the gloss says that it does not apply to other cities because when it 
says “de urbe” the city of Rome is to be understood, but consider instead that 
477 Commentary ad C.9.8.2, in Summa Azonis super novem libris codicis
(Pavia, 1506): “Est autem crimen laesae maiestatis ubicunque quis contra urbem 
aliquid molitur, vel quod profugit ad hostes; vel quod hostes qualitercunque iuvat, vel 
armis, vel pecunia, vel consilio; vel quod subiectas provincias nititur facere rebelles,
vel quod seditionem movet in civitate, vel quod magistratus occidatur, vel princeps, 
vel qui circa latus eius militant, vel quod arma sumit, vel occupant loca contra 
rempublicam ut appellatur hoc crimen perduellionis.” The switch to the plural may 
represent an error in the printed edition. 
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one who assembles a group in a city other than Rome should be treated in 
accordance with the lex Iulia de vi (D.48.6 and 7).”478  Just as the word 
maiestas came to stand for the crimen laesae maiestatis more often than the 
imperial dignity itself in Roman law and literature, so the word vis (violence) 
had come to stand for the crime of sedition in later Roman law, as in the titles 
on private vis and public vis.  Bartolo, grappling with the gloss on the words “in 
urbe sint” in D.48.4.1, which held that “urbs” (city) should stand for Rome 
alone, declared that the crime of assembling a group in a city (one of the 
elements of treason if committed against an entity with maiestas) would be 
instead the crime of sedition. According to Bartolo, Such a crime should be 
treated not as treason, but as vis, the umbrella under which serious offences 
against public order that did not rise to the level of treason were punished in 
Roman law.479 In practical terms, moreover, treason meant confiscation, and 
on the crucial and related issue of the existence of a fisc, no less an authority 
than Alberico de Rosate had held that, even though civitates are republics, 
“nevertheless the fiscus and the respublica are different.”480
478 Bartolo ad D.48.4.1 in Commentaria in secundam Digesti novi partem
(Lyon, 1555), f. 183v: “quero aliquis congregat gentem in alia civitate quam in civitate 
Romana: an incidit in l. Iul. Maie. Dicit glossa quod non habet locum in alia civitate 
quia cum hic dicat de urbe, intelligitur de civitate Romana, non autem intelligitur de 
alia: et allegat suas leges [gl. “in urbe sint” ad 48.4.1]. Sed adverte quod qui facit 
congregationem gentis in alia civitate, tenetur l. Iul. de vi.”
479 Olivia F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome, 78-80.
480 Alberico de Rosate, De statutis, iii, q.19, in Tractatus universi iuris, vol. 2, f. 
57v: “tamen fiscum et respublicam differunt.” 
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“Though laws prescribing both for and against have been elegantly 
presented in this matter,” Baldo began his opinion, directly addressing the 
Florentine lawyer’s consilium, “three points must be reviewed in order to arrive 
at a more fruitful teaching: First, what is the category of this crime? Second, by 
what law is it punished? And third, with what penalty?”481 And it is here, 
immediately, in his answer to the first question, that Baldo arrives at the 
philosophical crux of the matter: maiestas, he states, is fourfold, since the law 
speaks of the majesty of God, the emperor, the Roman people, and the king; 
but cities do not share in the quadruplicity of majesty because they merely 
stand in the place of private persons, nor do parties (like the Guelfs and 
Ghibellines) because they are simply factions.482 Indeed, most cities are 
municipia, autonomous but still subject to a superior, and thus possess no 
maiestas; on the basis of name alone, then, they cannot be the object of “the 
481 Ibid., “Licet eleganter pro et contra sint inducte leges proprie ad propositum 
facientes et determinantes tamen pro uberiori doctrina recensenda sunt tria, primo 
[consideranda sunt add. M] quis est titulus huius criminis, secundo, qua lege punitur, 
tertio qua pena.”
482 Ibid., ff.89v-90r; I quote this crucial passage at length: “Et premitto ad 
evidentiam quod quadruplex est maiestas, scilicet Dei. ff. de arbitris, l. Non 
distinguemus, §. Sacerdotio (D.4.8.32.4), Imperatoris ut Inst. in prohe. (I. Pr.), et C. 
ad l. iul. mai., l. Quisquis (C. 9.8.5) cum si., Romani populi ff. e. l.i (D. 48.4.1), Regis 
C. ut nemo privatus titulos, l. Regie maiestatis (C. 2.15[16.]1). Dicitur maiestas 
pretoris, ff. de iusti. et iur., l. pen. (D.1.1.1), ff. de iur. om. iud., l. si familia (D. 2.1.9). 
Civitatis vero alie ab urbe non dicitur maiestas, quia civitates loco privatorum 
habentur ff. de furtis, l. Ob pecuniam (D.47.2.82), ff. de verborum significatione, l. 
Bona civitatis (D.50.16.15), et l. eum qui vectigal (D.50.16.16). Item partis guelfe vel 
gebelline non dicitur maiestas hec enim non sunt nomina civitatis sed nomina 
partialitatis, de quibus notatur in c. statutum, § cum autem, de rescriptis lib. vi. (VI. 
1.3.11.3).” Alberico, in his Dictionarium, s.v. “maiestas cadit”, would also present 
maiestas as multiplex to some extent, since it can be committed “in principem et in 
regem et in praetorem et in quemlibet iudicem.”
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crime of injured maiestas.” But the crime of sedition can be committed against 
them: “He is guilty of sedition,” Baldo stated, “who conspires to betray or 
overthrow the public and good government of a city or to wage war against it 
or something similar, not in thought alone but by acting, like conspiring, 
waging war, or occupying a territory of his city or municipium.”483 In a sense, 
sedition is the broader category into which the crime of treason falls (i.e., 
sedition against an entity with maiestas is treasonous), but for sedition against 
a municipium it is not enough to merely wish for tumult or revolution, rather a 
seditious conspirator must betray his city in a material way. Under the ius 
commune, sedition is punishable by death, but some conspiritors are given 
clemency “either because of their rank or, perhaps, because they did not act to 
promote the sedition.”484 Since Florence is a municipium and governed by its 
own laws, though, those who conspire against it should not be punished under 
the ius commune of sedition but according to the statutes of the commune. 
“Thus,” Baldo says, “we should follow the via statutorum, neither adding nor 
detracting.”485 Reviewing the statutes, he found that they had given the rectors 
considerable choice (arbitrium) in terms of sentencing and, as a result, argues 
that the penalties they announced should not be supplemented after the 
483 Ibid., f. 90r: “Est autem seditiosus ille qui [seditio quando quis post Est M] 
tractat facere proditionem et novitatem contra publicum et bonum statum civitatis, vel 
facere guerram, vel aliquid simile non nuda cogitatione, sed perveniendo ad aliquem 
actum: puta faciendo coniurationem vel rumorem vel guerram vel occupando aliquam 
terram contra suam civitatem vel municipium.”
484 Ibid., “vel propter personarum dignitatem, vel puta quia minus delinquerunt 
ut quia non processerunt ad actum proximum factis.”
485 Ibid., “ergo sequamur viam statutorum neque addendo neque detrahendo.”
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fact.486 Since the sentences against the conspirators had not mentioned a 
confiscation of their goods, the officials of Florence ought to remain firmly fixed 
in the ius strictum and do nothing to ramp up the penalties. “It is apparent,” 
Baldo concluded, “that an implicit confiscation is not included within the ambit 
of corporal punishment, and since the statute, which is of the ius strictum, 
does not assert this, we should neither assert nor add it.”487
Baldo’s opinion was a brilliant balancing act. On the one hand, he had 
diminished the authority of Florence, declaring that it lacks maiestas and 
arguing that it ought not be allowed to impose a delayed confiscation on the 
conspirators. On the other, though, he has not challenged the sphere of 
capacious authority secured for it in the Florentine lawyer’s opinion, in which 
its rights and privileges are equal to those of Rome and in which its statutes 
and judicial acts are inviolable. By maintaining the logical fire wall of 
separation between the ius commune and statutory law in the opinion, Baldo 
was able to arrive at his desired conclusion and his desired goal, the 
perpetuation of the rule of law—that is, that governments themselves, as well 
as their citizens, are constrained to adhere to their own lawfully established 
statutes and procedures. The government of Florence could have declared in 
its statutes that sedition against it be treated like treason, but it did not; those 
statutes could have called for confiscation, but they did not; and its judges 
could have used their statutory authority to impose such a confiscation, but 
486 Ibid., 90v: “Et quia pena arbitraria est incerta, donec declaretur per 
iudicem, nullo modo pena non declarata supplenda est per impetrationem legalem.”
487 Ibid., “Et ex his apparet quod confiscatio tacita bonorum not venit in 
conscientiam pene corporalis, quia statutum quod est stricti iuris hoc non dictat ergo 
nec nos dictare debemus neque supplere.”
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they did not. Baldo’s reasoning would have permitted all those things, but it will 
not permit them after the fact. In his opinion, it is precisely the very power and 
authority of Florence that restricts its power and authority. And this is the 
paradox at the heart of the primacy of law. In a metaphorical sense, one could 
say that the almost spectral superiority of Rome over Florence in Baldo’s 
opinion stands for the superiority of the law over the Florentines and its 
officials, the maiestas of Rome for the awesome dignity and terrible power of 
the law itself. 
The Influence of Baldo’s Opinion
While the importance of the specific legal issues of 1379 diminished 
over time and ultimately disappeared, the perceived injustice of the guild 
government’s beheading of Donato Barbadori would live on in Florentine 
memory. In his Cose fiorentine, for example, the Florentine statesman and 
historian Francesco Guicciardini discussed his execution more than 150 years 
after it had occured, lamenting the death of a noble and likely innocent citizen 
in the midst of a turbulent time for the Republic and embellishing his final, 
plaintive speech.488 In the margin of the text, Guicciardini, a trained jurist, 
wrote: “See the consilium of Baldo that speaks of messer Donato.”489 One 
488 Cose fiorentine, edited by Roberto Ridolfi (Florence: Olschki, 1945), 76-81.
489 Guicciardini, Cose fiorentine, 79, n.2: “Vedi el consiglo di Baldo che parla 
di messer Donato.”
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legal historian has seen in this reference evidence of the impact of 
Guicciardini’s legal training on his later work as a theorist and historian, one 
for whom a consilium can transcend its strictly legal bounds.490 While this is 
certainly true, I prefer to see this extraordinary reference in a different light—
as an intended proof of Guicciardini’s point, as the opinion of a respected jurist 
who (after the deed was done) condemned and was repulsed by the 
execution. Baldo’s repulsion is seen clearly in the version of the opinion that
he wrote about the December 1379 conspiracy that survives in manuscript in 
the Vatican Library. He laments: “We turn now to Messer Donato de’ 
Barbadori, in whose person one can cry out ‘O my people, what have I done to 
thee?’ (Micah 6:3) and also ‘Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people 
devised vain things’ (Psalms 2:1) and his faith was decapitated by lies and 
false accusations.”491
Although it is clear that the influence of Baldo’s lament stretched into 
the sixteenth century, it is difficult to know the true impact of Baldo’s opinion in 
its own time. Early in February of 1379 [80], the Florentine chancellor Coluccio 
Salutati crafted an eloquent defense of the repression of the conspiracy in a 
letter to Urban VI that contrasted the moderation of the city’s response with the 
astonishing evil of the conspirators’ plans, noting that “although the goods of 
490 Osvaldo Cavallar, Francesco Guicciardini giurista: I ricordi degli onorari
(Milan: Giuffrè, 1991), 4-5. Cavallar’s brief description of the consilium, on pp.5-6, 
follows the headnotes of the Venetian printed editions. 
491 BAV, Vat. lat. 8069, fols. 364v-367v, 367r: “Quinto, respice in dominum 
Donatum de Barbadoris, in cuius persona dici potest deplorando popule meus, quid 
feci tibi et iterum quare fremuerunt gentes et populi meditati sunt inania et confictis et 
mendacibus allegationibus decapitata est fides eius.” For the biblical quotations, I 
have used the Douay-Rheims translation. 
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the condemned had been confiscated for treason, we never allowed the 
sentences to be executed with respect to those goods.”492 And although it was 
never common, Florentine officials continued to use the language of maiestas
when discussing conspiracies against the city.493
It is also remarkably difficult to assess the influence of Baldo’s 
consilium in juridical thought. First, the opinion was not printed until the early 
1490s in the Milanese incunabulum of Leonardus Pachel,494 and before that 
was circulated in manuscript in at least two forms, as I discussed above. 
Second, any survey of Quattrocento legal literature on the subject of treason 
will necessarily be capricious and impressionistic. Nonetheless, such a survey 
throws some light on the question, revealing that the Vatican version was 
more widely circulated and had greater influence in Tuscany and its 
492 ASF, Missive,18,109r: “quod quamvis fuissent damnatorum bona pro lese 
maiestatis crimine confiscata, numquam tamen passi sumus sententias exequi quo 
ad bona”; the full letter is also transcribed in Heinrich Otto, “Eine Briefsammlung 
vornehmlich zur Geschichte italienischer Kommunen in der zweiten Hälfte des 
Mittelalters,” Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 
11 (1908): 80-146, at 103-107.
493 For example, the Esecutore Marino di Niccoluccio da Fermo condemned 
38 persons on 2 April 1380 for committing, among many other terrible acts, “crimen 
lexe maiestatis contra civitatem predictam et eius regimina”; transcribed in Giuseppe 
Odoardo Corazzini, I Ciompi: Cronache e documenti con notizie intorno alla vita di 
Michele di Lando (Florence: Sansoni, 1887), 72-3.
494 The Pachel edition is dated 1489, but it almost certainly followed the 
Brescian 1491-2 edition of Boninus de Boninis Ragusius Dalmatini. The problems 
that accompanied the printed transmission of the consilia of Trecento jurists, are 
addressed for Bartolo (who produced far fewer consilia than Baldo) in Mario Ascheri, 
“The Formation of the Consilia Collection of Bartolus of Saxoferrato and Some of His 
Autographs,” in The Two Laws , 192-197. A more detailed discussion of this problem 
as it relates to Baldo’s consilia is found in the articles of Colli and Vallone cited above. 
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surroundings than in the Veneto, where Baldo ended his career. The Tuscan 
jurist Nello di Giuliano Martini Cetti (d.1430), called Nello da San Gimignano, 
who taught at Florence during the last two decades of his life, appears to have 
been the first lawyer extensively influenced by Baldo’s opinion.495 In his 
important 1424 treatise De bannitis, Nello cites Baldo and regularly quotes him 
on the question of whether sedition against cities, like Florence, should be 
treated as treason; for Baldo, he says, “the name of such a crime is sedition 
and not perduellio or treason.”496 In the sections where Nello quotes Baldo 
verbatim, it is apparent that he was using the Vatican consilium. In his 
important treatise on crime, the De maleficiis, the Aretine jurist Angelo 
Gambiglioni (d.1450) devoted an entire rubric (Et hai tradito la tua patria) to 
the problem of treason understood broadly, and, on the question of whether 
one can commit treason through knowledge alone (scientia simplex), 
expectedly cited the Vatican version of the consilium of Baldo, disagreeing 
with it.497 Likewise, Agostino Bonfranceschi, called Agostino da Rimini 
(d.1479), also cited Baldo’s consilium in his widely distributed Additiones to 
495 On Nello and his treatise, see Anthony M.C. Mooney, The Legal Ban in 
Florentine Statutory Law and the De bannitis of Nello da San Gimignano (1373-1430)
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: UCLA, 1976), esp. 194-223.
496 Nello follows Baldo throughout I.II., quaestio 16, in De bannitis in Tractatus 
universi iuris, vol. 11; quote at 366v: “tenuit tunc Baldus consulendo ex eo quia titulus 
talis criminis est seditionis non perduellionis, vel maiestatis quod sic probavit.”
497 Angelo Gambiglioni, De maleficiis (Lyon, 1551), rubr. Et hai tradito, etc., 
f.79rv: “quod tamen limitat Baldus in quodam suo consilio, quod incipit quanquam 
allegata sint multa etc.” On Angelo, see Domenico and Paolo Maffei, Angelo 
Gambiglioni giureconsulto aretino del Quattrocento: La vita, i libri, le opere (Rome: 
Fondazione Sergio Mochi-Onory, 1994) and Giorgio Zordan, Il diritto e la procedura 
criminale nel Tractatus de maleficiis di Angelo Gambiglioni (Padua: CEDAM, 1976).
255
Angelo’s treatise. On the problem of whether treason can be committed 
against tyrants and princes, or only against the emperor, he notes, “and on 
this issue, see a beautiful consilium of Baldo that begins ‘Quanquam allegata 
sint multa et plura’.”498 This is the incipit of the Vatican consilium, and 
Agostino’s adjective “beautiful [pulchrum]” is certainly fitting for that version of
the opinion, in which Baldo was more attentive to rhetorical issues than in the 
Lucchese version. 
Yet slightly later Martino da Lodi (d. 1453), who taught in Pavia, Siena, 
and Bologna and was one of the leading jurists in northern and central Italy 
during the early Quattrocento, did not cite Baldo’s opinion in his very early 
treatise on treason, the De criminine laesae maiestatis, even when he 
addresses the question of whether one may be guilty of treason by knowledge 
alone (sola scientia).499 Similarly, the fifteenth-century Veronese jurist 
Bartolomeo Cipolla (d. 1475), who worked at the Paduan Studium and wrote a 
series of famous consilia on criminal matters, addressed the familiar question 
of whether treason could be committed against a city, in this case Faenza, and 
498 Additiones Augustini de Arimino ad Angeli Aretini De maleficiis tractatum, 
printed in Angelo de’ Gambiglioni, De maleficiis (Lyon, 1551); quotation at ff.78v-79r: 
“Et in hac materia vide unum pulchrum consilium Baldi quod incipit quanquam 
allegata sint multa et plura.” On Agostino, see the entry “Bonfranceschi, Agostino” in 
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 12 (Rome, 1970), 32-4.
499 De crimine laesae maiestatis, in Tractatus universi iuris, ff. 22v-23v. On 
Martino, see the brief biographical sketch in L. Frati, “Martino de Garati da Lodi,” 
Archivio storico lombardo 6 (1919): 322-25 and Ingrid Baumgärtner, Martinus Garatus 
Laudensis: Ein italienischer Rechtsgelehrter des 15. Jahrhunderts (Cologne: Böhlau, 
1986). The treatise has also been attributed falsely to the French jurist Pierre Rebuffe 
(d.1557), as in Tractatus varii Petri Rebuffi (Lyon, 1619).
256
if a confiscation of goods could occur after death.500 One is not said to commit 
treason, Bartolomeo declares with certitude, “if he is a rebel or betrayer 
against an inferior of the emperor or against a city, except Rome, because 
cities stand in the place of private persons.”501 To support this claim, he cites 
the lex Eum qui vectigal (D.50.16.16) and other sources, but not Baldo’s 
opinion, even though he uses similar language. Later in the opinion, 
Bartolomeo does cite Baldo’s commentary on the lex Si quis nummos
(D.38.2.3.4) to the effect that counterfeiting the money of such a city would be 
treason, which seems at odds with the main thrust of Bartolomeo’s argument 
and, indeed, Baldo’s consilium.502
In his legal commentaries, Baldo had given to the emperor an 
extraordinary and unique dignity; this is perhaps nowhere clearer than in his 
500 Consilium 17 in Cipolla, Consilia criminalia (Venice, 1555), ff. 37v-42r. On 
Bartolomeo, see the biographical sketch in O. Ruffino’s entry “Cipolla (Caepolla, 
Cepola, Cepolla, Cevola, Zevola), Bartolomeo (Bartolomeo da Verona, 
Bartholomaeus Veronensis),” in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vol. 25 (Rome: 
Istituto della enciclopedia italiana , 1981), 709-13. On the importance of Bartolomeo 
in Quattrocento Venetian jurisprudence, see Aldo Mazzacane, “Lo Stato e il Dominio 
nei giuristi veneti durante il ‘secolo della terraferma’,” in Storia della cultura veneta, 
vol. 3 (Vicenza: Nero Pozza, 1980), 595-605. His consilia have not received the 
attention they deserve, but see, for example, Giuliano Marchetto, “Il matrimonium 
meticulosum in un consilium di Bartolomeo Cipolla (ca. 1420-1475),” in Matrimoni in 
dubbio: Unioni controverse e nozze clandestine in Italia dal XIV al XVIII secolo, ed. 
Silvana Seidel Menchi and Diego Quaglioni (Bologna: Mulino, 2001), 247-278.
501 Cipolla, Consilia criminalia, f.39r: “si est rebellis vel proditor contra 
inferiorem ad imperatorem vel contra civitatem excepta romana, quia alie civitates 
habentur loco privatorum.” This holds even in the case of a city “quae non 
recognoscit superiorem, sicut est civitas Florentina, ut no. Bar. in l. hostes 
(D.49.15.24), circa fin. ff. de capti.” 
502 Ibid., 39v. 
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treatment of the lex Si ab hostibus (I.1.12.5), where, following Bartolo closely, 
he declares: “Anyone who stubbornly says that the emperor is not lord and 
king of the whole world should be counted as a heretic because he speaks 
against the opinion of the Church and the text of the gospel which says, ‘there 
went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that [the whole world] should be 
enrolled, etc. (Lk. 2:1),’ for Christ himself recognizes the Emperor when he 
says ‘Render therefore to God, the things that are God’s; and to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar’s (Mt. 22:21).’”503 But in his commentaries he had also 
held that free and self-governing cities (“qui vivunt in propria libertate et 
absolute proprio regimine”) did not require the authority of a superior, even if 
only by virtue of custom (“consuetudinis prescriptae”).504 His rationale was, 
essentially, de facto: because the cities no longer obey Caesar (“cum civitates 
non obediant Caesari”), the superior no longer has power over them.505 While 
he never went as far as Bartolo, Baldo believed that a civitas like Florence 
could fill the place of the princeps, even if it could never attain the suprema 
503 Baldo ad I.1.12.5, in Commentaria ad quatuor Institutionum libros (Lyon, 
1585), f. 10v: “Dicendum est ideo, quod si aliquis eorum diceret pertinaciter 
Imperatorem non esse dominum, et monarcham totius orbis, esset censendus 
haereticus, quia dicit contra determinationem ecclesiae, et contra textum 
evangelicum qui dicit Exivit edictum a Caesare Augusto ut describeretur etc (Lk. 2:1). 
nam Christus recognoscit Imperatorem cum dixit reddite quae sunt Dei, Deo, et quae 
sunt Caesaris Caesari (Mt. 22:21)”. I have used the Douay-Rheims translation for the 
biblical passages, modifying appropriately. Here Baldo followed Bartolo’s commentary 
on the lex Hostes (D.49.15.24), which was much copied, as noted by E. Kantorowicz, 
The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957), 
466, n.42. 
504 Baldo ad C.7.46.2 
505 Baldo ad C.9.12.17.
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potestas of one.506 If not the suprema potestas, though, Baldo in certain 
lectures did argue that a free city could at least possess something like the 
maiestas that had been translated from the populus romanus to the Emperor 
himself.507 This ambiguity is especially clear in Baldo’s commentary on the lex 
Si quis nummos (C.9.24.2), where he discusses counterfeiting and argues: “I 
should say that in such a city it would be a crime like treason (simile lese 
maiestatis) if any subject of that city were to counterfeit its coinage; I say 
subject because a non-subject does not commit the crime of treason.”508
In the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Florentine lawyers 
adopted arguments like these and established in the populus florentinus and 
its Signoria the “force and majesty associated with the princeps of the law 
books.”509 In practice, they defined a “political entity which acknowledged no 
superior in temporal affairs, at the same time claiming a fiscus, a subject 
territory, and an unlimited right to make its own laws.”510 This precious 
freedom and power would survive, essentially unchallenged until the sixteenth 
506 On this point, see Canning, Political Thought, 115-6, and Magnus Ryan, 
“Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Free Cities,” 65-89. 
507 Canning, Political Thought, 122, misconstrues Baldo’s opinion on maiestas
to imply that Baldo believed such cities possessed the same maiestas as the 
emperor. 
508 In Lectura in VI-IX libros Codicis (Lyon, 1498),f.370v: “Dicerem in civitate 
ista quod esset crimen simile lese maiestati, si quis subditus istius civitatis falsaret 
istam monetam. Ideo dico subditis [sic?] quia non subditus non incidit in crimen lese 
maiestatis.” 
509 Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft, 425. 
510 Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft, 430.
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century, when Charles V’s control over Duke Cosimo I would prompt Tiberio 
Deciani to say that “the emperor is superior and lord, so the republic is not free 
as it once was.”511
The Case of Tommasino da Panzano
Less than a year after the repression of the December 1379 plot, 
another case would draw Baldo’s attention to Florence and its precarious guild 
government, and this opinion would also seem to problematize Baldo’s clarity 
on the issue of maiestas. On 15 September 1380, Messer Giovanni di Mone, 
ambassador of the republic of Florence, was murdered in Arezzo. A grain 
dealer who had more than once been drawn as prior and gonfaloniere, 
Giovanni had served as one of the so-called “Eight Saints” in 1376, was 
knighted by the Ciompi in 1378, and continued to serve the subsequent and 
short-lived guild government until his death.512 When word of Messer 
Giovanni’s death reached Florence, says the chronicler Stefani, it came to be 
considered the “most disgraceful and unruly thing that had ever been done, 
511 Tiberio Deciano, Responsa (Venice, 1602), III, 19, quoted in Danilo 
Marrara, “I rapporti giuridici tra la Toscana e l’impero (1530-1576),” in Firenze e la 
Toscana dei Medici nell’Europa del ‘500 (Florence: Olschki, 1983), v. 1, 223: 
“imperatorem esse superiorem et dominum, ergo Republica non est libera ut prius 
erat.”
512 ASF, Tratte, 223, passim; R. C. Trexler, “Who were the Eight Saints?” in 
Renaissance News 16 (1963): 89; DIARIO D’ANONIMO, 73.
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because no other ambassador had ever been killed by Florentines.”513 Among 
the three assassins who assaulted and stabbed him was Tommasino da 
Panzano, who had arrived in Arezzo one day earlier along with Charles of 
Durazzo, who had been received “with every royal honor” by the Aretines and 
denounced in a Florentine pratica on the same day as a “public enemy” and 
“enemy of the regime.”514 Along with the killers, Charles had brought a small 
army, including hundreds of mounted soldiers and a band of more than fifty 
Florentine exiles and conspirators, led by Lapo da Castiglionchio, many of 
whom had been implicated in the plot to overthrow the government nine 
months earlier.515 In an assembly on 15 September, Francesco Cambi, a 
fervent supporter of the government, called for the priors to “make sure, using 
every means, that the murder of messer Giovanni di Mone be punished and 
his memory honored.”516 In a stern measure, the priors declared Giovanni di 
Mone’s murder an “unspeakable wickedness and abominable crime” and the 
perpetrators “sons of Satan” who should be killed; the government also 
proclaimed that if Tommasino were not dead within one year his male relatives 
513 STEFANI, rubr. 870, 379: “la più sconcia cosa mai fosse fatta, perocchè mai 
non fu più morto ambasciadori per Fiorentini.”
514 Ibid., rubr. 869, 378: “con ogni onore reale”; ASF, CP, 19, f. 59v: “quod 
Dominus Karolus est inimicus istius status,” and f. 60r, “quod Dominus Karolus est 
hostis publicus.”
515 The Florentine plotters with Charles are listed in ASF, CR, 13, 137rv; 
compare with the list of those condemned in ASF, Capitano 1198, 55r-56r, discussed 
above.
516 ASF, CP, 19, f. 63v: “Quod Domini provideant per omnem modum quod 
occisio Domini Johannis Monis puniatur et honoretur sua memoria.” 
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would also be comdemned as rebels of the commune.517 His memory was, 
indeed, honored days later with a public funeral, but the punishment would 
have to be deferred.518 Fearing war with Charles, the Florentines agreed to 
pay 40,000 florins for a peace pact, which required Charles to stop harboring 
Florentine exiles and to refrain from interfering with Florence and her subject 
towns. In the words of the pact, Charles, who had been a public enemy, would 
become “as his ancestors had been, protector and benefactor of the city of 
Florence.”519 The murder of Messer Giovanni would finally be avenged on 20 
January 1381, when Giovanni di Messer Luca da Panzano killed his cousin, 
the murderer Tommasino, in a Sienese inn. Hoping to avoid becoming a rebel 
and having been promised a reward, Giovanni had become an assassin for 
the republic.520 In a measure two months later, the priors and Otto di Guardia 
praised and rewarded Giovanni for the killing, explaining that, by murdering 
the ambassador, Tommasino had become a rebel of the commune, and was 
thus liable to be killed by citizens of Florence.521
517 ASF, PR, 69, ff. 131v-133r: “nefandum scelus et abominabile delictum… 
satane filios…”; Stefani, Cronaca, rubr. 889, 387. 
518 For the Florentine response, see STEFANI rubr. 871, 379; ANONIMO, 417; 
and the diplomatic letter of 17 September to Charles of Durazzo in ASF, Missive, 19, 
f. 47r.
519 ASF, CR, 13, 136r-139r (along with related documents at 139v-143v): “erit 
prout fuerunt eius progenitores protector et bene[factor] civitatis Florentie.”
520 Tommaso Strozzi, one of the leaders of the guild government, was also 
accused of having paid someone in Lapo da Castiglionchio’s household in Rome to 
poison him; STEFANI, rubr. 890, 387, and ASF, Missive, 19, ff.100r-101v. 
521 ASF, PR, 256r-257v, “Octo Balie et custodie Civitatis Florentie in favorem 
Johannis domini Luce de panzano.”
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In these days, the tumult of politics could dissolve even the strong, 
affective bonds of pre-modern Italian kinship, setting cousins like Giovanni and 
Tommasino against each other, and even fathers against sons.522 In a 
consilium sapientis in support of Giovanni’s reward, Baldus addressed this 
very issue. “He is not said to be a fratricide who, driven by the fervor of public 
love and desiring the protection of his native homeland, kills a savage enemy 
of it.”523 Indeed, Baldus argued, the kinship between them is annulled and the 
enemy is cut from the republic like a diseased limb; and since such a person 
deserves to be killed, his killer deserves a payment “that should be called ‘the 
reward for an extraordinary service’ as in the lex Si pater (D. 39. 5. 34).”524 But 
Bartolo had signaled an opposing argument in his commentary on the lex Si 
adulterium § Liberto (D. 40. 5. 39[38]. 9). He opened his discussion of that law, 
which asks whether a freedman can kill his patron with impunity if he catches 
him in adultery, by presenting the opinion of the thirteenth-century jurist Dino 
del Mugello, who had held that “if a statute says that anyone can kill a banned 
person with impunity, it will not allow a son to kill his banned father, nor a 
522 For example, Benedetto di Simone Peruzzi, whose condemnation is 
discussed above, was famously denounced by his father in his account book for his 
treasonous activities against the guild government; Armando Sapori, ed. Libri di 
commercio dei Peruzzi (Milan: Treves, 1934), 522. 
523 Baldus, Consilia, III.264 (Milan, 1489), n.f.: “Qui fervore publice caritatis pro 
tutella naturalis patrie accensus cruentissimum eiusdem patrie hostem occidit non 
dicitur fratricida…” There is no extant manuscript of this consilium; the Milanese 
edition is therefore the most authoritative version.
524 Ibid., “merces enim eximii laboris appellanda est, ut ff. de don. l. si pater.” 
In support of his assertion, Baldus also offered other relevant citations, namely D. 37. 
1. 13, D. 37. 4. 1. 9, D. 3. 4. 5. 9, D. 28. 2. 29. 5, D. 11. 7. 35, and D. 3. 27. 1-2.
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freedman his patron, nor a vassal his lord.”525 In disagreement with Dino, 
Bartolo observed that such a situation was addressed in Todi, where it was 
said that a son could even kill his father if banned. He accepted the view that a 
patron caught in adultery is still a patron, “but this is not so in the case of a 
banned person, who is made an enemy and deserter of his city... and he is 
lost to his son just as he is lost to his city”.526 This doctrinal conflict between 
Dino and Bartolo was deftly reconciled by Baldus in his consilium. Bartolo’s 
commentary on Si adulterium § Liberto, he explained, “concerns an enemy 
who committed treason (hostem ex crimine lese maiestatis), as here, and 
another enemy who was banned because he primarily harmed a private 
person and secondarily harmed the republic”; and since the contrary opinion is 
speaking about “one to whom the city is an enemy” and “not one who is an 
enemy to the city,” his own argument about the reward stands.527 A person to 
whom the city is an enemy because he fell under the ban for a primarily 
private offense (as, presumably, in Dino’s opinion) cannot be killed by his son 
with impunity. If Tommasino had been an enemy of this sort, then Giovanni 
would have been bound by kinship not to kill him and would not have 
525 Ad D. 40. 5. 39(38). 9, in Super infortiato et digest novo (Bologna, 1971 
rprt), n.f.: “quod si contineatur in statuto quod quilibet possit impune occidere 
exbannitum quod non ideo filius ex vigore predicti statuti possit patrem occidere nec 
libertus patronum nec vasallus dominum”.
526 In secundam Digesti Novi partem (Venice: 1590), f. 162v: “Nam licet hic 
libertus reperiat patronum in adulterio, remanet tamen patronus et habet iura 
patronatus, sed non hic in exbannito, qui efficitur hostis et transfuga civitatis l. 
Amissione § Qui deficiunt,ff. de cap. dimi (D. 4. 5. 5. 1) et sicut is perditur civitati, ita 
perditur filio l. Postliminium § Filius ff. de cap. et postlim. rever. (D. 49. 15. 19. 7).” 
527 Baldus, Consilia, III.264, n.f.: “...sed refert inter hostem ex crimine lese 
maiestatis ut hic et alium hostem qui est diffidatus quia offendit principaliter privatam 
personam et secundario offendit rem publicam de quo cui civitas est hostis sed non 
ipse civitati de quo loquitur Bartolus.”
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deserved the reward paid by the Otto. But Tommasino is an enemy of the 
other kind, an enemy to the city, an enemy “ex crimine lese maiestatis,” and 
thus Giovanni was rightly rewarded. In this consilium, Baldus did not 
extensively address the question of whether Tommasino, in addition to being a 
rebel and enemy of the commune, was also guilty of treason; but he did at 
least imply in his discussion of Bartolo’s opinion that he was. Baldus had a 
repertoire of steering assumptions, philosophical principles, and a consistent 
working method throughout his works, even when the solutiones necessarily 
hinged on particulars; it is thus entirely possible that, if he had explicitly 
addressed the issue, he would have held that Tommasino could not commit 
treason against Florence for the reasons presented in the earlier consilium. 
Yet the possible discrepancy between Baldus’s two opinions, which were 
probably first written within a year of each other, is nonetheless meaningful 
because it makes clear that the question of whether Florence possessed 
maiestas and could be the object of treason was still open to juristic 
interpretation.
The power of the Florentine regime when Baldo wrote these opinions 
was regularly threatened within the walls of the city and outside them, by elite 
Florentine families, by disgruntled workers, and by foreign princes and their 
armies. Mobs subverted the procedures of the courts and threatened the lives 
of judges; the priors lived in a state of siege and dispatched assassins to kill 
enemies of their regime. Nonetheless, Gene Brucker has accurately described 
the Florentine guild government of 1378-82 as the “closest approximation to 
the corporate ideal that Florence was ever to experience,” and a commitment 
to legality was fundamental to that ideal and to the motivating ideology of the 
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Florentine popolo.528 At moments of emergency, such regimes asked jurists to 
serve as trusted third parties and honest brokers to resolve troubling politico-
legal issues. In response, jurists like Baldo blended legal principles and 
pragmatic attention to specific circumstances in order to fashion solutions that 
conformed to the ius commune, respected legitimate political authority and 
lawfully-enacted governmental measures, and afforded legal protection to 
citizens and subjects. When judges are menaced by armed mobs, when 
suspicion and fear govern the men entrusted with preserving the republic’s 
welfare, and when possibly innocent citizens are condemned to death, law 
may seem to be nothing more than a flimsy rationalization or, worse, a 
convenient instrument of injustice. In such a time, though, Baldo’s strict 
adherence to the law and his ability to speak freely as an “oracle of the law” 
provides refuge. In such a time, we should look to Baldo’s opinions, crafted 
with consummate skill by a jurist who believed in the sacred character of law, 
because they attest to the abiding dignity of law as a human institution, one 
that although imperfect aims in the words of Ulpian to be the great “ars boni et 
aequi.” 
At its moment of greatest weakness, the Florentine guild government 
cloaked itself in the language of Roman imperial power and maiestas. This 
fiction is blatant when discussing weak and precarious regimes like that one, 
but the ways in which later regimes, ones far less committed to law, in 
Florence and elsewhere, adopted and employed this rhetoric to mask or justify 
their illegal abuses of power and erode the fragile authority of the law are more 
subtle and thus more dangerous. As the power of these regimes increased, 
528 The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1977), 46.
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the authority of jurists decreased, and the history of the jurisprudence 
surrounding the crimen laesae maiestatis is thus an essential site for an 
examination of this process. What F. W. Maitland famously said of treason in 
medieval England, that it is a “crime which has a vague circumference and 
more than one centre,” was also true of laesa maiestas in Trecento Italy.529  
This vagueness gave to jurists the freedom to defend the rule of law against 
the capricious and unrestrained power of political regimes, a freedom they 
would not enjoy two or three centuries later, when the authority of jurists as 
oracles of the law had been greatly diminished and the power of such regimes 
greatly enlarged, when, in other words, the sphere of laesa maiestas (and, as 
a result, of state power) was less like Maitland’s and more like the terrifying, 
disorienting, and all-encompassing sphere described in a different context by 
Pascal, “whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere.”530
529 Frederic W. Maitland and Frederick Pollock, The History of English Law 
before the Time of Edward I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1899), II, 503.
530 Pensées and Other Writings, trans. Honor Levy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1999), 66; on this metaphor, see Borges, “The Fearful Sphere of Pascal,” in 
Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, edited by Donald A. Yates and 
James E. Irby (New York: New Directions, 1962), 189-92.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 
List of ammoniti compiled from several sources (see note 177 at page 96).
In the absence of official lists of ammoniti from September 1377 
through April 1378, one must assemble a (necessarily faulty and to some 
extent capricious) list from the available chronicle sources—STEFANI, rubrics 
770, 775, and 788, MONALDI, 511-514, and ANONIMO, 336-53—which can be 
collated, along with the official lists of persons drawn for office and declared 
ammonito or ghibellino, located in ASF, Tratte, 595, for example at ff. 57-59r, 
and searchable in the ONLINE TRATTE. Stefani’s lists are the most complete. 
Aside from some variation in spelling (e.g., Gianni for Giovanni), the lists in 
STEFANI rubr. 770 and 775 are identical, sharing 69 names. On the basis of 
other sources, it is clear that “Ammodeo di Frate Grigio da Barberino (rubr. 
770) is the same person as “Ramondo fratello di Giorgio da Barberino” (rubr. 
775), and that “Francesco di ser Tingo Rocchi” (rubr. 770) and “Francesco di 
ser Arrigo Bocchi” (rubr. 775) are as well. The list in STEFANI 788 contains 23 
names, for a total of 92 in Stefani’s Chronicle. 41 names are added from 
MONALDI, ANONIMO, and ONLINE TRATTE, marked respectively [M], [A], and [T]. 
The 133 named ammoniti are : Agnolo di Giovanni di ser Lotto, Agnolo 
Palarcione [A and M], Alberto di ser Lapo da Barberino, Albizzo di messer 
Filippo da Barberino [ser] (notaio) [R], Alessandro dell’Antella [messer] [M], 
Alessandro di Benedetto Gucci [T], Amaretto di Zanobi Mannelli, Amaretto di 
Zanobi Pontigiani [T], Amedeo di Frate Grigio da Barberino OR Ramondo 
brother of Giorgio da Barberino, Andrea di Betto Filippi (San Iacopo Oltrarno 
268
A), Andrea di Feo (lanaiuolo) (lastraiuolo M), Andrea di Iacopo di Collino 
Grandoni (lanaiuolus T), Antonio d’Agnolo Mazza (corrazzaio) [M], Attaviano di 
Dino Attaviani, Attaviano di Geremia di ser Tano (Attaviano di ser Tino Della 
Casa T), Baldassare di Giovani Nucciboni [or: di Nuccio Boni], Baldo Coppini 
da Vicchio (di Mugello A) (da Borgo a San Lorenzo M), Banco di Tosco [Tosto 
T] (rigattiere), Bancozzo di Giovanni di ser Bartolo Catenacci (tintore AM, San 
Iacopo tra fosse A), Bartolommeo di lacopo di Giambernardo Adimari, 
Benedetto di Geri del Bello, Bernardo di messer Covone [T], Bettino di messer 
Covone Covoni, Bonafede di ser Piero Aringhieri[ser] [T], Cantino d’Agnolo di 
Monna Checca (popolo di San Lorenzo), Ceo Cei (speziale) [M], Cinozzo di 
Piero Agli (notaio), [ser], Como Federighi da Signa (Santa Trinita A), 
Cristofano di ser Bartolo Nevaldini da Barberino (notaio) (Santa Maria in 
Campo A) [ser], Davanzato di Naccio di Contro Guidi (galigaio), Diedi di ser 
Francesco Fei [ser], Diedi, brother of Miniato de’ Libri [ser] [M], Domenico de’ 
Gualzelli (fornaio) [A], Donato del Ricco [Aldighieri] [Gherardi M] ( giudice) 
(San Romeo A), [messer], Dono di Lotto (vinatterius) [T], Duccio Dietaiuti 
Gualzelli, Filippo di Maso [di Iacopo M] Mangieri Mauvoli da Ognano, Filippo di 
Ugo (spetiarius) [T], Forese di Francesco Adimari, Forese di messer Forese di 
Guido Benzi [A], Francesco Bartoli Baldoni (bottaio), Francesco di Benedetto 
Gucci (quartiere di San Giovanni) (lanaiuolo A), Francesco di Bonaccorso 
Alderotti (San Felicie A), Francesco di Cino Rinuccini, [messer], Francesco di 
Geremia di ser Tano, Francesco di Geri (ferraiuolo), Francesco di Giovanni di 
Buonaccorso Alderotti [R], Francesco di Iacopo del Bene [M and T], 
Francesco di Lippo di ser Bonaventura Bonaiuti (setaiuolo A), Francesco di 
Niccolò called “Bate” [or: Abate A] (orafo M) (da Poggibonsi A), Francesco di 
ser Arrigo Rocchi [Bocchi M], Francesco di ser Donato [Fazzi] (speziale), 
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Francesco di ser Iacopo Cecchi da Signa, Francesco di Ventura (lanaiuolo) (in 
Baldracca A), Francesco Vigorosi, Giorgio di messer Francesco Scali [T], 
Giovanni Ciari [or Cia A] (quartiere di Santo Spirito) (ritagliatore A), Giovanni 
d’Aldobrando del Ricco (popolo di Santa Maria Maggiore), Giovanni d’Amerigo 
del Bene, Giovanni del maestro Neri da Barberino (giudice) (da Poggibonsi A) 
[messer], Giovanni di Luigi Mozzi, Giovanni di Mancino Sostegni, Giovanni di 
messer Scolaio di Berto da Petrognano (giudice) [messer], Giovanni di Piero 
Palarcioni, Giovanni di Piero Parenti (quartiere di San Giovanni) (corazzaio 
AM), Giovanni di Riccardo Cerchi [R], Giovanni di Ruberto Ghini (popolo di 
Santa Trinita) (in Porta Rossa A), Giovanni di ser Rucco (quartiere di S. 
Croce) (lanaiuolo A), Giovanni di ser Ugo Orlandi [R], Giovanni di Tura Dini, 
Giovanni Dini (speziale), Guido di Caccialoste Guidi Trinciavelli, Iacopo 
d’Amerigo del Bene [A], Iacopo di Bonafè (popolo di S. Pier Maggiore) 
(mercator T), Iacopo di Vanni (ritagliatore) [T], Lapo di Guido di Fabro Tolosini, 
Lionardo di Rinieri Rustichi, Lorenzo Capogrosso [M], Lorenzo di Giovanni 
Lottini (lanaiuolo A), Lorenzo di maestro Dino medico (da Ulena M), Luigi di 
Poltrone Cavalcanti, Manente [or: Monte] di Amedeo [Buon-]Cristiani 
(lanaiuolo A), Manieri di Giovanni Chiarissimi Bilenchi (notaio) (tavoliere A) 
[ser], Martino di maestro Dino medico, Maso di Neri (funaiuolo, quartiere di 
San Giovanni), Matteo di Bonaccorso Alderotti (S. Felicie in piazza A), Matteo 
di Giovanni di Meglio Bonarli [R], Mazza d’Andrea (corazzaio), Meo di Bartolo 
Cocchi, Mese di Guccio (corregiarius) [T], Michele di ser Vanni di ser Ugolino 
di ser Dino da Castiglione (da Cascia M), Nastagio di ser Francesco (popolo di 
San Simone), Niccolò del Ricco (lanaiuolo), Niccolò di Bocchino [Rimbaldesi], 
Niccolò di Filippo Soldani [T],Niccolò di Giovanni di Meglio Bonarli (San 
Frediano A), Niccolò di Lodovico Ricciardi [R], Niccolò di Lodovico Ricciardi 
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Cerchi, Niccolò di Manetto Tecchini [R], Niccolò di Neri Macinghi [T], Niccolò 
di ser Ventura Monachi [ser] [R], Niccolò di ser Ventura Monaci [Monachi T], 
[ser], Niccolò di Zanobi di Rinieri Rustico [A], Niccolò di Zucchero (campsor) 
[T], Nofri di Simone dell’Antella, Nofrio di Giovanni di Meglio Bonarli, Nozzo di 
Vanni Manetti [T], Nutino di Pontone [Fantone] di Giraldo da Ognano, Piero di 
Donato (spetiarius) [T], Pierozzo di Francisco (speziale, San Filicie) [A], Pietro 
Donati dal Sambuco (speziale M), Ricco [ser], “che era tratto priore” [M], 
Salvestro d’Andrea di Chiarissimo [or: Chiarissimi] da Barberino (called 
Tragualza A) (in charge of gabelles AM), Sandro Muletti da Panzano (popolo 
di San Niccolò) (sensale M), Santi de’ Ricco (San Iacopo tra le fosse) [A], 
Scarlatto di Nuto Scarlattini (popolo di San Fr[ed]iano), Simone di Gabbriello di 
ser Simone (beccaio), Simone di Monte Grimaldi [M], Simone’ di Palmieri 
(vasaio, quartiere di S. Spirito) (vaiaio A), Simone di ser [messer M] Benedetto 
di Martino Petri da Santo Ellero (da Castiglione A), Simone di Vanni Meccere 
(popolo di San Lorenzo), Stefano Brunacci (lanaiuolo), Stefano di Bindo Benini 
[or: Del Benino] [Bernini M] (quartiere di Santa Croce), Tommaso di Giovanni 
Cocchi [T],Tommaso di Lippo Soldani, Tommaso di Luigi Mozzi [T],Tommaso 
di Pazzino (bilanciaio) (“che fa i saggiuoli A), Tommaso d’Ugolino di Vieri 
(speziale), Ugolino di Bonsi [Bonzi M] (speziale, popolo di San Fr[ed]iano), 
Vanni di Pontone [Fantone] di Giraldo da Ognano, Vieri di Niccolò Bocchini 
[T], Zanobi del Truffa (ritagliatore A), and Zanobi di Neri Macinghi [T]. In 
addition to the individual names, five entire families are named as ammonite, 
“la casa de’ Covoni” [M], “la casa de’ Manelli” [M], “la casa de’ Mozzi” [M], “la 
casa de’ Soldani” [M], “tutta la casa Tolosini” [M]; and a group of individuals 
described as follow but not actually named: “tutti i consorti” of Meo di Bartolo 
Cocchi [M], “tutti que’ del lato” of Nofri di Simone dell’Antella [A], the brothers 
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of Francesco di ser Iacopo Cecchi da Signa [A], the consorts of messer 
Alessandro dell’Antella, one person from the contado, “da Monte Lupo” [M], 
one of the Davanzati [M], and Santi de’ Ricco’s brother (San Iacopo tra le 
fosse) [A]. 
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Appendix 2
List of confinati from 30 August 1378. Source: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, 
Capitoli, registri, 12, f. 86rv. Note: The places of confinement are given after 
the name; I have supplied the Italian version in parentheses only where the 
Latin version is significantly different. 
Bonaiutus ser Belchari de Serraglis, Peseri 
Nicholaus Gerii de Soderinis, Trivisii
Nicolaus Sandri de Bardis, Ferrarie
Antonius Niccoli Cionis Rodulfi, Viterbii
Ubertus Schiatte Rodulfi, Arimini
Dominus Johannes ser Fruosini, Forilivii (Forli)
Bettinus d[omini] Bindaccii de Ricasolis, Ancone
Simon Rainerii de Peruçis, Spoleti
Iohannes Iacobi de Giugnis, Mutine (Modena)
Pierus Masini de Antilla, Fulginei (Foligno)
Dominus Iacobus Pieri de Sacchettis, Tuderti (Todi)
Dominus Benghi de Bondelmontibus, Perusii (Perugia)
Alexander domini Francisci de Bondelmontibus, Rome 
Bartolus Ionannis Siminetti, Mantue
Andreas Segnini Baldesis, Bononie (Bologna)
Filippus Blaxii de Stroçis, Castelli (Città di Castello)
Ser Dona Taddeus Donati de Marchis, Neapoli
Bingerius Iohannis de Oricellariis, Parme
Ciprianus Lippoççii de Mangionibus, Mediolani (Milan)
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Perus Iohannis de Tornaquincis, Faventie (Faenza)
Pepus Marignani de Bondelmontibus, Verone
Franciscus Donati de Marchis, Esculi (Ascoli)
Carolus Stroçe de Stroçis, Ianue (Genoa)
Pierus Filippi de Albiçis, Venetiis
Masus Luce de Albiçis, Barlette
Iacobus domini Francisci de Paçis, Brixie (Brescia)
Giovenchus domini Lotterii de Filicharia, Manfredonie 
Verius domini Pepi de Adimaribus, Aquile
Piggellus domini Loisii de Cavicciulibus, Padue
Attavianus Boccaccii de Brunelleschis, Eugubii (Gubbio)
Iacobus Bartolomei de Medicis, Regii
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2a. Preliminary list of confinati from 25-27 August 1378.
Source: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Capitoli, registri, 12, f. 81v. Note: The 
confinati were voted upon by 127 representatives of the government and its 
magistracies. 
Bonaiuto ser Belcharo Serragli 
Nicolo Soderini 
Niciolo di Sandro de Bardi 
Antonio di Nicolo di Cione Ridolfi 
Uberto di Schiatta Ridolfi 
Messer Giovanni di ser Fruosino 
Bettino di messer Bindaccio da Ricasoli 
Symone di Rinieri Peruçi 
Giovanni Giugni 
Piero di Masino Dellantella 
Messer Iacopo Sacchetti 
Messer Benghi Bondelmonti 
Alexandro di messer Francesco Bondelmonti 
Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti 
Andrea di Segnino Baldesi 
Filippo di Biagio degli Stroçi 
Ser Taddeo di Donato Marchi 
Bingieri di Giovanni di Bingieri 
Cipriano di Lippoço Mangioni 
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Pero Tornaquinci 
Pepo di Marignano Bondelmonti 
Francescho di Donato Marchi 
Carlo degli Stroççi 
Piero di Filippo degli Albiçi 
Iacopo di Messer Francescho de Paçi 
Giovencho di messer Lottieri da Filichaia 
Vieri di Messer pepo Adimari 
Piggello di Messer Luigi Cavicciuli 
Attaviano di Bocchaccio Brunelleschi
Iacopo di Bartolomeo de’ Medici 
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Appendix 3
List of persons condemned on 30 January 1379[80]
Source: ASF, Atti del Capitano del Popolo 1198, ff 55r-56r
Note: The numbering does not appear in the original.
1 Dominum Lapum olim Lapi de Castiglionchio populi Sancti Remigii de 
Florentia
2 Dominum Iohannem Pocciam Bectoli de Coppolis de Perusio 
3 Benedictum Simonis de Peruççis populi Sancti Jacopi inter foveas de 
Florentia 
4 Adouardum Bartolomei de Pulcis populi Sancti Petri Scheraggi de Florentia
5 Bernardum Lippi Cionis del Cane populi Sancti Fridiani de Florentia 
6 Iohannem Bartoli Cennis de Biliottis populi Sancti Felicis in piaçça de 
Florentia 
7 Nicolaum Brunetti populi Sancte Trinitatis de Florentia 
8 Dominum Albertum Pepi Antonii de Albiçis populi Sancti Petri Maioris de 
Florentia 
9 Marianum Landi Antonii de Albiçis populi Sancti Petri Maioris de Florentia
10 Iohannem Guereri Tribaldi de Roscis populi Sancte Felicitatis de Florentia 
11 Pigellum ]    fratres et filios quondam Domini Loigii de Adimaribus populi 
                           Sancte Marie
12 Talanum ]    Nepotecose de Florentia 
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13 Tomassum quondam Raneri de Cavalcantibus populi Sancte Lucie 
Omnium Sanctorum de F.
14 Bartolomeum olim Niccoli Ridolfi populi Sancti Michaelis Berteldi de 
Florentia
15 Cennem quondam Naddi de Rucellariis populi Sancte Marie Novelle de 
Florentia
16 Nicolaum Iacopi de Bordonibus populi Sancti Michaelis Berteldi de 
Florentia
17 Bernardum Iacopi de Beccanugis            ] populi Sancti Michaelis
18 Loigium vocatum Mostone filium dicti Bernardi ] Berteldi de Florentia 
19 Jacopum Bartolomei et Domine Nicolose de Medicis populi Sancti Tomasi 
de Florentia 
20 Dominum Guidonem Silvestri Bandere populi Sancti Petri Maioris 
21 Simonem Andree vocatum Morello     ] populi Sancti Pauli de Florentia 
22 Bartolomeum filius dicti Simonis ] 
23 Iacopum Teste vocatum Testinella populi Sancti Petri Maioris de Florentia
24 Mateum Turini vocatum Teo populi Sancti Laurentii de Florentia 
25 Mateum Scilti populi Sancti Fridiani de Florentia 
26 Bingerium Peri de Rocellariis populi Sancti Pranchatii [sic] de Florentia
27 Dominichum Bonaiuti vocatum Bonaiuti Dança populi Sancti Laurentii 
[ comitatus Florentie 
[ a Vicchio
28 Checchum ] fratres et filios Vannini populi Sancte Felicitatis de  
                    Florentia
29 Guidonem ] 
278
30 Canbium Iohannis vocatum Carnacino populi Sancti Nicolai de Florentia 
31 Çanobium Montini tesitorem populi Sancti Ambrogii de Florentia 
32 Lucarinum petinatorem populi Sancti Georgii de Florentia 
33 Checchum Çanobii vocatum Ghinazzo populi Sancte Marie a P[e]retola
34 El Maçça tesitorem populi Sancti Ambrosii de Florentia
35 Nannem Ghutii populi Sancti Ambrosii de Florentia 
36 Simonem vocatum Compare populi Santi Fridiani de Florentia 
37 Francischum Sixti vocatum Lomperio scardaçierem populi Sancte Lucie 
Omnium Sanctorum [ de Florentia
38 Testam fratrem Macinelle populi Sancti Fridiani de Florentia 
39 Basilium ]     fratres et filios Matei populi Sancte Lucie 
      OmniumSanctorum de Florentia
40 Abraamum ] 
41 Ormannum olim de Padua habitantem populi Sancti Ambrosii de Florentia 
42 El Fredura habitantem in via a San Gallo de Florentia 
43 Lucam Melani populi Sancti Pieri Gatolini de Florentia 
44 Michaelem Giufredi veneditorem [sic] populi Sancte Trinitatis de Florentia
45 Doninum de Sancto Donino petinatorem populi Sancti Fridiani
46 Antonium vocatum Cateratti populi Sancti Laurentii 
47 Antonium Recche populi Sancti Ambrosii de Florentia
48 Antonium vocatum Lombardo Schamantini habitantem a San Gallo de 
Florentia
Omnes et quemlibet ipsorum proditores et rebelles communis Florentie et 
homines male conditionis vite et fame contra quos et quemlibet eorum per 
modum et viam inquisitionis processimus, etc.
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Appendix 4
Roster of the Personnel of the Guild Government in January 1379[80]
Source: ASF, Capitoli, Registri,12, ff. 89r-90v
Note: The names are left here, as in the original, in the ablative case; I have 
supplied my own headings and translated occupations in parentheses. 
The Priors:
Christofano Bartholi vaiario (furrier)
Bartholo Lapuccii cardatore (wool napper)
Angnolo Donati Barucci 
Arigio Biondi cimatore (wool shearer)
Georgio Gucci Dini Guccii 
Laurentio Puccii Cambini [oliandolo, oil dealer] 
Francischo Jacobi coraçario (armorer) 
Simone ser Matthey Biffoli 
The Standardbearer of Justice:
Francischo Terii becchario (butcher) 
The Sixteen Gonfalonieri:
Niccholao Johannis de Uçano 
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Bartholo Betti bicchiarario (dish maker) 
Mattheo Lugli feratore (iron worker) 
Michaele Lapi spetiario (apothecary) 
Ceffo Venture Ceffii farsettario (doublet maker) 
Çenobio Taddey Borghini 
Francischo Spinelli vaiario (furrier) 
Lapaccio Ammoniti tintore (dyer) 
Alesso Francisci Borghini 
Biecho Teghie linaiuolo (linen draper) 
Batino Cambiuççi magistro (stoneworker) 
Gregorio Barducci linaiuolo531 (linen draper) 
Cenne Marchi albergatore (innkeeper) 
Ser Guccio Francisci Andree 
Dominico Pieri vaiario (furrier) 
Bartholo Guiducci balisterio (crossbowman) 
The Twelve Buonuomini:
Pegolotto Francisci Balducci [setaiuolo, silk merchant] 
Johannes Çenobi magistro (stoneworker) 
Guido Justi farsettario (doublet maker) 
Jacobo Niccholai Riccialbani (SC) 
Niccholao Cambini linaiuolo (linen draper) 
Francischo Gosi linaiuolo (linen draper) 
Baldese Turini Baldesis 
531 ONLINE TRATTE has “Lanifex” (lanaiuolo, wool manufacturer) instead of 
“linaiuolo”. 
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Mattheo Pacini legnaiuolo (carpenter) 
Agostino ser Pieri galligario (tanner) 
Jacopo Bonafedis mercatore (merchant) 
Micchaele Francisci Lippi setaiuolo (silk merchant) 
Micchaele Giobbi becchario (butcher) 
Captains of the Parte Guelfa (ending 19 January):
Ridolfo Jacobi Guerucci
Franciscus Saliti linaiuolo (linen draper) 
Panicho Angeli Panichi
Bartholomeo Leonis Simonis
Iacomino Goggii campsore (money changer)
Manetto Iannis de Spinis
Anthonio Francisci sartore (tailor) 
Guidone domini Thomasii Nerii Lippi 
Michaele Landi [probably scardassiere, wool carder] 
Captains of the Parte Guelfa (beginning 19 January):
Anthonio Marigniani Sassolini 
Bartholomeo Ristori coregiario (armorer) 
Filippo Taddey Donati lanaiuolo (wool manufacturer)
Salvi Laurentii cimatore (wool shearer) 
Piero Lençi ritagliatore (cloth cutter) 532
Anthonio Gherei albergatore (innkeeper)
532 ONLINE TRATTE has “Lanifex” (lanaiuolo, wool manufacturer) instead of 
“linaiuolo”.
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Nofrio Johannis Bartholi Bischari 
Angnolo Pauli Perini biadaiuolo (grain dealer)
Ristoro Cionis magistro (mason) 
The Ten of Liberty (Dieci della Libertà):
Mattheo Niccholi Corsini
Johanes Tinghi calçolario (shoemaker)
Fantino Tegnie ritagliatore (cloth cutter)
Simone Vespuccii 
Dominico Matthey galigario (tanner)
Piero Andree chiavaiuolo (locksmith)
Piero Cecchi rigatterio (cloth cutter)
Leonardo Neri ser Benedicti 
Francischo Ricchi tintore (dyer)
The Eight of the Watch (Otto di Guardia):
Ugolino Bonsi spetiario (spice merchant)
Bruno Pauli ferratore (ironworker)
Domino Francischo milite de Rinuccinis 
Simone Cini legniaiuolo (wood worker)
Jacopo Ubaldini Fastelli 
Johannes Taddei Bencii linaiuolo (linen draper)
Guidone domini Thomasi Neri Lippi
Piero Francischi becchario (butcher)
The Nine of Mercanzia: 
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Bindo Lapi Gilii
Johannes Montis becchario (butcher) 
Leonardo Bartholini 
Dominico Francischi 
Scarlatto Nuti Scarlattini 
Leonardo Bellincionis saponario (soap maker) 
Johannes Cambii de Medicis
Francischo Renaldi galigario (tanner)
Londo Baldovini spetiario (spice merchant)
The Capitudini of the Guilds:
Giudici e notai (judges and notaries): 
Ser Francischo Masini and Ser Niccholao ser Pieri Gucci
Kalimala (international merchants): 
Niccholao Vannis Ricoveri and Thomasio Monis Guidetti
Cambio (money changers): 
Leonardo Bartholini Salimbenis and Bardiccio Cherichini
Lana (wool): 
Thomasio Pieri Parigii and Bartholomeo Lorini Bonaiuti
Por Santa Maria (silk): 
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Filippo ser Johannis and Johannes Lençi
Medici e Speziali (doctors and apothecaries): 
Carroccio Caroccii spetiario (apothecary) and Stefano Miglioris borsario (purse 
maker)
Vaiai e Pellicciai (furriers): 
Piero Lapozzi vaiario (furrier) and Francischo Brunaccii pellipario (skins 
dealer)
Beccai (butchers): 
Jacopo Montis and Laurentio Matthey Perini
Calzolai (shoemakers): 
Benedicto Tendi de Carlone and Tolomeo Cecchi Bocchini
Fabbri (blacksmiths): 
Johannes Ugolini coltellinario (knifemaker) and Donnino dominici maliscalco 
(farrier)
Linaiuoli e Rigattieri (linen drapers and used cloth dealers): 
Lapaccino Tosi linaiuolo (linen draper) and Benino Guccii linaiuolo (linen 
draper)
Maestri di Pietro e Legname (masons and wood workers): 
Mattheo Gerii fornaciario (oven maker) and Johannes Fecti magistro (mason)
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Vinatieri (wine sellers): 
Piero Fantonis and Berio Ricchuccii
Albergatori (innkeepers): 
Simone Tuccii and Blasio Garduccii 
Oliandoli e Pizzicagnoli (oil and wax and sausage and cheese sellers): 
Lodovico Andree [pizzicagnolo, sausage and cheese dealer] and Migliore 
Gherardi [pizzicagnolo, sausage and cheese dealer]
Cuoiai e Galligai (leather workers): 
Filippo Gardi [galigaio, leather worker] and Francischo Angeli [pezzaio, leather 
cutter]
Corrazzai e Spadai (armorers and sword makers): 
Nuto Vannis and Salvi Nuti 
Correggai (belt makers): 
Bartholo Micchaelis and Mese Guccii 
Chiavaioli (locksmiths): 
Jacopo Ricci and Laurentio Simonis 
Legnaioli (carpenters): 
Francischo Bartholi schodellario (bowl maker) and Verio Guidonis 
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Fornai (bakers):
Johannes Rote and Piero Pauli Tondi 
Farsettai e Cimatori (doublet makers and wool shearers): 
Jacobo Micchaelis del Rosso cimatore (wool shearer) and Anthonio Johannis 
cappellario (hatter) 
Tintori, etc. (dyers, etc.): 
Romolo Buoni tintore (dyer) and Bino Bini remendatore (wool sewer) 
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